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

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
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
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AN
ESSAY
Towards the
THEORY
OF THE
Ideal or Intelligible
WORLD.

Being the Relative Part of it.

Wherein the Intelligible World is consider'd
with relation to *Humane Understanding*.
Whereof some Account is here attempted
and proposed.

PART II.

By JOHN NORRIS, Rector of Bemerton
near Sarum.

*Immensum rerum confecimus aequor,
Et jam tempus equum fumantia solvere colla.*

LONDON,

Printed for S. Mansfield, at the *Ship* in *Cornhill*, near the *Royal-Exchange* ; and W. Hawes, at the *Rose* in *Ludgate-street*,
near the *West-End* of *St. Paul's Church*. MDCCIV.

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Director
Museum
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*To the Right Worshipful Sir
Thomas Cookes Winford, of
Aftly in the County of Wor-
cester, Baronet.*

S I R,

TH E Respect that I intend You, and the real Honour that I do my Self, in prefixing your Name to these Papers, will, I hope, excuse my Presumption in waiting upon You with so mean a Present : If not, your own Goodness I am perswaded will, of which the greatest Commendation that I can give, will be my Reliance upon it. Should You meet with any thing like Entertainment here, I should be well pleased, tho' I dare not promise You any. You are desired, Sir, to sit down at a Philosophers Table, which does not use to be either very nicely, or very magnificently spread, but whose chief Furni-

The Epistle Dedicatory.

ture is Temperance and Frugality. However, if you can Feast upon *Ideas*, which indeed is Angels Food, perhaps You may not rise altogether Empty, unless the Celestial Diet, (which is what I fear) be rendered less acceptable by the undue Management of the Hand that prepares it.

But be it never so well prepared, I know such *Ideal* Fair is too thin and aery a Repast for most Palates, next kin indeed to what they call a *Welch* Bait, and some witty Men (as they think themselves) will perhaps affect the recommending and distinguishing the niceness and justness of their Taste, by disrelishing it. But St. *Austin*, who had a Taste as nice as any of theirs, will not stick to tell them, that the Doctrine of Ideas is of such importance, that there is no being Wise without it. *Tanta vis in Ideis constituitur, ut nisi his intellectis, sapiens esse nemo posset.* As indeed how is it possible it should be otherwise, since as Wisdom is founded upon Truth, so the Foundation

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Foundation of that Truth which Wisdom contemplates, is laid in Ideas, as in this System you will find, if I mistake not, sufficiently shewn.

As for the more general Prejudice that may lie against this as a *Metaphysical* Theory, I am well aware of it, tho' not so much concerned at it, as being well satisfy'd in my self of the great Value and high Importance of *Metaphysics*, notwithstanding the neglect and disuse, if not contempt of it, among those who should be better Judges of the worth of things. For sure the Stream of Philosophy and Divinity too, must quickly run low, if not fed by a Metaphysical Spring. And indeed I must needs say, that unless it be the Mathematical Sciences, I know nothing so fit to inform, clear, and inlarge the Mind, as *true Metaphysics*, which may be called the Key of Knowledge, and is of it self a kind of universal Science, as containing within its pregnant Bosom such general Truths as may serve for Principles

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ples to the particular Sciences. And he deserves not the Name of a Scholar, at least of a Divine or Philosopher, that is not competently instructed in it. The interest of Truth demands so much, tho' perhaps my own may not advise me to urge the Matter so far, unless the following Account were a better Specimen of what I commend.

But, Sir, such as it is, I make bold to put it into Your Hands, and if You find nothing worthy of Your self in it, yet be pleas'd to accept of the good Will, and well-meaning Endeavours of one, who by the very Poverty of his Present, shews how ambitious he would be to serve You, if he had any thing better to offer. But I fear I am troublesome, and so begging Your Pardon for this Interruption, I take leave, being, Sir, with all Philosphick Truth and Reality,

Your very humble

and respectful Servant.

JOHN NORRIS.

THE PREFACE.

IN the Conclusion of the former Part of this Theory, I express'd my self with some suspense and irresolution, or at least with some uncertainty, whether I should proceed further in it my self, or deliver up the Grounds which I had laid to be built upon by some other Hand. And according to the uncertainty of the undertaking, so was the Delay. After I had finished my first Part (it being so miserably abused and disguised by the Errors of the Press, I may own it for mine) I did not presently set about this, but spent some time in taking a view of my great and formidable Subject, before I advanced to lay a close Siege to it, as the Roman General did before the Walls of Jerusalem. At length, finding my self in an indifferent State of Health, and thinking it pity that a System already carried on so far should remain unfinished, and withal despairing of its being

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ever compleated by any other, I set my self to it, not as a Task to be done out of the way with Rid-dance and Dispatch (for Systems are not made up like Suits of Mourning) but taking time for it I went on with it as with Church-Work, doing it by little and little, as my Health and Leisure would give me leave. And now for want of a better Hand, I do here present it to the Reader finished with my own, thinking it better so than not at all.

And now Reader thou hast (such a one as it is) a perfect and complete System: Perfect I mean as to the Intireness of it, as having now in thy Hands both the Globes of the Intelligible World. But as for any other Perfection expect it not, for I do not pretend to it: So far from that, that I do not think it comes up to the Idea which I my self have of it, nor has all the Perfection which I my self could have given it, if the Circumstances of my Condition did more favour the designs of my Mind. Those who enjoy abundance of Leisure, and are retired from the noise of the World, and have their Time at their own disposal (as Religious Persons, Fellows of Colleges, and above all, private Country Gentlemen) and whose strong Admantin Bodies will endure so much Thought and Meditation as is necessary to enlighten their Minds, may, if they have any Genius to it, and Capacity for it, do great Things, even what they please. And indeed 'tis from such as these that the World may justly expect the most considerable Assistance towards the discovery of Truth, and the improvement of the Sciences. But we that want these Advantages, who have

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have Parochial Cures to attend upon, whose Hands are full, whose Engagements great, whose Interruptions many, who live in Noise and Hurry, much to others, and little to ourselves, and whose Time is render'd yet more short, for want of Health, it may be, to employ it, we must do not as we would, but as we can, and take it for a Favour if the World will at all consider our Disadvantages, and make any allowance for them to excuse the shortness of our Performances.

But the difficulty of the Subject is to be regarded, as well as the disadvantageous Circumstances of the Writer. And if that may be admitted as a favourable Suggestion, perhaps I may now have as good a Plea as ever any Writer had: For sure never was there any Subject of a more abstract Nature, nor many of a larger Compass. For the abstractness of it, had I the Metaphysicks of Men and Angels, I could here employ and bury it all; and for the Compass of it, could I live till the Revolution of Plato's Tear, I could never hope to wade through it. Think not then to find the Subject here exhausted; I pretend only to make a kind of a Vista into the Intelligible World, and to have open'd some of the Head-Fountains of this great Deep, leaving my contemplative Reader to go on with the Streams of it in his own private Thoughts; to which, as a Suppliment for my Defects and Omissions, I leave what remains untouched of this immense Subject, as I do what I have perform'd in it to his Pardon: Whereof I am sensible I shall have but

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but too much occasion, since I find in many places that I need even my own.

For indeed when things are so very Fine, Subtile and Abstract, 'tis a hard matter to be always Clear or Intelligible, either to ones self, or to others. Clear in ones Conceptions, or Intelligible in ones Expressions and Representations of Things. And when one is so oppress'd and overlaid with abundance of Matter, as in so copious an Argument as this is it must needs be, that one can hardly see Wood for Trees, to think of every thing, and to set every thing in its due and proper Place for the avoiding Confusion and Disorder, and to settle and dispose the Cardinal Parts in an orderly System, according to the natural Dependencies of one thing upon another, is a Work of more Trouble and Difficulty than Men of mere Bookish Learning can well be aware of, or than will easily be imagin'd even by the Thoughtful, without some Trial and Experience. Upon the whole, the best Judges will be the most sensible of the Difficulties I have labour'd with in this Undertaking (as knowing how hard it is to write well upon any Subject, much more upon one so abstruse as this is) and accordingly 'tis from them that I promise my self most Favour and equitable Allowance in their censures of it. Perito Judice nihil aquius. And 'tis well that Skill and Favour go together, since we treat of great Things, such as are hard to conceive, harder to explain,

I do not pretend to the Character of a clear Writer, because I think it to be the greatest Qualification of its kind. Or if I could pretend to it in

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a Sermon, or any other practical Discourse, or even in the management of some ordinary Church-Controversy where the Way is beaten before me, and little falls under Consideration that is much out of it, yet I should not be forward to pretend to it here. And yet as Abstruse as the Argument of this Theory is, and as defective as my Abilities are to manage it as it deserves, I cannot but think however, that by Care and heedful Attention I have express'd my self so Intelligibly, that any Reader of a competent Apprehension, and that is not in too much hast to be at the end of the Book, may make a shift to understand me in some measure, and that because I find I understand myself. So that I hope there will be no great Dispute about what I mean, however unsatisfy'd any may be about the Truth of what is advanc'd. With the Commentators of Aristotle, the Truth of what he affirms is supposed, and all the Question is about what the Philosopher means. That's a certain Argument, or at least a strong Presumption of an obscure Writer, as the other is of a superstitious and bigotted Reader, to be so devoted to Humane Authority as to rest and acquiesce in it with an implicit Faith. 'Tis enough to pay that Deference to Scripture.

I suppose my Reader to be something acquainted with the Terms of Art, and Distinctions of the School, which, for the sake of those that are not, I should not have used so much as I have, if I had known any better, or as good wherein to express my Sense, or illustrate the Truth. But indeed I do not; for however the Physicks, or Natural Philosophy

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losophy of the Schools does not please me, as partly proceeding too much upon the false and confused Ideas of Sense, and partly as explaining the particular effects of Nature, by the general and indeterminate Notions of pure Logick, yet I have a great Value and Esteem for their Metaphysicks, and for their Theology. And tho' here they may sometimes start Questions, some of which may be too trifling and superfluous, and others too curious and intruding, and may perhaps be too Elaborate in discussing the former, and a little too bold and peremptory in the determination of the latter, and too much influenc'd by Authority in both; yet whatever their Matter be, their Form and Method is always excellent, and the Terms whereby they express themselves, most happily (indeed admirably) fitted for the illustration and compendious Conveyance of their Notions, tho' perhaps every one that uses them may not rightly apply them; nor, it may be, they always themselves. And indeed I am pretty much of Opinion, that nothing of any moment, either in Philosophy, or in Religion, can be either distinctly stated, or well understood, without the help of their useful, I might say, necessary Distinctions: Which, whosoever is well instructed in, has a great advantage over him that has not, tho' otherwise never so ingenious; whereof I need go no further for an Instance than the Controversy concerning Liberty and Necessity between Bishop Bramhall and Mr. Hobbes; who, tho' a Man of some natural Wit

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Wit and Parts, yet for want of Scholastick Education and Learning, was extreamly Confused and Defective, not only as to the Truth of his Nations, but as to the clearness of their Delivery, and so upon the whole became a cheap and easy Triumph to his acute and learned Adversary. But whether I use the Terms of the School, or my own, my great Endeavour is to be clear and intelligible, that the Reader may comprehend my Meaning with as little Trouble as may be, for fear lest it should not be found to deserve a great deal.

Not that I think Clearness (as great a Perfection as it is in Writing) to be always of such advantageous Consequence. It contributes indeed to the Ease and Pleasure of the Reader, and to the greater Perfection of the Work itself, but the Writer has not always that advantage by it. Those who write in the Clouds, as we say, involving their Sense in hard Words, as the Chymists, or perplexing it with ambiguous Expressions, or who keep within the Sphere of loose and indefinite Generalities, especially if they have such a flow of Words as to draw out their Periods to great lengths, that the parts of the Argument may lie at a distance from one another, and are without much Masters of Style as to give their Sentences a tunable turn, a smooth Movement, and a round graceful Close, they have the happiness not only to hide their Faults (since no body can see very far in a Mist) but are oftentimes admired for their Profoundness. They walk in the Night, and tho' for that Reason they stumble ever now and

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and then, yet it passes unobserved, and their Dark-
ness is their protection: Whereas, when a Man
writes clearly and distinctly, and explains things
of great Abstrusity upon clear and intelligible Prin-
ciples, and in a perspicuous Manner and Method,
he holds out a Light to his Reader whereby to
discover his own Defects, and 'tis then easie to
see whether he succeeds well or no in what he un-
dertakes: For when 'tis once conceived what 'tis a
Man means, 'twill not be very difficult to discern
whether what he means be true. So that a Man
that shall write clearly, had need advance that
which is true and solid, or else his own Light will
betray him. As a Man that has a light Shop
had need sell good Ware. Clear Writing then is
not always the best Policy, but 'tis the best Hon-
esty and Ingenuity, and that's better than Poli-
cy, or all the false Colours of a corrupt and im-
posing Eloquence.

For the avoiding of which I have thought it
convenient to use great plainness and chastness of
Style, and to express my self not only Scholafti-
cally, but even sometimes Syllogistically, as be-
ing not out of conceit with Syllogism, notwithstanding
the late Address wherewith a well known
Author has endeavour'd to disparage it, and bring
it into disesteem: Which indeed seems not much less
paradoxical and surprizing than to speak against
Reasoning itself: For what is Syllogism but on-
ly a more recollected and express way of Reason-
ing, the putting together all the parts of an Argu-
ment, and nothing but those Parts, and that in their
due

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due Form and Order. To Syllogize is an Arithmetical Term signifying the making up of an Account, or the Collection of the sum of several Numbers, whence, by an apt Traduction it is applied to signify that form of Argumentation, which, for the proportion it bears to it, we call by the Name of Syllogism, for Syllogism is a sort of Numeration; that is, it is that in Reasoning or Logick, which Addition is in Arithmetick, viz. The laying together, or assembling the particular sums, and thence deducing the sum total or product of the whole. The particular Sums or Items, are the Premises or the sum Total resulting from them, is the Conclusion. Which, tho' potentially in the Premises, as the sum Total is in the particular sums, yet is really distinct from them, and indeed more than the sum Total is from the Items; the distinction here being only formal, whereas the Conclusion is a proposition really distinct from the Premises, as having but one only Term in common with each of them. To talk against Syllogism therefore in Reasoning, is like talking against Addition in Numbring, or casting Account. And a Man cannot talk rationally against it, without the practical Contradiction of falling into it, since 'tis that whereof all rational Discourses consist, and into which it finally resolves: For there is nothing strictly rational in any Discourse but what is either a premise of one sort or other, or a Conclusion. And whatever upon a due secretion or separation is found to be neither

of

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of these, whatever Figure it may otherwise seem to make, or of what use soever it may really be in other respects (as Definitions and Distinctions for the right stating of the thing in Question, or Division for the more distinct and orderly proceeding in it) is yet the Account. So that the Syllogism, at least materially considered, is so much of the very Essence of Reasoning, that 'tis impossible to discourse rationally out of it. 'Tis true indeed, the parts may not be all expressly set down, nor those that are, duly ranged and disposed in their proper Order (which is all the difference that I know between a rational Discourse at large, and a formal Syllogism) but then what is wanting in each of these, must be mentally supplied, or else the Argument is imperfect; and if it be supplied, then 'tis a Syllogism.

All the Question here will be whether a Conclusion may not immediately follow upon the premissal of one single Proposition. This indeed seems to be favour'd by the ordinary way of speaking, as when we say, that this, or that is the Consequence of this or that Principle; and so the fore-designed Author seems to intimate, when he tells us, That to infer is nothing, but by virtue of one Proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as true. And the Instances he gives of Reasoning, are of this kind, as consisting of Inferences deduced from single Principles. But as far as I understand what belongs to Reasoning (which perhaps I am now convincing the World is but little) there:

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there can be no Consequence justly drawn from one solitary Proposition. There must be two Premises to support a Conclusion, understood at least if not expressed, and that for this clear Reason, because the truth of the Conclusion as a Conclusion, or the force of the Illation depending upon the Union or Agreement which each of the extremes has with that intermediate Idea to which, as to a common Measure, they are applied (for even according to our Author, 'tis by virtue of the perceived Agreement of this Idea with the Extreams, that the Extreams are concluded to agree among themselves) there is a necessity that each of them should be distinctly applied to it, that so from their agreement with it, they may appear to agree with one another. And the several Application of this middle Idea to each of the Extreams, makes the two Propositions antecedent to the Conclusion, which accordingly we call Premises. But an instance in Geometry (which indeed is the best Logick) will sufficiently clear this Matter. In every Triangle the greatest Angle is opposed to the greatest Side, let that be the Proposition. Now from this Proposition, which is the nineteenth of Euclid, it may be said to follow, and 'tis a Corollary which a Mathematician of note draws from it, that if from a Point out of a right Line, one draws upon this Line as many right Lines as one pleases; as suppose

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AB, AC, AD, AE, one of which, namely, AB is Perpendicular, this Perpendicular will be the least or shortest of them all, since it will be opposed to, or sustain an Acute Angle, such as C, D, and E, all of them are; whereas the others will be opposed to, or sustain a right Angle, such as is B. The sum of which Argument is in effect this; That is the least side which is opposed to the least Angle, therefore AB is the least side; or, to take the Minor instead of the Major, AB is opposed to the least Angle, and therefore AB is the least side; which seems a Consequence drawn from one only Proposition. But, 'tis plain, that this is an imperfect Argument, unless more is understood than is here expressed: And that to make it perfect and conclusive, it must be reduced to this or the like Form. That is the least side which is opposed to the least Angle. But AB is opposed to the least Angle, as being opposed to an Acute one, C. Therefore AB is the least side; whereby it appears, that tho' in a popular way of speaking, a Consequence may be said to follow upon one Proposition, as laying the main Ground upon which the Argument that proves or infers it may be built, yet another must be added to it before it actually and truly does or can follow. And when it is added, then what is the Argument but a Syllogism? Against which therefore it

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it must be extream Absurdity for any Man to pretend to write.

But what shall we say to the Consequence of an Hypothetical Syllogism; is not that a Consequence from one single Principle? No such Matter. Such a Consequence is no Consequence at all, but only a Proposition, declaring that such a thing would follow if such a Condition were put: But then till it be put, that is, till another Proposition be added, there is actually no Consequence, but only an Affirmation that if it were put; such would be the Consequence of it. So that what is here called a Consequence, is indeed only a Hypothetical Proposition, or an Affirmation of a Conditional, the connexion not lying between the subject and the simple Attribute, but between the subject and the complex Attribute, or intire Conditional, as I shew at large in my former Part. And this appears from the denial of, or contradiction to such a Consequence. For what is it that we then deny or contradict? Not the Part following, upon the Condition, but the intire Conditional itself. We say, indeed; Negatur Consequentia, but we must be supposed to deny the same that we contradict, and the Contradiction, as every Logician knows affects the whole Conditional. For we contradict here, with a Non si, which plainly shews that there the Affirmation must properly be understood to lie. And so also, when such a Consequence is proved, the Enthymematical way of proving it shews the same: For 'tis not any actual Consequence, or the Part following upon the Condition, that is pretended to be proved,

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but the entire Conditional itself. What we then prove is not any Consequence that actually is, but a Proposition, declaring a Consequence that would be upon such a Condition. As to return to our Geometrick Instance: If A B be opposed to the least Angle, then A B is the least side. Suppose any one to deny this Consequence (as we usually speak, tho' indeed we should more properly say, this Proposition) what is it that I am to prove? Not surely that A B is the least side, but the entire Conditional, that if it be opposed to the least Angle, that then it is the least side. What I am to prove is the whole Conditional, the part following, or that would follow upon the Condition, being still left in suspense. For thus my proof proceeds: The least side is opposed to the least Angle; therefore if A B be opposed to the least Angle, then A B is the least side: If it be, but whether it be or no, is the business of another Proposition to shew, and till that be done, nothing actually follows; but things hang in the same suspense as before: By which it clearly appears, that the Consequence (as 'tis called) of an Hypothetical Syllogism is not properly an actual Consequence, that is a Proposition actually following from something premised, but only a single Proposition declarative of a Consequence that would follow upon such a Position. Which, by the way, I take to be the Reason (or else I am not Logician enough to assign any) why, tho' the Conclusion of a Syllogism may not be denied, yet the Consequence of it may. But, I pray, why so? Is not a Consequence and a Conclusion of the same?

Yes,

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Yes, an actual Consequence is, for what is a Conclusion but a Proposition following upon Premises. And therefore if the Consequence of such a Syllogism were an actual Consequence, it ought no more to be denied than the Conclusion, but rather the Premises upon which it depends: But then this shews plainly that it is not. And indeed the true Reason that justifies the denial of such a Consequence, I take to be this, That the consequence of a Hypothetical Syllogism is considered not as an actual Consequence, but as a bare Proposition, tho' of a particular Kind or Form: And 'tis no strange thing for a Proposition to be denied. From all which it is clear, that the Consequence of an Hypothetical Syllogism, is indeed no actual Consequence as Conclusion is (for then it would be no more to be denied than Conclusion) but only a bare Enuntiation, till the Hypothesis be put; and when it is put, then indeed there will be an actual Consequence: But not from one Proposition, for then there will be another added to it, and a Consequence from two Propositions premised, is the very thing which we call a Syllogism, out of which therefore there is no actual Consequence to be found (for the true Consequence of an Hypothetick Syllogism, that is, that which actually and really follows, is no other than the Conclusion) nor consequently any effectual Arguing or Reasoning; and therefore for any Man to pretend to employ his Reason to the disparagement of that wherein, and whereby all true Reasoning proceeds, must needs be an odd and a bold Extravagance.

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Now as to the usefulness of Syllogism, I might say a great deal; but touching upon it here only en-passant, shall but just glance at a few Considerations. As 1st. That it shortens and draws together our view of things, and brings a large Field of Truth under a narrow compass. This we look upon as the great advantage of Algebra, that it teaches us the way to abridge our Ideas, whereby the Capacity of the Mind is enlarged for the discovery of such compounded Truths, as at first view appear incomprehensible. For indeed the leaving out such things as would needlessly fill and distract the Attention of the Mind, is equivalent to the enlarging of its Capacity; it being to all intents of Vision the same thing, whether the sight be carried further, and spread wider, or the prospect be brought nearer home and made more contracted. But then this, in its proportion, is as true of Syllogism. Then again, as it contracts the subject of our Contemplation; so it serves 2dly, as a measure to us in the management and disposal of our Thoughts in our Reasonings and Discourses to others, wherein we cannot otherwise avoid Confusion and Disorder, than by considering what the Conclusion is which we would prove, by what mediums we would prove it, and to which part of the Argument, whether Major or Minor, or Conclusion, this or that particular part of our Discourse relates; so that tho' our Discourse be not laid out in the exact formality of Syllogism (which ordinarily to affect, would perhaps savour a little too much of School-Pedantry) yet

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yet we should have a kind of a syllogistical Plan before us, that so in every Stage of our Discourse we may know where about we are, and what we are doing. But then Lastly, as it regulates our own, so it will serve as a measure whereby to judge of the Discourses of others. For passing a right Judgment upon which, we must consider what the Conclusion is which they offer to prove, what the Premises are whereby they prove it, and whether such Premises do indeed prove such a Conclusion. And indeed I know no better way to form a right Judgment of any Discourse; or, to prevent our being imposed upon by the plausible flourish of a long Harangue, than to reduce it to Syllogism. For then you will see all the parts of the Argument in Miniature, what truly belongs to it, and what is put in only for Show, Pomp, Amusement, and every part in its proper Place and Order; and withal what Connexion one part has with another, which is the best way that I know of whereby to judge of the whole. Whereby it may appear that there is some other use of Syllogism than what the Author is pleased to mention, viz. That the chief and main Use of it is in the Schools, where Men are allow'd without Shame to deny the Agreement of Ideas which do manifestly agree. Which Reflection perhaps is neither so True, nor yet so Pertinent as it should be. Not so true, since by the Laws of Argumentation, the Respondent is not so at liberty to deny whatever comes in his way; but that in certain Cases (whereof the denial of a manifest Truth is one) he may be justly required to assign a Reason for it. Nor

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Yet so very pertinent: For since, as is well known, these Scholastick Engagements are intended for Trial and Exercise-sake, as well as for the Discovery of Truth, I see not where the Harm or Shame of it lies, if, as the Opponent argues against a plain Truth, to see whether the Respondent can defend it; so the Respondent should be sometimes allow'd the liberty to deny a plain Truth (supposing it not to be so plain as to be uncapable of proof) to see if the Opponent can prove it. So that this Reflection, seems not very just or fair. But enough of this Matter, unless I had occasion to treat more professedly of it.

There is a Passage in the former Part, which tho' otherwise clear enough in it self, may yet perhaps require a little farther clearing, because of a School-Objection which seems to brush hard against it. 'Tis where I represent the λόγος, as concurring in the Work of the Creation, not so properly by way of a strict Efficiency, as by way of a Rule or Exemplar. Now this perhaps may be thought to clash with a receiv'd Rule in Divinity. The Rule is, That the Works of the Trinity which are without, are undivided; which seems to imply, that those that are within are on the contrary divided. The ground of which Difference I take to be this, That in those Operations which are within the Formal Principle of the Operation, is not the Nature, but the Person. And because the Persons are distinct, therefore the Operations are also divided. And so we say, the Father generates, and not the Son; and the Son is generated, and not the Father. But now in those Operations which are without, and terminate in the Creature,

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ture, there the Principle of Operation is the Deity it self, or the whole Divine Nature; and consequently every Person must be jointly concern'd in them, and that because every Person equally communicates in that Divine Nature. But what then? Tho' they all jointly concur, yet there is no necessity by virtue of this Rule, or any other, that I know of, that they shbould all concur after the same manner. No, tho' they have the same external Work in common between them, because of the Unity of their Essence; yet the manner of their Concurrence in it may be different, according to the Distinction of their personal Properties. As appears plainly in the great Work of Man's Redemption, which tho' as much a Work without as the Creation, and consequently, by virtue of our School-Maxim, as much undivided, that is, as equally common to all the Persons of the God-head; yet 'tis well known, and must be allowed, that they concurred in it very differently, one after one manner, and another after another, according to the Order and Oeconomy which each Person has in peculiar to himself in the same Divine Nature. So that there is no such great Difficulty in this Matter as may appear at first sight, and I believe no good School-Divine will have any Contentions with me about it.

Neither, I hope, will it be thought strange that in this present Part I make the $\lambda\beta\gamma\Omega$ of St. John to be the same with Solomon's Wisdom. And to this purpose I here further remark, besides what is there alledged for it, that it seems not unreasonable to suppose, that St. John by his $\lambda\beta\gamma\Omega$ (since he

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be falls so directly, and, as it were, abruptly upon it, and says withal no more of it) did intend to express a Notion or Doctrine that was before received by th Jewish Church, and contained in the Scriptures of the Old Testament. And, if so, it will be most reasonable to suppose, that it was therein contained under the Term of Wisdom, which occurs so often in the Writings of Solomon, the Psalms, and elsewhere, there being no other that carries so near an Affinity with it. And that St. John did chuse to express this old Doctrine by the word λόγος as being a Technological Term well known among the Jews (probably from the Writings of Philo) at that time. And herein I have Concurring with me, the very Learned Author of the Judgment of the antient

Judgment of
the antient Jew-
ish Church, Page
(as I think) 162.

Jewish Church against the Unitarians. It cannot be denied, says he, that St. John being one of the Circumcision, did write with an especial respect to the Jews, that they might understand him, and receive benefit by it. And therefore it cannot be doubted but that when he called Jesus Christ the λόγος, he used a word that was commonly known among the Jews of those times in which he lived. Otherwise if he had used this word in a sense not commonly known to the Jews, he would have signified to them that new Idea he had affixed to it.

I am not ignorant that the success of Books depends not only upon the Judgments of the Writers, but also upon the Qualifications of the Readers.

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And tho' there may be many more capable Readers than good Writers, there being not so much required for the former as for the latter; yet when 'tis considered how Mens Affections do betray their Understandings, and how far Men are under the Power of these Affections; and that, tho' they read with their Eyes, and conceive with their Understandings, yet they judge and give sentence generally by their Passions and Prejudices; and considering again how various these are in different Men, 'tis not easie to pre-sage from the *intrinſick Worth or Quality* of any Book, what the fortune of it will be. That Account which Monsieur de Launoy gives us of the various Fortune of Aristotle in the Parisian Academy, is a sufficient instance of this. Tho' upon the whole, I cannot but think that Aristotle's Books have had very good Fortune. How this may speed in the World is of less Consequence, tho' perhaps of more hazard, by reason of its incurring so many Prejudices, and its appearing in an Age of so much fineness and exactness. So that I have at once both old Prejudices, and new Light to contend with. 'Tis a great disadvantage to come abroad in a discerning Age. Many things that were written formally when the Chanel of Learning was at a low Ebb, being then well received and thought considerable, by reason of their Comparative Eminence, have liv'd upon the same Stock of Reputation ever since, and retain'd that Credit afterwards which they happen'd to have at their first Delivery; which, if they were now to make their first appearance into the World, would not, I am confident, be so much admired. And I am
of.

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of Opinion, that few things of the Antients, except their Poetry and their Oratory, if they were now first to see the Light without our knowing the true Date of their Age, would relish over and above with us. But the single Prejudice of that reconciles us to them.

-----*Meliora Dies, ut vina, Poemata reddit.*

How far this present Treatise needs the Favour and courteous Acceptance of the Publick, I am sufficiently sensible; but how far it may deserve it, it belongs to others to judge, tho' perhaps not to so many as will. All that I can say for it is, that I have inquir'd carefully after the Truth, and am ready to Correct whatever I shall find contrary to it. As thinking it as much below the Ingenuity of a Man to resolve to defend with pertinacious Animosity what he has once erroneously said, as above the present Condition of Mortality never to fall into any Mistakes.

This being the first time (as far as I know) that this Hypothesis has appear'd in the form of a System, it may, upon that account, have some Pretence to hope for a kind and candid Reception: Which, if it meets with, perhaps I may be encouraged to trouble the World, once more, upon a Subject of more general concernment, as thinking it of the soonest to leave off Writing at an Age wherein perhaps it would be most advisable to begin. In the mean time, Reader, supposing thee to have consider'd the former Part, I now commit this to thy Hands; beseeching thee, if thou vouchsafest to peruse it, not to do it with

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with too much haste, nor with any prejudice, but as thou readest me to inquire with me of him that teaches us both in the Secret of our Hearts. For we have all one common Master, and are Fellow-Scholars in the same School; and therefore as I would not impose any thing Magisterially on thee, so neither shouldst thou be forward to tax that as a fault in me, which is only a Prejudice in thy self, nor judge well or ill any further than thou seest clear Reason for it in the Light of Interiour Truth. But if after all thou dissentest from me, there is no harm done, thou hast liberty to abound in thy own Sense; only let us joyn at least in our Prayers, that God would lighten our Darkness for the discovery of that Truth which we do not see, and dispose us to the Practice of that Good which we know. That he would pity our Ignorance, and forgive and rectifie our Mistakes, and lead us into all necessary and saving Truth. And as for Truths of Speculation that are of more difficulty, and less importance, let us learn to forgive and tolerate one another, considering how short-sighted and fallible we all are. And as for such Truths as are above the pitch of our present Comprehension, them let us have at least the Prudence not to employ our search about, studying only what is intelligible by us in this imperfect State, and leaving the rest to that great and shining Day, when the Light of the fally Learn'd shall be turn'd into Darkness, and the Darkness of those who sincerely and humbly apply themselves to the inquiry of Truth, and the practice of true Righteousness, shall be turned into Light.

ERRATA.

E Piftle. Ded. Page 2. Line 10. Read fair. Preface, p. 1. l. 9. it. r. if. p. 6. l. 1. as partly, r. partly as. p. 9. l. 13. or r. and. ibid. l. 27. r. Discourses, p. 10. l. 6. supply what is wanting thus, is yet as to the pure reasoning part of the Discourse, a mere Cypher that goes for nothing in the Account. Ibid. the Syllogism, r. Syllogism. Ibid. l. 10, after expressly, add and separately.

Book, Page 9. Line 13. Read is a, p. 10. l. 28. r. it is, p. 23. l. 19. Art r. At, p. 30. l. 26. r. Eternal, p. 80. l. 7. as r. and, p. 117. l. 2. r. nor perhaps, p. 153. l. 2. serv'd r. sever'd, p. 170. l. ult. r. after the biggest Efforts, p. 178. l. 6. r. to be, p. 191. l. 2. r. no more, p. 209. l. 1. r. is not that, with an Interrogation, p. 223. l. 11. r. Consequence, p. 229. l. 4. or r. and, p. 246. l. 19. r. Colour, p. 248. l. 14. or r. as, p. 253. l. 1. r. there are, ibid. l. 6. r. things, p. 258. l. 29. in r. to, p. 267. l. 30. ber r. our, ibid. l. 31. r. affection, p. 289. l. 28. as r. a, p. 296. l. 3. r. be not, p. 305. l. 20. be r. we, p. 330. l. 6. whence r. when, p. 334. l. 5. r. quojuscunq; ibid. l. 17. r. is of, p. 345. l. 26. r. intentional, p. 346. l. 22. of, r. if, p. 359. l. 20. r. Extant, p. 361. l. 27. r. an Organical Body, p. 383. l. 15. us r. use, p. 393. l. 11. World r. Word, p. 394. 14. ibis r. thus, p. 402. l. 21. r. Relations; ibid. l. 31. r. unintelligible, p. 167. l. 3. whoever r. who ever, p. 418. l. 7. 'tis r. is, p. 420. l. 1. ibis r. his, p. 422. l. 7. r. whether, p. 423. l. 14. r. Outr, p. 436. l. 3. shall r. all, p. 450. l. 26. r. be is, p. 463. l. 23. r. Aereasq; p. 496. l. 25. del. it, p. 500. l. 14. r. Considerations, p. 521. l. 4. Casually r. Causally, p. 529. l. 7. r. formerly, p. 540. l. 11. r. Concedimus, p. 550. l. r. implying, p. 552. l. 21. r. needed, p. 554. l. 27. whole r. whose, p. 559. l. the last r. Beatifying, p. 569. l. 21. r. Sense, p. 572. l. 3. r. Noli, ibid. l. 18. r. Hypothesis, ibid. l. 28. of r. with.

These are the Mistakes of the greatest importance. But as for false Spellings, such as *Impenitability*, *Modesty'd*, *Independent*, *Aristotelian*, *Suppliment*, *Antecedent*, &c. I leave them to the Correction of the Reader. And so also as to false Pointings; only there are a few which so very much affect the Sense, that I think fit here to rectify them, p. 241. l. 27. instead of, representing Colour, at least as something, r. representing Colour at least, &c. p. 313. l. 13. instead of, but besides that, we may see, &c. r. But besides, that we may see, &c. p. 384. l. 8. instead of, making it even, as the Argument, &c. r. making it, even as the Argument runs, &c. p. 492. l. 2. instead of, been premised. First, r. been premised first.

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THE THEORY OF THE Ideal World, &c.

Part the Second. *Being the Relative Part.*

CHAP. I.

A Preliminary Consideration concerning the Principle of Thought, or what it is that thinks in us; with a full Discussion of that great Question, Whether Matter can think?

THIS Theory (as was intimated in the beginning) admits of a double View or Prospect. One according to its Absolute State and Nature as it is in it self. **A**nd another according to the Relation which

which it carries to *Human Understanding*. So that it must be considered both these ways by him that will exhibit a just and complete System of it. According to the first way we have already considered it in the former part of this Undertaking, wherein we have proved an *Intelligible World*, or *World of Ideas* eternally existing in the Divine Mind, and truly exhibitive of all that is out of it, as also have explained in a competent Measure the State, Nature, and Manner of this *Ideal System*, and that both as to the Ideas themselves, and those Eternal Truths which necessarily result from them, and depend upon them as their Central Stay and Fundamental Ground. We have also shewn our Divine Ideas to be the Ground of all Theory and Science, as well as of Truth, and indeed to be the formal and proper Objects of them, as being the true and very Essences of Things, those *Intelligible Essences* of theirs which are distinct from their Existences, and which therefore all Science solely regards, as having a stable, permanent, and immutable Intelligibility, whether the Things themselves exist in Nature or no. These and many other Things of this Abstract Kind relating to the *Absolute Consideration* of the Ideal System, we have already accounted for. Let us now with Reliance on the Divine Assistance advance to the *Relative part*, the Application of the foregoing Principles, and see whether upon our Ideal Foundations we can give an Account of the true manner

ner of *Human Understanding*, or at least erect an Intelligible System of it.

2. 'Tis a great thing which is now taken in Hand, to explain the way of our Understanding. All Knowledge of our selves is difficult, but there are two Parts of our selves which seem most to lurk and hide from us, and to be most unwilling to be traced and found out by us, the *Heart* and the *Head*, which are the two most intricate and puzzling Pieces of the Human Frame, and that give the greatest trouble to our *Metaphysical*, as well as to our *Physical* Anatomy. The Heart is deceitful above all things (says the Holy Text) and desperately wicked, who can know it? The Motions of the Moral Heart, like those of the Natural, tho' easily felt, are very hard to be discern'd in their *Springs* and *Principles*. And tho' the Understanding seems to promise a Discovery of it self by its own Light, yet it has a dark side to us ward, and that which perceives all other things, cannot so easily perceive it self. Whether it is that the Soul has no Ideal View of its own Substance, as knowing it self by a conscious Sentiment rather than by Idea, or that it sees other things by a direct Intuition, but it self by Reflection, and that Reflex way of Perception be attended with peculiar Difficulties and Disadvantages, by reason of the real Identity and Indistinction of the Faculty and of the Object, which may possibly require the greater Application and Attention for the one to discern

cern the other: But so it is, the Understanding that searches all things and finds some, is blindest at home, and knows least of her self and her own Functions.

3. Should we now suppose (what hereafter shall be consider'd) that the Soul has no Idea of it self, the present Inquiry may perhaps be thought not only a difficult, but a vain and impossible Undertaking. For where our Ideas fail us, to what purpose do we discourse, or what success can we promise our selves if we do? But for the prevention of this Objection, 'tis to be minded that we neither pretend nor undertake here to lay open and unfold the very Nature and Essence of the Soul, (*This Knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me, I cannot attain unto it*) but only to give some Account of the manner of Understanding, and that tho' the Soul should be found to have no Idea of it self, yet it must be allowed to have a conscious Sentiment, as of its Being, so also of its Operations, and to be able also to reflect upon them.

* Expos. in Evang. Joan. Trad. 47. This being the Privilege, (as St. Austin observes) which the Spiritual has above the Carnal Eye, that whereas *the Eye of the Flesh sees other things but not it self, the Understanding sees other things and it self too*, as being able not only to act, but to reflect upon its Actions, and so to make it self its own Object. A Privilege peculiar to Spirit, and which exceeds the whole Power and Capacity of Matter.

4. But

4. But before we proceed to Consider *how* we understand, perhaps it may be worth our while to take a Preliminary Consideration in our way concerning the *Principle* of Thought, and to inquire *What* it is that thinks or understands in us. That we do Think is what we are inwardly conscious of to our selves, what we feel and know by a Sentiment as clear and evident as that of Pleasure or Pain. And as 'tis impossible to prove it to another, so we need not go to prove it to our selves, as having already such a preventing Assurance of it as no Rational Procedure can either abate or improve. But *how* we think, or what it is in us that is the Principle of Thought, are Discoveries not so easily made, and such as we must be beholden for to Thought and Reflection if ever we make them.

5. Thinking is generally presumed to be a Property belonging to the *Soul*. And indeed supposing my self to consist of Soul and Body, 'tis fairly *presumable* that 'tis my Soul that thinks. Because Thinking is the noblest Operation that I am conscious to my self of, and it seems reasonable that the noblest Operation of my Nature should be referr'd to the noblest Part of it. But perhaps (I speak as a Philosopher) it may be only a Supposition that I have a Soul, as that signifies a Principle or Substance distinct from Matter, or if it be a real Truth, yet how does it clearly appear to me from my having a Soul, that 'tis my Soul that thinks?

For may not this be as much a Presumption as the other? But I would fain have something, if I could, more convincing than a Presumption as to both.

6. But this it will be impossible ever to have as to either of them, if Matter be allow'd to think, or to be so much as capable of Thought. For I cannot be assur'd of my having a Soul but by my *Thinking*. I do not see it, I only feel its Operations, (if I ascribe them to the right Principle when I say so) and therefore setting Revelation aside, and considering things only in a rational way, 'tis by *them* that I must expect all the Satisfaction I can hope to have in this Matter. 'Tis true indeed the different appearances of Life and Death, and the different States of the Body that are consequent upon them do sufficiently prove the Distinction of Soul and Body as to a gross and popular Sense, that is, they prove that this sensible and visible Substance which we call our Body is not the whole Man, but that there is something besides that belongs to the Constitution of his Nature. But whether that Something be a Substance in its whole Kind distinct from what we call the Body, or only a Body of a finer Mould and Contexture than the other, no Observation drawn from the appearances of Life or Death can satisfy a rational Curiosity, since all those things may be Mechanically accountable. No, this can be known only by our *Thinking*. But neither will *that* be a concluding

cluding Argument for the purpose, if Matter can think. For if so, how can I prove from my thinking that I have any such Principle in me distinct from Matter as I call my Soul, since upon the Supposition of Matter's having a Capacity of Thought, that very Principle may be no other than Matter, which by my Thinking I would distinguish from it? And as I cannot know whether I have any thing in me distinct from Matter, so neither for the same Reason can I know whether that be it which thinks in me, if Matter be supposed capable of the same. So that both these Questions, Whether I have a Soul, or whether it be my Soul that thinks, must be determin'd by one and the same common Measure, and can neither of them be establish'd in the Affirmative but upon this Principle, viz. *The utter Incapacity that Matter has to Think.*

7. Indeed, had I but a clear Idea of my own Soul, such as I have of Extension, Numbers or Figures, I might then without troubling my self about Matter, barely by consulting that Idea, see in one and the same View what Properties and Modifications it includes, and consequently whether *Thinking* be one of them. And so need not argue this round about way, that 'tis my Soul that thinks because Matter is not capable of doing it. But such an Idea I cannot at present find that I have, and if I had it yet even then tho' I should know whether my Soul thought or no, yet I would not

be assured that 'tis my Soul *only* that thinks, unless I am also satisfy'd that Matter is not capable of Thought. For if it be, how know I but that I may think with my *Body* as well as with my *Soul*? But in case Matter be found not to have any capacity for thinking, then I shall know two things of no ordinary Importance, and which I have hitherto been used to take for granted. 1, That I have a Soul. 2, That 'tis my Soul, and that only, which is the true Principle of all that Thought which I am now, or any other time, Conscious of. So that the Question will still turn upon this, *Whether Matter can think?*

8. Those that think it can (of whom I hope the Philosophick World has not many) do as far as I can apprehend, make it plainly impossible to prove the *Immateriality*, and consequently the Natural *Immortality* of the Soul. Nay, indeed whether we have any such thing as a Soul in us, or no. I say the *Natural Immortality* of the Soul. For as to a Positive Immortality, such as is founded upon the pure Will of God, and the extraordinary influx of his Conservative Power, that any thing may have, be the Nature or Quality of it what it will, if God please to stay it in its Being, by such an External support. But for any thing to be Immortal in its own Nature so as to be above the Force of any created Power to destroy it, that I think Philosophy has always reserv'd as the Privilege of Spiritual and Immortal Beings.

Beings. Indeed as Immortal signifies only *Unperishable*, and is opposed to *Annihilation*, so all things have a Natural Immortality, Matter as well as Spirit (from something to fall to nothing, or from nothing to rise to something, being equally above the Force of Natural Causality) and accordingly in this Sense, the Soul would be Immortal tho' it were not of a Substance, in its whole Kind distinct from the Body, provided it were a Substance at all, and not as some have fancied, a *Modality*, or *Temperament* of the Body only. To be a Substance at large a sufficient Qualification for this kind of Immortality: But as Immortal is taken for *indissoluble*, and as 'tis opposed to *Corruption*, so nothing but what is Immaterial, can be Immortal. Since if Material it will be divisible and so Mortal or Corruptible. But now as I cannot know that I have any Substance in me distinct from my Body, but by my Thinking (for what else is there in me, that Matter may not do as well as Spirit?) so I cannot know it by that neither, if Matter can think. And consequently upon this Supposition, tho by the assistance of Revelation, I may *Believe*, yet I cannot by any pure Method of Reason, *prove* that I have an Immortal Soul.

9. But to prevent any misunderstanding in a Point of so great Consequence to be rightly understood, I think fit here to enter a double Cau-
tion, before we proceed any further. 1. That I do not pretend by this that the Question of
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the Soul's Immortality is so far concern'd in that other, concerning the Cogitative Power of Matter, that the holding this in the *Affirmative*, should oblige us to hold the other in the *Negative*, that is, that if Matter be allow'd to think, then the Soul is not Immortal. No, my meaning is not that it concludes against the Soul's Immortality in it *self*, but only that it does so as to *us*, so far as it makes it impossible for us to know, or prove, but that our Souls may be as Corruptible as our Bodies. And so much I conceive it plainly does. For as the Soul cannot be Immortal, unless it be Immortal, so it cannot be proved to be Immortal but by its Thinking. Nor by that neither, if Thought be within the Power of Matter. Since if Matter can think, then my Soul notwithstanding its thinking may be, for ought I know, no other than Matter, and so as liable to Corruption as Matter is.

2. That I would not be thought hereby to insinuate that * all those who allow a Power of thinking in Matter, do advance so singular a Notion with any design of prejudice, to the Doctrine of the Soul's Immortality, or even to the very possibility of its Proof, but only that is the Natural Consequence and tendency of the thing which makes it impossible for us, in a rational way, to have any satisfaction concerning

* I say *All*, because I think there is a certain late Author, who by his second Thoughts of Human Soul (a Book which shews that second Thoughts are not always the wisest) has given us but too just an Occasion, that we should except him.

Part II. *the Ideal World, &c.* 11

ing that great Article in Philosophy as well as in Divinity, the Immortality of our Souls, as undermining the Foundation upon which it stands. That is in short, we cannot upon this Principle know the Soul to be Immortal because we cannot know it to be Immaterial.

10. Now tho' this be not only a great Prejudice, but also a considerable Objection against Matters being capable of thinking, and a good reason to make the Patrons of this Paradoxical Notion very suspicious of it, as well as to make all others Cautious of admitting it, yet however since it will hardly amount to a satisfactory Resolution of the Point, as expositing rather than proving, and as tending rather to shew which side of the Question is most for our Interest to have true, than positively to determine which is so, let us consider whether we can confirm these Presumptions by some more direct and convincing Evidence. And because we cannot Judge of things any better, or indeed any otherwise than by those Ideas which we have of them, we will first consider what Idea we have of Matter, and then examine whether Matter according to that Idea, can have that Thought or Power of Thinking which we are conscious of to our selves.

11. Matter or Body according to the Philosophy of * some, is either *Physical* or *Geometrical*, which Geometrical Body is said to be *Extensi-*

* See the *Burgundian Philosophy* Tom. 4. p. 184. as also *De Hamel de Consens. Vst. 5 Nov. Phil.* p. 666.

an. But this is a distinction which I do not well understand, not being able to conceive any other Matter or Body, but what is Physical. 'Tis true indeed the Object of Geometry may in some Sense, be said to be extension. But what Extension is it? not that which is Local and Material, but *Intelligible Extension*, that is not Matter, but the Idea of Matter, or, not Matter as it is in Nature, but as it is in Idea. There seems to be a necessity for this, not only upon the Consideration largely insisted upon in the former Page 51. part, *viz.* That the Figures which Geometry contemplates, are Ideal or Intelligible Figures only, as being consider'd according to such Exactness of Perfection as they have not in Nature, but also because Geometry being a strict Science, must have a stable, necessary and immutable Object for its Contemplation, such as the Natural and Corporeal World cannot afford, and is to be found only in the Intelligible. That Extension then which Geometry contemplates as its formal Object, is not Corporeal Extension, any more than the Figures are Corporeal Figures, but Ideal or Intelligible Extension, which has nothing of Corporeity in it, as not being a proper Extension, but only so call'd from the Power which it has of representing it to our Thoughts. There is no such thing then as Geometrical Matter, and that because the Object of Geometry is not Matter, but Idea. But then the Consequence of this is that the Distinction of Geometrical and Physical Matter

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Part II. *the Ideal World, &c.* 13

ter is without due Foundation in pure Reason. And indeed it has only a confuse Imagination to support it, as arising only from want of a right Apprehension of the Abstractedness of the Science of Geometry, which is presumed to Abstract from Matter not in the reality of the Thing but only rationally and as to the manner of Consideration, and so to have something really Material for its Object. But this Mistake we have already rectify'd, shewing that Geometry is every whit as Abstract a Science as Metaphysics, and therefore for the present supposing no other Matter but what is Physical, I shall confine my Consideration to that.

12. Now of this I think the most simple and genuine Idea that will offer it self to the Mind that attentively considers it, is that of an *Extended Being*. To this some perhaps would join Impenetrability, Divisibility, Solidity, Hardness, &c. But I think when we have said *Extended Being*, we have said what sufficiently expresses the Nature of the thing as to a general Conception of it, and that all those Characters which are or can be further added, will be found to be either *Properties* belonging to Bodies, or such Sentiments which we have in our selves upon their Occasion. Now as for those *Sentiments* which we have in our selves upon the Occasion of Bodies, and are apt confusedly to transfer from our selves to them, such as Heat, Cold, Colour

see Part I. p. 59.

lour, Hardness, &c. we must have a care how we make them enter into the Idea or Essence of Body. For these things do not so much as really belong to the Nature of Bodies, as being not (as is ordinarily conceiv'd) sensible Qualities really inherent in *them*, but only certain Sensations or Modalities of our own Souls, occasion'd by them, as shall be shewn hereafter.

Des Cartes indeed will tell you
Princip. Philos. p. 25. that such Qualities do not be-
long to the Nature of Body

Act. 4. because they may be separated from it, the Nature of Body still remaining entire. But I believe it may and will hereafter be made appear that they were never so much as in it. And then as to the *Properties*, tho' they are (what the others are not) really appendant to Body, yet they ought not to be taken into the Idea of it, which ought to comprehend no more than the general Reason or Essence of the thing, that with which it can, and without which it cannot be conceiv'd, and that is Extended Being. He indeed that *touches* Bodies *feels* something else, and so calls one Hot and another Cold, one Sweet and another Sour (how truly shall be consider'd in its place) but he that *thinks* of them need think of nothing else, and can think of nothing else belonging to Bodies but what supposes and is built upon the other. But if he will add more because there are more things that may be truly affirm'd of Body besides that it is a Being

ing Extended, he may as well put together all the Properties that belong to a Figure comprehended within three right Lines, and call that a Triangle. Which if he does, he will have enough to *Define*, and nothing to *Demonstrate*.

13. So now the Question more explicitly proposed, will be, Whether Extended Being can Think? In answer to which I shall not say, That as Extended Being is what we are to understand by Matter or Body, so Thinking Being is that which constitutes the Idea or Essence of the Soul, being not as yet supposed to know whether I have a Soul or no as not knowing what it is that thinks in me. But this however the Evidence of my Perception will warrant me to say at present, That Extension and Thought are two distinct Ideas, distinct in their whole Kind, as distinct as a Circle and a Triangle, or as any other two things can possibly be from one another. And therefore as I can assuredly say, That a Circle is not a Triangle, because I conceive them distinct, so for the same Reason and therefore with the same Assurance, I can say, That Extension is not Thought. And I have no cause to doubt of the Goodness of that Reason since we who know things by their Ideas, have no other way to discern the difference of them but by the Diversity of their Respective Ideas.

14. Thus far then our way is clear. Extension is not Thought, that I distinctly perceive. Sup-

Suppose now I should further say, that as Extension and Thought are distinct because the Ideas we have of them are so, so an Extended Being and a Thinking Being are no less distinct because we have as distinct Ideas of them. An Extended Being then is one thing and a Thinking Being is another, and therefore as a Thinking Being is not an Extended Being, so neither is an Extended Being a Thinking Being. And if an Extended Being be not a Thinking Being, then is it not a plain Consequence that an Extended Being cannot Think? which way of Arguing is according to the *Cartesian* Principles, and differs very little either as to Matter or

*Resp. ad secundas Ob-
iect. p. 69.* Form, from that used by *Des
Cartes*, when he says, *Omne id
quod potest Cogitare est Mens, sed
cum Mens & Corpus realiter Distinguntur, nul-
lum Corpus est Mens, Ergo nullum Corpus potest
Cogitare.*

15. This indeed is a dispatching Demonstration, if it be One. But the Conclusion turns so short, and comes so quick upon one, that it seems by the very Surprize of it (as all Arguments of that sort do) to be fallacious. But we shall be the better able to judge of it if we reduce it to Form, and then it will stand in this Posture,

If an Extended Being be real-
ly distinct from a Thinking
Being, then an Extended
Being cannot Think;

But

But an Extended Being is really distinct from a Thinking Being;

Therefore an Extended Being cannot Think.

The Consequence of the Argument is most clear and certain, since for an Extended Being to be really distinct from a Thinking Being is the same as not to be a Thinking Being. And to be sure that which is not a Thinking Being cannot think. All the Question will light up on the minor Proposition, whether an Extended Being be really distinct from a Thinking Being? which is proved again thus,

If they are distinct in Conception, then they are also distinct in the Thing.

But they are distinct in Conception.

Or thus,

If the Ideas of an Extended Being and of a Thinking Being are distinct, then an Extended Being and a Thinking Being are really distinct.

But the Ideas of these Things are distinct:

Therefore the Things themselves are really so.

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The Consequence of this second Argument cannot I think be reasonably excepted against any more than the former. For we have no other way to judge of the real Distinction of Things than by the Distinction of those Ideas we have of them when we think about them. And 'tis for no other Reason that we affirm a Circle not to be a Triangle, but only because we conceive them, by distinct Ideas. This part of the Argument therefore cannot be denied. And indeed could it be made appear that the Idea of an extended Being is as distinct from that of a Thinking Being, as the Idea of a Circle is from that of a Triangle, I should no more doubt to affirm that an Extended Being is not a Thinking Being, than I do to affirm that a Circle is not a Triangle.

16. And yet as clear as this is, some perhaps will demur upon this part of the Argument, and will say, That diversity of Ideas does not always infer diversity of Things. But then I ask, Does it sometimes infer it? If they say, No; then I say, That we have no possible way whereby to judge of the diversity of one thing from another. If they say, Yes; then they confess the Rule rightly stated and qualified to be good. And indeed there is but this one Condition wanting to set it right, and to justify the consequence from the diversity of Ideas to the diversity of Things; and that is, that the Ideas be distinct not by Abstraction, or inadequate Conception, but in them-

themselves and in their own absolute Natures; that is, that they be entire and complete, not inadequate Ideas. For indeed, if the Ideas be distinct only by Abstraction, and for want of intireness of Conception, then, tho' *formally* distinct, they may be *really* the same, and so would not be two things but only inadequate Conceptions of the same thing. As for instance, a long Substance and a broad Substance, these are conceiv'd by distinct Ideas, but because their distinctness is only from Abstraction, wherein length is consider'd without breadth, and breadth without length, tho' the same Substance in reality be both long and broad, it would be no Consequence from the formal distinctness of their Ideas to infer a real diversity between them. And accordingly were the Ideal distinction between an extended Substance and a thinking Substance no better than that between a long Substance and a broad Substance, the Consequence as to the real diversity of them would be no better; that is, they would not be really different things, but the same thing inadequately conceiv'd. But now if the Ideas are adequate and complete, and not made distinct only by Abstraction and partial Consideration, then the things themselves are also really distinct, and we may securely say, That one of them is not the other. And for this Reason it is that I can positively say, That Figure is not Motion, tho' I cannot say that a figured Substance is not really the same

same with a moveable Substance, the Modes of things being *really* distinct from one another, tho' but *formally* from the things whose Modes they are. So then the difficulty is wholly transferr'd from the Consequence to the minor Proposition again, and all the Question will be, whether the Ideas of an Extended Substance and of a Thinking Substance are thus truly distinct or no? That is, whether they are adequate and complete Ideas, and so distinct in themselves; or only made distinct by Abstraction, that is, whether *formally* or *really* distinct.

17. Let us consider then what Abstraction is, and how we may know when Ideas are by that means distinct. Abstraction (otherwise called Precision) is not the bare considering one thing without another, as to think of a Circle without thinking of a Triangle, since these are things that *must* be thought of one without the other, as not being to be included in the same Idea. But it is the considering one thing without another in things that are not in reality deniable or exclusive of one another; so that the same Idea might comprehend them both, were there but a due Proportion between the Intelligence and the Intelligible. For Abstraction is not making two Ideas of two, but making two Ideas of one, or the having two Ideas for one thing, and the considering only one of them at a time. We must distinguish here between the occasion of Abstraction and the real

real foundation of Abstraction, that which I would call the *Abstrahibility* of a Thing. The occasion of Abstraction is the Infirmity of the Understanding, and the narrownes of its capacity. For tho' it be an Argument of a good Understanding to be *able* to conceive Things abstractly (which is the very finenes and excellency of Metaphysical Contemplation) yet to *need* abstraction, or to be under a *necessity* of conceiving things by abstract, and inadequate Ideas argues narrowness in the Mind, which not being able to comprehend the whole of a Thing in one intire View, is forc'd to divide it as it were into its intelligible parts, and so to consider it in *several*, wherein the Understanding seems to imitate the Eye, which views a large Object by piece-Meal, and according to the different Faces and Appearances which it has in different Lights.

18. The *Foundation* of Abstraction is the various Intelligibility of one and the same thing, and that either according to the different Modes or Manners of Being, which it has in itself, or according to the different Respects which it bears to other Things. Thus in the latter way, when Things really distinct from each other, as taken intirely with the Differences, Accidents, and Circumstances that determine them, are yet consider'd not with those distinguishing Conditions, but only so far as they agree, and according to what they have in common, that Formality under which they

are then consider'd, is an *abstract* Idea, and 'tis what we call a *General* or *Universal*. As suppose when a Circle, a Triangle and a Square, are consider'd only under the general Idea of *Figure*, because in that they have a formal Unity, tho' otherwise a real diversity. And so again in the other way, as things may have different Respects according as they are differently compared with *other* things, so one and the same Substance, may have different Modes or Manners of Being *in itself*. As the same Body may have Motion and Figure, or else different Figures. Now this lays another ground for Abstraction. For tho' there be a real Identity between Modes and the thing modeſied, yet as Figure suppose may be consider'd without Body, so Body may be consider'd without its Figure, or sometimes as having this Figure, sometimes as having that, just as it is in *Dimensions*. The former way of Abstraction I would call for distinctions sake, Abstraction in the way of *Modality*, and the latter in the way of *Habitude*. Between which two sorts of Abstractions I conceive there may be this observable difference. That in the way of *Habitude* the abstract Ideas, tho' formally distinct, are yet really the same not only with the things from which they are taken, but also with one another, As Rational and Animal, suppose have a real Identity with one another, as well as with *Man*. But now in the way of *Modality*, the Modes are really distinct from *one*

one another, and are really the same, only with the *Thing* whose Modes they are. But herein indeed the Identity is no less real than in the other Case. And accordingly, tho' Figure and Motion be really distinct from each other, (as Real is opposed to Rational distinction) yet a figured Substance and a moveable Substance need not be so, nor is there any arguing from the formal distinction of their Ideas that they are so, since the same Substance may admit of both those Modes.

19. The great Point now is, how we may know when our Ideas owe their distinction only to Abstraction? In the way of Habitude this may be well enough known; barely by reflecting upon our own Thoughts, by considering after what manner we think of things. Which if we heedfully do, we cannot abstract, but we must be sensible of that Art of the Mind, whereby we do so as well as of any other. Because we shall then observe that we conceive Things not completely, but only under a certain respect or formality of Consideration, as suppose when we consider a Triangle only as a Figure; which (if we think of what we think of) we must needs perceive to be an *abstract* Idea, because it goes not through the whole of a Triangle, that is I mean does not take in even what we intend or understand by it, but stops at that which it has in common with other Figures, from which we know a Triangle to be distinct.

20. But now in the way of *Modality* this perhaps may not be altogether so easy; because here tho' I know in the general that Mode, and the thing modified are really the same, and consequently that distinction of Modes is not repugnant to the Identity of that Being, whose Modes they are, and consequently again, that a Thing thus modified and a Thing thus modified, as suppose figured Substance and moveable Substance, tho' distinct in their Ideas, may yet possibly not be two distinct Things, but only inadequate Considerations of the same. I say, tho' I know all this, yet not knowing how many ways some Beings may be modified, or what in particular are Modes and what not, I may not be able to know always by consulting the Ideas I have of them, whether they are really different things, or whether they are in reality the same Thing, only abstractly and incompletely consider'd. This is the great difficulty of *modal Abstractions*; and here I confess 'tis sometimes pretty hard to know whether our Ideas are complete, or incomplete, abstract or intire, and consequently whether Things are really distinct or indistinct from one another, by the formal Conceptions which we have of them.

21. But how then shall we know if not by the formal Conceptions? Why there may be a way for this too, and such as will be equally serviceable in the other Case. Things that are modally distinct, or distinct by a modal

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Abstraction, that is, whose distinction is owing to the consideration of them sometimes with one Mode only, and sometimes with another, tho' the same thing be in reality the common Subject of both; I say things that are thus distinct tho' they may be abstracted from one another, that is, one of them may be conceiv'd without conceiving the other, yet they cannot be conceiv'd to be one without the other. And that because they are not indeed one without the other, as being really the same one with the other. And they cannot be conceiv'd to be any otherwise than they are. As for Instance, Motion and Figure are Modes of extended Being. And tho' I can conceive Motion without Figure, and Figure without Motion, and abstract both from extended Being, yet I cannot understand Motion or Figure to be without extended Being, tho' on the contrary I can easily conceive extended Being to be without Motion or any determinate Figure. Nay, further, since Motion and Figure are supposed to be both Modes of extended Being, tho' I can abstract a moveable Substance from a figured Substance, yet I cannot conceive a moveable Substance to be without a figured Substance, and that because I cannot conceive Motion to be in that which has not Figure, nor Figure to be in that which is incapable of Motion. For Figure is in a Substance moveable, and Motion is in a Substance having Figure; therefore figured Substance cannot be

be conceiv'd to be without moveable Substance, nor moveable Substance without figured Substance, since if you take away moveable Substance, or that Substance which is moveable, we could have no Conception of Figure; and if you take away figured Substance, or that Substance which has Figure, we could have no Conception of Motion: Figured Substance then and movable Substance are distinct only by a modal Abstraction, that is, the same Substance is really both one and the other, figured and moveable, tho' sometimes consider'd as affected with one of these Modes, and sometimes as affected with the other, as appears from the impossibility of conceiving one to be without the other. Since if you take away figured Substance, you take away that very Substance which should be the Subject of Motion; and if you take away moveable Substance, you take away that very Substance which should sustain Figure. Now I say this plainly shews that these things are in reality the same, and only distinct by a *Modal Abstraction*, and accordingly that the Ideas whereby we conceive them are incomplete, not adequate Ideas.

22. That which is remark'd here of Abstraction in the way of *Modality*, is no less applicable to those in the way of *Habitude*, or to any other sort of Abstractions, if any such there be. For as in things only modally distinct, one cannot be conceiv'd without the other, or if the other be conceiv'd not to be, so also in that

that formal distinction which is between things and that certain Habitude of Agreement under which they are consider'd, there is no possibility of conceiving one if the other should be removed, so much as in *Thought*. For so tho' I can conceive Figure in general, according to the abstract Reason of it, without thinking upon this or that in Particular, yet if there should be supposed to be no Circles, no Triangles, no Squares, &c. 'tis impossible I should have any Idea of Figure remaining after all these are taken away. And indeed this is no more than what follows from the general Nature of *Abstraction*, and therefore must be true in all the sorts of it. For an abstract Idea is supposed to be really the same with that from which it is abstracted, and to owe its distinction only to the operation of the Mind, that considers it without considering the other. And that indeed it may do. But if that other should be supposed not to be, the very Foundation of all Abstraction would be taken away, and so I should have nothing to abstract from, and so could have no abstract Idea.

23. From these Principles then I gather this Rule, That whensoever I find it in my power not only Negatively but Positively to Abstract, when I can so far divide and separate one thing from another in my Thoughts, as to be able not only to conceive one of them without conceiving the other, but to have a clear and distinct Conception of one as existing, tho' the other

other were removed out of being, or were supposed never to have been, I may then conclude this to be a sure sign that there is no Modal nor any other sort of Abstraction in the Case, but that the Ideas are absolute and complete, such as have no dependance upon, or communication with one another; and consequently that the things whose Ideas they are, are of a kind and order wholly distinct. There being no further condition wanting to confirm the consequence from the distinction of Ideas to the distinction of Things, than the compleatness and Intireness of those Ideas; which whoever denies to be a sufficient Mark or Argument of real distinction, makes it utterly *impossible* for us to *know* any thing, and very *impertinent* to *argue* or discourse about any thing.

24. To apply this Rule then to the Case which is now under Consideration; It seems in the first place very clear that I cannot only abstract a Thinking Being from an Extended Being, or Matter, but that I can conceive a Thinking Being to be, even tho' I should suppose Matter not to be, and that because I can so conceive it while I doubt whether Matter be or no. I can upon Metaphysical Principles doubt, till by a further pursuance of those Principles there appears Reason to be otherwise satisfy'd, whether there be any such thing as Matter or Body in the World. Not only for the Reasons assigned by *Des Cartes* taken from the Errors of the *Senses*, and the Imagination which we have of many non-existing things in our *sleep*, but also

also partly because Bodies are not the Causes of those Sensations which we have upon their occasion, and partly because we do not see them (as will be shewn in the sequel) either by themselves or by Ideas that proceed from them. And therefore our seeing them or having Ideas of them, is no Argument that they really are. Therefore I can doubt, and that very justly and reasonably, whether they are or no. But I cannot doubt of my Thinking, nor yet of my Being while I think, as *Des Cartes* rightly remarks. But then if I can neither doubt of my Thinking nor of my Being while I think, 'tis plain I can conceive a Thinking Being to be, and that while I doubt whether there be any such thing as Matter or no. And if I can conceive, nay, am sure that I do conceive a Thinking Being to be while I doubt whether Matter be or no; then 'tis plain that I might conceive the same Thinking Being tho' I should suppose Matter not to be, since that which I am certain of can no ways depend upon that which I am in doubt of, since if it did, it would be as doubtful as the other. But now this is more than can be said of figured Substance and movable Substance, for tho' I can conceive one of these without conceiving the other (or else they would not be so much as *formally* distinct) yet I cannot conceive figured Substance at the same time supposing moveable Substance not to be, no, nor even if I should doubt whether it be or no. And therefore from my being able to conceive a Thinking Being to be, tho' I should

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suppose Extended Being not to be, I conclude that the Ideas of these things are distinct not by modal Abstraction, as figured Substance and moveable Substance, but really and intirely distinct from one another, and independant one upon another, and that because things whenever they are must be according to their Ideas.

25. But to carry this Matter a little further ; I think, and when I think I think of certain Truths, and when I think of these Truths I find I understand them ; whence I gather notwithstanding my Ignorance of some Truths, that all Truth is intelligible. And some Truths I find I always understand in the same way and manner, as not being able to conceive them any otherwise. And these I perceive to be necessary, eternal and immutable Truths, whence I gather that such Truths indeed there are, and that they are always intelligible, as being always Truths, and intelligible only after one determinate manner, which supposes their being simply so. As Intelligibility then is a Property or Affection of Truth, so constant and perpetual Intelligibility is a Property of necessary and external Truths. They are always and for ever intelligible. And this is as necessary a Truth as any of the rest. But now this cannot be without supposing a Thinking Being to which the Intelligibility of an Object carries a necessary Relation. Therefore a Thinking Being is full as necessary as any necessary Truth.

Truth is. But now all Matter is contingent, and it being utterly impossible that what is necessary should depend upon what is contingent, it seems sufficiently plain that we may conceive a Thinking Being, tho' all Matter should be supposed not to be, which again proves the same Conclusion.

26. Besides, the Ideas are independant upon one another as well as the Things, and I can have the Idea of a Thinking Being without the Idea of Matter. The Idea of Matter, tho' of a great Comprehension, so as to be the Object and Foundation of a whole Science (that which is called, tho' I think not very properly, by the Name of *Geometry*) is yet however not necessary to Thought. For when I think I find (what every one may that will at all reflect) that there are abundance of things which I conceive after a manner so pure and so wholly Intellectual as not to have any corporeal Phantasms, Images, or Representations of them; and as I then have them not, so I want them not, being able to think of those things as clearly, to understand them as perfectly, and to demonstrate the Affections that belong to them with as much evidence and certainty as I can in the other Objects that are represented to me under those corporeal appearances. I find then that the Idea of Matter, tho' a very large and filling, is not the only Object of my Thought, but that I conceive Things by way of pure Intellect as well as by *Imagination*, and that

that even while I have the Idea of Matter before me, and contemplate Things that have an intelligible Extension; for even those very Things admit of a pure intellectual Consideration, as *Des Cartes* has most happily observed and proved by the Instances of a *Triangle* and a *Chiliagon*. Of this distinction between pure Intellect and Imagination (one of the best Discoveries of the new Philosophy) I shall have occasion to say more hereafter. At present, supposing it, I thence infer that the Idea of Matter is not so necessary to Thought, but that I can think without it. And if I can think without it, then I can have an Idea of a Thinking Being, tho' I had no Idea of Matter; nay, (were such a Supposition possible) tho' there were indeed no such Idea at all. And if I can, then I would further propound it to be consider'd, whether this does not prove that these are not abstract but compleatly distinct Ideas, and consequently that the things are as really distinct as the Ideas.

27. Further yet, if Thinking Being and Extended Being were distinct only by a modal Abstraction, in like manner as figured Being and movable Being are conceived to be, then however by such an Abstraction one of them may not formally include the other, yet it would never positively and actually exclude it, eyen as figured Being never excludes moveable Being. Well then, if I can instance in a Thinking Being, from whose Idea all Extension is po-

positively and necessarily excluded, then I hope, it will be granted me that Thinking Being and Extended Being are not distinct by a modal Abstraction. But now this I can do; for I have in me the Idea of a Being absolutely perfect, and so has every Body else, even those that deny the real Existence of such a Being, since otherwise they will deny what they do not conceive, and so will deny they know not what. But then as such an Idea must include *Thought*, as being a Perfection, so for the contrary Reason it must exclude *Extension*. Such a Being then must be a Thinking Being, and must not be an Extended Being. Here then is an Instance of a Thinking Being, that is not an Extended Being; nay, that cannot be, and that because his Idea positively excludes all Extension. But now give me such an Instance of a figured Being, that is not a moveable Being: You cannot. But then does not this plainly shew that these Things are not distinct by a modal Distinction, since if so 'tis reasonable to think that they would never be found to be exclusive of each other; but on the contrary, as every Extended Being would then be a Thinking Being, so every Thinking Being would also be an Extended Being, even as every figured Being is also a moveable Being. The Sum is, if these Ideas, Thinking Being and Extended Being were distinct only by a modal Abstraction, then 'tis reasonable to think they would be always

undivided, even as figured Being and moveable Being are, whose distinction is such. But we are sure at least of one Instance wherein they are divided. And therefore 'tis reasonable to think that they do not owe their distinction to any such modal Abstraction.

28. But there is an easy Supposition that will yet further clear and conclude the Point. I shall only beg leave to suppose (what even Geometrick strictness will allow to be a reasonable *Postulatum*) that God is able to create a pure Thinking Being, that is not at all Corporeal, as also on the other side that he is able to create a Being purely Corporeal that does not think. What I here suppose as possible, is no more than what is generally presumed to be, *de facto*, actually done; but I shall content my self with supposing only the Possibility of it: And that, I hope, is so fair a Demand, that even the Author of the Letters against the Bishop of Worcester, who is so liberal of Thought, as to bestow a Capacity of it upon Matter, lest he should limit the Power of God, will not stick to grant it me. For sure he that exalts the Power of God so far as to be able to endue Matter *with* Thought, (which in its Essence, by his own Confession, it does not include) must needs allow me to suppose what is a great deal less, that by the same Omnipotence he is able to make Matter *without* it, that is, pure Matter that does not think, as also for the like reason that he is able to make a Thinking Being

ing that is not at all Material, but a pure Spirit. Or if he pleases, we will suppose that as God is able to make two such Beings, so he is able to make them separately by themselves, a Thinking Being by it self, and a Material Being by it self, (notwithstanding the present actual Union of these in Human Nature;) or that he can make one of them without making the other; or which comes to the same, that when he has made them both he can preserve one of them in being, and annihilate the other.

29. These two last Suppositions proceed upon the two-fold Separability of Things; for Things may be separated either thus, as when one remains, the other perishing or not being; or thus, as when both remain, but without any real Union with each other. Now in the first place, either of these Suppositions would immediately prove a reality of distinction in the Things, and that because either of the Separabilities does so, as is most clearly demonstrable of each of them: For when one Thing can be when the other is not, then most certainly one is not the other; since if they were really the same, it would follow that the same Thing could be and not be at once. And so again, when Things can exist separately from one another, tho' at the same time 'tis as necessary that one should not be the other, since otherwise it would follow that the same Thing could be separated from it self, which is repugnant to the *Metaphysical Unity* of any Being. This then

would clearly prove the distinction of these Things, since if one be produceable without the other in either of the Senses supposed, it appears that one is not the other, which is all that we can understand by a real distinction.

30. Well, but to set by this Conclusion for a while, according to our present Method of reasoning, we are to prove the distinction of the Ideas, and by that the distinction of the Things. Let us then to our Supposition again, and see whether it will do that too. The Things are separately produceable, which supposes that they are simply so. Now as from their being simply *produceable*, we may conclude (according to the Principles establish'd in the former part of this Theory) that there are Ideas according to which they are to be produced; so from their being *separately produceable* we may as well argue, that those Ideas whereby they are so produceable are complete and really distinct Ideas. For if a Thinking Being and an Extended Being are separately produceable, then it seems plain that the Idea whereby one of these is produceable, is not the Idea whereby the other is produceable, since if it were, then the Production of the one would involve also the Production of the other, and so they could not be produced asunder, which is against the Supposition. In other words, If a Thinking Being and an Extended Being be really but one Idea, that is, (for I would willingly be understood

derstood if I could) if the very same Being be in Idea both Thinking and Extended, however by us considered sometimes under one Formality, and sometimes under another; then the Production of a Thinking Being would be also the Production of an Extended Being, and so they could not be produced apart. But we suppose them separately producable, and thence think we have reason to conclude that their Ideas are completely and intirely distinct Ideas, and not the same Idea incompletely considered.

31. But then if the Ideas of these Things are really distinct (as upon this fair and unrefusale Supposition it appears that they are) this will give us a further right to conclude that the Things themselves are so too. For as we may argue from the distinction of Things to the distinction of Ideas, so we may as justly argue from the distinction of Ideas to the distinction of Things. Only there is this difference between the one Method and the other, that in the former we argue *à Posteriori*, but in the latter *à Priori*; for as distinction of Things is a *Sign* of distinction in Ideas, so the distinction of Ideas is the Ground of all the distinction that is, or can be in Things.

32. And in this we have touch'd upon the true reason why from the real distinction of their Ideas, we may justly infer the distinction of Things. This indeed is by some presumed, and we have hitherto presumed it as reasonably we might, there being no other direct way to

know the distinction of Things but by the Ideas we have of them; but neither we nor they, as I know of, have as yet undertaken to resolve this Consequence into its true Ground, or to assign any Rational Account of it. Nor indeed do I know how it can be done but upon the Principles of the present Theory, and upon *them* the reason is so very obvious that we cannot well miss of it. The real distinction of Ideas argues the like distinction in the Things, because indeed as I but now hinted, it is the ground of it. Things were made according to their Ideas, and therefore if the Ideas are really distinct, 'tis impossible but that the Things must be so too. And hence it is that we can justly argue from the one to the other, from the distinction of Ideas to the distinction of Things, which yet would be no Consequence if either there were no such Ideas, or if we did not see Things by the same Ideas whereby they were made. For as for Ideas that are *Modalities* of our own Souls (as some are pleased to dream) I see no reason why any distinction in *them* should argue any distinction in Things. For what Connexion is there between my being variously modify'd and made different from my self, and other things being really different from one another. But if indeed I see Things by those very Ideas whereby they were made, then indeed I have good reason to think them really distinct, if I find that their Ideas are so, and that because they were made according to those Ideas.

Ideas. Which by the way I commend to the Consideration of my Reader as a good Argument to prove both the Existence of our Ideal World, and our seeing things in it, since 'tis otherwise impossible to give an Account why the greatest distinction in our Ideas should argue any in things, unless our Ideas of things be also those very Ideas whereby they were form'd, and from whence they receiv'd their specifick difference. But upon this Hypothesis the Question is resolv'd as soon as asked, so well do these things hang together.

33. But to return; there appears now upon the whole a great deal of reason to conclude that the Ideas of Thinking Being and Extended Being are complete and really distinct Ideas, and not one and the same Idea incompletely consider'd. And if the Ideas of these things are really distinct, then the things conceiv'd by these Ideas are as really and verily distinct as the Ideas themselves are. And therefore as we may, and must say of one of these *Ideas*, that it is not the other, so we may, and upon that very foundation, must say of one of these *Things*, that it is not the other, and consequently that an Extended Being is not a Thinking Being. And if an Extended Being is not a Thinking Being (as seems now plain since the Idea of the one is not the Idea of the other) then 'tis as plain that an Extended Being cannot think. And to ask whether it can or no, will be as wise a Question as to ask, whether a Circle can be a Square?

Square? which cannot be affirm'd without the extremity of Confusion and Contradiction.

34. Should any one now come in with such an Objection as this, what tho' Extension be not Thought, yet why may not an Extended Being think? For tho' Extension be not Thought, yet it is not more distinct from it than Figure is from Motion. And yet these, as distinct as they are, can unite together in the same Subject. And if a figured Substance and a moveable Substance, notwithstanding their being distinct in Conception, are yet the same in the thing, then why may not a thinking Substance and an extended Substance be in reality one and the same Substance; notwithstanding the distinctness of the Ideas whereby they are conceiv'd? This Objection, how considerable soever it might have appear'd, and what trouble soever it might have given us, if it had been urged sooner, comes now too late to do us any prejudice as being already prevented in what we have premised; for by that it may appear that the Case is not at all the same, and that there is no manner of Proportion between the things upon which the Objection proceeds. Figured Substance and moveable Substance are, as we have shewn, incomplete Ideas, as being only modally distinct from one another; which formality of distinction, as it is consistent with a real Identity between the Ideas themselves, so consequently it can argue no real diversity between the things conceiv'd by them, and that because

Things

Things are not made according to incomplete, but according to complete and perfect Ideas; or in other Words, Things are not made by Ideas as they are abstractedly or imperfectly consider'd by us, but as they are in their own *Intelligible Natures*. But now thinking Substance and extended Substance, are, as has been shewn, complete and really distinct Ideas, and where there is such a distinction in the Ideas, there must be the like distinction in the Things, because Things are made according to their Ideas. And consequently an extended Substance will be as distinct from a thinking Substance, not as a figured Substance is from a moveable Substance, but as *Figure* it self is from Motion, or even as Extension is from Thought. And accordingly as we can never truly say that Figure is Motion, or that Extension is Thought, so we can never truly say that an extended Being is a thinking Being.

35. But to complete the Answer, I further add, That tho' perhaps Thought be not more distinct from Extension, than Figure is from Motion (not to dispute at present whether there may be *degrees* in real distinction,) yet there is not the same possibility that Thought should be in an *extended* Being, as that Figure should be in a *moveable* Being. For Figure and Motion are both *Modes* of extended Substance, and so if Figure be in a moveable Being, 'tis not as *moveable* but as *extended*, the same extended Substance being the Subject of both

both these Modes, with which it carries a suitable proportion. But now Thought and Extension are not two *Modes*, as Figure and Substance are, Extension not being the *Mode* of any Substance, but the *Formal Reason* and essential Difference of that Substance which we call Matter; and therefore if Thought be in an extended Substance, it will not be after the same manner as Figure is in a moveable one, that is, that the same Substance only should be the common Subject of both, but it must be in an extended Substance *as such*, or as that signifies a Substance whose Essence is to be extended. Between which there appears no manner of proportion, which makes a great disparity in the two Cases. For indeed (as much alike as these two Questions may seem, and as apt as some may be to confound them) 'tis one thing whether a Substance that is extended can think, meaning a Substance which has extension belonging to it as a Mode. And another thing, whether an extended Substance can think, meaning a Substance whose Essence is to be extended. Now this latter is what we must be supposed to mean in the present Question, which plainly shews it to be a very different Question from the other, *viz.* Whether a moveable can be also a figured Substance? And accordingly tho' the latter may be answered Affirmatively, yet there is great reason to think that the other cannot, since if an extended Substance can think, that is, a Substance whose

whose *Essence* is to be extended, then it will be necessary that Thought should proceed from *Extension* (as every Property that is in a Thing must proceed mediately or immediately from the Nature or Essence of that thing) which we have good Reason to think cannot be, because of the Ideal distinction between Thought and Extension, not to say a Thinking and an extended Being. For tho', for instance, a Substance that is Circular may also successively at least admit of a Triangular Form, yet if you could suppose a Substance whose *Essence* is to be Circular, you would not stick, I presume, to say of such a Substance that it could never be Triangular.

36. Well, but after all, should we examine the Idea of Matter, and find Thought in it, that indeed would be a happy discovery, and such as would deserve a Sacrifice to the Muses for the rarity of the Invention. But let us see: The Idea of Matter is an extended Substance, and so much is granted by the Author of the Letters, only he adds *solid* to it, wherein we will allow him to please his Fancy, since by it he makes no alteration as to the Issue of the Question. Now this intelligibly extended Substance (for so we must further specify it, to avoid confounding the Idea with the thing) having intelligible parts one without the other, 'tis plain in the first place that 'tis mentally divisible, as having those intelligible parts. And if there be an intelligible divisibility in the Idea, there must be a real one in the Thing, be-

because Matter is made according to its Idea, whereupon it follows that all Matter is divisible as such, it being not to be conceiv'd that a thing should be extended and not divisible, which by the way shews the Doctrine of *Democritus* concerning *Indivisibles* to be impossible. And thus I see *Divisibility* in the Idea of Matter. I see also in it *Impenetrability*, it being as impossible, or rather as inconceivable, that one of these Intelligible parts should be contained in the other, as that one should be the other; whence it further follows (from the conformity, that Matter must have to its Idea) that all Matter is really impenetrable, as accordingly we find it to be. For if to one Inch suppose of Matter, another be added, this necessarily makes two Inches, which plainly shews that one does not occupy the place of the other, since if it did it would still be but one Inch, which is against the Supposition. Again as the Idea of Matter contains *Divisibility* in it, for the same Reason it will contain *Intelligible Figure*, that arising from termination of Extension as the termination does from Division. Now as for *Motion*, tho' this be not so formally contain'd in the Idea of Matter as the other Properties of it, yet there is that in it which will lay a Foundation for its possibility, which is sufficient. For Matter in the Idea of it, having intelligible parts (which is the more explicit Notion of extension) this is a sufficient reason why Matter in the Thing, should

should have real Parts one without another, since otherwise it will not be conformable to its Idea, if it has not that *really* which the other has *intelligibly*. But now if Matter or Body has such real Parts, these parts must be really distant, more or less from one another, and so it will be possible for one Body to exist successively upon or to the Parts of another Body, so as sometimes to answer to this Part, and sometimes to that, which seems to be all that we can understand by Motion, as it is a Mode of Body, which can signify only the Translation of a Body, from one part of Matter to another, as when I move my Hand upon the Paper now I am writing. But as for Motion as it signifies that *Force* or *Power*, whereby a Body is so translated, that I do not take to be any Mode or Property belonging to Matter, nor indeed do I in that Sense find *Motion* in the Idea of Matter, any more than *Thought*.

37. These are the Properties that are contain'd in the Idea of Matter, and you see how they all derive from that Idea, as indeed nothing can be said to be contain'd in the Idea or intelligible Essence of a Thing but what is deducible from it as a consequent from its Natural Principle. And truly, besides these, it would be a pretty hard task to find out any other. For as for *Solidity* if that be taken *Mathematically*, 'tis the same with that Intelligible Extension which is the very Idea of Matter,

Matter, and so it neither adds any thing to it, nor can be properly said to be contain'd in it. And if it be taken *Physically*, then either it signifies the Imperviousness of one Body to another, or that which hinders two Bodies from coming together (in which Sense I find it used

Essay of Human Understanding, p. 48. by the Author of the *Essay of Human Understanding*) and then 'tis the same with *Impenetrability*,

or else it means the compactness of the whole, from there being a deal of Matter under a little Surface, in opposition to Rarity, and then it imports not any Property belonging to Extension, or that can be in the Idea of it, but only more Degrees of the same. But as for Solidity, according to the vulgar and popular Sense of it, wherein it is used for *hardness*, as when they say a hard solid Body, meaning one and the same thing by those two Terms, this is either no real Property belonging to the Nature of Body, but is only a Sentiment which we feel in our selves upon that resistance, which it makes to our touch, or if it signifies any thing in Body, it can mean nothing but what is to be resolv'd either into the compactness, or into the figure of it.

38. But we have not yet among these found out *Thought*. No, nor never shall while we look for it in the Idea of Matter. To seek for it here is to seek for the Living among the Dead. The depth (the whole Abyss of Matter)

ter) says it is not in me; And upon inquiry we find that it is not, unless one of *these* should be Thought, which would be equal Extravagance either to suppose or to confute. But moreover as our inquiry reports that it is not so (to prevent all loss of Labour in a further search) our Reason will assure us that it can not possibly be in the Idea of Matter, because of the real distinction and intire diversity between the Ideas of a thinking, and of an extended Being. Since to suppose Thought to be contain'd in the Idea of Matter, notwithstanding this Ideal diversity between a thinking and an extended Being, would be all one as if you should suppose that a Circle should have the property of a Triangle. But now if Thought be not in the Idea of Matter, then 'tis plain that it cannot be in Matter itself, and consequently that Matter cannot Think. And that because Matter (as every thing else) is supposed to be made according to its Idea, and consequently to have its *Real* Nature conformable to its *Ideal* Nature.

39. And so much is granted even by the Author of the Letters against the Bishop of Worcester, viz. that Thought is not included in the essence of Matter. But then he is pleased to betake himself to the Omnipotence of God, which he will have able to bestow upon Matter a power of Thinking, tho' no such Power be (by

See his reply to
the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his
2d Letter.

his

his own Confession) included in the essence of it. 'Tis I acknowledge a little odious to dispute the Power of God in any Case, and in some Cases not very Philosophically done to ingage one in it. And since this Gentleman expressly owns that Thought is not included in the essence of Matter, it will concern him to consider whether this be not one of those Cases. I have, I hope, a due reverence for the Power of God, and would be as far from setting any undue limits to it as he can be. And yet I must needs say that to assign the Power of God instead of a Natural Reason, or to fly to the Power of God *against* clear Reason, appear to me equally unphilosophical. And indeed considering that we can take our Measure of Things, only by those Ideas which we have of them, if after we have duly compared those Ideas, and determined of the natures and differences of Things according to them, it shall be thought a sufficient Answer to have recourse to the Power of God, then we shall never be able to know how to judge of any thing, or when we have concluded any thing. And *Transubstantiation* it self may be good sound Doctrine, notwithstanding all that our Philosophy shall remonstrate to the contrary from the Idea which we have of Body.

40. But to apply our Answer a little more distinctly, there are two Senses wherein God may be suppos'd able by his Almighty Power, to make Matter think. Either in a divided,

or

or in a compounded Sense, that is (to give the meaning of this School-distinction in plain English) either in this Sense, that that which before was an extended Being, may afterwards by transmutation become a thinking Being, or in this, that an extended Being, remaining an extending Being, may also have Thought imparted to it, and so at the same time be a Thinking as well as an Extended Being. Now tho' I am not able to comprehend *how*, yet I shall not pretend to deny but that it may be possible to an Almighty Power to make Matter think in the former way of understanding it. He that could make a thinking Being out of no Being, may, for ought I know, be as able to make the same out of an extended Being. And he who was able out of Stones (as the Scripture speaks) to raise up Children unto *Abraham*, may also for any assurance I have to the contrary be able to make a thinking Being of mete Matter. I say I know not but that the same Power that could do the one *may* also do the other, tho' I must withal observe that neither of the Instances proves that it *can*, as not being fully commensurate to the Case. For when a thinking Being is said to be made out of nothing, the Phrase *out of nothing*, signifies not the Matter, but only the Term of its production. But when a thinking Being is said to be made out of an extended Being, the meaning must be, that 'tis made out of it, as the Matter from whence, which is much hard-

er to conceive than the other, unless you will suppose one to be annihilated, and the other to be produced in its room, but then 'tis not making a thinking Being, out of an extended Being, but out of nothing, as in ordinary Creation. And so again, when God is said to be able out of Stones, to raise up Children to *Abraham*, I suppose there is no necessity of Understanding the Text, as to the Souls of those Children, but only as to their Bodily part, that which is intellectual Being, from elsewhere to be derived, as in ordinary Generation. In like manner as when God is said to have form'd *Adam* from the Dust of the Ground, we can understand it only of his Body, the Original of his Soul being otherwise accounted for even by the sacred History. But now there is a vast deal of difference between converting one sort of Matter into another, as Stones into Flesh, or Water into Wine, &c. (for the effecting of which perhaps there needs no more than a new arrangement and disposition of Parts) and converting Matter into Spirit, or an extended Being, into a thinking Being, things intirely different in their whole Order and Kind from one another; which yet, tho' of the extremest difficulty of any thing that can fall under our Conception, I will not say is absolutely impossible.

41. But now as for making Matter to think in a *compounded* Sense, that is Matter, remaining Matter, this is a Thing of a very different confi-

consideration from the other, and that must be determin'd by other Measures. And yet even here I shall readily acknowledge that God is able to make Matter to do whatsoever can be done by the Power of Matter, because he perfectly understands what the Power of Matter is, and knows also how to manage it to the best advantage. And if Men, by that little Skill which they have in the Mechanical Arts, and that little Power which they have to use and apply that Skill, can yet perform such great and wonderful things; God, who comprehends all Mechanism in its utmost extent, and wants no Power to reduce his Theory to Practice, can, to be sure, if he pleases, perform much greater, even all that the Power of Matter can possibly rise to, or (which is the true Measure of that Power) all that the Idea of Matter can in any intelligible degree be said to contain. But to go beyond that, or to give Matter a Power or a Perfection that is no way contain'd in the Idea or intelligible Essence of Matter, this would be to alter the Species, and instead of making *Matter* to do this or that, to make something else to do it, which is not Matter; concerning which, there is no dispute.

42. If then God can make Matter think, it must be by something contain'd in the Idea or Essence of Matter; for as for any *superinduced* Perfection that is not within the Comprehension of that Essence, that would make a change in

the Species. But now Thought is not in the Idea or Essence of Matter. We have seen by Examination that it is not; we have proved by Reason that it is not; and our Author confesses that it is not. And to this I further add, that as Thought is not in the Idea of Matter, so neither can it result from any thing that is contain'd in that Idea, it being apparently impossible that any *Division*, *Figure*, or *Motion* should beget *Thought*, because of the utter disproportion and Ideal diversity of these things. Besides, that if they could, then Thought would still be (at least potentially) contain'd within the Idea of Matter, which is contrary to what we have before shewn, and now suppose. From hence then we may safely determine thus far at least, that God cannot make Matter think by any thing that is in the Essence of Matter, there being nothing of Thought contain'd in that. And yet again, if he can make it think it must be by something contain'd in the Essence of Matter, since to make it think by any adventitious or *superinduced* Virtue that is no way contain'd in the Essence of Matter, would not be to make *Matter* think, but something else. But we have our Author's leave to suppose it impossible that Matter should be made think by any thing in the Essence of Matter, partly from his owning Thought not to be contain'd in its Essence, and partly from his flying to superinduced Perfections; and I leave him from these Premises to draw the Conclusion.

43. The only thing in this way and form of arguing that can with any pretence of Reason be excepted against, is the Supposition upon which it proceeds, *viz.* That the Superinduement of any Perfection not contain'd in the Idea of Matter, should of necessity alter the Species of it. But I think this is very plain, because the Idea of a thing is the measure of its Species, as being that according to which it is form'd; and therefore if any thing be superadded that is not in the Idea of a thing, it must necessarily vary the Species of it, as rendring it disconformable to its Idea. And our Author must not have consider'd the Nature of Ideas so well as might reasonably be expected from one that has said so much about them, if he is ignorant that the Idea of a thing does one way or other comprehend within its extent whatever belongs to that thing whose Idea it is; if not formally, yet at least potentially; or if not directly, yet at least by consequence: For so tho' a Triangle in the most simple and precise Conception of it be only a Figure comprised of three right Lines, yet these three Lines will necessarily make three Angles, and these three Angles will be equal to two right ones, &c. And so all the Properties that belong to, and are demonstrable of a Triangle, do some way or other rise from the Idea of it, in like manner as Motion, Figure, &c. do from the Idea of Matter. And indeed otherwise there would be no reason to hinder but a Triangle might

have the Properties that belong to a Square, Circle, or any other Figure. And therefore our Author makes no just Parallel, how popular soever it may seem, when from the Addition of Motion, Vegetation, Life, &c. to Matter without making any essential change in it, he carries the Gradation of his Argument to *Thought*: For these things (*Sense* only excepted, if he means Perception by it, otherwise not) are contain'd within the Idea of Matter, at least by way of consequential Result. Whereas *Thought*, even by his own Confession, is not contain'd therein, and therefore cannot be added without a specifick Variation; for what tho' it be as he speaks, *but one step higher*, yet if it be such a step as passes into another kind, 'tis plain that Matter cannot have it and remain what it is, any more than two right Lines can be made to inclose space while they remain right.

44. But once more, and all at once. Notwithstanding the infinity of God's Power (from which far be it any thing here should be intended as a Derogation) all the rational World knows that there are *Impossibilities*. And since our Author is pleased to allow, as of necessity he must, that *Thought* is not contain'd in the Essence of Matter; and since, as we have further shewn, the Ideas of a Thinking Being and of an Extended Being, are Ideas really and intirely distinct, as indeed his own Concession would sufficiently prove, there being no other Rea-

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Reason why Thought should not be contain'd in the Idea of Matter, but only because of the Ideal diversity of a Thinking and of an Extended Being; I say these things consider'd, I would leave him to advise with his own better Thoughts, whether, for God, in this compounded Sense, to make Matter think, be not the very same as to make a Circle to be a Square, and consequently whether the former be not as impossible as the latter.

45. Well, then we may now at length not unreasonably conclude upon Consideration of what has been thus amply premised, that Matter cannot think. And yet I am conscious of Thought (and that not a little upon this occasion) and 'tis that indeed whereby I know that I am, and have a real Being in the World. That then that thinks in me is not Matter, because Matter cannot think. And therefore I have in me a Principle distinct from Matter, really and wholly distinct, an immaterial and consequently an immortal Soul; which indeed, as a Substance at large, would be immortal as that signifies unperishable, because no Substance naturally perishes, but only the Modalities of it. But as being also a Substance really distinct from Matter, must likewise of necessity be *Indissoluble*, that which does not consist of any parts not being capable of any Division or Dissolution.

46. But besides the Immortality of the Soul (a great Conclusion, and which alone shews the Principle from whence it is derived to have been worth the Consideration we have bestow'd upon it) there is yet some further improvement to be made of the foregoing Doctrine concerning Matter's being uncapable of Thought, and that in two Reflections, one relating to sensual and intellectual Pleasure, and the other concerning the Souls of Brutes.

47. For in the first place, if Matter cannot think, then since all Sensation (as we shall further observe hereafter) is a kind of Thought, we may hence further conclude that 'tis the Soul and not the Body that is the true Subject of it. That 'tis the Soul that sees and not the Eye,

(according to that of St. Au-

In Psal. 41.

Itin, Oculi fenestra sunt Mentis,

Interior est qui per has videt,

quando Cogitatione aliqua absens est, frustra patent)
the Soul that hears and not the Ear, the Soul that tastes, smells, and feels. And that tho' we talk of intellectual and sensual, spiritual or corporeal Pleasures, yet that 'tis not the Body but the Soul only that is the proper Subject of them. And accordingly that the true difference between them does consist, not in this that sensual or bodily Pleasure is that which is perceiv'd by the Body, and intellectual that which is perceiv'd by the Soul. Nor yet (as I once thought) in this, that sensual Pleasure is when the Body is primarily affected, and the Soul secundarily

or

or by participation, and that intellectual Pleasure is when the Soul is primarily affected, and the Body secundarily or by participation (the Soul being the only true percipient in both) but in this, that sensual Pleasure is that which the Soul perceives by the mediation of the Body, upon the occasion of some motion or alteration in it, whereas intellectual Pleasure is that which the Soul perceives immediately by it self without any such occasion from the Body.

48. But to carry our Principle one step further, if Matter cannot think, then we may securely determine thus far concerning the Souls of Brutes, that if they are Matter then they can have no Thought, not even the least Sensation properly so call'd; or if they have any Thought or Sensation, then they are not Matter. So then either they are not Matter, or if they are, then they do not think. Or thus, either they do not think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. Thus far in the general is clear, and consequently no room left for any middle Hypothesis that shall pretend to come between the two Extremes. But which of the Extremes themselves bids fairest for the Right, requires more particular Consideration, which for our own and the Reader's Refreshment, we shall adjourn to the following Chapter.

C H A P. II.

*A Digression concerning the Souls of
Brutes, whether they have any Thought
or Sensation in them or no?*

1. **T**O those that have been accustom'd to judge of Things according to the Appearances of Sense, this will seem a very strange *Question*; and should it happen to be determin'd in the Negative, that perhaps would be thought yet a stranger *Answer*. But 'tis to be remember'd, that sensible Prepossessions are the greatest Prejudice we have to contend with in our Search of Truth; and I am so far from addressing the ensuing Reflections to those that are govern'd by them, that I think they are not fit to be consulted with, much less to sit Judges upon such an Enquiry as this, in which nothing but the chaste Answers of pure and uncorrupted Reason, is to be regarded. These therefore I shall only attend, as the proper Measures by which this Matter is to be concluded; and if, following the Light of clear *Reason*, I should happen to determine any thing against *Sense*, I shall, I believe, find my self inclined rather to despise that Objection, than to change my Measure, or renounce my Guide.

2. Not

2. Not that I pretend to give a positive and absolute Determination upon this Question. I do not think it possible to be done with any certainty on either side, unless we were better acquainted with the inward Natures and Essences of Things than we are; for upon this the Point will be found to turn, both as to the thing it self, and as to our Knowledge of it. For as whether Brutes think or no, must depend upon their Natures, so our Knowledge of this must in like manner depend upon our Knowledge of those Natures. And therefore since we do not precisely know what kind of Natures or Essences God has bestow'd upon these Creatures, 'tis impossible (without a Divine Revelation of that) we should be able to tell with certainty whether they do think or no. Something indeed may be determin'd, *ex Hypothesi*, according to what we have already intimated, as that if they are Matter then they cannot think, or, if they do think, then they are not Matter, because Matter has been proved incapable of Thought; but as to the absolute issue of the Question, that, I think, we can hardly make any definitive Judgment of; only there may be greater Probabilities on one side than on the other, and which of them it is that seems to carry the most rational Appearance, shall be our present Business briefly and impartially to consider.

3. This is a Subject of a vast Latitude, and much may be said upon it, but I think the whole *Area* of

of the Question may be comprised within three Suppositions: For either the Souls of Beasts are Matter and so do not think; or else they do think, and so are not Matter; or else they are both material and thinking. Which Suppositions, because they contain the full state of the Question, we will for more distinction's sake consider as so many different Opinions concerning it.

4. The two first Opinions agree in this common Principle, That Matter cannot think. And consequently, that if the Souls of Beasts are Matter, then they do not think, or if they do think then they are not Matter. They content in the general, that Matter and Thought cannot consist together, and so that they cannot be both material and thinking, and divide only upon the particular side which they are to determine for, *viz.* whether they are Matter, and do not think, or, whether they do think, and are not Matter.

5. One of these Opinions supposes that the Souls of Beasts do think; but then, consistently with it self, it supposes also that they are not Matter, but immaterial, and by consequence immortal. Those of the other way conceiving this will engage them in great Difficulties and Inconveniences, chuse rather to suppose that they are mere Matter, but then they are also so self-consistent as in consequence of their common Principle to hold that they do not think. Between which two comes in the third Hypothesis,

sis, endeavouring to unite these extremes in one, by supposing that the Souls of Beasts do both think, and are also material.

6. Against the middle of these Suppositions (for so indeed it properly is, a Logical middle, tho' as here set down a Physical extreme) there lies a strong Presumption, and a very clear Argument. The *Presumption* is this, that it tends to undermine the Foundation, upon which our own Immortality stands. For if the Souls of Brutes, notwithstanding their being mere Matter do yet think, then our Souls notwithstanding their Thinking, may be for ought we know material too, and so liable to Corruption. The *Argument* which lies so clear against it, is no less than the whole preceding Chapter, wherein it has been shewn that Matter is utterly incapable of Thought. But now if Matter cannot think, then from this Principle we may securely argue, that if the Souls of Brutes are Matter, they do not think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. Or if you will thus, that either they are not Matter, or if they are, they do not Think; or that either they do not Think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. From which two forms of arguing the one *Hypothetical*, and the other *Disjunctive*, it plainly appears that the Souls of Brutes cannot be Material, and Thinking too, since if they were, then Matter would Think, which would be a contradiction to the Principle supposed.

7. Rejecting therefore this middle way, which unites Matter and Thought together in Brutes, as utterly absurd and unmaintainable, we shall now find the competition to lie wholly between the two extremes, that is, whether the Souls of Beasts be Matter and don't Think, or whether they do Think, and are not Matter.

8. These will be found to be the two *Rival Suppositions*; but before we determine any thing in favour of either of them, I must do them both the Justice to say, that whether absolutely right or wrong, they are however both in the general consistent with themselves, which the middle Opinion is not. When I say consistent with themselves, my meaning is, that they do not contradict in one Part, what they affirm in the other, which the middle Opinion upon the Principle supposed plainly does. Since by that Supposition, to say that the Souls of Brutes are Matter, is by consequence to say that they do not think; and to say that they do think, is by consequence to say that they are not Matter, which in effect will be to say, that they are Matter, and not Matter, and that they think and do not think.

9. The two extremes then, are the only consistent Opinions. But however 'tis one thing for an Opinion to be consistent with itself, and another thing to be absolutely true, since tho' one part of an Opinion may not over-

overthrow another, yet the whole may be overthrown, or shewn to be false, by some other Argument. And since, tho' both of these supposals are consistent with themselves, yet but one of them can be true, it will now be a proper enquiry to consider which is most likely to be so.

10. Now as for that Hypothesis which ascribes Thought without Matter to Brutes, tho' it be not nigh so absurd as that which supposes them to be Material, and yet to think, yet I must needs own that 'tis intangled with much difficulty and perplexity, is liable to several *rational* Arguments that may be urged against it, and has none to rely upon, but only such as are drawn from a certain imaginary *Experience*, that is grounded upon the confuse appearances of *Sense*.

11. For in the first place (to give a Specimen of this charge) if we ascribe Thought, or Perception to Brutes in any degree, tho' it be only in that of *Sensation*, where shall we stop, or what shall we deny them? If they are allow'd to have it in the degree of *Sensation*, why may they not be capable of it in the degree of *Reason*? That indeed is thought too much, even by those who contend for Thought in Brutes, who as kind as they are pleased to be to them, are yet however willing to distinguish themselves from them, by a peculiar Privilege which they reserve to themselves above them. And accordingly while Man glories in being

a reasonable Creature, the poor Beasts are fain to be contented with an Inferior kind of Knowledge, that which for distinction sake, is call'd a *sensible* or *sensitive* Knowledge, or at most with some dark adumbrations of Reason (dark enough indeed, as being they know not what) something that looks like it, but is not it. But why this Partiality? And why, since they are so liberal to them, as to allow them Thought, are they so scanty in the Proportion of it? Is it that they may not make them equal to themselves? But tho' this may be a Reason of Inducement, yet this is no warrantable or justifying Reason. And I doubt it will be impossible to assign any that is. For if the Souls of Brutes are Matter, then they are not capable of the *lowest* degree of Thought, and if they are not Matter, then they may be capable of a *higher* as well as of a lower. And if we give them any, how shall we know when we have gone high enough? For as for that distinction of a sensible Knowledge, as opposed to that which is of the rational Kind, either by sensible Knowledge is meant the Knowledge that is from a *Material* Principle, and in this Sense there is no such thing as a sensible Knowledge, because Matter cannot think; or else that Knowledge which is from an *Immaterial* Principle by the Mediation of the *Senses*, or upon some impressions made upon certain parts of the Body. But now such a sensible Knowledge or Perception (for we take Knowledge

ledge here in a large Sense) tho' call'd sensible in a certain respect, is yet absolutely Intellectual, tho' perhaps of the lowest kind; and if Brutes are once allow'd to have an intellectual Perception in any degree, why they should stint them just to the very lowest, is what neither I, nor they, I believe, do well understand.

12. It will be said perhaps that they deny them Reason, because by their Actions, it appears that they have none. But in the first place, if they make this Plea, how are they consistent with themselves, since at another time, when another end is to be served, they so highly magnify their great *Sagacity*, and the many wonderful Performances which they are observ'd to do? Besides, this Argument from their *Actions*, concludes nothing against their being *capable* of Reason (upon the supposition of their Thinking) however it may be pretended against their *actual* having it. But neither will it prove that. For in the first place, how are they sure that they understand their Conduct, and that the silly appearance which their Actions seem to carry, may not be owing to their not being acquainted with the secret Measures by which they proceed? But however supposing their Actions to be really as silly, and ill-conducted as they appear to them; yet how after all do they know but that this may be merely by some Organical Indispositions of their Bodies, and not thro' any defect in their

understanding Faculty, just as it is in the case of Fools and Changelings, whom yet these very Men will allow to be reasonable Creatures, as to the Power and Faculty, tho' not as to the actual use and exercise of it. And how do they know but that Brutes (who certainly do not act more sillily than some Men) may be so too, if they once allow them to have any Thought. Those indeed that think they have none, must by consequence deny them that of the superior kind; but to grant them one degree of Thought, and to deny them another, seems at best very arbitrary, and without a sufficient foundation in Reason. So that methinks they should either deny them what they grant them, or not be so difficult to grant them what they are pleased to deny them.

13. But again, as we shall not well know where to stop as to *Thought*, if we allow any degree of it to Brute Creatures, so neither shall we know where to stop as to *Brutes*. For which of them will you exclude? If you will suppose a Horse to think, or a Dog, or a Bird, then why not a Fly, or a Louse, or a Worm, or a Snail, or even an Oyster? And if such things as these should be allow'd capable of Thought (which I am apt to fancy the most liberal bestowers of it, would not be extreme forward to grant, at least as to the last of them, tho' upon the foundation they go, I see no reason why they should make any exception)

ception) there will be a shrewd Temptation, to enlarge the Bounds of the thinking World, and to take in Vegetables into the honourable Society, so that a *sensitive Plant* may perhaps in due time, come to signify something beyond Figure or Metaphor.

14. Again, if the Souls of Beasts have any Thought or Perception, then of necessity they must be *Immaterial*. Of which consequence St. Austin seems to be sensible, when he tells the *Manicheans*, that the Soul of a Fly is better than the Sun. And so indeed the Opinion we are now considering supposes them to be, upon the general Principle which it has in common with the other, *viz. that Matter can't Think*. But however tho' the consequence be undeniable, yet this (to go no further) will seem a very hard *Consequent*, the Souls of Beasts being generally supposed to be material, even by those that allow them Thought. But then again what will the consequence be of their being *Immaterial*? Even no less than that they are *Incorruptible*, and so naturally *Immortal*. Which again will strike hard against the vulgar Opinion wherein the Souls of Beasts are presumed to be as Mortal as their Bodies, and accordingly to Perish with them, as being no less material than they are, which seems also not a little favour'd by Holy Scripture, when it makes this difference between the Spirit of a Man, and that of a Beast, that the former goes upward, and the latter goes downwards to the Earth.

15. But as Paradoxical as it is, and as Anti-scriptural as it seems, to say that the Souls of Beasts are Immortal, so however they must of necessity be upon this Supposition. For besides that Immortality is the natural consequence of immateriality, that which has no extension, not being capable of any division, to say that they are immaterial and mortal would lead to strange and intolerable absurdities. For in the first place, if the Souls of Beasts, tho' immaterial, are yet mortal, then nothing hinders, but that our Souls may be also mortal, notwithstanding their being immaterial. And so there will be no proving, or knowing, by Reason that we have immortal Souls. Nor indeed by any thing else: For tho' Faith assures us of an everlasting Life after this, yet if what is immaterial may be mortal, we know not but that Immortality Faith speaks of, may be wholly of a *positive* Nature, such as depends altogether upon the Will and Power of God; and that naturally, and in themselves, our Souls may be as mortal as our Bodies. Which at least would be a very Unphilosophical, if not an Irreligious Consequence.

16. But then again, the Souls of Beasts are upon this supposition more Noble and Excellent than their Bodies. 1. As Immortal. 2. As Thinking. And yet if these immaterial Thinking Substances, are at the same time *Mortal*, and having these high Privileges above the Body, do yet Perish with it, then 'tis plain,

plain that they are made for the Body, and have no other end than the enjoyment of it. But then it seems a more excellent Being can be made for, and subjected to that which is less excellent, which is against the Rules of all Order and Proportion. Whence will follow those strange consequences reckon'd up by * Mr. Malebranche, * See his Defence against the Accusation of M. de la Ville. viz. That *God wills Disorder*; that *human Nature is not corrupted*; that *God might make Man for the enjoyment of Bodies, and subject him to the motions of Concupiscence* (which upon this Supposition cannot be proved to be a Disorder or Depravation of Nature, since it might have been the first Institution of it) which *destroys Original Sin, and consequently overthrows Religion, by taking away the necessity of a Mediator.*

17. These are dreadful Consequences, and therefore for the avoiding of them it will be necessary, supposing the Immateriality of the Souls of Beasts, to say that they are *Immortal*. But then this will turn us upon other Difficulties. For if the Souls of Beasts are *Immortal*, then before we make a Step further, what a Horror must it strike upon our more reflecting Thoughts to consider what liberty we take with these immortal Lives, and how many of them we daily sacrifice, not only to what we call our *Necessity*, but even to our *Fancy* and our *Humour*, to our *Pleasure* and our *Diversion*, as also to consider how cruelly and abusively

fively we treat them; which Practices neither consist with the Dignity of their Souls, nor yet with that Sense and Perception which is ascribed to them? For as supposing the Souls of Beasts immaterial and mortal, it would be a strange Thought to consider that every time I kill their Body, I destroy also a Soul; so supposing them Immortal (as indeed they must be supposed) it would be a very hard thing to digest, that a Creature that has an immortal Spirit should be slaughter'd to nourish and keep alive my mortal Body, when there are so many other natural Provisions for its Sustenance. Especially considering that the Creature I kill and feed on is *Innocent*, and I a *Sinner*.

18. But what shall we do with these immaterial and immortal Souls of Beasts, or how shall we dispose of them after they are parted from their Bodies? We must suppose them either in a state of Misery, or in a state of Happiness, or in a state of Neutrality. Miserable they cannot be, because innocent. Nor would it be very reasonable to assign them a state of Neutrality. For tho' some Philosophers talk of a state of *Silence* and Inactivity that belongs to humane Souls before their entering into these Bodies, and others that are for the sleep of the Soul between Death and the Resurrection, assign the like state to them during that Interval (which perhaps may be the *real* case of an Infant in the Womb) yet 'tis to be consider'd that this is only for a certain time in the supposed Instan-

Instances. But to suppose so many thinking Creatures to be for ever preserv'd in a state of Being, that is, neither happy nor miserable, seems in effect the same as to suppose them continued for continuing's sake, without any further end or purpose; which would be too ridiculous a Supposition to be in earnest maintain'd.

19. We must then suppose them in a state of *Happiness*. But what kind of Happiness shall it be? What will you have a *Mahometan* Paradise for them, consisting of sensual Delights? Such indeed would best become *Brutes*; but however that cannot well be, while these immaterial Spirits of theirs are separate from their Bodies. For sensual pleasure being (as was noted before) that Pleasure which the Soul perceives by the mediation of the Body, the natural possibility of it must depend upon its vital union with it. The Souls of Beasts therefore are not naturally capable of enjoying this kind of Happiness while in a state of Separation. And should they be ever united to Bodies again, tho' they would, 'tis true, recover that Capacity, yet to suppose that God should make so many immaterial, immortal, thinking Beings, only for the bodily Life and the enjoyment of its sensual Pleasures, is a Thought not very becoming either of him or of them.

20. Shall then their Happiness be intellectual? That would be great indeed, and another valuation would then be due to Rats and Mice than

is usually set upon them, even by those who suppose them to have Thought. Well, but shall this Happiness be by way of Reward, or by way of a pure and inconditionate Bounty? If by way of Reward, then you must suppose them moral Agents, capable of Good and Evil, and of Laws and Obligations. But if by way of pure inconditionate Bounty, this indeed would be very kind, and Men perhaps might be inclined to envy the Privilege of these happy Spirits who are so securely lodged in a Haven of Rest and Felicity, which they with so much difficulty, hazard and uncertainty are making their way to, through the Waves of a troublesome and a tempting World. But this seems not to be either so congruous in it self, or so suitable to the method of God's proceeding, who as kind and bountiful as he is to his Creatures, does not use to bestow such happiness as this upon them, but after some trial and probation of them, and as a Recompence of their good Behaviour.

21. Besides, shall these immortal Souls be always in a separate state after Death, or shall they be again embody'd? To be always in a separate state would be violent and unnatural to Spirits made apt for the information of Bodies, to which therefore they would naturally require to be united. But to what Bodies shall it be? To the same that they lived in. Then the Brutes also will have a *Resurrection*. But if to other Bodies, then either to the Bodies of other

other Animals naturally generated (as in the way of *Transmigration*) or to Bodies that shall be made on purpose for them. As for the way of *Transmigration*, besides that this shifting and shuffling of Souls out of one Body into another looks a little untoward, it carries also an appearance that is not very Philosophick, it being not reasonable to suppose that there is so little Congruity and Proportion between the Soul and the Body of an Animal, that any Soul should be fit to inhabit and inform any Body, as the Soul of an Elephant, suppose the Body of a Fly, or *vice versa*. But after all, the Hypothesis of *Transmigration* is calculated only for the time of natural Generation, and when that shall cease, as it will when all the Animals in the World are dead, there will be an end of the other too. But if instead of Bodies naturally generated (because they will not hold out always) you will have new Bodies made on purpose for them, that would be a very great thing, and (that it might not be done in vain) such as ought to be done for some very great end and purpose, which I believe it will not be very easy to assign.

22. And thus you see upon the present Hypothesis, whether we make the Souls of Beasts to be mortal, or whether we make them to be immortal, we run into great Difficulties both ways. Which if any one shall think to avoid by supposing that tho' they are naturally immortal as being immaterial, yet that they are

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annihilated by God immediately upon their quitting their Bodies, I am afraid that this will prove but a sorry Expedient, and such as, instead of helping him out of the Mire, will but plunge him further in. In the first place this would be a Supposition *therefore* only made, because they that make it have occasion for it, which renders it *precarious* in the highest degree. Again, this is to be very free with the Power of God to ingage it at our pleasure to serve an *Hypothesis*. But then again what a dreadful Thought would it be that every time I kill a Gnat or a Flea, I procure the annihilation of an immortal Soul? And what a profusenes of Luxury and Epicurism would it be for us to live upon Animals, whose *Souls* must be annihilated that we may feed upon their *Bodies*. But are ours worth the preserving at that expensive Rate?

23. But before we make such haste to destroy such precious Lives (as those of immaterial and immortal Spirits must needs be) what Example is there of *Annihilation* in any place or part of the Creation, that any one should suppose it here? No Substance can fall to nothing of it self, much less those that are Immortal; nor can we find that God annihilates any. Even Matter, tho' it undergoes an infinite variety of changes, yet it never perishes so much as in one Atom of it. And shall God create so many Myriads of immaterial and immortal Substances, and then annihilate them? Does God make

make to unmake again? But he *may* annihilate the Souls of Beasts, if he pleases. No doubt of it, and ours too; and there are not wanting those that will tell you that the Souls of wicked Men shall be so dispos'd of: But as we have no Example that God ever did annihilate any of his Works, so we have no reason to think that he ever will, tho' perhaps the *Hypothesis* of some Men, and the *Lives* of others may make it convenient that he should.

24. It may further deserve to be consider'd, whether that Argument of St. *Austin* (taken notice of by Mr. *Malebranche* in his *Apology* against Mr. *de la Ville*) which he makes use of against the *Pelagians* to prove Original Sin, be not equally conclusive against Brutes having any Thought or Perception. St. *Austin*, in the former of his two latter Books against *Julian the Pelagian*, lays down this Principle, That under a just Page 9.
God no Innocent can be miserable. *Neque enim sub justo Deo, miser esse quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest.* And then from the Miseries and Afflictions of Infants concludes, upon that Principle, that they can't be innocent. But now if this be a good consequence, Infants are miserable; therefore they are not innocent, because the justice of God will not permit that Innocence should be afflicted; then it seems a reasonable Question to demand, why the consequence on the other side should not be full as good; Brutes are innocent, therefore

fore they are not miserable, since 'tis plain that in both Arguments the consequence proceeds upon the same common Principle. But then they must have no Sense or Perception, since if they have, 'tis plain that they are often miserable or in pain.

25. The Holy Scripture does not much concern it self about natural and philosophical Matters, and when it has occasion to touch upon those Points, it does not always express Things according to the very exactness of Philosophick Truth, but according to the outward appearances of things to our Senses, and the common apprehensions that the generality of Men (who judge by such appearances) have about them. For which reason we cannot always draw an Argument from Scripture for the decision of *natural Questions*: And for the same reason should the Scripture, at any time, seem to attribute Thought or Perception to Brutes, as when the righteous Man is said to regard the Life of his Beast, and the Ox is said to know his Owner, and the Ass his Master's Crib, and the like, this would be of no manner of force to ground any Argument upon, any more than the 16th of the First of *Genesis* would prove the Moon to be bigger than the Stars, because in Expressions of this kind that strike in with the vulgar apprehension, the sacred Style (unless other Circumstances determine us to a stricter Interpretation) may well be presumed to speak *Popularly* and by way of Accommodation. But should

should it at any time seem to deny Thought or Knowledge to Brutes, as suppose when it says, *Be ye not as the Horse, or as the Mule, which have no understanding*; that being so point blank against the common Sentiment and Appearance, would be of more considerable weight, and deserve the greater regard.

26. But I have two Things to observe from Scripture, in relation to the Point in hand. One is that the Scripture seems to represent the Souls of Beasts as *Material*, and the other is, that it seems to represent them as *Mortal*. First, as Material, as when this is assign'd as the reason of the Prohibition of eating Blood, because it is the Life. *Be sure that thou eat not the Blood, for the Blood is the Life, and thou may'st not eat the Life with the Flesh.* And so again to the same purpose, *whatsoever Man, &c. eateth any manner of Blood,* *Levit. 17. I will even set my Face against that Soul, &c.* *For the Life of the Flesh, is in the Blood, and I have given it to you upon the Altar, to make an atonement for your Souls.* For it is the Blood that maketh an atonement for the Soul. 'Tis remarkable that in these Words, another Reason is given for the not eating of Blood, besides what was mention'd in the former, viz. because 'tis given to make an atonement upon the Altar, as much as to say, I have set it apart for a higher use, to be a Ransom for your Souls, as a Type of the Blood of Christ, and

and therefore it must not be eaten. Now this Reason join'd to the other, seems to be a good comment upon it, and to intimate that when the Blood is said to be the Life, that should signify as much as that 'tis the very *Soul* of the Beast. For as 'tis the Soul that Sins, so it seems it should be the Soul that principally and properly makes the atonement. And accordingly tho' the whole Beast be offer'd in Sacrifice, yet the atonement is here ascribed to the *Blood*. As indeed it seems but reasonable that the best Thing in the Beast, should be that which atones for the best Thing in the Man, which will still make it carry a greater Proportion to the great Sacrifice of Christ, whose *Soul*

Is. 53. 10.

is said to be *made an Offering*

for Sin.

27. And as the Scripture seems to intimate the Souls of Beasts to be Material, so also (which is a natural Consequence of the other) to be *Mortal*. This it does when it distinguishes the Soul of a Beast, from that of a Man by this characteristick difference, that the one goes downwards to the Earth, and the other upwards. And more plainly, when it compares a Man that is in Honour, and without understanding, to the Beasts that

Is. 40.

perish. As much as to say, let a Man be never so considerable for Worldly greatness, yet if he understand not the true ends of living, nor what is

is his right Business and Interest in this World, he will live as much like a Beast, as if his Soul were to die with his Body, as the others *does*. But now if the Souls of Beasts are Matter, then by the next consequence they do not Think, because Matter, as we have before shewn, is not capable of Thought. And so also if they are mortal, then by the next consequence they are Matter, and so again do not think, because if they did, they would not be Matter, and consequently not Mortal.

28. He must want Eyes, that does not now see what a Wood of Difficulties and Objection this side of the Question is incompar'd with, where tho' there are variety of Paths, a Man can yet hardly make a Step in any one of them, without being intangled in the Briers, and arrested in his way! And yet in the midst of all this Perplexity could there be but one clear and rationally convincing Argument produced, to prove that Brutes have Thought, or Perception in any degree (as sometimes a conclusion that labours under great and unanswerable difficulties may yet as to the Truth of it be sufficiently *Evident*) the darkness should not hinder me from seeing the Light, nor should I for the sake of what is obscure and unaccountable, reject what is otherwise clear and manifest, as having made St. Austin's Rule a Maxim in my Metaphysics, *Nos negandum esse* *De dono Perseverie. remia. cap. 14.* *quod apertum est, quia comprehendendi non potest quod occultum est.* But indeed as

as far as I can discern, as there are a great many rational Objections that lie against the Supposition of Thought or Perception in Brutes, so the chief, if not the only Argument that can be brought for it, is that which is taken from what passes (as I may say) in their *Exterior*, as appears to our Senses. Which I doubt will be found to be a *Prejudice*, rather than a *Reason*.

29. 'Tis observ'd that Brutes have several Movements resembling those which in us are accompanied with, and proceed from Sensation, and that they do a great many things resembling those which we do by Thought, and which by the Beauty, Order, and Contrivance of them betray a thoughtful Principle. And hence, without any more ado, 'tis concluded that they feel, think, and understand. And this we are apt to look upon as a sort of experimental Evidence, as a sensible Proof and Demonstration of the Thing in question, and are ready to say, That we find by *Experience* that they think and feel; and all that is offer'd to the contrary (tho' with never so much Reason) is talking against *Sense*, and against *Experience*.

30. I deny not but that *Experience* is a very good Argument as far as it goes, and so is *Sense* too. And 'tis to no purpose to argue against them. But that we may not think they go farther than indeed they do, 'tis to be observed here, (and the careful observing of it will prevent

vent a great deal of confusion) that what we have a sense and an experience of in the present Case, is not that brute Creatures have Thought. We do not properly sense or experience *that*. All that we sense or experience, are the outward Actions and Motions which proceed from them, and the Effects that are done by them. These indeed we see. But as to the internal Principle from which they come, that we do not see, but *conclude* from what we see. But whether rightly or no, belongs to Reason to consider.

31. The Question then will turn upon this Point, whether this be a good Conclusion, or a necessary Consequence, that because Brutes express themselves (as I may say) in several Gestures and Motions resembling those which in our selves are accompanied with Sensation, therefore they *feel*; or because they do a great many Actions resembling those which we do by Thought, therefore they *think*? Or lastly, whether because they leave behind them several Effects or Works, which, by the Artifice and Contrivance of them, discover a thoughtful Principle, therefore that thoughtful Principle is in *them*? To these three plain Questions the final upshot of the Business will now come, the Suppositians upon which they proceed comprising within their compass the whole flourish that is usually made upon the strange things that appear in Brutes, in order to the proving that they have Thought. 'Tis all reducible

ducible (to avoid the tediousness of particular Instances) to the Motions that they use upon impressions made upon their Bodies; as crying, suppose, when struck, to the Actions that they do; as running away, suppose, when threatened or persued, and to the Effects which they leave behind them, as the building of Nests by Birds, or the making Honey by Bees, &c. These are the *Appearances*; and because these Things resemble such as we do by Thought, therefore 'tis pleaded that they which do them do also think. But the Question is, whether this be a necessary Consequence? To which, if I answer at all, I must answer, *No*. And that because these Appearances may be otherwise accounted for, without having recourse to any Principle of Thought in Brutes for the Solution of them.

32. For tho' Matter be not capable of Thought (as exceeding the whole Ideal *Stale* and *Compass* of it) yet nothing hinders but that it may be capable of such outward Movements as resemble those which in us proceed from that Principle. And when the Matter shall be supposed to be in the Hands of an omniscient and omnipotent Artist, that knows how to dispose its Parts, and to order its Motion to the best advantage, this its Capacity cannot then fail of receiving its utmost improvement. God has an infinite Wisdom to direct his Power, and as infinite a Power to execute the Dictates of his Wisdom; and when

two such Qualifications concur, we cannot reasonably doubt of the Possibility of effecting as much as this comes to, that a pure material Being may without thinking, by the mere Mechanism of its composure, exert the same sort of outward Motions which in us take their rise from a Principle of Thought. And surely those who exalt the Power of God so far as to be able to make Matter think (which those of the middle way, who suppose the Souls of Brutes to be material, and yet to have Thought, by consequence do) cannot without as great inconsistency as irreverence, I will not say deny, but so much as question the Possibility of this.

33. Nor sure can any Body else that shall duly consider how far the possibility of this Supposition is promised, nay, even exemplify'd in the Works of Art, and of *Nature*. Tho' the Power of Matter be so imperfectly comprehended by us, and we have so little force, and such unwieldy Instruments to reduce that little Theory which we have to Practice; yet what strange things in the way of Mechanism have been done by the Art of Man, and what stranger things yet may? And who can tell to what pitch of Perfection that continually growing Art will, by the constant Improvements of the Mechanical Sciences, in future Ages actually arrive? He that should have been told in some of the past ones, before the Invention of *Watches*, that there might be such an Instrument contriv'd, which by the bare mechanick

Structure and Disposition of its Parts should do what we see done by some of these Machines in the state of Perfection they are in at present, would have thought it incredible, perhaps impossible. And should one of the best of these Pieces of Art be now shewn to a Stranger of a barbarous Country, where nothing of this kind had been seen or heard of before, he would go near to think it *alive*. And perhaps the main Reason why 'tis not thought so by more, is because we see its inward Structure, the Springs and Wheels whereby its Motions are caused and regulated. Tho' after all, whether that be a good Reason why we should not think it alive, as truly as a Plant is alive (tho' not in so perfect a degree) I know not, as not being able to conceive any thing by what we call the *Life* of a Plant, but only a more perfect Mechanism, such a Structure or Disposition of its Parts, as inables it to receive in the Juices of the Earth, and to work them into its proper Substance, so as to grow or be nourished by them. And when that Structure is so disorder'd that it cannot do this, then the *vegetable Watch* ceases to go, or the *Plant* dies. This is as much as our Reason can conceive, tho' our Imagination may be apt to suggest somewhat more. I know not what *vital Principle*, but but could we see the Interior of a Plant as distinctly as we do that of a Watch, (but that indeed cannot be, the Works of Nature being so incomparably finer than those of Art) we should

should see by what Springs and Wheels its vital Operations, as we call them, are carried on, and so should no more think of Life in a *Plant* than in a *Watch*.

34. But among the many strange and stupendous Things done by the artful management of Matter and Motion, I chiefly mean and appeal to those which are near Imitations of Life and Sense, and where there is a ground laid for such a Train and Suit of Movements as resemble those which Thought ordinarily produces. The Grotto's and Water-works * M. Regis talks of in some great Mens Gardens, are a fit Illustration of what I mean, where when

Strangers enter they cannot help treading upon certain Springs so dispos'd, that if they approach to a *Diana* that is bathing her self, they will make her run away and hide in the Reeds or Rushes; and if they offer to go further in pursuit of her, they will make come towards them a *Neptune*, who shall menace them with his Trident, and forbid their curious Progress. Here you see are Movements that use to accompany the Passions of Shame and Anger, and the occasions upon which they are done makes it seem as if they proceeded from them here, and you may easily carry on the Train a great deal further if you please. But now if Mechanism can rise to such things under the Conduct of Human Art, what will it not be

* See the Preface to the 7th Book of his Physicks, Tom. 2. p. 504.

able to do under the Direction of a Divine Hand? And accordingly M. *Regis* in the same place applies this Instance of the *Grotto's* (and that indeed very ingeniously) to illustrate the Movements of Brute-Animals, telling us, that as soon as the Animal Spirits enter into the Cavities of the Brain, they pass from thence into the Pores of its Substance, and from those Pores into the Nerves, where, according as they enter more or less in some than in others, they are able to change the figure of the Muscles in which those Nerves are inserted, and by that means to give Motion to all the Members, as we may see in the *Grotto's* and Fountains of great Men's Gardens, that the sole Force with which the Water moves, as it issues from its Source is sufficient for the moving of divers Machines there, according to the various disposition of the Pipes which conduct it: For, says he, one may well compare the Nerves of the Bodies of Animals to the Pipes of the Machines of those Fountains; their Muscles and their Tendons to other Springs which serve to move them, their Animal Spirits to the Water which moves them, whereof the Heart is the Source, and the Cavities of the Brain are the Heads of the Conduit. In fine, we may consider the external Objects which, by their presence, act upon the Organs of Sense of Beasts, as those Strangers who entring into some of the *Grotto's* of these Fountains cause, without thinking of it, the Movements which are there done at their presence.

35. But

35. But to pass from Art to Nature, or from the Art of Man to the Art of God. The Works of Art are not so strange, but that those of Nature are much stranger; and that in the way of *Mechanism*, tho' partly our Ignorance of them, and partly our familiarity with them, makes us less sensible of it. The Works of Nature are so admirable, that 'tis one of our great Studies to contemplate them, and our Philosophy to understand them. And yet these Works, as excellent and as admirable as they are, must be confess'd, at least in great part, to be mechanically perform'd. The World is a great *Machine*, and goes like a Watch, and the several Bodies that compose its System are, as to their constituent Principles (for I speak not of their efficient Cause) mechanically made and laid together, and must be in like manner resolv'd and accounted for. And so as to the Operations of Nature, as great and as strange as they are, they proceed ordinarily from Mechanism, the wise disposition of Matter and Motion, and then do we understand them most perfectly, and philosophize upon them with best Satisfaction, when we can resolve them into their *Natural*, that is, their *Mechanick* Causes. For tho' other Principles (fit rather to amuse than instruct) have been pretended, yet I doubt not but that the true Reason after all why the Load-stone draws Iron, or why Salt preserves Bodies from Corruption, or why the Air dissolves them, why Rubarb purges,

or why the Fruit of the Quince-tree binds, why Opiates still and quiet the Spirits, or why Coffee disperses them, &c. I say, the true and only intelligible Reason of these Appearances (tho' not always very easy to find) must be such as is taken from the specifick Contexture of these Bodies, and the different Figure and Motion of those Parts whereof they consist. This you may call, if you please, *New Philosophy*, but 'tis what should have been the *Old*; and if any one should go about to reprehend it as injurious to Piety, and should gravely say, That mechanick Principles will not serve alone to account for the Phænomena's of Nature, but that we must needs have recourse to the Being of a God for the Explanation of them, he will be found to be one of those impertinent Objectors that are so far from confuting the Hypothesis they pretend to censure, that they do not so much as contradict it. For when the Moderns contend that there are no other Principles but Matter and Motion, &c. to be sought for in explaining the Phænomena's of Nature, they speak of the constituent or inherent Principles of Bodies, that there is nothing in the Bodies themselves but the Disposition, Figure, or Motion of their Parts that is the cause of their Operations, in opposition to those imaginary Principles of substantial Forms and Qualities introduced by the School of Aristotle, not in the least intending to exclude a God, neither from Being, nor from Operation, whom they

they suppose to have laid things thus mechanically together, and to conduct and direct them according to those general Laws of Motion which he has establish'd, whereby the course of Nature proceeds, so that the Earth it self may be said to bring forth Fruit mechanically, or as a great *Automaton*. And whether the Holy Text may not intimate something to that purpose by 'Αυτομάτη γῆ καρποφορεῖ, *Mark 4. 28.* I leave to be consider'd.

36. The very Structure of the Bodies of Animals plainly discovers a mechanical Intention, since otherwise to what purpose such a variety of Parts, and such an apt Arrangement of them, for the better dependance that is to be between them, and the easier Correspondence and Communication that one Part is to have with another. But as Man is the most perfect Animal, so his Body is the most perfect *Machine*, fearfully indeed and wonderfully made. And tho' 'tis most certain that we have in us a higher Principle than Matter and Motion, yet again 'tis also certain that there are several Movements in our Bodies, over which our Souls have at present no power (however it might be in the first Institution of Nature) and which are no more subject to our Wills than the ebbing and flowing of the Sea. And tho' it be true that there are other Movements of ours over which we have power, and which we do by the direction of Thought; yet 'tis as true too that we often do them without it, meerly by a mechanical

chanical direction of the Spirits into the Nerves and Muscles, as when we are in danger of falling, in which case we use such Movements for our Security as the severest Reason must approve, but whereof it cannot be the Causē; partly because there is not then any time for Thought or Deliberation, and also because the most that use them are utterly ignorant of the Laws of Mechanism, and yet order their Footing as artificially as the most skilful, placing their Bodies in the aptest Postures for their preservation such as the wisest Mechanist cannot correct.

37. But the most unexceptionable Instance that Nature gives us of her Mechanick Performances, is in *Plants*. Some *Animals* really have a Principle of Thought, and all pretend to it, and where there are two possible Springs of Action, it may be a little disputable from which it proceeds. But now (as was before observ'd) the very Life of a *Plant* can be nothing else but a certain Mechanism of its parts, and whatever is done either in it, or by it, must be done mechanically, since to suppose any thinking Principle in it would be to transcend the Order of *Vegetation*, and to pass into that of *Sense* at least, if not into that of *Reason*. Which even the limits which the common Philosophy has set to these degrees of Being, will not allow. All therefore that Plants do, they must do by pure Mechanism, and that even upon the very Supposition of the School-Philosophers. For there being

being but two conceivable Principles of operation, Thought and that, since they allow them no Thought (tho' I know not upon their Principles why they should not) they must acknowledge that they do what they do by the other. And yet what strange things do they do? I speak not of their Medicinal Operations, those alterative or sanative Effects which they have upon our Bodies (of which the Tree of Life in Paradise was a wonderful instance) which are so many and various as to require a particular *Art* for the Consideration of them, but of those which they perform within themselves. And these perhaps will appear, if compared upon equal Ground, not to yield to the most surprising performances of Brutes.

38. The Hony which the Bees by a natural Chymistry extract from Flowers, the Geometrical Structure of the Comb wherein they lodge it, together with the regular Oeconomy and Administration of their Government, is as strange a Scene, perhaps, as mere *Animal-Nature* has to shew. And yet whoever shall attentively consider how a Plant draws the Juices of the Earth to it self, works and elaborates those Juices till it converts them into its own Juice, then of that Juice (to say nothing of the Circulation of it, and its regular distribution through all the parts) turns some into Wood, some into Leaves, some into Blossoms, some into Fruit, some into beautiful Flowers, &c. He, I say, that shall dwell a while upon this Consideration

deration, and shall read those who have given us the Anatomy of Plants, and described the manner of their Growth, and in particular those nice and curious Observations which *M. Regis* has made of this kind, will perhaps by that time he has done, begin to think it no such unequal Collation if we should set the Plantal Operation against that of Bees; nor perhaps charge us with Partiality, if we should prefer it before it. And yet 'tis plain that all this is here done mechanically; and why not then as well in the other Instance? Or if you will have *Bees* to do what they do by Thought, then why not *Plants* too? And then what a wise World should we have, and what great reason for the Expression of *Common Sense*, when only Stocks and Stones would be deprived of it.

39. And thus whether we regard the Infinite Wisdom and Power of God, or the wonderful Examples of things done by way of *Machine* in the Works of Art, or of Nature, but especially if we consider altogether, we cannot I think with Reason or Modesty deny, but that 'tis possible those Actions or Movements which are observ'd in Brutes to resemble such as we do by Thought, may in them be the result of pure Mechanism, that God, if he pleases so far to exert his Power, may make a Company of Machines that shall do just as they do, and have the same appearances of Thought which they have. In one Word, that mere Matter so, and so disposed, so and so figured, and so and

and so moved (which comprehends all that Mechanism imports) may under the Conduct and Direction of an omniscient and omnipotent Agent, be able to produce such movements in Brutes, as come from Thought in us, and accordingly seem to argue it in them. This whoever can doubt of, will shew himself to have but a scanty notion of the Power of God, and as little to have consider'd those magnificent Proofs of it, which he has every where display'd in the Works of Nature, and that tho' he be not able by the Principles of Matter and Motion, to explain the Actions of Brutes in the particular which yet may be Mechanically perform'd, tho' our short and shallow Understandings may not always serve us to render a precise Account of the manner how. And yet I must not omit to remark that great Attempts have been offer'd in this kind, and greater yet no doubt may. But I shall not enter so far into the detail of the thing, referring those, who have that Curiosity, to what the new Philosophy has produced upon that Occasion.

40. Well but Brutes do not only do such things as resemble what we do by Thought, but such as by the Order, Proportion and Contrivance of the Work betray a Thoughtful Principle. True, they do so. And I do no more believe, that so Geometrical a Work as a Hony-Comb is made by chance, than I do believe that the World was made by chance.

No,

No, without doubt it is a thoughtful Work, and such as comes from a Principle of Thought, *Some-where*. But why must this Principle of Thought be in the Bees? For is not the Vegetation of a Plant, also a Thoughtful Work, and yet will they say that a Plant does it by Thought? No, here 'tis confess'd that the Principle of Thought is *without*, and by consequence that the Author of Nature does it in the Plant, by the Mechanical disposition of its Parts. And why not so in the other Instance, especially, considering that the Work itself does not more discover a Principle of Thought, than the manner of their doing it does that this Thought is not in them? And that because they do it always alike, after one constant uniform manner; without either Variety, or Improvement: which indeed is a general consideration that runs through all the Actions of Brutes, and is a strong Presumption, that Thought is not the Principle by which they act, but rather some natural Impression or *Instinct*, as 'tis call'd, which distinctly resolv'd can signify nothing intelligible, but a certain specifick contexture of Parts, determining Animals of the same kind to the like Actions upon the like occasions. Besides that after all, this Argument that would prove from the excellent contrivance of their Works, that they do them by Thought, will be found to prOVE a great deal too much, since if they do them by that Principle, they will not only Think, but out-think us,

us, it being impossible for the Art of Man, with all his Philosophy, to build a Nest like a Bird, or to extract Hony from a Flower like the Bee, which indeed is not at all strange, if you consider these Creatures as so many *Machines* set on Work for those purposes, by the great Artist (the whole wonder of the Matter then coming to no more than that the Works of Nature should exceed those of Art, which is no wonder at all) but utterly unaccountable if they do these things by Thought, unless you will suppose them to have better *Head-pieces* than our selves. But if they have so much Thought, or indeed any at all, 'tis much again that they do not give some Proof of it, in other Instances, but if they act in the way of Machine (as indeed this determination to one thing seems to intimate that they do) there will be nothing strange in this neither. For Watches must go as they are set.

41. But admit it possible that the actions of Brutes may be purely Mechanical, it does not hence however follow, you'll say, that they actually are so. No, it does not. Neither do I so argue. I know very well, that tho' we may argue from the exiistence of a Thing, to the possibility of it, because we then proceed from the greater to the less, yet we cannot argue from the possibility of a Thing, to the actual exiistence of it, as proceeding then from the less to the greater. I do not therefore conclude from the bare possibility, that the Actions of

of Brutes may be Mechanically done, that therefore they actually are so. I would only hence infer, that to say that they think because they do such Things as we do by Thought, is no good Argument, and that because the consequence is not necessary, because these sensible appearances may be otherwise accounted, *viz.* by the way of Mechanism. And this I think is a plain Consequence, for sure that which may be resolv'd into another Principle than Thought, cannot be said to argue Thought by him that has any. And this is as much as I intend in this part of the Argument concerning the possibility of the Mechanick way. But then when 'tis further consider'd what great Difficulties and Objections lie against their Thinking, and that the main Argument for it does not conclude, it may deserve Consideration (if the common Prejudice of the World can admit any such Thing) whether this put together, may not suffice to make it highly presumable that they do not think, at least to render it exceeding doubtful whether they do or no. Which will be enough to repress the Confidence of those supercilious Judges, who upon a few sensible appearances have so posseſ'd their Minds with the Supposition of Brutes having Thought and Perception, as to think there needs only the Assertion of a *Smile*, to confute those that shall offer to make any Question of it, tho' there is so much from Reason to be urged against it, and so little besides the

the confuse representations of Imagination and Sense, to be produced for it. But this shews what *Prejudice* can do, when an Opinion so common (as the Affirmative side of the Question is) shall have so little ground in Reason to support it, and when Men shall decide with Precipitation, and at sight upon a Question, than which I know none, within the whole Circle of Philosophy that requires a more strict Examination.

42. Such indeed I do not pretend to have made in this Discourse, which is not designed as a just Treatise upon the Subject, but only by way of *Essay*, to touch upon the chief Things, and to lay them into such a Scheme, as to open a View into the right State of the Question, that so it may appear which side of it bids fairest for our Approbation. And truly I think that by the Light wherein we have placed it, (as imperfect as it is) any one whose Eyes are free from the Tincture of Prejudice may now see, that that Opinion which supposes Brutes not to have any Thought or Perception, nor any Principle in them distinct from Matter, but to be purely Material, and to do what they do, by the advantageous disposition of Matter and Motion (which is the *Cartesian Hypothesis*) is by much the more simple, easy, safe and probable. For the *possibility* of it being but once admitted, which upon the foregoing Considerations, I see not how any reasonable Person can deny, the difficulties that lie on

the other sides, seem sufficient inducements to incline one to think it *true*, for indeed the way is perfectly blockt up with impassable difficulties on both the other sides, the final result of which among others, will be either to make us as Mortal as the Brutes, as in the mid-way that unites Matter and Thought in those Creatures, or else to make them as immortal as our selves, as in the other way that supposes them to think, and to have immaterial Souls, neither of which I presume can sit very easy upon the Mind of any Man, that can obtain leave of his Prejudices to make a free use of his Thoughts.

43. Should it now at last be objected against the side we have most favour'd, that if Matter can perform such strange Operations, then for ought we know, we our selves may be no more than *Machines*. To this I answer, that if indeed Matter did Think, then we our selves, notwithstanding our Thinking, might be no more than *Machines*. Which absurd consequence as was remark'd before, falls upon those of the middle way, who unite Matter and Thought in Brutes, by supposing them to have material Souls and yet to Think. But this does no way concern the *Cartesian Hypothesis*, which only holds that such Operations are done by Matter in Brutes, as resemble those which proceed from a Principle of Thought in us. For tho' it follows that if Matter did Think, then we who think may possibly have

no other Principle in us but what is material, yet it does by no means follow from Matters being able to exert such Movements (without Thinking) as Thought produces in us, that therefore we who think may be no more than Matter ; that is, in other Words, it does not follow, that because God can so Mechanize Matter, as to make it capable of doing some things that correspond to what we do by Thought, that therefore he can so Mechanize it as to make it *Think*. So that we who do Think, and are conscious to our selves that we do, should be concluded to be no more than Matter, only because some other Creatures, who do not think, but only imitate what we do by Thought, are supposed to be no more. 'Tis plain, I say that there is no ground for this consequence, and consequently no force in the Objection, which, tho' strong against those of the *middle* way, that unite Matter and Thought, does not at all affect the *Cartesians*, who do not use to link together such inconsistent and unsociable Ideas.

44. To conclude now with a Word or two, concerning the *Treatment* of Beasts. Tho' it is my Opinion, or if you will, my Fancy, that Reason does most favour that side which denies all Thought and Perception to Brutes, and resolves those Movements of theirs which seem to carry an appearance of it (because like those which we exert by Thought) into mechanical Principles, yet, after all, left in the Re-

solution of so abstruse a Question, our Reason should happen to deceive us, as 'tis easy to err in the Dark, I am so far from encouraging any practices of Cruelty, upon the Bodies of these Creatures, which the Lord of the Creation has (as to the moderate and necessary use of them) subjected to our Power, that on the contrary, I would have them used and treated with us much tenderness and pitiful regard, as if they had all that Sense and Perception, which is commonly (tho' I think without sufficient Reason) attributed to them. Which equitable Measure, they that think they really have that Perception, ought in persuance of their own Principle, so much the more *Conscientiously* to Observe.

CHAP. III.
Of *THOUGHT.*

1. Having shewn at large what it is that *He* thinks in us, I should now proceed to inquire *How* we think; but that I conceive it of some importance in order to the fuller display of the Nature of that Understanding, whose Account is here undertaken, to premise some Considerations concerning *THOUGHT* it self. For as the intireness of the Subject makes it necessary to be spoken to, so the order of the thing seems to require that we should first consider what Thought or Understanding is, before we consider how we Think, or after what manner we Understand. The whole Theory of Human Understanding being, as I conceive, reduceable to those two general Questions.

2. From what we have discours'd concerning the Principle of Thought, and the utter incapacity of Matter to think, it appears plain in the general that Thought is an *Act* of the *Mind*. But what that *Act* of the *Mind* is, which we call *Thought*, I shall not pretend exactly to tell, not because, as it happens in some Cases, I cannot explain it so well as I conceive it, and so should rather obscure than define it, but because indeed I do not

know. Only there are some things that may be observ'd concerning Thought, partly that relate to the Act of it, and partly that affect the Object of it, which may be neither unworthy of our Consideration, nor besides the Limits of our present Design.

S E C T. I.

Of formal and objective Thought. With some Reflections upon the scholastick Use of that Distinction.

Clearness of Thought depending upon the strictness and severity, that is, the determinate signification of Words, when ever it happens, as it but two often does, that the signification of Words is not determinate, we must endeavour to make it so by distinguishing their Ambiguity. And this is what we are concern'd to do in the present Case. For by Thought we sometimes understand, which indeed is the most proper acceptation of it, that Act or Operation of the Mind which we are conscious of when we think, abstracted from the Object of it. As when 'tis inquired, whether Brutes are capable of Thought? we are supposed by Thought here to mean the same as the Act of Thinking. Sometimes again by Thought we understand the Act of Thinking, not abstractly, but concretely, as it terminates upon its Object, or rather perhaps the very Object it self.

self. As suppose when 'tis said that a Thinking Being and an Extended Being, or a Circle and a Square, are distinct Thoughts or Conceptions, or when we speak of such a Thought, or such a Notion, or when God is said to know our Thoughts, then by Thought we at least include the Object, if we do not solely intend and denote it.

2. Thought then, it seems, may be taken either for the Act of Thought, or for the Object of Thought, in like manner as the Term (Faith) is used in Theology. But when I say the *Object*, I would be understood not of the secondary or ultimate Object, the thing said to be thought upon, as a Man or a Horse, but the primary and immediate Object, that whereby we think upon it. That is, as a School-Philosopher would express it, not the *Objectum quod*, but the *Objectum quo*; or to word it more agreeably to the Language of the present System, not of the Real, but of the Ideal Object. For so when 'tis said that a Thinking Being and an Extended Being are distinct Thoughts or Conceptions, and that therefore the Things themselves are distinct; by Thoughts in this way of reasoning must be meant, not the Things themselves, for that these are distinct is the Conclusion to be proved, but the Ideas of those Things, from the distinction of which it is argued to the distinction of the other. And therefore unless the same thing could prove it self, or be at once the Principle and the Conclusion, by

Thoughts, we cannot suppose the Real, but the Ideal Object to be intended. For if the Real, then the Sense would run thus, Thinking Being and Extended Being are distinct Things, therefore they are distinct Things. Which is to make the Conclusion the Reason of it self. Whereas the true Sense of the Argument is, That because the Ideas of these Things are distinct, therefore the Things themselves are no less so. Which plainly shews that as Thoughts here must be taken *objectively*, and not barely for the Act of Thinking, (since no consequence can be justly drawn as to the Natures or Differences of Things from any *mental Acts* of ours about them) so the Object that they refer to must of necessity be not the Real, but the Ideal Object.

3. Thought of the Act, or as it signifies the very Act of Thinking, I would for distinction sake, call *formal* Thought, as that of the immediate Object, *objective* Thought. For tho' in the reality of the thing there can be no thinking without thinking upon something; (any more than there can be seeing without something seen) yet the Act of Thinking may be consider'd without the Object thought upon, (even as the Act of Vision may be abstracted from the Thing beheld) that not belonging to the formality of Thought, which is complete without it, however it may to the Exercise of it, just again as it is in *Vision*. So then Thought has a complete Form or Essence of

of its own, as 'tis a certain mental Operation, independent on its Object, tho' as it *exists* it cannot but be accompanied with it, because of the inseparable Relation that is between the Act and the Object that it is conversant about. But there is no necessity that that should be taken into its formality; and when 'tis consider'd without it, in its pure intellectual Act, then I call it *formal* Thought, that is, Thought consider'd according to that metaphysical Form or Essence which it has as such a certain Operation of the Mind. So that in short, by formal Thought here is intended no more nor no less than the very formal Act of Thinking.

4. This distinction of formal and objective Thought or Conception is used by the Philosophers of the School, tho' in a Sense very different from what we have here assign'd to it. By *formal Thought*, if I apprehend them right they mean that Similitude or Representation by which the Mind conceives any thing. Which Similitude they seem to call *Conception*, upon the supposition that these Similitudes or Ideal Representations are the proper Product, and, as it were, natural *Off-spring* of the Mind. And they seem also to give it the name of *Formal*, partly as being the intrinsical and formal Term of Thought, and so as it were a kind of Form of the Mind that thinks, and partly as it formally represents to the Mind the Thing which is thought upon. That is in short, either as it terminates the Act, or as it represents,

resents the Object. Tho' I think this may be a better Reason why it should be call'd the Form of Thought, rather than formal Thought. But neither Men nor Things are always named with Reason. By *objective* Thought they mean no other than the Thing it self that is represented to the Mind by formal Thought, or by that intelligible Form or Similitude under which it is conceiv'd. By which it appears that their formal Thought is the same with our objective Thought, and that their objective Thought is no other than the outward Object or Thing said to be thought upon. But upon what account this should be call'd *Thought*, I find it not very easy to apprehend.

5. I shall not much contend with any that shall think fit to pay that deference to the Authority of the Schools as to call the immediate Ideal Object of the Mind (that which some call *Verbum Mentis*) by the name of formal Thought, tho' I think 'tis plain it cannot be so call'd without some Impropriety, it being as was before noted, rather the Form of Thought, or of the Thing thought upon, and so objective rather than formal Thought. And tho' we do often use this way of Expression, as when we say, the *formal Conception of a Thing*; yet 'tis plain we must mean not the very Conception it self, but the Form of the Thing conceiv'd, or the Form which we conceive of a Thing, which is indeed the Idea not the Conception. And therefore partly for this Reason, and partly

ly because there is no other Term left for the Act of Thought (which the Schools take no notice of in this distinction) and this most properly agreeing to that, and but improperly to the other, I think it best to express the Act of Thought by the Term of formal Thought, and to express what they call formal Thought by the Term of objective, or if you will, *Ideal* Thought. Which designs the same thing which they intend, only expresses it with less ambiguity; formal Thought being most apparently proper to be understood of, and so more apt to signify the very Act of Thinking, than that inward Term of it which they mark out by that name. And therefore I chuse rather to distinguish the former by the title of formal, and the latter by that of objective Thought.

6. But as to what the Schools are pleased to call objective Thought, meaning not the Ideal, but *Real* Object or Thing said to be thought upon, it seems not very obvious to understand why they should so call it; for sure nothing can have any just pretence to be call'd *Thought*, but what is either the Act of it, or what does at least intrinsically terminate that Act. And 'tis for this latter Reason that the Ideal Object, tho' we do not with the Schools call it formal Thought, because that name more properly belongs to the Act of Thought than to any Object of it; yet it may by reason of the Analogy which it has to the other in an allowable sense be call'd *Thought*, as being in the Mind when it thinks,

thinks, and as being the formal Term of its Conception: Whereas their objective Thought, as they call it, is neither the one nor the other of these; not the Act to be sure, nor yet the intrinsick Term of it, as being without the Mind. For which Reason indeed it is not so much as the Object of it, strictly and exactly speaking; for nothing can be the Object of Thought but what the Mind thinks upon, and the Mind thinks upon nothing but what is in the Mind when it thinks, and is the formal and intrinsick Term of its Thought. For this Reason I say it is not so much as the Object of Thought, unless in a remote and secondary Consideration, because that Ideal Object which truly is so, does formally express and represent it. And in this sense indeed it may be call'd the Object of Thought, as usually it is, as when we say we think upon a Man or a Horse, because the Ideas that terminate our Thoughts (and which therefore are the only true Objects of them) do formally represent such Things. But how it can so conveniently be call'd *objective Thought*, since it is out of the Mind that thinks, a Man had need wipe his Spectacles to see. Or if they will call it objective Thought, because it is in *some* sense the Object of Thought (for I know no other ground that can be pretended) then for the same and much greater Reason ought they to call the Species or Idea objective Thought, as being in the Mind that thinks as well as the immediate Object of it.

And

And yet this they call formal Thought, which seems very odd and untoward.

7. Formal Thought then in our way of considering these things, is the very Act of Thinking, and objective Thought is the immediate and intrinsick Term of that Act; which Act has a great Latitude, if taken at large, and such as will extend to more things than belong to our present Consideration. For under the name of formal Thought we may understand whatsoever we are conscious of as done in our selves, and so it will comprehend not only Understanding or Perception, but willing, desiring, loving, hating, hoping, fearing, and all the Passions, nay, even *Sensation* it self; for 'tis all formal Thought in one kind or degree or other. But as Thought in general is chiefly to be understood of formal Thought, so formal Thought is chiefly to be understood of Perception, that being the principal Act of it, and indeed the only formal Thought that we are directly concern'd with in the present Theory, which having Human Understanding for its Subject, is properly concern'd with that Thought which is the Operation of it.

8. What this formal Thought or Perception is, as to the reality of the thing, you will ask me in vain, because 'tis in vain that I ask myself. I know, or rather feel by inward Sentiment that I think, and I make a shift in a rational Method to find out what it is that thinks in me; but what that Act of mine which I call

call *Thinking* is, I want, I will not say words to express, but penetration of Thought to comprehend. Sometimes my Fancy whispers me that 'tis a kind of application of the Mind to its Ideal or Intelligible Object; but then I reject that again as a figurative way of speaking, borrow'd from the Position or Conversion of one Body to another. What that is indeed I know, but because I do so, I know also that it cannot belong to spiritual Beings, unless improperly and by way of metaphorical Allusion; which is as much as to say, that the thing it self does not really belong to them, but that something else does, which corresponds to it. But what that is, remains as much a Question as before. Then again I say to my self, that sure 'tis an intellectual Sight, a kind of Vision of the Mind. But here I correct my self again, as soon as I consider the meaning of what I say: For either Vision here is taken materially for that impression which is made upon the Visive Organs by the Rays of Light, and then there is nothing but a dark and confuse Metaphor in the Expression; or else Vision is here taken formally for that Sense or Perception which we are conscious of upon that luminous impression, and in this Sense vision is indeed the same with Thought, and so can give no Illustration to it. But what then shall I say it is? Or without offering at any thing further, shall I own my Ignorance? That I find I must do, since there is no seeing without Light. I enter into my self

self again and again, I consult my self over and over, but can have no answer. Nor can I reasonably expect any, till I have an Idea of my Soul. But that I know only by Sentiment, not by Idea, and having no Ideal Knowledge of my Soul, how can I have any of its Operations? And what I have no Idea of, how can I explain, tho' the inward Sense and Consciousness of it be never so quick, vigorous and lively in me? I must say then of Thought what St. Austin does of the Word of

the Mind, *Quaris a me quid sit verbum Dei? Si tibi vellem dicere quid sit verbum Hominis,* Sermo de Temp. 145. cap. 4.

non explico, fatigor, hasito, succumbo, non possum explicare vim verbi Humani. A Consideration certainly that ought to humble us in the height of our intellectual Attainments, to think that in the midst of our most elevated Thoughts and towering Contemplations we are yet so ignorant of our selves, and of what passes within us, as not to be able to tell what *Thought* is. And yet proud Man, that knows so little of himself, will be so vain as to pretend to things that are far above himself, as the Knowledge of *Angels*; nay, can hardly be beat off from fancying that he comprehends the *Divine Nature*, tho' he be so little acquainted with his own. Or else sure the Mystery of the Trinity would never have been so curiously pried into, nor so boldly disputed. Which gave occasion to St. Austin for this Re-

De temp. Sermo. 188. *Reflection, Lutum & vas signuli de Creatore disputat, & ad natura sue rationem non potest per- venire, & curiose querit scire de mysterio Trinitatis, quod Angeli in cælo scire non possunt.*

9. And yet as unknown as I am to my self, methinks I have a confuse Interview of this involv'd Secret, like the glimmering Light, that trims the edges of a dark Cloud. For I can distinguish between some acts of Thinking, and others. I know very well not only when I think, and when I do not Think (if any such time there be) I say I do not only know this, which reaches no further than the existence of the Thing, and lets me into no view of its Nature, but I can discern Perception from Will, I know when I simply perceive, and I know when I desire. And tho' I perceive whatsoever I desire (it being impossible I shoud Will what my understanding has no Notion of) yet I do not desire whatever I perceive, but sometimes I perceive only, there being nothing desirable in what I perceive. This actual Separation, shews a difference between these ways of Thinking, which is further confirm'd to me, by observing that I have certain Bodily motions which follow upon my Will, which do not follow upon my bare Perception. For let me Think (in the Perceptive way) of moving my Finger, never so intensly or never so long, and it continues as unmoved as the Center, but if I will the mov-

moving of it, in that very Instant it moves, which convinces me again of a difference between Thinking by way of mere Perception, and Thinking by way of desire. And this difference I see even before any such sensible Conviction of it, at least so far as to know that they do indeed thus differ. Tho' even this would be difficult to explain to another, as a great many Things are that are very evident, as well as that are very obscure.

10. Concerning this formal Thought, or Perception, 'tis further observable that the acts of it are always of a like and uniform Nature, so that all the diversity that is in Thought is from the *Objective* part of it. For whether I think of a Circle, or whether I think of a Square, whether I think of the Sun that shines in the Firmament, or upon the Candle that lights me in my Study now I write, my act of Thinking or formal Thought is the same. But 'tis my objective Thought that makes all the difference, variety and inequality that is here to be observ'd. And 'tis in this respect only that one Thought does at any time differ from another. The act is similar and uniform, having no other difference but that of a greater or lesser Intenseness or Application (which is only a gradual, not a specifick difference) but the Ideal Object is various and multiform, and 'tis the diversity of this Ideal Object that makes all the diversity and distinction that is to be found in our Thoughts, whether Natural or Moral.

This is hinted at by *Des Cartes* in his 3d Meditation, but for want of thus distinguishing between formal and objective Thought, not so clearly expressed by him as his other Notions generally are. So far, says he, as these Ideas are only certain Modes of Thinking, I perceive no inequality between them, and they all seem to proceed from me after the same manner, but as one of them represents one Thing, and another another, 'tis plain that they are very different from one another. For without doubt those which represent to me Substances are something greater, and as I may say, contain in them more objective Reality, than those which represent only Modes or Accidents. And so again that Idea by which I conceive a Supreme, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent God, the Creator of all Things that are besides himself, has certainly more objective Reality in it, than those by which I conceive finite Substances. The sum of this is, that there is no inequality in Ideas as Modes of Thinking, but only as one represents one Thing, and another represents another. And that so consider'd they are very different. True indeed they are so, but Ideas cannot be consider'd any otherwise than so, *viz.* than as thus diversly representative. They cannot be consider'd as Modes of Thinking, but only as the objects of Thought. 'Tis plain then that he confounds objective with formal Thought, both when he considers Ideas, as Modes of Thinking, and when he talks of their proceeding from us after the same manner,

ner, this being not applicable to the object, but only to the *Act* of Thought. For neither are Ideas Modes of Thinking, nor do they proceed from us after that uniform Manner he speaks of. So far from that, that they do not proceed from us at all, nothing belonging to Thought proceeding from us, or being properly ours, but only that very *mental Act* whereby we formally Think. As for the Ideal Object which we think upon, and which immediately terminates that *Act*, that we do not make, but find. Instead therefore of saying that there is no inequality in Ideas, as Modes of Thinking, but only as representative, he should have said (if I may assume the Liberty to correct the Writings of so great a Man) that there is no inequality of difference, in formal Thought, but only in objective Thought, which had been both clear and true. But as to Ideas (which are the Object) they are always different, and 'tis all the difference that *is* in Thought, which is specified and distinguish'd not from the *Act*, but from the term. Upon which consideration that comparison which a * Modern Philosopher uses is not unapt, ^{* *Du Hamel de mente humana.*} when he compares Thought to Motion, and the Ideal Object of it to the determination of it. For as Motion as to the formal Nature of it is always the same, and differs only as to the determination of it, so Thought as to the formal *Act* of it is always uniform and indistinct, and receives all its va-

riety and distinction from the Ideal Object which it contemplates, but can neither make nor diversify.

11. And for this very Reason it is that we are less sensible of the formal, than we are of the Objective part of Thought. When we think upon the several intelligible Things that upon all Occasions present themselves to our Minds, we do not usually regard the formal Act of Thinking, but most of our attention and application is upon the Object, which is almost the only thing that is generally minded in Thought. But this comes to pass not only because the Act is common and ordinary, and this or that Object but now and then occurs, but also and chiefly, because the Act is always the same without variety or diversity, whereas the Ideal Object is continually presenting us with a new *Scene*. For which reason the Object, tho' foreign to us, does yet affect us more than the Thought itself, which having no change in it, cannot so well awaken our Notice and Observation, so that we must be beholden to some *Reflection* to make us sensible of it. Concerning which in the following Section.

S E C T. II.

Of Direct and Reflex Thought.

1. **H**A D we as clear a Notion of *Thought* as we have of some other Things, 'tis not likely that so many thinking and philosophical Men would have agreed to express the Properties that belong to it by such *Terms*, and that because they are *Figurative*, that is, in their strict simplicity belonging to something else, and only by a proportional Accommodation applied to this. For sure that clearness which is so highly valuable elsewhere, is more especially to be affected and endeavour'd after here (when we speak of *Thought*) and to this purpose nothing can be more unserviceable than *Metaphor*. For however it may have its use in the perswasive way of Speaking, as working upon the Imagination, and stirring the Passions by those lively Scenes of Corporeal Imagery which it sets before us, yet certainly it is not so well fitted to enlighten and instruct the Mind as the more chaste and simple way is, and that because it does not express things according to their exact Natures which they have in themselves, but only according to some general and confuse Resemblances which they have as to other things. For which reason this Figurative way is not to be used when we design clearness, and our Business is only to Instruct, and therefore when-

ever in such Cases we do use it (as sometimes we are forced to do) 'tis either because we want Judgment in the manner of wording our Discourse, or because we have not a clear Idea of the Subject we would discourse of, and so not being able to discourse of it exactly as it is, we are fain to express our selves of it as we can. The latter of these may be presumed to be the present Case, when we say of Thought that 'tis *Direct*, or *Reflex*. For it being not presumable that so many Philosophical Men should be so injudicious as not to prefer a simple way of Speaking here before a figurative one, if it could be had, we may suppose that they used the latter because they had not an Idea of Thought clear enough to support the former.

2. 'Tis supposed here that these Terms, *Direct* and *Reflex*, are figurative when applied to Thought. And 'tis certain that they are so, and that because they properly belong to *Motion*, between which (as being a Mode of Matter) and Thought, there is no less than an entire and ideal Diversity. And whatever is proper to one thing, must be Figurative if applied to another. Then we say a Motion is *Direct* when a Body moves on without changing its determination, and then *Reflex* when there is a change of its determination upon the Rencentre of another Body which it cannot move or displace. For it being impossible that a Body should lose its Motion any otherwise than as it communicates it, if it meets with one to whom

whom by reason of its resistance it cannot communicate it, it must needs continue its Motion in the same *Quantity*, and only take a new *Determination*, quite contrary to what it had before, which is what I conceive we are properly to understand by *Reflexion*. By which it appears that Motion is one thing, and the Determination of it another thing, because the Motion continuing the same the Determination of it is changed, and that in a Direct and Reflex Motion the contrariety does not so properly lie in the *Motions* (for Motion is not contrary to Motion, but Rest) as in their *Determinations*, which are the only Things that are here truly opposite, and in respect of which all Motion must be said to be either Direct or Reflex.

3. These Terms then when applied to Thought are *Figurative*, and the Figure is taken from Motion, or rather the Determination of it, where indeed they are *proper*. All the Business will be to reduce this Figure to a Simplicity: Direct and Reflex as it is in Motion cannot be in Thought, because Thought is ideally distinct from Motion, and so cannot be capable of its Properties. But there is something in Thought, or at least this Form of Expression supposes that there is, that carries some resemblance to these determinations of Motion. But to express this resemblance in its naked simplicity, is perhaps no more possible than to tell what Thought it self is, and that for the same common reason, because we have no clear Idea

of our Souls. All that can be done here is to design what that Thought is which we call Direct, and what that Thought is which we call Reflex, that so we may not be supposed to talk like Parrots, by using these Terms altogether without any meaning under them. Now as to this, I conceive that then Thought is said to be Direct when the Act of Thought terminates upon its ideal Object; and then Reflex, when the same Act of Thought terminates upon it self, or is its own Object. As when a Man thinks that he thinks: In which Act there seems to be a kind of a return of the Mind upon it self as in that determination of Motion which we call Reflex, but how or what it is I do not well understand, and therefore shall not go about to explain.

4. We may take occasion here to remark by the way, that tho', as was said, there is no thinking without thinking upon something, yet that 'tis not necessary that that something should be always an *Idea*, since as you see it may sometimes be the very Act of Thought, which may be an Object to it self. And 'tis further observable that *Object* is of a larger extent than *Idea*. For tho' every Idea is an Object, yet every Object is not an Idea, since the very formal Act of Thinking which is most apparently distinct from Idea, may also be consider'd as having the express formality of an Object, as it is in that reflex way of thinking we are now speaking of, wherein the Mind retiring

as

as it were from all Ideas turns its view as I may say inwards, and in a very wonderful manner considers what passes there. In which Act of hers 'tis hard to tell which is the most great and noble, whether the Spectacle beheld, or the View.

5. 'Tis this reflex Thought that chiefly distinguishes the Character of what we call a *Thinking Man*. *Direct Thought* is more easy (the Mind seeing better a little from it, than so very near at hand) and for that reason more common: Men ordinarily use this in considering the several Ideal Objects that occur to their Minds, and there is also something in those Objects upon the account of the novelty and variety of them, as well as the greater brightness of the Light wherein we behold them, which draws off the Mind from it self to the Contemplation of them, wherein finding more Light and more Pleasure, no wonder that it chuses to be out of it self, and converse abroad rather than at home, upon a Principle not much unlike that whereby we generally love the company of Strangers better than our own. For this reason it is that all the World thinks *directly*, at one rate or another. But there is but here and there a Man that *reflects*, that turns himself to himself, and carefully and attentively observes what's doing in his own Mind, and considers the various workings of that intellectual Principle which is the Dignity and Excellency of his Nature, that sets him above

bove the Beasts, and but little lower than the Angels. This is but dry Entertainment to the generality even of studious and curious Men, they would rather study Books than Things, and any thing rather than their own Minds, by which means it comes to pass that when they know almost every thing besides, they live in a deep ignorance of themselves, like those that have travell'd most parts of the World, and yet are Strangers to their own Country.

6. For I must further remark that 'tis this reflex Thought that teaches us the knowledge of our selves, that Knowledge of our selves which both *Pagan* and *Christian* Philosophy so earnestly recommend, and inculcate as the most useful and important Lesson, that Man has to study. As indeed it truly is, tho' few value it, and most industriously fly from it. But while Philosophers exhort to the Study of it, 'tis Reflection only that teaches it, and that in the School of Solitude and Retirement, which is as little liked as either the Lesson, or the Mistress. 'Tis by Reflection that we come to know the true State of Human Nature. We enter into our selves, and taking a quiet view of our own intellectual Frame, we learn how 'tis with other Men, as having discover'd in our own Breasts the Springs by which they act, and consequently know how to deal with them. 'Tis by Reflection also upon the Operations of our Minds, that we come to find out the way how to direct them in the research of

of Truth, *Logick* being the result of Reflection and of those Observations that are made by it, upon the due or undue use of our rational Faculties. But Reflection has also a very friendly Influence upon good Manners, as being that faithful Mirror that shews a Man himself, and returns to him the Moral State of his Soul, and so helps him to correct what is amiss there, as also to govern his Thoughts, and to keep a guard over his Passions. So that in fine when we have used our Thoughts in the *direct* way, never so long to make us *Learned* and *Knowing*, we must be beholden at last to *Reflexion* to make us *Wise* and *Good*.

S E C T. III.

Of Thought of Perception, and Thought of Volition, wherein also of Idea and Sentiment.

1. **W**E were speaking last of reflex Thought. And when we do indeed reflect upon our Thoughts (which we but seldom have the leisure or the Inclination to do) one of the first Things we shall discover concerning them perhaps will be, that some of them are in the way of mere *Perception*, and some in the way of *Volition*. Which I take, next to that of formal and objective, to be the most general division of Thought. Only I was willing to premise that of direct and reflex before it, because 'tis by *Reflexion* that we come to learn what

what the several Acts of Thought are which we are conscious of in our selves.

2. How to make these Terms (*Perception* and *Volition*) any clearer than they already are, I do not well know, as not pretending to know much more of the things signified by them, than only to distinguish one from the other. And that I can plainly and easily do. Whether I perceive only, or whether I will also what I perceive, I plainly discern that willing is one thing, and perceiving is another. But especially when I only perceive without willing (as I may do, tho' I cannot Will without perceiving) because then the actual separation shews the distinction, which is also further confirm'd *a Posteriori* from those bodily Movements which follow upon a Thought of *Volition*, but pay no manner of Obedience to our Perceptions.

3. Perception is either in the way of *Idea*, or in the way of *Sentiment*. For even our very *Feeling* is a sort of Perception, and is usually so call'd. Perception in the way of *Idea*, is when we perceive something that is without us, and distinct from us, even that Idea which is the immediate Object of our Thought. Perception in the way of *Sentiment* is that inward feeling which we have of our selves, and of the different Manner of our Being, as when we are in Pleasure or in Pain. The former of these for distinction's sake I would call *Intellectual* or *Ideal Perception*, and the latter *sensible Perception*.

ception, or in one Word, *Sensation*. The difference between which may already in great Measure appear, and shall be more fully laid open hereafter.

4. At present I shall only further remark that Perception, and that in the Ideal way is the only Act of Thought that properly belongs to the *Understanding*. And because this is one of those Points, upon which the new Philosophy has adventured to divide from the old, it may be worth our while, and not besides the Business of a Theory, that undertakes to inquire into the manner of Human Understanding, to touch upon it in a few Reflections.

5. The old Philosophy has been so liberal to the Understanding as to bestow a theefold Act upon it, *viz.* *Apprehension*, *Judgment*, and *Discourse*, By Apprehension meaning the Simple view or Perception of a Thing. By Judgment the Union or Separation of Things by Affirmation or Negation. And by Discourse the deduction of one Thing from another; which threefold Division of the intellectual Operation, has furnish'd the Logicians with so many capital Grounds to proceed upon in their ordinary Systems.

6. But neither the Matter, nor yet the Form of this division (as authentick as time and consent have made it) are unobnoxious to just exception. For first allowing for the present the Matter of it to be right, that is, that those

those three Acts did really belong to the Understanding, yet the Form seems not to proceed according to Art. And that because the third Member in the division is contain'd under the second, that which they call Discourse being only a mediate Judgment, and differing from Judgment at large no otherwise than as a Conclusion differs from a Proposition, as being only the judging a Thing to be so, or so, for such a Reason. And I hope judging will be never the less, judging for having a Reason for it.

7. But the Matter of this Division, will perhaps be found to be as faulty as the Form. For Judgment and Discourse, or to speak more collectively, Judgment (the latter being only a Species of the former) seems rather to belong to the Will, than to the Understanding, as being nothing else but that assent or dissent which the Will gives to what the Understanding perceives, or seems to perceive, by affirming or denying, that is, embracing or refusing what is proposed, according to the apparent Evidence wherewith it comes. For why may there not be a willing and a nilling that belongs to Truth as well as that which respects good? And what is Judgment but that Act of the Will which respects Truth, not as desiring such a Thing to be true (for so it must be consider'd as *good*) but as acquiescing or consenting that it is so. And indeed if the Will be the subject of Error, as it seems reasonable

sonable to think, because 'tis so of *Sin*, the greatest of all Errors, 'tis plain that Judgment must belong to it too, since Error is no other than a wrong Judgment.

8. And this we have always in our Power, to avoid by assenting to no more than what we clearly perceive. For as Error in the formality of it, is the assenting to what is false, so the cause of Error is the assenting to more than we perceive, for by this means we come to assent to what is false, or to *err*. But now tho' by reason of our not only finite, but very limited capacity, we are necessarily ignorant of many Things, yet it is always in our Power to avoid Error, by suspending our assent, till the light and evidence of Truth demands it of us. We have then it seems a free Command over that assent. And tho' we are not presently to conclude that the Will is the subject of Error (and consequently of Judgment) because we can avoid it if we Will, since the cause of Error may not always be the Thing that errs, yet if we consider how it is that we can avoid it, and find that it is by that Empire which we have over our Act of assent, in being able to suspend it at Pleasure, we may more reasonably argue, that that Assent or Judgment, which we have so much Power over, is an act that properly belongs to the Will.

9. But what then will be the Work of the Understanding? Why to *Perceive*. And is not that Work enough? Methinks I find it so, but if

if I did not, I know not how inlarge it. For sure the busines of the Understanding can be no other than to *Understand*; and what can we possibly mean by Understanding, but only *Perceiving*? and besides the Object of the Understanding, being in the whole compass of it, nothing else but Ideas and their Relations, I see not what the Understanding has to do, but only to perceive those Ideas, and the Relations that are between them. And when this is done, then is a thing sufficiently Understood, and if it be thoroughly done, then 'tis understood as much as it possibly can be. For sure he that in any Science has a thorough Perception of the Ideas that belong to that Science, and of the Relations that belong to those Ideas, understands as much of that Science as is to be understood, and I know not what Instructions you can further add to make him understand it better. Whereby it appears, that Perception is the only Operation that properly belongs to the Understanding, and tho' there may be some variety in that, yet that it can have no other.

10. All *Judgment* then belongs to Thought of Volition, and is an act of the Will, reposing it self, and acquiescing in what the Understanding perceives, and rejoicing as it were in its Light.

For there is a twofold act of the Will, one that respects *Good*, and another that respects *Truth*. Between which, two general Objects of

of the Mind, there seems to be this difference, that Truth is that *absolute* Relation which things have among themselves, whereas Good is that Relation of Agreement, or as the Schools call it, *Convenience*, which they have to us.

Now that act of the Will which respects *Good* is either its bare acquiescence in its being so, that is, its assenting to that Relation of convenience which it has as to us, which seems not at all to differ from that assent which is given to *Truth*. Or that movement of Love, whereby it is carried towards it as such.

That act of the Will which respects *Truth*, is more single, as being in the general but one, and that is what we call *assent*, which is its acquiescence in that absolute Relation, which appears to be between things in themselves.

But then this assent is of several kinds, according to the degree of the Perception, or the different quality of its own proper Motive or Ground.

There are indeed three Assents. Not *Faith*, *Opinion* and *Science*. For 'tis plain that Science is no assent, but rather one of the Grounds upon which it proceeds. For I assent to what I know. Science then is not Assent, but Perception, and as such belongs not to the Will, but to the Understanding. But however there is a threefold Assent, and the ground of it is this.

All assent is either upon the evidence of the Thing, or upon Authority or Testimony. If upon Authority, then 'tis what we call *Faith*. If upon Evidence, then this Evidence is either complete or incomplete. If incomplete, then the Assent, which is given to it is what we call *Opinion*, which is an imperfect Assent, or Judgment. But if the Evidence be complete, then 'tis another kind of Assent that is given to it, and what should be call'd by another Name, that may contradict distinguish it to *Opinion*. But I know no particular Name for it at present, and therefore must be contented with the general one of a *full or perfect Assent*.

This full Assent I think passes in the Schools for *Knowledge*. But 'tis plain, that Knowledge is not Assent, but Perception. Neither again is Knowledge opposed to Opinion, but to Ignorance. That which is opposed to Opinion must be contain'd under the same common *Genus* with it, and so must be an Assent as Opinion is. But what particular Name (since *Knowledge* is not a proper one) to give this Assent, which answers to Opinion, I know not; nor is it for me to impose any. 'Tis enough for me to understand the Things, and till a more particular Term be assign'd, to distinguish them by the Names of a perfect and imperfect Assent.

But then concerning Assent 'tis further observable, that 'tis either immediate or mediate. For as there is an immediate or mediate Perception,

ception or Knowledge (concerning which more hereafter) so also is there an immediate or mediate Judgment or Assent. If the Assent be immediate, as when the Relations of Ideas are judged of, or assented to, upon an immediate collation of the very Ideas themselves, then 'tis simple Judgment, or Judgment and no more. If the Assent be mediate, as when they are assented to by the mediation of some other Idea, then 'tis Reasoning or Discourse, which is an illative Judgment, or judging a Thing to be so, or so, not simply as before, but for such a Reason.

For all Reasoning is Judgment, tho' all Judgment be not Reasoning. And all Judgment and Reasoning properly so call'd, belongs to the Will. The Understanding, as such, does nothing but Perceive. But still Truth is the Object of both, of the Understanding as perceiving it, and of the Will as assenting to, or acquiescing in what the Understanding perceives.

11. Hence then we gather, that the proper defect of the Understanding is *Ignorance* or *Non-perception*, as that of the Will is Error or a wrong Assent. And that tho' we rightly may, as we usually do, distinguish between an affected and not affected *Ignorance*, yet we cannot in like manner distinguish between an affected and not affected *Error*, since by the Premises, it appears that all Error is in some degree affected. For tho' from an Errors being wil-

ful, we cannot strictly conclude, that therefore Error is in the Will as the Subject of it, (for then we might also conclude Ignorance to be in the Will, since that also may be Wilful) yet from Errors being in the Will, we may on the other side conclude that 'tis always Wilful. As indeed it is, it being always in our Power to avoid it, by not judging if we do not Perceive, or by not Judging any farther than we Perceive. Which I take to be the true Reason why tho' Ignorance may be sometimes excusable, yet Error is always a Fault.

S E C T. IV.

Of Active and Passive Thought, with a Reflection upon the Scholastick Distinction of agent and patient Understanding.

1. **T**Hought in the Latitude of it, comprehending Volition as well as Perception, and Perception being Sensible as well as Ideal, we have from hence, an Occasion given us to consider another Distinction that may be made of Thought into Active and Passive. Which denomination, tho' attributed to Thought, may yet perhaps more primarily and properly belong to the Mind that *Thinks*, there being some Thoughts wherein the Mind is active, or does something, and other Thoughts, wherein the Mind is Passive, and receives as it were

the

the Action of something else. I say the *Mind*, that signifying as I apprehend the whole Thinking Power of the Soul, or the Soul as it Thinks at large. For as by the *Understanding* here is intended that Power in us which Perceives, so by *Mind* I think (as that Term is distinguish'd from the other) we are properly to mean that Power which both Perceives and Wills, the latter being attributed to the Mind as well as the former, which is therefore esteem'd the Subject of Moral, as well as of Rational Perfection, According to which is the Language of Scripture, when it speaks of our being *renew'd in the Spirit* Ephes. 4. 23. *of our Mind.*

2. Now to distinguish what Thought in us is Active, and what Passive (meaning in which it is that the Mind is one or the other respectively) we have no other way, but to reflect upon what we are conscious of in our selves, and when we do so, we shall find in the first Place, that all Volition is Active, and purely Active. For tho' *Love*, which is a sort of Willing, is often call'd a *Passion* (a general Name for the several Acts of the Will, as they are accompanied with certain bodily Movements) yet this I think ought to be understood, only with respect to that certain Mechanical Commotion of the Body, which attends that Thought of the Mind, and not with respect to the Thought it self, wherein, whatever affections or alterations the Body may suffer, the

Mind is truly active, as indeed it is in all the Operations of the Will. Which as I conceive is the Reason why the Soul is accountable for these sort of Thoughts, and of that moral distinction, as to Good and Evil, whereof they are capable.

3. And as Thought of Volition is purely active, so sensible Perception or Sensation is as purely passive. The Soul has no immediate Power over her Sensations, as not being able to modify her self. And accordingly we find by experience that we cannot give our selves Pleasure or Pain, any otherwise than by making use of such impressions of Bodies, as by the Law of Union, between our Soul and Body, have an ordinary connexion with such Sentiments, nor then neither, if the mechanical Texture of our own Bodies happen to be so disturb'd or indispos'd that the Motion impress'd upon the Nerves be hinder'd from being communicated to the Brain. And as the Soul has no immediate Power over her Sensations, so as to produce them by any Act of hers, so neither is Sensation it self an Act of the Soul, but rather the Reception of the Act of some other Being, which has Power over her. Indeed when we have any Sensation, as Pleasure or Pain, 'tis hardly possible but that some Act of the Mind will be consequent upon it, as of intellectual Perception in reflecting upon what we feel, or of Volition in willing or refusing it as grateful or ungrateful, but still the *Sensation* it

it self is no Act, but only a different state or manner of Being in the Soul, which as it comes from the Cause that produces it, however it may be call'd an Act, yet as it is in the Soul, it is no Act but a Passion, as not being any thing that the Soul does, but something which it suffers or receives.

4. But now as to that other Perception which (to distinguish it from Sensation, which is also a kind of Perception) we call *Intellectual*, that is partly active and partly passive. Some will tell you that 'tis only the latter. And I confess they have so far reason for what they say, as it is a kind of Reception of the intelligible Object or Idea, which indeed may import no more than a *Passivity*, but sure methinks to *perceive* should also imply some Act of the Mind about that intelligible Object, or else how is it *perceiv'd*? And our own Experience and Reflection will teach us that the Soul is not idle in this any more than in any other way of Thinking, but employs her self with a great deal of Activity, especially in the Contemplation of some Objects, where the Ideas are very abstract, or where their Relations are very compounded. Nor is this Activity of Perception only the Will which the Soul has to perceive. This indeed it has, but then besides this (for every one that is willing to perceive, does not presently perceive, as a Man may be willing to see, and yet be in the dark) there is also a certain Effort or Exertion of Mind in intellectual

Intellectual Perception, that which is usually express'd by *Attention*, and in this consists that labour of Thought which we call *Study*. And if we reflect, we shall find that this Attention in perceiving is a very distinct thing from the being barely willing to perceive, since there is a causal connexion or dependence between them, our willingness to perceive being the reason why we attend. But besides the Soul finds difficulty in Thinking, especially upon some things, which would not be if the Understanding were only passive, or receptive of Ideas, and had nothing to do in the *Contemplation* of them, which very word seems to imply Action as well, if not rather than Passion. And this is so natural a Supposition that our common Language runs upon it, wherein 'tis ordinary to say, an *Act* of Thought, or an *Act* of Perception. And accordingly the Schools themselves, tho' they expressly make the Understanding to be a passive Power; yet 'tis obvious to observe that they call (let them see with what consistence) the several Thoughts of it by the name of *Operations*. And so Knowledge which belongs to the Understanding, and is a sort of Perception, is by them said to be a *Habit*; tho' again, by their own Doctrine, a Habit results from a frequency of *Acts*. And so likewise *Happiness* is said to be an *Operation*, and that not of the sensitive, but of the intellectual part only, and that too more minutely yet (according to the School of *Aquinas*) of the

Understanding and not of the Will. In which Expressions they seem to forget that the Understanding is a passive Power, since that which is purely so cannot act, or have any Operation. But now we speak of *Happiness*, I would further offer it to be consider'd, whether it does not seem a lazy Supposition, and an unworthy Notion of that *Rest* which Heaven means, to suppose that it consists in a State of Inactivity, and that in the beatifick Vision of God, and the Contemplation of all those intelligible Truths which shine forth from his glorious Essence, the beatified Soul should have nothing to do, but be as purely passive in her Understanding, as some fancy she is now in her Will, as passive to the Light of *Truth*, as they fancy she is now to the Influences of *Grace*. And if such a passive inactive State as this is to be our future Happiness, whether it be so conveniently expres'd by the name of *Life*, which imports so much of Activeness in the ordinary Conception we have of it. Upon which Considerations it seems reasonable to conclude, if not that Perception it self is an Act, yet at least that the Soul is active as well as passive in her intellectual Perceptions, which is as much as the present purpose requires.

5. This distinction of ours, of active and passive Thought, carries a sound, much resembling that of the Schools, concerning *Agent* and *Patient* Understanding, but is in sense and intention very different from it. For in our di-

distinction the meaning is, that there are some Thoughts wherein the Mind acts, and some again wherein it only receives the Action of another, so that still 'tis the same thinking Principle, and as thinking, that is, both active and passive. Whereas tho' they distinguish of an *Agent* and *Patient* Understanding, and so seem to ascribe Thought to each, yet when they come to explain their Sense, we find that with them 'tis the *Patient* Understanding only that truly thinks, understands, or perceives. The Business of that which they call *Agent*, being not to *understand*, but to form intelligible Species for the Contemplation of the other. Which indeed is to make it active with a witness, tho' not in the way of Understanding. It being certainly a Work of more difficulty to form Ideas, than it is to perceive them, or understand by them. But the Schools, if they had so pleas'd, might have spared this Imposition upon poor *Intellectus Agens*. For Thanks be to God, we want not Ideas, nor could any Faculty of ours pretend to make them if we did. Nor indeed is it the Business of Human Understanding to make Ideas, but only to contemplate them, which alone (without working at that intellectual *Forge* which the Schools have set up) will sufficiently employ all its Activity as well as Capacity. But concerning this Matter, we shall have occasion for further Reflections hereafter. In the mean time let us proceed to some other Considerations of *Thought*.

S E C T.

S E C T. V.

Of simple and complex Thought, with some Remarks concerning Knowledge.

I. **T**HIS Consideration of Thought will be found perhaps to carry a double Aspect, one respecting the Act of Thought, as it is in it self, and the other as it relates to its Object. In *Thought of Volition* it respects the Act purely as in it self, which is sometimes said to be *complex*, not as if the Act it self were *compounded* (for I know not whether any Act of Thought be complex in that sense) but because it *compounds* or puts together something else. For so, for instance, that Act of the Mind which we call *Judgment*, which has been shewn to belong to the Will, as being an Assent or Dissent to what the Understanding proposes to it, this Judgment, I say, whether immediate or mediate, whether Judgment by way of Proposition, or Judgment by way of Conclusion; whether enunciative or illative Judgment, is a *complex* Thought, as uniting and compounding one thing with another, in opposition to that Apprehension or Perception which is rightly said to be *simple*, because it rests in the pure view of things as they are, without affirming or denying any thing concerning them, and is indeed the first Act or Operation of the *Mind at large* (which perceives in

in some degree or other before it wills or judges) but not the first, but rather only *Act of the Understanding.*

2. But now in Thought of Perception, this distinction of Simple and Complex respects the *Act* partly as in it self, and partly as it relates to the Object: First, as it is in it self; for as Thought of Volition is in that respect said to be sometimes complex, because of the Composition, or rather Componency, which is in that its Operation, which we call Judgment, so in the same respect, but for a contrary reason, Thought of Perception is simple. As indeed it always is as to the *Act*, even when it is complex as to the Object, as having no Composition or Division in it. But then as it relates to its Object, it is partly simple and partly complex, according as the Nature of the Object is. Then is Perception, in the present way of considering it, said to be simple, when the Object of it is simple, and then complex when the Object of it is complex. And since the intire and adequate Object of Thought (as will hereafter appear) is comprised within the compass of Ideas and of their Relations, we may more explicitly say that then is Perception simple when it is the Contemplation of Ideas only, and then complex when with the Ideas it takes in also the Consideration of their Relations and essential Habitudes. It is simple, when it has for its Object the single and solitary Ideas, and 'tis complex when it considers those *Truths* which result from those Ideas.

3. Per-

3. Perception then is either simple or complex; but whether one or the other, 'tis always simple as to the *Act*, as not compounding or dividing, tho' partly simple and partly complex as to the *Object*. And since it is so, this Perception, according to the whole Latitude of it, is what the Schools either do or should mean by their *simple Apprehension*; for when they call it *simple*, they must in reason be presumed to mean as to the *Act*, partly in opposition to the *Acts* of Composition that follow, and partly because if they meant simple as to the *Object*, they should also have put a complex Apprehension to answer to it in the same kind, which, meaning it as to the *Act*, they could not do, because indeed there is no complex Perception as to the *Act*, and accordingly they were forced to go immediately off to Judgment and Discourse. But now even complex Perception, as to the *Object*, is simple as to the *Act*, and is therefore to be concluded within the compass of their simple Apprehension, which should not, rightly comparing Things, be understood as to the simplicity of the Ideas *apprehended*, but as to the simplicity of the *Act apprehending*, which is found as much in a complex as in a simple Perception. And consequently their simple *Apprehension* ought to have that reach as to include one as well as the other, or else (which is further considerable) there will, I think, be no place allow'd for, nor notice taken of *complex Perception* in their whole System.

System, which is not to be supposed, the Perception of the Relations of Ideas being plainly as much a Perception as that of the single Ideas themselves, and consequently as much to be consider'd: Which therefore 'tis the kindest Interpretation to suppose them to do under their *simple Apprehension*, tho' I must confess their way of expressing themselves, seems so loose and indetermin'd, that sometimes one would think that by their simple Apprehension they meant the Perception of single Ideas only, and sometimes that of their Relations. As when a

a certain Scholastick Writer says, *When we hear the name of a Man, we form in our Minds a certain simple Conception. And*

Eustachius, summa Philosophae, p. 12.
so when we hear the name of Animal, we form also a simple Conception conformable to it. Which is the work of the first Operation. Then apprehending the Nature of an Animal and a Man, we animadvert that there is some Agreement between them. Whereupon we attribute Animal to Man, by affirming thus, Man is an Animal, &c. Observe here that having spoken of the Conception of simple Ideas, and ascrib'd it to the first Operation (by which one would think he made the first Operation to consist in the Conception of simple Ideas) he talks afterwards of our Animadverting an Agreement between them, and upon that, of our Attributing one to the other. But now what can this Animadverting be which he places between the Conception

ception and the Attribution, but the *Perceiving* that agreement? And what can our attributing upon this Animadversion signify, but our judging so and so, because we perceive so and so? Which as it plainly implies, that there may be a perception of Relations, as well as of Ideas, so it seems to imply further, that that apprehension which he had made, the first Operation should take in the former as well as the latter, because of that *Attribution* or Judgment which is here made to follow upon Animadversion or Perception. So then their simple Apprehension has or should have the same latitude with our Perception, which whether of single Ideas, or of their Relations is always simple as to the Act, tho' as to the Object, as was said before, it be partly simple and partly complex.

4. This complex Thought, or Perception of the relations of Ideas, which we may otherwise call the perception of *Truth*, is as, I conceive, that very Thing which we term *Knowledge*, by which in the general Notion of it, I can understand nothing else but the Perception of *Truth*, or of those Ideal Relations, wherein Truth consists, which whoever is Master of in any Thing will, I presume, be allow'd to want no further Qualification to intitle him to a just Knowledge of that Thing. As in Geometry, suppose he that only *Perceives* the Truth of such a Proposition, must needs be allow'd to know that Proposition to be true, and all

all the Demonstration in the World, will not make him know it better. There is then no need of an *evident Assent*, nor can Knowledge without great confusion as well as falsehood, be said to consist in it. For besides that Knowledge is presupposed to assent as the ground and reason of it, and therefore is essentially complete without it, and consequently cannot possibly owe its metaphysical Form to it; 'tis further considerable, that an *evident Assent*, is in the resolution of it, no other than an assent to what is evident to us, that is, again an assent to what we perceive or know. Which plainly includes two acts, and that of two distinct Faculties, perceiving or knowing belonging to the Understanding, and assenting belonging to the Will. And therefore unless two acts could be one, or an act that belongs to one faculty could formally constitute an act that belongs to another, it is impossible that Knowledge should consist in an *evident Assent*, wherefore we conclude that it does not, but in the *perception* only which we have of Truth; only there will be a diversity in our Knowledge, according as the manner of this Perception is.

5. Perception then is either immediate or mediate. *Immediate*, as when we perceive the relations between Ideas (that is, that they agree, or disagree) by the very Ideas themselves whose relations they are, without the help or *mediation* of any other. As when we per-

perceive the line A, suppose, to be equal to the line B, only by comparing these two lines with themselves. Or else *mediate*, as when we perceive how they are related to each other by comparing them both to a third. Which we are sometimes forc'd to do, because we cannot always compare or set together any two Ideas, so as to perceive whether they agree or disagree by their immediate collation. For A perhaps may be an *inaccessible Line*, to which no immediate approach is to be made. And then if we would know whether A be equal to B, we must do it by their being both equal to C, or in other Words, by A's being equal to that which is equal to B, that is, to C. The method of which perception is formally this, C is equal to B, A is equal to C, therefore A is equal to B. In which Process 'tis plain that the line A is perceiv'd to be equal to B, not immediately, but by the mediation of C, which therefore is as a common measure between A and B.

6. This distinction of Perception will give us occasion to remark a like difference in *Knowledge*, which consisting as was shewn in Perception, must needs be either immediate or mediate as the other is. For indeed whatever we know, we may be said to know it either as a *Principle*, or as a *Conclusion*. As a Principle that has an internal Evidence, and shines as we say by its own light, and so needs no Illustration from without; or as a conclusion, which being not evident of it self, must be render'd

so by the help of an external Light let in upon it. Not that there is perhaps always a difference between a Principle and a Conclusion in the nature of the things themselves, taking Conclusion *materially* for the Proposition concluded (for that which is a Conclusion to us may perhaps be a Principle to a superior Understanding) but only in relation to us, according to the immediateness or mediateness of our Conception, who call those Truths *Principles* which we discern to be so by the immediate Collation of their Ideas, that is, those Ideas whereof the Truth or Proposition consists, that which the Schools call *Subject* and *Predicate*; and those *Conclusions*, which we know or perceive, not by their own Ideas, but by the mediation of some other Idea that is not contain'd in the Proposition. For which reason, by the way, it is, that that other Idea, call'd by the Schools the *middle Term*, because of its uniting the Extremes, or serving to shew their Agreement, ought never to enter into the Conclusion.

7. Immediate Knowledge, or Knowledge of the Principle we may call *Intuitive*, because the Mind then in one and the same view that it perceives the Ideas, perceives also their Relations. Mediate Knowledge, or Knowledge of the Conclusion we may contradictinguish to the other by the Name of *Demonstrative* or *Discursive*, because in this latter knowledge the Mind perceives the Relations of Ideas not in that view which it has of the Ideas, themselves, but in

in the view of some other Idea applied as a common Measure to both. The difference between which two ways of knowing the Relations of Ideas, I cannot more briefly and sensibly illustrate than by *Lines*, which we find to be equal, either by comparing them with themselves, or, in case one of them be inaccessible to the other, with a *Third*, by their agreement to which it appears that they agree among themselves. According to that well known Rule, *Quae convenienter eidem tertio, convenienter inter se.* Which Rule seems to have the clearness of a Principle, tho' that which is known by it to be consider'd as a conclusion, and may serve to let us see that all Demonstration resolves at last into Intuition.

8. This Discursive or Demonstrative Knowledge is that which the Schools have been pleased to signalize and dignify with the Name of *Science*, which they peculiarly apply to that knowledge which is acquired by Demonstration, according to that saying of theirs, *Demonstration begets Science*, which accordingly is consider'd as the effect of it. And indeed it is so, and for that reason demonstrative Knowledge is truly and properly Science. But why it should be call'd *Emphatically* by that Name, and the word *Science* appropriated to it, is not very obvious to my Understanding. For Science is but the *Latin* word for Knowledge, and Knowledge in the formality of it, can mean only the Perception of Truth, or of those Relations of agree-

ment or disagreement that are between Ideas, which whoever clearly and rightly perceives, is truly said to *know*. But that this be done immediately or immediately seems not to be of the general reason of Knowledge, but to belong rather to the difference and distinction of it, as that which divides the Genus, and constitutes the Species that are under it. If then there be a Perception of Truth, whether it be mediate or immediate, whether it be perceiv'd as a Conclusion or as a Principle, whether in the Intuitive, or in the Discursive way, there is Science or Knowledge. Intuition then is as truly Science, as that which is acquired by Demonstration, and what I know as a Principle without any labour or formality of Proofs, I know as properly and as well as the best demonstrated Conclusion. Indeed I know it better, as seeing it in a more clear, because more immediate Light. For which reason let a conclusion be never so well demonstrated, it never shines with the Brightness of a Principle. As indeed 'tis impossible it should, since its Evidence is derived from it, and does at length resolve into it. Besides when all's done, that Demonstrative Knowledge, which the Schools have honour'd with the Name of *Science*, notwithstanding the great Things that are said of it, and the ambitious pretences that are every where made to it, will at length appear to be an imperfect kind of Knowledge, and to be founded upon the imperfection of our Understandings,

ings, which by reason of their narrow capacity not being always able to perceive the Relations of Ideas by themselves, are forced to have recourse to some other common Measure, as a weak or dim Eye is fain to use the assistance of a *Glass*, which tho' a great help to the Eye, is yet no great Commendation of its Sight. And accordingly the Schools themselves have thought fit to remove this discour-
five kind of Knowledge, as an Imperfection from the more perfect Beings, as well as from him that is absolutely so, and in lieu of it to substitute (as better becoming the dignity of their Natures) that which is *Intuitive*, which by this they seem to suppose to be, what indeed it is, the most perfect and excellent way of Knowing, as ascribing it to *God* and *Angels*. But then why a particular Species, and that too the least perfect, should carry away the Name of the whole kind, as if it were the only Knowledge, or at least the more excellent of the two, when indeed it is neither, I leave to the consideration of the Men of Art, as a thing that seems to want a better Account than I can presently give of it.

9. The Sum is, Knowledge consists in the sole view and perception of Truth, and the clearer that view is, still the more perfect is the Knowledge. And consequently if any Knowledge should be call'd by way of Eminence by the Name of *Science*, methinks it ought to have been that of *Intuition*. But to prevent Confu-

sion and Mistake, perhaps 'twere better if the School would consent to have them both enjoy the Name of Science in common, and to be distinguish'd from each other by the mediatenes or immediatenes of it. It being most reasonable that things should be distinguish'd by that wherein they differ, and not by that wherein they agree. As indeed they both do in this. For whether mediate or immediate 'tis all Knowledge whatever we clearly perceive, the mediatenes or immediatenes not belonging to the Essence, but to the specification and distinction of it. 'Tis true indeed all Knowledge must be immediate or mediate *indeterminately*, so that whatever a Man knows, he must know in the one or the other of these two ways; but that it should be *determinately* one or the other seems no way necessary, the Notion of Knowledge being fully completed in the perception of Truth, always provided that it be a *clear* and *distinct* perception; which gives us occasion to enter upon another Consideration of Thought, that will open to us the next Section.

S E C T. VI.

Of clear and confuse Thought, with some incidental Strictures upon the Criterium of Truth.

1. **C**learness of Thought, tho' not in such popular Estimation as some other things, because of the exceeding fewnes of them that are

are either *Masters* or *Judges* of it, and so not so well answering the ends of those illiberal Students who court Popularity more than Truth, is yet certainly the greatest Excellency and Perfection of the Understanding. For the greatest perfection of any Faculty must be to operate in the most perfect manner, as that *Sight* is most perfect that sees best. And the most perfect manner of Understanding must be to have the most clear conception of things, as again that *Sight* sees best that sees most clearly. For the clearer the Perception is, still the more there is of Perception, and consequently of *Knowledge*, that consisting, as was shewn, in the Perception of Truth.

2. The goods of the Mind are of all others the most unduly valued. *Intellectual* Accomplishments are generally set at a higher rate than *Moral*, and of *Intellectual* those that consist in the *Extensiveness* of Thought carry it in the publick Vogue before those that consist in the *Intensiveness* of it. To have an insight into a great deal, tho' but confuse and superficial (so fond are Men even of the shadow of Universal Knowledge) is reckon'd a great Atchievement by some, and for that reason as ambitiously affected by others, who are for skimming over the Surfaces of a great many things, without going to the bottom of any thing, like those who prefer a general Acquaintance before an intimate Friendship. But would these Men think it a Commendation of their *Eye-sight* to

see a great many things confusely, *Men as Trees walking*, or to see a few things distinctly and well? But Number makes a Shew and a Noise, and for this reason Wit, Fancy, Memory, Strength of Imagination, Richness of Invention, Fluency of Expression, great Reading, Languages, &c. are cry'd up and admired. And yet when a Man has follow'd the *publick Cry* never so long, and improved and cultivated these Talents never so much, he understands after all just so much as he clearly perceives, and no more, and one *Science* thoroughly understood is worth a thousand half-views and superficial glimpses of Things, fit only to amuse others, and to puff up ones self with the empty swellings of imaginary Indowments, which a clearness of Thought would soon disperse, as discovering to us among other things, our own *Ignorance*. For which reason alone, next to the Divine Grace, and a Heart inwardly sanctify'd and rightly disposed by it to God and Goodness, I should think the greatest Blessing that Heaven can here bestow upon any Man, is a *clear Understanding*.

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3. M. Des Cartes makes a difference between *clear* and *distinct*, which seems a little too subtle for my Apprehension. He calls that a *clear* Perception which is present and open to the Mind attending to it, even as we say we see those things clearly, which being present to the Eye strike it with a strong Impression.

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He calls that *distinct*, which being clear, is without all so serv'd and disjoin'd from all others, that it contains nothing in it but what is clear. He instances in Pain, the Perception of which is very clear, but not always distinct, because generally confounded with that obscure Judgment which Men have of its Nature, thinking there is something in the Part affected like the sense of Pain, the only thing that is clearly perceiv'd. Whence he concludes that there may be a clear Perception that is not distinct, tho' there can be no distinct Perception but what is also clear.

4. Now I confess indeed there is a Confusion in the case, in that the Perception of Pain is accompanied with a Judgment, that this Pain is in a bodily Part, whereas it is truly in the Soul, because Matter can have no Thought or Perception. But yet 'tis to be consider'd that the Perception or Sentiment of Pain is one thing, and the Judgment, as to its being in such a part of the Body, is another thing. Now that which is here confuse or not distinct, is not the Sentiment, but the Judgment. And that which is clear, is not the Judgment, but the Sentiment. That then which is clear, and that which is confuse or not distinct, are plainly two different things. Were the same thing clear and not distinct (which seems to be the force of the Argument) this indeed would well prove a difference between clear and distinct, because if there were no difference, then for a thing

thing to be clear and not distinct, would be all one as for the same thing to be clear and not clear, which is impossible. But if that which is clear be one thing, and that which is not distinct be another, this proves no difference between clear and distinct, because 'tis no repugnance for different things to be at once clear and not clear. Now this is the case. 'Tis the Judgment only that is here confuse or not distinct. As for the Sentiment, that is clear, and as clear, 'tis also distinct. But the Judgment which is not distinct is also not clear. That then which is clear, is also distinct, so far as it is clear, tho' it may be confuse in another respect, or tho' something else may be join'd with it that is confuse. And consequently this Argument does not prove that there is any difference between clear and distinct.

5. Taking then clear and distinct for one and the same thing, till there appears a better Reason for their difference, let us a little consider what we may reasonably be understood to mean by it. There is a twofold Clearness; a Clearness of Thought, and a Clearness of Expression. That Thought is clear, or then I think clearly, when the Object of my Thought is clear to me, the Idea when 'tis simple, and the Relations of Ideas when 'tis complex Thought, and then the Object of my Thought is clear to me, not when I think upon a *determin'd* or *determinate* Object, whether Ideas or their Relations (for 'tis impossible but that I must

must think upon a *determin'd Object*, that is, such certain Ideas, or such certain Relations, if I think at all) but when I have that *determin'd Object* in a full and perfect View. For as we are then said to see such a thing clearly or distinctly, when we see it in a full Light, so as to discern every Part of it, together with the Figure, Order, and Situation of those Parts; so we may be then said to think clearly, when we perceive plainly, perfectly, and fully those Ideas, or those Relations of Ideas which are the Objects of our Thought. So that to *apprehend* clearly, will be the same as to *comprehend*, if not the whole Object which our Thought is employed about, yet at least so much of it, and so far, as we are said clearly to apprehend. For once more to illustrate this by Vision, which carries the greatest Proportion of any thing that I know of to Thought. When I look upon the *Moon*, and see only an Orb gilded with Light, with some little variety of Features and Signatures, which by reason of some fantastick resemblance in the appearance, I am apt to compare to those of a *Human Face*, then I may be said to have but a confuse and indistinct View of that Planet. But when renewing my Prospect with the assistance of a *Telescope*, I shall descry (suppose) Rocks, and Hills, and Vallies, and Plains, and Seas, and Woods, or any other Marks and Characters of an habitable World, you will then say that I have a more clear View of it. And the more Discoveries I shall make, still

still the clearer my View will be. And were my Glass so good as to help me to survey it minutely in all the Parts of it, as I do the Table or Desk upon which I write, you will then, I suppose, allow that I see it *clearly*. The Application of this to Thought, and the intelligible Object of it, is very obvious; only I shall here further remark, that whatsoever I conceive or apprehend thus *clearly*, I do also apprehend *distinctly*; between which I can perceive no difference, unless it be this, that *clearly* relates to the Object of my Thought, as it is in it self, and *distinctly* to the same Object of Thought as it differs from other things. Which seems rather a diversity of Consideration than of the thing, since a thing differs from another only by what it is in it self, and by the same real Act whereby I discern a thing as it is in it self, I also discern it from any thing else. Even as by the same Act of Thought whereby I perceive a Circle, I discern it from every Figure that is not a Circle, so that if I understand a Circle clearly, I do also understand it distinctly.

6. So much for Clearness of Thought. Now for that which is the Consequence of it, Clearness of Expression, the greatest Perfection of Discourse, as the other is of Thought. And

* See the Epistle to the Reader, prefix'd to the fourth Edition of the Essay of Human Understanding.

here indeed that *Determinate-ness* will come in, which a * certain Author speaks of, and would substitute in the room of clear and distinct as a more

inlightning Term; tho' I think it will be found not to be the formal Reason of this clearness, but rather the Cause of it. Clearness of Expression seems to import nothing so properly as the *In-telligibility* of it, or its aptnes to be understood; for as a Glass is then said to be clear, when we can see well through it those Objects which lie beyond it, so Discourse is then clear (for the Expression seems to be Metaphorical) when we may easily and commodiously see through it as I may say, that is, take or apprehend it, either as to the meaning of him that speaks, or as to the Thing which is spoken. For it is here worthy of remark, that Clearness of Expression may admit of a double Respect, one as to the Thought or Meaning of the Speaker, and another as to the Thing it self, or Matter whereof he discourses. Then is Expression clear as to the former, when it has an aptnes to discover the *meaning* of him that uses it, and then as to the latter, when it has an aptnes to explain the *Thing* meant, or to render it intelligible as far as the Nature of it will admit. I say, as far as the Nature of it will admit; for it may sometimes happen that I may know well enough what a Man means, when I do not so well understand the Things themselves which are the Matter of his Discourse; not through any defect in the Expression, but by reason of the great nicety and abstractednes of their Natures. And yet however let the Subject-Matter of a Man's Discourse be what it will

will for easiness or difficulty of Comprehension, then I think he may be said to speak or write clearly, when by the manner of his Expression 'tis plain what he means, and when also the Thing it self is set in a fair Light, and render'd as intelligible as the Nature of it will bear; and if it be not actually understood, 'tis not for want of due advantagiousness in the Expression, but meerly through the intrinsick Nature of the Thing whose proper difficulty would not admit of a clearer Representation, and which 'tis not to be expected that the Speaker or Writer should be able to alter, who has no Power over the Nature of intelligible Objects, tho' the difference of the Light or View wherein he places them may fall under his choice and disposal.

7. For I think we ought to distinguish between the Obscurity that arises from the Nature of the Thing, and that which arises from the manner of the Expression, as also between the clearness that is from the Thing, and that which is from the Expression. Sometimes the Expression is dark, and the Thing clear. Sometimes the Thing dark, and the Expression clear. And as some are thought to write clearly mere-ly through the easiness and obviousness of their Matter, tho' they express themselves never so obscurely, so 'tis the unhappy Lot of some to be thought to write obscurely mere-ly because of the niceness of their Matter, tho' they ex-press themselves never so clearly. But this
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is unfair; for tho' the Thing, after all that is said of it, continue obscure, yet if the obscurity does not proceed from the way of expressing it, but purely from the Nature of the Thing discours'd of, the Expression may notwithstanding be sufficiently *clear*. From which all that can justly and reasonably be expected is, that the Meaning of him that speaks be represented plainly and intelligibly; and the Thing it self as plainly and intelligibly as a Thing of that Nature may well be. From whence we may gather that a Thing's being hard to be understood, is not always an Argument of want of clearness in the Expression (since that may proceed from other Causes, and 'tis not possible with all the clearness of Expression in the World that a metaphysical Dissertation should be made as intelligible as an Historical Narrative, or a piece of Practical Morality) but indeed if there be any reasonable difficulty about a Man's *Meaning*, that seems to be a good Presumption that his Expression has not all that clearness which it should have, nor perhaps his *Thought* neither; and I believe generally speaking, when upon competent Consideration, we do not in this respect understand others, there may be great reason to question whether they do well understand themselves.

8. The clearness of Expression is then the intelligibility of it, in each of the respects beforemention'd. But now that which serves to make

make it thus intelligible, is indeed the *Determinateness* of it, when words are always used in a certain determinate sense, that is, when they are used as signs of the same determinate Ideas. As Expression is formally clear by its Intelligibility, so that which makes it effectively so is the Determinateness of it, because then it may be clearly known what Ideas such words do stand for, and consequently what is meant or intended by them; which cannot so well be when words are used loosely and indetermin'dly, sometimes in one sense and sometimes in another, which, like the *Trumpet that gives an uncertain sound*, will occasion great Confusion in the Minds of the Hearers, and oftentimes of the Speakers too. For the prevention of which, the most effectual Remedy perhaps would be that which is used by *Geometricalians*, in predefining the Signification of those Terms which they employ in their succeeding Demonstrations, which then proceed with all clearness, as having no Obscurity but what arises from the abstractedness of their Matter. But those who think this Method a little too formal (as perhaps it may in the ordinary way of speaking or writing) always to define their Terms, should however if they would either understand themselves, or be understood by others, think themselves obliged to be the more strict and uniform in the use of them. By which means they will cut off all occasion, or at least give none, for any verbal Contention. And when all

all that difficulty and dispute is removed which arises from the use of words, there will but little remain in the Nature of Things, which will not bear long dispute, when we are once agreed about the Terms that express them.

9. As, to specify and illustrate this by an instance; suppose the Question were put, Whether Fire be Hot? So long as the sense of the word (Hot) remains indeterminate, this will always be a Question, and Men will divide upon it. *A.* will say that it is Hot, and *B.* will say that it is not Hot, tho' perhaps without opposing one another any further than by a verbal Contradiction, as meaning it in different respects. However, this shew of Contradiction will be enough to keep up a *Wrangle*, and while the Question continues thus *unstated*, it will be impossible to accommodate it. But 'tis but to define the sense of the Term *Hot*, and the Dispute will quickly be at an end. For if by *Hot* be meant that inward Feeling or Sentiment which we are conscious of, when we approach the Fire; then 'tis plain that Fire is not Hot, because Matter cannot think, nor in that sense perhaps did *A.* contend that it was. But if by Fire's being Hot, be meant that there is something in the figuration and motion of its Parts that occasions the Sentiment of Heat in us when we approach it; then 'tis plain by experience that it is Hot, nor perhaps in this sense did *B.* contend that it was not; or to come a little nearer to the Matter, we were but now

considering, suppose the Question were, whether the *Determinateness* of Expression be the thing that makes it clear? While the Term (*Makes*) retains its ambiguity, and carries an uncertain meaning, this will be disputable, and one will say it does, and another will say it does not, according to the different Ideas which they apply to that *Term*. But the definition of that would have prevented any dispute, and when interposed will quickly end it. For if *Makes* be meant *formally*, as if *Determinateness* were the formal Reason of *Clearness*, or that wherein the Essence of it does consist; 'tis plain that in this sense *Determinateness* does not make clearness, but that it consists in the *Intelligibility* of Expression. But if the Term *Makes* be taken *effectively*, as that which causes or produces, in this sense indeed the *Determinateness* of Expression does *make* it clear, and that because it serves to make it intelligible, which is the formal Reason of clearness. By which it may appear how the uncertain and unsteady Application of Terms to Ideas darkens the Nature of Things, as well as our Discourses about them, and of what consequence it is for the *unclouding* of both, to observe a definitive strictness in the use of our Words.

10. Happy indeed were it if we could think, and communicate our Thoughts without them, as Angels are said to do, either by ordering their Conceptions by their bare Will,

so as to be manifest to the Intuition of another, according to *Aquinas*, or as the Rival School of * *Scotus* will have it, by impressing upon the Mind of another Angel, a Conception that is like unto their own. That Angels do speak, there can be no reasonable doubt, as that signifies at large their having a way to reveal their Thoughts; and accordingly the Apostle who had been in the third Heaven, tells us of the *Tongues of Men and of Angels*. And 'tis most probable that they do it, not by sensible Signs, but after some such intellectual manner as the Schools suppose. And perhaps when we come to be like Angels, we may be able to do so too; for who knows what may be the Privilege of a Resurrection-Body join'd to a beatified and glorified Soul; and whether that of the Apostle may not be even literally verify'd, *Tongues shall cease?* Whether we shall not then all speak the Tongue of Angels only, converse intellectually, darting pure and immediate Thoughts into each other without the *Vehicle of Words*? And what a happiness and advantage would it be if we could do so now! what a calm, quiet, and serene way of conversing would this be, and how clearly and intelligibly, and withal with what expedition would it express our Minds! other's Thoughts would then be as clear to us as our own, and ours again would shine out to them

* *Dico quod Angelus loquitur Angelis causando in eo conceptum immediate illius Obiecti de quo loquitur.* Lib. 2. Distinct. 9. Q. 2.

with as unquestionable a brightness. And how secure then should we be of each other's Meanings, and that we rightly took one another's Thoughts? How free from Misunderstandings, and those infinite *Chicanes*, and wrangling Disputes which arise from the equivocation of words, whereby we darken Knowledge, and impose both upon our selves and others? But this Angelical Conversation is too sublime for Mortality. As our Souls are incarnate, so must our Thoughts too, as not being discernable in this thick Region, till we cloath them with words, or with some other sensible sign. We have not at present (whatever we may have hereafter) any other way of communicating our Thoughts; and since it tends so much to the pleasure and real advantage of Life to have them communicated, we have reason to thank Nature for giving us the Power of Speech, that is of *articulating* Sounds, which of all sensible Signs is the readiest and most expedite Method of expressing to others what we would have them know of our Minds. But then if we would have them know it indeed, and not amuse instead of informing, we should take care (at least while we are in the search or discovery of Truth, if not in common Conversation) to speak so as to be rightly understood, and accordingly to join the same word always with the same Idea, that so if possible, there may be as little question about the Sense which we think, as there is about the Words which we

we pronounce or write. And if once the sense of what we say be *clear*, it will be easy to an attentive Mind to discern if it be *true*.

11. This gives the occasion to say something of *distinction*, which is the expedient that *others* have to clear our meaning, as the determinate use of Words was observ'd to be our *own*. For if we will not prevent Ambiguity by the strictness of our expression, the only remedy that others have, is to remove it by *distinction*. All distinction supposes ambiguity, and if there were no ambiguity, there would be no occasion for distinction. But as Men generally speak and write, there is but too much necessity for it. For as there are a great many seemingly plain Questions, which a Man cannot answer to till their meaning be distinguish'd, so there are a great many Propositions which tho' seemingly determinate enough, have yet more Senfes than one, and are true or false, according as the Sense is wherein they are taken, and it must be distinction that must point out what that Sense is, and till that be done there is no affirming or denying them; which shews distinction to be a considerable part of Logick, and to be of great use and necessity in all argument, or disputation. As for instance, suppose any one should advance this Position, that *Moral good is willing natural good*, this looks like a plain assertion, and would perhaps pass for such among most People, to whom it should be proposed. But if we attend to it, we shall find

that it is of too loose and indetermin'd a Sense, as it stands, to be either determinately true or false, and that to judge rightly of it, we must distinguish both the parts of it, *viz.* Natural Good, and Moral Good.

Natural Good is either Formal, or Effective; either Happiness, or the means of Happiness. Now I think Moral Good is not willing Natural Good formal, but effective, that is, not Happiness, but that which naturally causes it.

Then again as to *Moral Good*, that is to be understood, either materially, for the Thing or Action said to be morally Good, as 'tis the proper subject for a Law, and fit to be commanded: Or formally, as it is a certain habit in the Agent, disposing him to such an action, and so denominating him good or virtuous. The former you may call if you please Moral Good objective, and the latter Moral Good subjective.

Now if we speak of Moral Good in the first Sense, then Moral Good is not *willing* Natural Good, but is rather that action which naturally causes natural Good or Happiness.

But if we speak of moral Good in the second Sense, as it denotes a moral Habit in the Agent, then indeed and then only, moral Good is willing natural Good, that being the thing that makes a Man good or virtuous, or wherein his virtue formally consists, to Will the doing of such Actions as have a necessary connexion with his Happiness, or a natural tendency to procure it, which is willing natural Good in the second

second Sense of natural Good, as it signifies the good of the means, and not of the end. For whoever was thought virtuous for desiring to be Happy. So that in short, the right State of the Proposition is this, that moral Good subjective, is willing natural Good effective. And thus distinguishing (and not otherwise) it is very clear, and very true, that moral Good is willing natural Good.

12. But to return once more to clearness of Thought, or Perception, into this I think must be resolv'd that *Criterium of Truth*, so much talk'd of both by the old and new Philosophers; which we may distinguish two ways, as Understanding by it, either the Power or Faculty by which, or the Rule or Measure according to which Truth is discern'd. The former we may call *Criterium per quod*, and the latter *Criterium secundum quod*. The Criterium by which is no other than our Reason or Understanding, which is the only Faculty which we have in us both for the perceiving Truth, and the discerning what is True or False, our *Senses* being no further concern'd, than only to serve for the deriving certain Impressions of other Bodies upon our Bodies, and thereby for the awakening certain Ideas in our Minds, which it may be we should not have had without those Impressions. The Criterium, according to which, is that very clear and distinct Perception which we have been discoursing of. But when we say that clear and distinct Thought is the *Criterium of Truth*,

Truth; our meaning is, that it is the rule or measure whereby Truth is to be known and judged of; not in this Sense that whatever is true, we do clearly perceive, and consequently that whatever we do not clearly perceive, we may therefore conclude not to be True (for as we have elsewhere shewn at large, human Reason is not in this extent the Measure of Truth, there being a great many Natural, as well as Divine Truths that transcend the reach of our Comprehension) but in this Sense, that we may safely conclude all that to be true, whereof we have a clear and distinct Perception. That is, in short, tho' all that is True is not clearly perceiv'd by us, yet all that is clearly perceiv'd by us is necessarily true.

13. 'Tis supposed here, and I think very reasonably, that there must be some Measure, or Criterium of Truth. And indeed the several excellent Laws and Methods which rational and contemplative Men have left us, for our direction in the search of Truth, would lose much of their usefulness and satisfaction, if we have no Mark whereby to discern when we have found it. But now that humane Reason cannot be the measure of Truth in the first Sense, is plain from the infiniteness of Truth, and the limitation of our intellectual Capacities. And yet that it must be so in the second Sense, will upon a little consideration of the Matter appear necessary to be granted. For first, whatever we clearly perceive, we perceive it as

as it is, for if we perceive it otherwise than it is, then we do not clearly perceive it. But if we perceive it as it is, then 'tis plain that it is as we perceive it; and if it is as we perceive it, then I see nothing further wanting to make it true; and consequently whatever we clearly perceive is true. And indeed it seems a contradiction that it should be otherwise, as resolving into this, That our Perception of a Thing, is at once clear and not clear.

14. But besides, what we clearly perceive we may and must assent to, and judge to be true, as having no Power to doubt of it, or so much as to suspend our assent. And when we do assent to it, it cannot be denied but that we use our judging faculty rightly, and as we ought. And indeed we never use it rightly, but then however we may accidentally happen to be *in the Right*. But then if what we clearly perceive may not be true, then we may err in the right use of our Judgment, which is manifestly absurd. Nay we *must* err, and are under a *necessity* of being deceiv'd, and that while we make a due and proper use of our faculties, which is yet more absurd. Besides, whether this will not intitle the Author of our Natures to our errors, as supposing him to have given us such fallacious faculties as lead us into error, even in the right use of them, and so without any possibility of avoiding it. For the most that can be done by *us*, for the preventing our falling into error, is to hold our Judgment

ments in such a suspense, as not to give our assent, but when we cannot suspend it any longer, that is, to what we clearly and distinctly perceive. But if we may still be mistaken even then, there will be no possibility of avoiding it. And it is not supposable that the wise and good Author of our Beings, should give us such Faculties as will necessarily deceive us, and decoy us into errors, and that whether we use them right or wrong.

15. We may then conclude, that whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, and that as long as we have Light before us, and assent to nothing but what we have a clear view and perception of, 'tis impossible we should err, or judge amiss. And consequently that we may then judge securely, and safely acquiesce and repose our selves in such Judgments, as true and certain, and as it were the undeviating answers of Truth it self, even that interior Truth, whose *School* and *Oracle* is within our Breast, whose Instructions are faithful and unerring, and who seldom fails to answer us by them if we consult her aright. And indeed after all, we have no other reason to think any Proposition true in any of the Sciences, but only because we clearly perceive that it is so, and it shines out upon our Minds with an unquestionable and irresistible Light, and if that Reason be not a good one, then we are not sure of our knowing any Thing, but must quit all pretences to Science, and after the Efforts

Efforts of Contemplation sink down into a *sceptical* uncertainty. But if this Supposition be too absurd to be granted (as all Philosophy and Religion too is concern'd to maintain) then we must say, that whatever we clearly perceive is undoubtedly so as we perceive it. Evidence then is the Mark and distinguishing Character of Truth, she dwells in Light, and we may know her *Divinity* among a thousand probable Appearances, by the *Glory* that surrounds her.

16. From this Doctrine we may gather two very important Inferences, with respect to Divine Revelation, and that Entertainment which is due to things *above* Reason, and things *contrary* to Reason. For hence it will follow, first, that we ought not to reject anything as incredible merely for its being above our Reason, since tho' whatever we clearly perceive is true, yet whatever is true we do not clearly perceive, and consequently cannot justly conclude from our not having a clear Comprehension of a thing that therefore it is *not* true. Secondly, That we may and ought to reject whatever is plainly contrary to our Reason, tho' the Authority it pretends to be never so great. Since tho' we do not perceive all that is true, and so cannot rightly argue from our inability to perceive a thing to the falsehood of it, yet 'tis most certain that all is true which we do clearly perceive, and so if we clearly perceive that such a thing cannot be (which

(which is that we mean by *contrary* to Reason) we may safely conclude that it cannot be. And as 'tis impossible that God should reveal any such thing to us, as the Object of our Faith, so if any such thing should be proposed to us as reveal'd by God, we ought rather to reject the Revelation, than to admit the thing, it being more possible that the Revelation should be false, that is, that such a thing should not be reveal'd by God, than that what we evidently perceive by those Faculties which he has given us, is false and impossible, should be true. Which equally concludes against the *Socinian* on the one hand, and against the *Papist* on the other.

S E C T. VII.

Of abstract and concrete Thought, with some Remarks upon the usefulness of Abstraction for the greater clearness and extent of Thought.

1. **A**bstraction being an Affection belonging to Thought, 'tis fit it should have a place among the Divisions of it. And since it has such an advantageous subserviency to its clearness (as in the sequel will be shewn) it may be very proper to annex the consideration of it to the foregoing. We have occasionally touch'd upon this already, and therefore shall be the shorter in our stay upon it, intending only a few Reflections of more important and less obvious

vious consideration, and for the rest referring those who would be more particularly inform'd to the common Systems, for their fuller Satisfaction.

2. That *Abstraction* is not the denying one thing of another, or the mental separating one thing from another, any otherwise than by the considering or thinking upon one thing without considering or thinking upon another; I need not advise those who are acquainted with the Scholastick use of this word. But then for the exacter understanding of this, it may be convenient further to note, that this separate consideration wherein the Nature of Abstraction is made to consist, is to be understood, not of different Beings, but of the parts of the same Being, that is, Abstraction is not the considering one intire and complete Being without another (for they being *numerically*, at least distinct, cannot be consider'd otherwise, since one Idea will not include them) but the considering one *part* of such a Being without another.

3. But further, Abstraction is not of such parts neither as are *really* and *physically* distinct, such as we commonly call *Integral Parts* (for I suppose I should not properly be said to abstract in considering one part of a Human Body, or one part of a Number without considering another, since these, tho' physical parts, are yet logical wholes, and so the separate consideration of them would be no proper Abstraction)

tion) but of parts that are *intelligibly* distinct, and have a real sameness in the Nature of the thing. When one of these really same, but intelligibly distinct parts is consider'd without the other, or without that real whole whose intelligible part it is, then is my Thought *abstract*; but when there is no such separate consideration, but all is included together in one Idea, and consider'd as really it is, then is my Thought *concrete*. So that in short, Abstraction, as 'tis a logical Affection of Thought, is the considering one thing without another, not *absolutely*, but in things that are not really one without the other, nor yet really deniable one of the other. For Abstraction is, as it were, the drawing of a thing away from it self. But where things are really separate or distinct, the considering them apart is not *Abstraction*, but only a mere divided Consideration; nor would the joining them in one be *Concretion*, but Confusion.

4. Abstraction then is the separate consideration of things intelligibly distinct, really indistinct. And of this there are, as I conceive, two sorts, one in the way of *Modality*, and another in the way of *Habitude*, according to the different Intelligibility that one and the same thing has, either as 'tis consider'd according to the different manners of Being which it has in it self, or according to the different Respects which it carries to other things. In the way of *Modality*, as when a Substance is consider'd

der'd without its Mode, or sometimes according to one Mode only, and sometimes according to another. In the way of *Habitude*, as when a thing is consider'd not throughout as it is in it self, but only so far as it agrees, or according to what it has in common with other things. As to give an instance of each, which will serve to illustrate the Doctrine of Abstraction in general, as well as these particular kinds of it. A Mathematician considers Body sometimes according to the Dimension of length only without attending to any breadth, and then he calls it a *Line*; sometimes according to length and breadth without attending to Profundity, and then he calls it a *Surface*; and sometimes again according to all three Dimensions, and then he calls it a *Solid*. This is Abstraction in the way of *Modality* or *Manner*. Again, the same Mathematician having before him a Figure terminated with three right Lines, consider's it sometimes throughout, according to the full specifick extent of it, as 'tis distinct from all other Figures, and then he calls it a *Triangle*. But sometimes again he consider's it no further than according to what it has in common with the rest, and then he calls it a *Figure*. This is Abstraction in the way of *Habitude*. And it may here deserve to be remarked, that this Abstraction is the ground of those common and more extensive Conceptions which we call *Generals* or *Universals*. Concerning which I should have here a proper occasion to speak,

speak, were I not too much prevented by our common Logick, which my design is not to repeat, but to supply.

5. The *Foundation* of Abstraction (as I noted before) is the various Intelligibility of the same thing, according to the several Faces or Appearances of it to the View of the Mind that contemplates it. This lays a ground for Abstraction, and you may call it, if you please, for that reason, the *Abstrahibility* of a thing, as being that which makes it capable of being abstractly consider'd. But the *occasion* of Abstraction is the Infirmity of our Minds, which not being able, by reason of the narrownes of their capacity, to comprehend things that have this various Intelligibility, or *intelligible Composition*, as I might have call'd it, in one intire View, is forced to consider them inadequately or partially, sometimes in one intelligible part, and sometimes in another, till at length it comes to have as clear a Perception of the whole, as this *metaphysical Anatomy* can give.

6. For it is here further to be observ'd, that this abstract and separate way of Consideration, or, as I may say, *Dissection* of things; tho' it be occasion'd by the Infirmity of the Understanding (for which reason a perfect intelligence can have no need of it) is yet a great help to it in Contemplation, as serving to make its View of things more clear and distinct. As Spectacles, tho' in him that uses them they argue weaknes

ness of Sight, yet when used they do very much assist the Act of Vision.

7. For besides that our Understandings (as great an Opinion as we may have of them) are best suited to the Contemplation of little Objects, and we can be more curious and exact in the survey of a little at a time, than of a great deal; especially in things of a very compounded Nature, and that have a great Latitude of Intelligibility, as a Man can more easily count and multiply great Numbers by their parts than by their wholes; I say, besides this advantage of Abstraction in lessening and contracting the Object, and so making it more proportionate to our Capacities, 'tis further to be consider'd that by that separate consideration of one intelligible part from another, which we call Abstraction, several distinctions of things do arise which are very necessary to the improvement of Knowledge; for we are led to look upon those things as (*intelligibly* at least) distinct from one another, which we can consider one without the other. And those distinctions serve us not only for the clearer Explanation of the thing it self, whose distinctions they are, but also as Principles whereon to erect other Conclusions of great importance to be known, and otherwise perhaps indiscovurable. As may be gather'd from the instance of *Refraction* and *Refraction*, the clear Reason and Doctrine of which is founded upon the abstract and distinct consideration of *Motion* in

general from the particular *determination* of it, and was never rightly understood in the World, till that distinction was made.

8. Besides, as Abstraction serves to the greater clearness and distinctness of Thought, so also the greater *enlargement* of it, as rendering our Ideas more general and *extensive*. Which is a great help to us in thinking; for things as they are being all singular, and singulars being in a manner infinite, we should find our narrow Faculties strangely incumber'd, nay even opprest'd in the consideration of them, if we did not abbreviate and contrast them by ranging them into certain general Orders or Sorts; that is, if we had not certain abstract Ideas, in which a great many of them agree, and so may be said to be contain'd under them. As for instance, when we consider an equilateral Triangle, only as a Triangle, or a Triangle as a Figure, &c. In all which kind of Abstractions this is to be observ'd, that tho' the inferiour degree contains the superior *in* it, with some further determination of its own, yet the superior contains the inferior *under* it; so that tho' the inferior contains actually more, yet the superior, as being less determin'd, *represents* more, and so contributes to the greater enlargement and extensiveness of Thought; the further consideration of which Matter I leave to the *Logicians*.

S E C T. VIII.

Of pure and impure Thought, with some Account of the difference between pure Intellect and Imagination.

1. **T**HIS distinction of Thought into pure and impure, is not here of a *Moral*, as by the sound it may seem, but of a *Metaphysical* importance. And according to this consideration of it, the *Schools* have applied it to the *Will*, and some of the *modern Philosophers* to the *Understanding*. That *Act* of the *Will* in the sense of the *School*, is said to be *pure* which is perfectly voluntary, without any mixture of nilling, when a *Man only Wills*, as in the love of that which is simply good, suppose *Health*. And that may be said to be *impure* or *mixt*, which is partly voluntary, and partly involuntary; voluntary absolutely or upon the whole, but *secundum quid*, or in a certain respect involuntary, or against the inclination of the *Will*. When a *Man* wills and nills the same at once, tho' in different respects, willing it from without or upon an extrinsick consideration, and nilling it from within or from the intrinsick nature of the thing, as in the chusing of a lesser *Evil* for the avoiding of a greater, suppose *Physick* for the avoiding of *Sickness*. This may be said to be *pure* and *impure* Thought, with respect to the *Will*.

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2. But I shall here consider it chiefly with respect to the *Understanding*. And in this regard, I call that a pure Thought or Perception whose Object is immaterial or spiritual; and that an impure Thought, whose Object is material or corporeal. This, as understood of the *ultimate* Object of Thought, *viz.* the things thought upon, is sufficiently plain without any further Explanation, the distinction of things into material and immaterial being both clear and confess'd. All the difficulty will be how to accommodate this to the *immediate* Object of Thought, that is, to *Ideas*, they being all immaterial. Now here 'tis to be consider'd (what has been formerly noted) that we may distinguish of a twofold Being in Ideas, the Real Being, and the Ideal Being, or that we may distinguish them either as essentially, or as representatively consider'd. The reason of which distinction is because there is something in God, and consequently of the divine Nature (because every thing that is in God, is really no other than He himself) that does not represent God, but something that is not God, and that indeed is out of him. By which means it comes to pass that what it represents is different from what it really is, and consequently that the same Idea as *essentially* differs from it self as *representatively* consider'd.

3. Now as Ideas, though they are all *Divine* *essentially*, and as to the reality of the thing, as being of the *Essence* of God, yet they are not all

all so *representatively* consider'd, as not representing him but Creatures. And accordingly they are Ideas of Creatures, and not Ideas of God; and God sees Creatures, not himself in them. So in like manner, and for the same reason, tho' all Ideas are *spiritual* and immaterial, really and essentially, yet they are not all so *representatively*, as not all of them representing Spirit, but some of them Extension or Matter. Some Ideas indeed are spiritual and immaterial, not only according to their real Being (for so they are all) but also according to their ideal or representative Being. But others are so only according to their real Being, being indeed essentially spiritual, because they are of the Essence of God, who is a Spirit, and the Father of Spirits; but not representing Spirit, but Matter, and so are spiritual in the same sense only as the Idea of a Creature is *Divine*, that is, essentially only, not *representatively*. Notwithstanding then the real spirituality of our Ideas as to their absolute Essence, they may however relatively be consider'd; and as to their representative Being, be said to be some material, and some immaterial, according to the different Nature or Quality of that thing (Body or Spirit) which they represent. That Idea then which represents a spiritual Being to our Minds, is with us a spiritual Idea, and so that Idea which represents any thing material, how spiritual soever it may otherwise be as to the reality of its absolute Essence, is yet in our

present account a material Idea, because we are now considering Ideas, (when they are said to be the Objects of Thought) not according to what they are in the reality of their absolute *Natures*, wherein they agree, but according to what they are in their *Representations*, wherein they differ.

4. Now then when the Idea that is the immediate object of my Thought, is in this sense spiritual, as representing a spiritual Being to me, then my Thought may be said to be *pure*, not only because Spirit is a purer Entity than Body, but because the Object of my Thought is then intirely spiritual, representatively as well as essentially, without any the least *mixture* or alloy of Corporeity. And so again, when the Idea that is the Object of my Thought is thus material, as representing Matter or any material Affection to me; then my Thought may be said to be *impure*, not only because Body is less pure than Spirit, or a very gross Being in comparison of it, but also because then the ideal Object of my Thought has a sort of *mixture* in it, as being essentially indeed spiritual, but representatively material. So then the metaphysical Purity or Impurity of Thought is the Immateriality or Materiality of its Object.

5. This way of considering Thought, as to the representative Materiality or Immateriality of those Ideas which are the immediate Objects of it, will lead us to the consideration of Intellect and Imagination (things very much, I wish

I could say as *distinctly* talkt of) and help to lay us a Ground whereon to erect a very clear and intelligible distinction between them. That these things are really distinct is abundantly clear from that famous Re-

mark of * *Des Cartes* upon the different Conception of a Pen- * See his sixth

tagone and a *Chiliagone* ; the

Meditation.

main thing will be to state the true reason and manner of their difference. They have been lookt upon as distinct Faculties of the Soul, but I see no necessity of conceiving them any otherwise than as different Operations of the same Faculty, or the same Faculty operating divers ways. Not to multiply Things or Words without cause, I suppose they may both be said to belong to the *perceptive* Faculty, Intellection and Imagination being plainly both of them *Perceptions* (for we perceive when we imagin, no less than when we understand) and differing from each other only with respect to the different manner or quality of it.

6. They who explain the manner of Human Understanding by material Effluvia's and Emanations from Bodies, seem to leave no room for any distinction between *Intellection* and *Imagination*, for with them all will resolve into the latter. But leaving that Hypothesis to be examin'd in its place, let us consider how these things, which, with the joint Consent of both old and new Philosophy we suppose to be distinct, are really distinguish'd. Both Philoso-

phies seem to consent in explaining Imagination with relation to *Body*; and that account in the new Philosophy seems most distinct (for what in the old is deliver'd concerning this matter, is hardly worth our consideration) which resolves Imagination into certain Images or Traces in the Brain, imprinted on it, as is supposed, by the different Motion and Disposition of the Animal Spirits. Which Prints or Images, when the Soul attends or applies it self to, then she is said to *imagin*, as on the contrary, when she thinks or perceives without any such corporeal Images, then she is properly said to *understand*.

7. But against this way of stating the difference of Imagination from pure Intellect, I have two Exceptions. In the first place I cannot well conceive how the various and rapid Motion of the Spirits should either by their own course, or by the impression of external Objects be so regularly and uniformly determin'd as to make such fine *Ingravings* and artificial *Images* of things, and such lasting ones too, upon the fluid Brain. Such Pictures sure had need be drawn, if not upon a better Table, yet at least by a more regular and steady *Pencil*, than the tumultuous Agitation of a Croud of subtile and volatile Spirits. But then, secondly, supposing such Images and Delineations of things to be drawn upon the Brain, and that even to the very *Life* as we say, with all the Art and Exactness of Imitation;

so that the Head of a Man shall be like a *Gallery* all hung round with Pictures, one representing one thing, and another another (pretty metaphysical Furniture) yet I want to be inform'd, and without the assistance of a very good Master, shall I doubt never understand, how a corporeal Image consisting of material Lineaments should be the immediate Object of Thought, or be any way by it self intelligible to the Mind, or how Body should be able to enlighten Spirit. And indeed if I could conceive it possible that the Soul should have one Thought or Perception, by turning it self to the traces or prints of things in the Brain, as the *Objects* of its View, I should be tempted to think, if not that all Understanding might be accounted for this way, or in the way of *Effluvia's*, yet that the Hypothesis of Ideas, was not of that Importance for the solving of it, as I now think I have reason to suppose.

8. Not but that I can readily admit that the Spirits may, and actually do make some sort of Impression upon the Brain (and 'tis by that whereby I would explain *Sensation*) but not such exact pieces of Peinture, or Sculpture as to resemble or represent things without. And I can admit again that the Understanding may in great Measure depend (as we see indeed that it does) upon the texture and disposition of the Brain (which may be a sufficient ground for the common and proverbial use of the word *Brains*, instead of *Wit and Sense*) and that these

these Impressions made by the animal Spirits, upon the Brain may be concern'd in the business of Thought, and have their real use and service in it, but not as *Objects*, but only as *Occurrences* of it. That is, they may by the Institution of Nature and that Law of Union, that is between Soul and Body, serve to excite and awaken some Ideas which are the Objects of Thought; but they are not the real Objects of Thought themselves, nor do they bear any resemblance to those Ideas which are. No, we understand only by *Ideas*, and the most that such traces in the Brain can be allow'd to serve for, will be only to excite them. And that indeed may be an Order and Institution proper enough for a Spirit, that is in a state of Union and Conjunction with Body, *viz.* that while it is in that state (for the case of a separate Spirit is very different) some of its Thoughts should depend upon, and be occasion'd by certain bodily Impressions, but that those Impressions should be the true *Objects* of Thought, so that the Soul by converting it self to them, should be able to think or perceive (as seems to be supposed in that Hypothesis which calls this *Imagination*) is extremely gross and unmetaphysical. And therefore I must own my self not a little surprized, to find this notion of *Imagination* so much favour'd as it seems to be, by Mr. *Malebranche*, as not seeing how it can consist with his Principles.

9. It seems then more reasonable in it self, as well as consistent with the Principles of this Theory ; to say, that as Ideas are the immediate Objects of our Thoughts, and we understand all things by them, so all the diversity that is between the kinds of our Perception must be stated upon, and derived from the diversity of those Ideas. And since these Ideas tho' all of them essentially Spiritual, are yet as to their representative Being, some of them material, and some of them immaterial, I would therefore assign this for the difference between imagination, and intellect strictly and properly so call'd, that in the former, the immediate Object of Thought is an Idea that is representatively material, and that in the latter the immediate Object of Thought is an Idea that is representatively immaterial. And therefore it is that it may with just propriety be call'd *pure Intellect*, as being a Perception purely Spiritual, or as we say *Intellectual*, because without any corporeal Image. Not in the Sense of the foremention'd Hypothesis, that is, that the immediate Object of it, is not Matter (for so Imagination is pure too, as having for its Object an Idea essentially Spiritual) but that 'tis without any such Idea as represents Matter. And herein indeed consists that purity of it, which distinguishes it from that Counter-Perception which we call Imagination, whose Object, tho' essentially Spiritual, as well as that of the other, is yet representatively material.

S E C T.

S E C T. IX.

Thought and Vision compared with a fuller illustration of the difference between Thought, in the way of Idea, and Thought in the way of Sentiment, with some Philosophical Remarks upon the latter.

1. **V**ision is generally apprehended as a different thing from Thought (for we are not said to see whatever we think of) and yet at the same time as so resembling it, that Thought is oftentimes express'd by Vision. As when we talk of our intellectual Sight or View, or say that we plainly see such a Thing to be true or false, &c. meaning that we clearly perceive it. And indeed Vision does in some respects differ from Thought (or else whatever we think of, we should be said also to see, and he that did not see would also not Think, whereas none think so strongly as the *Blind*) and yet in some respects again 'tis as true that Vision is really Thought, and does not only resemble it. But now to adjust this rightly, and to shew in what respect Vision differs from Thought, and in what respect it is really the same with it, is a pretty nice Point, in order to the clearing of which we had need consider *Vision* as distinctly as Anatomists do the *Eye*.

2. Vision then will admit of a twofold Consideration, and that so utterly different one from

from the other, as to have nothing in common but the Name. For first, Vision may be consider'd *materially* and with respect to the Body, as it signifies the passing or Trajection of the Rays of Light, with all their refractions thro' the several coats and humors of the Eye, and the Impression which they make in the bottom of it upon the Optick Nerve, or if you will that inner Tunicle or Membrane, composed by the little filaments or extremities of it, which Physicians call the *Retina*. And in this Sense Vision is, or ought to be consider'd in that Branch of the Mathematicks which professes to treat of it, and is accordingly call'd *Opticks*. Which I think we ought not to define (as a certain * Philosopher does) as a *Science of Seeing well*. ^{* Scbeibler.} For Opticks do not teach us to see, nor do we need any Science for that purpose, as being sufficiently instructed by Nature. Nor yet perhaps (with * another) as a Science of the appearance of things which we perceive with our Eyes. For besides

that the appearance of things and our Perception of them belongs properly to the Mind, and not to the Eyes. Our Perception of Things, or of their Appearances, is purely of a Physical Consideration, with which Opticks as being a Mathematical Science seems not to be concern'd, unless it be so far as it may consider that which is the occasion of those appearances.

<sup>* Keckerman in
his Mathematical
System.</sup>

ces. For indeed that I take to be the proper business of Opticks, namely to consider the *Radiature* of Light, and to shew according to what lines it passes through, and with what different Movements or Impressions it affects the visive Organs. So that when 'tis said to treat of *Vision*, it ought to be understood only according to this first Sense of it.

3. But then there is another, and a nobler sense of Vision. For as it may be taken materially for that luminous Impression which affects the Eye or the Brain, so it may also be consider'd *formally*, as it signifies that inward Sense or Perception which, according to the Law of Union establish'd by the Author of Nature between Soul and Body, follows upon, and is occasion'd by that Impression, and which we are conscious of to our selves whenever that Impression is duly made, and without which, notwithstanding any Impression of Light upon our Eyes we could not be said properly (that is formally) to *see*, any more than if we were altogether in the dark.

4. The Sense of the Word Vision being thus distinguish'd out of its ambiguity, we may now hope (what before would have been impossible) to state the respects of difference or of agreement which it has with Thought. For it is plain even at sight that Vision, if you go no further than the first Sense of it, is not Thought, but a mere mechanical Movement or Impulse, which tho' made upon a thinking Crea-

Creature, and that will also take occasion to think from it, has yet more of Thought in it, than if the same Impression were made upon Water or upon a *Looking-glass*. But then again if Vision be taken in the second, and indeed more proper as well as eminent Sense of it, then 'tis as plain that Vision is Thought, and that 'tis not the Eye that thus sees, but the Mind. Vision in this Sense belongs as much to the Soul, as in the other to the Body, and is indeed as much a Thought of it, as any other Sense or Perception that it has.

5. But do we see then whatever we think of? That indeed would be happy for those who lament their absent or dead Friends, and live almost upon the dear Remembrance of them, if by Thinking upon them, they could as it were conjure up their appearance, and set them before their view. Or again on the other side when we shut our Eyes, or otherwise do not see, do we then also cease to *Think*? That would be full as miserable for those that are Blind, if with the loss of their Sight, they must lose the use of their Understanding too. And yet thus it must be, if Vision and Thought be really and absolutely the same thing.

6. To disintegrate our selves then from this seeming intanglement, I further consider, that tho' Vision according to the formal Sense of it, be really Thought, as much as any that passes in our Minds, yet even thus consider'd it is a *peculiar Thought*, as having something in the man-

manner and circumstance of it so peculiarly qualifying and distinguishing from what is in our other Thoughts, that tho' Vision be really Thought, yet all Thought is not Vision. Which makes that we neither can be said to see whatever we think of, nor yet not to think whenever we do not see. But to make this more exactly comprehended, it will be necessary to lay out the Nature of Vision a little more distinctly yet, and accordingly I shall briefly *anatomize* not the *Eye*, but the *Sight*.

7. There are two things in this formal Vision (and we shall by and by add a third) which tho' for the most part confounded with each other, are yet of a very distinct consideration. There is a *Sensation*, and there is an *Ideal Perception*, something that we feel within us, and some Object that we contemplate without us. To instance in one of the most beautiful Appearances in Nature, when I look upon the *Rain-bow*, I have in the first place an Idea which is the immediate Object of my Vision, that which I *truly* see, and which represents to me that which I am *said* to see; that is, I have an Idea of a certain *Figure*, viz. an Arch of a Circle, and accordingly I say I see a *Bow*, which indeed I may properly be said to do, tho' that material one in the Clouds should not be the immediate Object of my Vision, because I see that Idea or intelligible *Arch* which represents it.

8. But then besides that pure Idea which is the Object of my View; I have also at the same instant

instant very lively and agreeable *Sensations* of certain *Colours* (as they are call'd) *viz.* Red, Green, &c. which affect me with so very charming a Delight, that I thence take a particular occasion to pity the blind.

9. It is here supposed (what shall be shewn in its place) that there is a real difference and distinction between *Sensation* and *Ideal Perception*, as also that those *Appearances* which we call *Colours*, and in the vulgar Philosophy are taught to look upon as certain *Physical realities* inherent (and therefore call'd *Accidents*) in the *Bodies* that are without us, are yet more exactly philosophizing no other than certain *Sensations* within our selves, however through the *Confusion* and *Prejudice* of *Sense* (which with most Men has more Authority than the *clearest Reason*) we are apt to transfer them from our selves to the things without, and accordingly imagine that we see the one as much as we do the other. But of this more hereafter. At present I shall only further remark, that *Vision* has this *peculiar* in it, not from *Thought*, (for its distinction from *Thought* does not depend upon that) but from our other *Senses*, that it includes *Idea* as well as *Sentiment*, that is, that there is in it an outward *Perception*, or *Perception* of something without us, as well as an inward *feeling*. Our other *Senses* have only the latter. There is nothing in them but only *Sensation*, some inward *feeling* or different state or manner of *Being* as to

Pleasure or Pain, that we are conscious of to our selves, and accordingly they may properly be said to be *pure Senses*. Whereas in Vision, besides that Feeling or Sensation which it has in common with the rest, there is also a true Ideal Perception which the others have not, for which reason it is not a *pure Sense*, but has something intellectual as well as sensible in it. Which, by the way, I take to be the only competent Ground of that Preference which is given to Vision above the other Senses.

10. Now thus far Vision has nothing *peculiar* in it; nothing, I mean as to *Thought*, tho' it has as to the other *Senses*, which as it equals by having a sensible, so it excels by having an Ideal Perception in it. But this makes no difference as to *Thought*; nay, upon this very account it is that it comes under the same common Notion and Consideration with it, its Sensation being as much a Thought of Sensation, as any other Sensation is, and its Ideal Perception being also as much a Thought of that kind as any other such Perception is. Concerning the former there can be no dispute, and he will shew himself to love Argument rather than to understand it, that shall seriously raise any against the latter. For whatever difference there may be in the Idea it self, yet certainly there is none in the Perception of it, nor yet in the *Subject* of that Perception: For tho' it be the Eye that is said to see, and indeed really does so in that *material* sense before spoken of, yet

yet that which *formally* sees (as seeing is taken for perceiving) must needs be the Mind, unless you will suppose Matter to think, which there is neither possibility of, nor yet occasion for, since if there be any Perception in vision (as I presume none will deny that has the use of either his Understanding or his Eyes) there will be no reason to vary the Subject of it, by supposing that what perceives in all other cases should not also perceive here. And as that which formally sees or perceives is the Mind, as in the other instances of Perception, so that Idea (whatever it be) which is thus formally seen or perceiv'd, is as truly and really perceiv'd as any other Object of Thought. And indeed 'tis by the *Perception* of the Idea that the outward Object is said to be *seen*, which (as we shall shew hereafter) is no otherwise *visible*, than as the Idea of it is *intelligible*.

11. But what is that *Idea*? That indeed is a great Question, if the meaning be as to the very precise and particular Nature or Essence of it, and such, as Things are hardly yet ripe enough to answer. But in general I may say, what will give us the first and leading Instance of that *peculiarity* of Thought which is in Vision and whereby it is specializ'd and distinguish'd from Thought at large; that that Idea which is then the immediate object of Perception, or which the Mind formally sees, is according to our premised distinction, an Idea that is *representatively Material*, or that represents

sents Extension with the several Modes of it. This I take to be that Idea (whatever it be as to the Nature or Substance of it, which I do not now consider) which the Mind perceives in Vision, which makes it to be what we call'd an *impure Thought*, and so immediately distinguishes it from *pure Intellect*, whose Object is an Idea representatively Spiritual, and indeed shews it to be (thus far) the very same with *Imagination*.

12. But then that which distinguishes it from this also, will be the peculiarity of the *Impression* whereby this Idea, and the sensation that always accompanies it, are rais'd, join'd with the greater and more intense degree of the Perception occasion'd by that peculiarity of Impression. The Idea it self is the same in Vision as in Imagination, *viz.* that which is representatively material, and what we do *Imagin*, we do also see as to the immediate Object of our Perception. But the Perception it self is much stronger in Vision than in Imagination, and the manner of the Impression whereby it is excited is also very different in the one from what it is in the other. And in these two things the whole ground of that distinction which we make between them, will I suppose be found to consist.

13. Should I say that in Vision that which makes the Impression are the fine and delicate touches or pushings of a certain subtle Matter, either as endeavouring to recede from the

Cen-

Center of its vortex, by Tangent lines, as *Des Cartes*, or as in actual agitation and movement as M. *Regis* rather chuses to suppose, I say should I ^{Tom. 3, p. 158.} make either the pressure or the impulsion of those subtle Particles upon the Eye, to be that which excites in us, both the Idea, and the Sentiment (whether of Light or of Colour) which we have in Vision, I should follow an Hypothesis which there is great reason to think right, if not in the precise specialty of it, yet at least as to its general Foundation. For since in all our other Senses the Perception is occasion'd by certain material Impressions, some of one sort, and some of another, but all *material*, why should it not be so here too? And I would fain know what those *Rays* of Light, which even the vulgar Philosophy speaks of, can be intelligibly supposed to mean, if not certain Chains or Lines of those little Bowls whereof *Des Cartes* makes his 2d Element to consist (and therefore fitly call'd *Rays*, as being so many *Semidiameters* of that Circle or Vortex, from whose Center they Issue) or at least of some other Matter.

14. But tho' this may be a right account of Vision as to the occasion of it, yet it seems not to distinguish it from *Imagination* so much, as from the other Senses, as from *Hearing* suppose, which is from the Impression made by a certain movement of the Air, upon the *Tympanum of the Ear*, if not rather upon the auditory

tory Nerve, or from *Taste*, which is from the Impression made by the Particles of the fapid Body upon the Nervous parts of the Tongue, and so for the rest. The difference between all which is (besides that of the sensations themselves) that the Impression is made upon different Organs, and by different sorts of Bodies. But now Vision seems to be distinguish'd from Imagination not by that which makes it *such* a Sense (that more properly belonging to its distinction from the other *Senses*) but by that whereby it is simply a Sense. And therefore for the better distinction of these things I shall chuse rather to say that in Vision the Impression from which the Perception arises, is from *without*, whereas in Imagination 'tis from *within*.

15. But to make this more distinctly Intelligible, I suppose with the new Philosophy that all sensation is in the Brain, yea and all Ideal Perception too, as far as the Operations of the Mind may be allow'd to depend upon the Body. Not as if the Brain had any Sense or Perception, or that the Soul which is the only Subject of it, had any thing in the Brain for its intelligible Object, that is I mean did contemplate any of those fine Pictures which are imagin'd to be hung up in that *Phantastick Gallery*. But what I mean is this, that tho' the Brain does not perceive it self, nor is yet the immediate Object of that which does, yet by virtue of that Law of Union which is between

tween Soul and Body, certain Impressions upon some part of the Brain (which I shall not be so curious as to assign) are connected with certain Perceptions in the Mind, and accordingly serve to excite them. I suppose again that those Movements or Impressions to which our Perceptions are annex'd, are communicated to the Brain by the Mediation of the *Nerves*. I suppose again that the Fibres of the Nerves may be struck or agitated two ways, either as when the Movement begins at those ends of them which terminate in the extreme parts of the Body, or in those which terminate in the Brain. The former by the Impression of outward Objects, and the latter by the Course or Flux of the Animal Spirits. Now when the Impression upon the Brain, is from the Impression of outward Objects upon the extremities of the Nerves, then it is that we *Sense*, but when the impress is merely from the course of the Spirits striking against the *inner* Fibres of the Nerves, then it is (according to the Principles of the best Philosophy) that we *Imagin*; which character of Imagination, is I think right enough so far as concerns its difference from *Sense*, tho' as to *pure Intellect* its distinction will be better stated upon the *materiality* of its Idea, as was discours'd before.

16. And indeed I much doubt whether the other will make any part of that difference, as not knowing but that *pure Intellection* may depend upon the internal motion of the Spi-

rits, as the exciting occasion, as well as the grossest Imagination. And therefore instead of saying that when the Impression is from within, then 'tis Imagination, I should think it an exacter and less obnoxious way of speaking, to say that in Imagination the Impression is from within. That perhaps being equally common to both Intellect and Imagination, and distinguishing only as to Imagination and Sense, which yet is as much as the present purpose requires.

17. Now to apply this to *Vision*. Here the Perception arises from the Impression of outward Objects upon the outer parts of the Nerves. For tho' whenever there is such an outward Impression 'tis not necessary the Perception that follows upon it should be *Vision* (since it may be as well some other Sense, suppose *Hearing*) yet in all Vision properly so call'd the Impression is outward, from an outward Cause, and upon an outward Part, I mean as to the first Incidence of it. Whereas in Imagination the Impression begins from within, as taking its rise from the course of the animal Spirits, which makes the difference between them (as much as it is) to be very clear and distinct.

18. I say as *much as it is*. For indeed according to this account, Vision seems not to differ from Imagination so much as Imagination does from pure Intellect. For Intellect and Imagination, tho' agreeing perhaps in the way of excitement,

ment, yet differ as to the *Idea*, one being Material and the other Spiritual, which is very considerable, whereas Vision and Imagination agree in the *Idea*, and differ only in the way of *excitement*, which seems to make the difference between them to be (as indeed thus far it is) rather modal and gradual than specifick. Modal in regard of the different manner of the *Impression*, and gradual upon the account of the greater vehemency of it in one case, than in the other, for that very reason, since we may reasonably suppose that the Fibres of the Brain will be more briskly struck, by the *Impression* of outward Objects, than by the sole afflux of the Spirits. Which is the reason why what we see appears more strong and lively to us, than what we only imagin; so that in this respect Vision seems to be but a stronger sort of Imagination, as Imagination but a weaker and fainter kind of Vision, the Spirits not moving so impetuously by themselves, and in their solitary Course (unless in *Fevers* and some other extraordinary Cases, when Imagination is so like Vision, that we can hardly distinguish them) as when quicken'd by the Impulse of outward Objects, as a Wind added to their own natural Tide.

19. From hence we may now distinctly gather two things. 1. What Vision is in it self. 2. What it is in relation to Thought. Vision in it self is the having or perceiving an *Idea* re-
prefen-

presentatively material in consequence of a certain impression made by Light upon that Expansion of the Optick Nerve which is at the bottom of the Eye. As to Thought, Vision is a sort of thinking, or a *special* Thought; it is thinking and something more, or thinking with a peculiar circumstance attending it, as its specifick difference. It agrees with Thought as 'tis a Perception of an Idea, for 'tis the Idea and not the Thing that is the immediate Object of Perception in both, and that which it adds to it, and whereby it differs from it, is partly the peculiarity of the Idea, being always that which represents Matter, and partly the organical impression whereby it comes to be perceiv'd. As to the *Idea*, therein it agrees with Imagination, but in this respect differs from it again, that in Imagination the impression upon which we have the Idea is from within, and in Vision 'tis from without. So that upon the whole, Vision and Thought differ not as one Species differs from another Species, but as a Species differs from a Genus, *seeing* being a certain determinate way of *Thinking* or *Perceiving*, and there being no other difference between *seeing* a Man and thinking upon a Man, than the peculiar manner or occasion whereby the Idea of a Man, which both have in common, is presented to the *Mind*, which after all is the only true Principle that both *thinks* and *sees*. But what does it see? why nothing but Idea

Idea immediately. But then since that Idea is representatively material, it may be said in a mediate or secundary sense to see Body, as seeing that which represents it, as will be better understood hereafter.

20. And thus having compared Thought and Vision, and shewn the difference between them, whereby it appears that Vision is only Thought under some peculiar Modalities and Circumstances, we may now upon these Principles, before we proceed any further, offer at a Solution to two very great Questions, which without them whoever should attempt to explain, would, I doubt, make strange work of it. One is, *Whether a pure separate Spirit, or Intelligence, may see?* To which I answer, That I do not understand how such a Being, how intelligent soever, should be able to see, as Vision is here taken in the peculiar strictness of it for a certain Perception upon certain bodily Impressions as above explain'd; such a Spirit not being supposed, as *separate*, to have any Organs proper for that purpose, nor yet, as *Spirit*, to be immediately and without them impressible by Body, which can act only by impulse, whereof Spirit is not capable; which, by the way, may suffice to shew that Bodies cannot be the true and proper Causes of our Sensations.

21. The other is, *Whether a pure Spirit, such as God, suppose, may be seen?* This is that Question which appear'd so difficult to

St.

* See his Epistles
de Videndo Deo, compar'd with the 29th Chapter of his 22d Book, *De Civ. Dei.*

St. Austin, and about which he bestow'd so much * Pains. A great deal of which might have been spared (as difficult as the Question is) if he had first well stated what is precisely meant by Vision.

For since, according to the foregoing account of it, Vision agrees so far with *Imagination*, as to have the same Idea with it, *viz.* such as is representatively *material*, and differs only as to the manner of exciting that Idea, *viz.* by the Impression of Bodies as above explain'd, I see not how we can avoid concluding that the most purely spiritual God is absolutely invisible, it being impossible that an Idea which is representative of Matter should represent God; and that because God is not Matter. And accordingly that all those things which are said concerning the beatifick *Vision* and of our *seeing* of God, whether in Divine or Human Writers, ought to be understood not of sensible Vision, such as we have been hitherto considering, but of that which is intellectual. Which indeed is no other than the clear Knowledge of God, according to that

saying of our Saviour, (which

+ *Prima secunda.*
Quæst. 3. Art. 4.

is that great Text upon which

the + Doctor of the Schools

grounds his Notion of Happi-

ness, as consisting in the Act of the Understanding) *This is Life eternal that they might know thee*

thee

thee the only true God, &c. For the enjoyment of which glorious and most blissful Theory, at the Light of which all that is here call'd Knowledge shall vanish away; may it be the serious Prayer and constant Endeavour of us all to *purify our selves even as He*, whom we hope thus for ever to contemplate, *is pure*. To which King eternal, immortal, invisible, and only wise God, who dwelleth in the Light which no Man can approach unto, whom no Man hath seen, nor can see, be Honour and Glory for ever. *Amen.*

1 Tim. 1. 17.

1 Tim. 6. 16.

22. But to step again into the Track before it closes. By this account of Vision, so far as was necessary to our present purpose, (for my Busineſs is not here to deliver the Doctrine of Opticks) it may now clearly appear how much there is of *Mechanism* in it, and how much of *Thought*, how much of it belongs to the Body and how much to the Mind, how far it agrees with Thought, and how far it differs from it. The Sum of which amounts to this, that it agrees with it as to the Ideal Perception, and as to the Sensation which it includes (both of which are true and proper Thoughts in their respective kinds) but that it differs from it partly as to the Idea which in Vision is always that which is representatively material, which is not the Idea of Thought at large, but of that particular Species of it which we call *Imagination*, and partly as to the peculiar way and man-

manner of exciting both the Idea and the Sentiment, which in Vision (for Reasons hereafter to be specify'd) does always accompany that Idea.

23. It is all along supposed in this account that Idea is a distinct thing from Sentiment or Sensation, and we have once already touch'd upon their distinction. But for the better understanding of these things, as well as for the fuller display of that Thought whose Nature (as 'tis fit in a Theory of this undertaking) we are now laying open, and one of whose prime Divisions is into Perception in the way of Idea, and Perception in the way of Sentiment, it may be very proper upon the occasion of this Discourse concerning Vision, wherein these two things have been observ'd to meet, to bestow some further Reflections upon the difference that is between them; especially considering how indistinctly they seem to be conceiv'd, I might say confounded, even by Philosophical Men, who in other cases are so apt to multiply distinctions without necessity.

24. That Idea and Sentiment should be confounded in *Vision* is not so strange, because of their constant and undivided Concomitancy therein, which tho' no real Argument of Identity, must yet be allow'd to carry some appearance of it. And so again, that those particular things which in reality will, I suppose, be found to be no other than Sentiments in us, such as *Light*, suppose, or *Colour*, should yet be so

con-

confounded as they generally are with Idea, so as to make up one *intelligible* Object with it, or be thence transferr'd, as we shall ana further remark, to the things without us, suppose the Sun, so as to make up, as we imagin, one *visible* Object with it; I say, neither is this so very strange, considering the Precipitancy and Confusion of most Mens Thoughts, and with all that these Sentiments are caused in us at the presence of outward Objects. We *feel* the one at the same time that we *see* the other, and that is apt to make us imagin that we *see* both. Hitherto therefore there is no great occasion for wonder. But should Idea absolutely and in the general be confounded with Sentiment, or those be lookt upon as over-subtile that distinguish them, this, I think, might deservedly be thought strange, since to any one that can and will consider, 'tis very apparent that hardly any two things are more distinguishable, tho' M. *Malebranch* be the first Philosopher that I know of that ever formally made this distinction.

25. That there is a necessity of distinguishing these things may sufficiently be made appear, before it be shewn wherein the antecedent Reason and Ground of the distinction lies. And because to shew that a thing is, is a less artificial way of *arguing*, (as proceeding upon Premises that have no *natural* Priority to the conclusion) than to shew why and for what Reason it is, we will begin with the former as the less perfect, tho' not always less convincing way

way of Probation. And to this purpose that Consideration which * Monsieur *Malebranche* uses, taken from God's having the Knowledge of Pain without having the Sentiment, is, in my judgment, very strong and cogent. I will give it you in his own excellent words, and in the form of Dialogue wherein it stands.

Theodore. Think you that God feels the Pain which we suffer?

Ariste. No, without doubt, for the Sentiment of Pain makes unhappy.

Theodore. Very well. But do you believe that he knows it?

Ariste. Yes, I believe he does; for he knows whatever happens to his Creatures. The Knowledge of God has no Bounds, and to know my Pain does not render him either miserable or imperfect. On the contrary-----

Theodore. Oh, oh, *Ariste!* God knows Pain, Pleasure, Heat, and the rest, and he does not feel these things. He knows Pain, because he knows what that Modification of the Soul is in which Pain consists. He knows it, because 'tis He alone that causes it in us, as I shall prove to you hereafter, and because he knows that which he does. In one word, he knows it, because that his Knowledge has no Bounds. But he does not feel it, since he would then be miserable. To know Pain therefore is not the same as to feel it.

Ariste.

* *Entretiens sur la Metaphysique.* p. 66.

Ariste. It is true. But to feel Pain, is not the same as to know it.

Theodore. No doubtless, since God does not feel it at all, and yet he knows it most perfectly. But not to intrcate our selves with ambiguity of Terms, if you would have feeling of Pain to be knowing it, yet at least you must grant that it is not to know it *clearly*, that it is not to know it by light and evidence, in one Word, that it is not to know the *Nature* of it, and that so, exactly speaking, 'tis not to know it at all. To feel Pain, for instance, is to feel ones self miserable, without well knowing either what one is, nor what is that Modality of our Being which renders us miserable. But to know is to have a clear Idea of the Nature of one's Object, and to discover such and such Relations of it, by light and evideuce, &c.

26. This Consideration is, I think, abundantly sufficient to satisfy any one that can with due Penetration enter into it, of the absolute necessity of distinguishing these Things, tho' not sufficient it may be to inform us wherein the precise Point of their distinction lies. It plainly and fully proves, and will force us to acknowledge that Idea and Sentiment do, and must differ, tho' it does not so plainly shew us the reason or the manner, either *why*, or *how*. But as for that matter, it need only be further consider'd that the different state or manner of our own Being is plainly one thing, and that an Object that is really distinct from us is another

ther thing. For if our Being, and another Being are distinct, then the Mode of our Being, and that other Being are also distinct. And tho' the Mode of our Being be distinct from our Being only as a Mode from a Thing, whose Mode it is, yet the Mode of our Being is distinct from another Being, as Thing from Thing, really not modally distinct; that is, it is as really distinct, as our Being is from that other Being; and that because it is *really* one with our Being, tho' modally distinct from it. Whoever understands the Doctrin of distinction, which is of great consequence, for our having a just discernment of Things, will, I suppose, allow this to be very *metaphysically* clear. But now *Idea* is an Object distinct from our Being; something which the Mind contemplates as distinct from it self: Whereas *Sentiment* is a certain state or manner, or if you will, *Modification* of our own Being (it being that to the Mind which *Contexture* is to Body) and consequently is as different from Idea, as our Being is from another Being, which is as much as any one thing can be from another. And for a further confirmation of this difference between Idea and Sentiment, it may be of some Importance to reflect upon a thing of common experience, but whose reason is not perhaps accountable, but upon the present Supposition, and that is, the *disturbance* we find in our severer Meditations from any Sensation, not only from great Pleasure, or Pain, but even a little *Noise*.

This

This is what all thinking Men find, and complain of, and accordingly for that reason, those that apply themselves to the serious contemplation of Truth, do all seek for Retirement and Silence (tho' all have not the happiness, or advantage, to enjoy it) and avoid as much as they can all Noise, as troublesome and disturbing. But why should Noise disturb, or how is it that it disturbs us? It disturbs us, as it hinders our *Attention*. For our infirm and limited Capacities cannot perceive the Truth, which we contemplate without attention, nor yet attend without quietness. But why so? How does Noise hinder our attention? Why it hinders our attention as it divides it by drawing off some degrees of it from the Object of our contemplation to itself, and we accordingly call it *Distraction*. Well, but that's a strange Thing, I am contemplating some abstract Truth of the greatest difficulty, of the greatest Curiosity, and of the greatest Importance too, it may be, to be known. And accordingly I apply my self to the speculation of it, with the greatest force, and most awaken'd recollection of Mind. And is it not then a very strange Thing that in spite of all the intenseness of Application I can use, a little Noise, as the buzzing of a Fly, shall be able to divert me from it? I know no reasonable account that can be given of this experience but this, that the Noise which I hear, is a *Sentiment*, whereas that which I contemplate is *Idea*. But now the Sentiment being a proper Modification of my Soul, I am

more affected with it, and my attention is more awaken'd by it, than by Idea which is something different from my self, which by the way may serve as a sensible Argument to convince us of the falseness of Mr. *Arnauld*'s notion of Ideas being *Modalities* of the Soul, since if they were, they would then affect us as strongly as our Sensations do. But that we find they do not; on the contrary we find our selves much otherwise touch'd by our Sensations than by our Ideas, and that because our Sensations are certain Modifications of the very Soul it self, whereas our Ideas are really distinct from us, by which means it comes to pass (or else it will be hardly possible, to resolve it into a distinct Cause) that a slight Sentiment, tho' it be only that of a little *Noise*, will be sufficient to draw off our attention from the contemplation of the most filling and ingaging Ideas, that the most thoughtful Mind can employ it self about. Which seems to be a very convincing Argument of the distinction of these Things.

27. What is here said of *Idea* and *Sentiment*, may with due proportion and accommodation be applied to Perception in the way of Idea, and Perception in the way of Sentiment, or, as we may call it, Ideal or Sensible Perception. The former being the Perception of some Intelligible Object, distinct from us, and the latter the inward feeling we have how 'tis with our selves, or of that particular state, or man-

manner of Being, which we are at any time in, sensible Perception being not Sentiment itself, but that inward consciousness which we have of a Sentiment. As to give an instance in each kind, when I contemplate a Triangle, or any of its Properties, then I have an Ideal Perception, but when I feel Pleasure, or Pain, then I have a sensible Perception, or the Perception of a Sentiment. Than which nothing can be more distinct.

28. But the distinction will be yet more apparent when it is further remark'd that in Ideal Perception there is a great deal of Light and Evidence. When we contemplate Ideas we see both them and the Relations that are between them in a clear Light, and because we do so we are accordingly said to *know* and understand the Natures and Reasons of Things. But now in sensible Perception (as also in Sentiment itself) there is nothing but Darkness and Obscurity, there being hardly any thing clear to us in Sentiment besides the *existence* of it. And that indeed is most evident, for we are as certain of what we feel, as of any Ideal Truth that we know, and can as little doubt of it. But what the Nature of that Pleasure or Pain is which we feel, or what that Modality of Soul is (as M. *Malebranche* speaks) which makes the one or the other, that we know no more of, than if we had never felt either of them. Not but that this is an intelligible Thing, because God knows it, and we our

selves may possibly know it hereafter, when we come to have a Sight (a great and ingaging Sight indeed) of that *Archetypal Idea*, upon which our Souls were form'd, the intellectual Mould, in which we were cast, and which at present, for wise Reasons, is hid from us. But that which I mean is that it is not intelligible by *Sentiment*, and that if ever we know it, it must be by Idea, and not by Sentiment that we can do so, *that* as such, going no further than a certain Modality of our Being, without including any Knowledge, or Ideal Perception of it.

29. And because there is such clearnes of Light and Evidence in Ideal Perception, and so much Darkness in Sentiment, therefore I conceive it is (which may be consider'd as another Argument *a Posteriori* for the distinguishing these Things) that I can make what I really perceive intelligible to another, only by directing him to those Ideas which I contemplate, by some common Signs whereby we have agreed to expres or characterize them. For the Ideas themselves being placed, as I may say, *in medio*, and visible by a common Light to every intellectual Eye, he can contemplate them when directed to them as well as my self; and therefore all that I have to do here to make what I conceive intelligible, is only by the use of certain outward Signs to set such Ideas before him, or rather to turn his Attention to the Contemplation of them. But now in *Sentiment* the Case

Case is much otherwise. Here I cannot make what I *feel* intelligible to another by any Expression I can use, were I never so great a Master of it. My Oratory may perhaps *please* him (if it be possible for me to be eloquent upon what I do not understand) but it cannot tell him what *Pleasure* is. No verbal description will reach this, but every Man must be left to *feel* it for himself, this being most truly and emphatically one of those Things.

Dicere que nequeo verbis, & sentio tantum.

And when he does feel it, he can know no more of it but what he feels, that is, that he is in *Pleasure*, or in *Pain*, or at most, that *Pleasure* is one Thing, and *Pain* another, because he finds himself otherwise affected or modified in one of those States of Being, than he does in the other; but what that modality of Being, is wherein either of these does consist, (wherein lies the proper knowledge of *Pleasure* or *Pain*) that *Sentiment* can never inform him, but after infinitely repeated Experiments will leave him as ignorant of, as he was before he ever made any. So that in this respect perhaps I need not scruple to say, That he that can *see*, knows no more of *Light* or *Colour*, than he that is *blind*.

30. Let me here remarque by the way, lest I should forget it, or not find a more proper place for it, that tho' I have hitherto used *Sen-*

timent and *Sensation* promiscuously, yet if we will more nicely distinguish them, we may do it by saying that *Sensation* is a Perception upon some Impression of outward Objects made upon the Body. For as the Power of receiving such a Perception, by means of a certain Organical Texture of some parts of the Body, is what I would call *Sense* (for sure Sense, as when we speak of the Sense of seeing, or the Sense of hearing, cannot in the propriety of it be supposed to mean either the Perception itself, or the organical Texture, but the Power of having such a Perception, by the mediation of such a Texture) so the Perception itself which arises in the Mind, upon the Impression of outward Objects on certain parts of the Body, whose Texture is aptly disposed for it, is what I should properly call *Sensation*. Whereas by *Sentiment* in the more strict acceptation of it, I would rather understand the modal Being of the Soul at large, or any inward feeling, whereof it is conscious to itself, whether occasion'd by Impressions from without, or from within, or indeed without any Impression upon the Body at all. For as, tho' all outward Impressions should cease, we might yet have certain *feelings* from the inward motion of the Spirits, so if both outward and inward should cease too, or if we had no *Bodies* at all, there is no doubt but that (if God please) our Souls might be modified as they are upon these Occasions, and we might have the same inward

ward feelings of Pleasure or Pain, &c. as we have now. Which tho' we could not so properly call *Sensations*, as not proceeding from the occasion of the Body, yet we may call them *Sentiments* at large, as we now absolutely consider them, as certain Modalities of the Soul, distinct from our Ideal Perceptions.

31. But to proceed. To what we have said concerning the distinction of these Things, we may add this further consideration, that in Ideal Perception we are *active*. Not that I think we make or produce our Ideas any more than we do our Sentiments (I leave that Privilege to the *Intellectus Agens* of the Schools, to *inlighten* or to *modify* our selves, being as I conceive equally above us) but that as we have a Power of contemplating them, so in our Ideal Perception we do actually exert, and employ that Power. I do not deny but that there may be Passion in this, as well as Action. All that I do or need here affirm, is, that we are truly active in our Ideal Perceptions, which is no more than what our Experience will inform us whenever we please to reflect upon those two ways of Thinking, which we may observe in our selves. For sometimes the *Tone* of the Mind, as I may say, is so loose and unbent, that we think carelessly and at random, not preferring one intelligible Object before another, or regarding the Nature or Distinction of what we think of, but taking Ideas as they come in our way, or as the Spirits opening

ing their Course thro' their beaten Tracks in the Brain happen to excite them, without considering what they are, or in what Order they succeed, or in what Relation they stand one to another. This indeed is *Thinking*, but so like that Thinking which we call *Dreaming*, that is, the Thinking in our Sleep, that were not the discovery more obvious to be made from the State of our Bodies, than of our Minds, it would not be very easy to distinguish, whether we were asleep, or awake. And without doubt he that in convenient time and place, should talk out such Thoughts as these would be suppos'd to talk in his Sleep. But that which is more to my present purpose to observe, is, that tho' this be Thinking, yet there is so little application of the Mind in it, as to leave some room for doubting, whether in this way of Thinking, she be active or no. But then again at other times, and upon more ingaging Occasions, we find that we shake off this littleness, *gird up* (even in this Sense) *the loins of our Minds*, and set our selves to Thinking, and are more earnest and intense in our view of Things, as in that sort of Thinking which we call *Study* or *Meditation*, which is known to employ the Soul, as much as the most toilsome labour does the Body, 'till the happy discovery of Truth, at once reward and concludes the painful Enquiry. So that in this way of Ideal Perception, at least I think 'tis hardly to be disputed but that we are *active*. But now in

Sen-

Sentiment, that implying only a different state or manner of our Being, and such as we have no immediate Power to produce in our selves at Pleasure, it seems to be very plain, both in the *Notion* and in the *Experience* of the Thing, that we are purely *Passive*.

32. *Passive*, but from what? This leads to the great Question about the true efficient cause of our Sentiments, or Sensations (for I think we need not here distinguish them) concerning which, much might be said, were I to handle it at large, but having done that already * elsewhere, and the more Philosophical Minds beginning now to break through the prejudices of Sense, into a clearer light and satisfaction concerning this matter, I shall touch upon it with the lighter Hand. That we are passive in our Sensations I here suppose, and I presume, with allowance. The Question is from what? To which I make no Scruple in the first place to answer, not from *our selves*, since *then* we should be Active and not Passive. Besides that we find we have no Power over our Sensations, either to cause them or to stop them when we will, and do frequently suffer some of them against our Will. That we have no immediate Power, is plain, that is, I mean to give or to remove from our selves, any Sensation by the bare act of either Willing, or Nilling it. All that we can do of this kind, is by the Mediation of

* See the 1st Discourse of the 3d Vol.

Bodies, and their Impressions upon our Body. But then this shews that we have no true Power over our Souls to modify them as we please, and consequently are not the proper causes of their Sensations (since if we were, we might produce them without the impressions of Bodies as well as with them) and will withal serve as a Clue, to direct us to that which is the true and real Cause of them. That is I mean, it will do it within the compass of a *Disjunction*. For since we cannot procure to our selves any Sensations, otherwise than by the application of bodily Motions and Impressions, this naturally suggests to us one of these two Thoughts, either that those Bodies upon whose Impressions we have these Sensations, are indeed the true Causes that produce them, or that these Sensations are only positively annex'd to these Impressions, by the settled Will and Order of some other Being, who is the true Cause of them, as producing them upon those Occasions.

33. It has been generally taken for granted, even by those from whom one would expect a better Reason for what they believe, than because they have ever believ'd it, that Bodies are the real causes of those Sensations which follow at their Prefence, and upon their Impressions. To support which Opinion, I know no assignable Reason, but that they do so, according to that sensible Maxim, *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, which indeed is good Logick with the

the Vulgar, who have scarce any other notion of Cause and Effect, than one Things following upon another ; but methinks should not pass for such with the Learned, as indeed it does not in other cases, in which they are ready enough to tell you that Concomitancy is no Argument for a causal Dependence of one thing upon another. As indeed a very little Logick will serve to satisfy any one that it is not.

34. But then as the Reason for this general Presumption is not good, so there is plain Reason against it. Bodies have nothing in them but Figure, Motion, &c. and as this shews that they can have nothing in them like those Sentiments which we feel at their Presence, so it proves also that they cannot properly, and as efficient Causes, produce them in us. Since if they do produce them, it must be by Figure, and Motion, &c. But Figure, and Motion, &c. as they cannot rise up to Thought in the Bodies themselves, so neither is it possible they should be able to produce it in us, unless we could suppose that a Cause might produce an effect of a more noble Order than itself, which is impossible. I leave my Reader to supply what is wanting to the form of the Argument, which when he does, he will see there is nothing wanting to the force of it.

35. Again

35. Again, let it be consider'd, that as there is no Proportion between Motion and Thought in general, between an Affection of Body, and a Sentiment of the Soul; so there is none between such a particular Motion, and such a particular Sentiment, between the Motion that is follow'd with Pleasure, suppose, and Pleasure, or between the Motion that is follow'd with Pain and Pain: For if there were, then the Motion that is follow'd with Pleasure should differ as much from the Motion which is follow'd with Pain, as one of these Sentiments differs from the other. But now these Sentiments differ *Essentially*; nay, even as Contraries; whereas the Motion that is follow'd with Pleasure, differs but in *Degree* from that which is follow'd with Pain. So that for any thing that is in the Motions themselves, that which is attended with one Sentiment, might as well be attended with its contrary, as having no peculiar aptness in its own Nature to produce one rather than the other. Whereby it plainly appears, that there is no Proportion between these Motions and their presum'd Effects, and consequently, that they are not the true Causes of them.

36. But to satisfie us at once that they are not, let it be further consider'd, that if Bodies be the efficient Causes of those Sensations, which we feel in the use of them, then Body must act upon Spirit. The Consequence, I presume, will not be denied, as depending upon

in these two plain Propositions, 1. That our Sensations are in our Spirits, Matter not being capable of any Thought. 2. That they cannot be produced there, but by that which acts upon them, it being obviously impossible that any Alteration or Effect should be wrought in any Being by that which does not act upon that Being. Whoever grants these two Propositions, as I conceive every one will that well considers them, cannot stand with me about the Consequences of our Argument. It remains then only to prove the Minor Proposition of it, that Body cannot act upon Spirit, which allowing the Notions we have of these two Beings (without which 'tis to no purpose to talk of them either one way or other) may, I think, be done with great Ease, Brevity and Clearness. Body can act only by Impulse, it can make an impulse only upon that which resists it. Spirit cannot resist Body, as being capable of Coexisting in the same *Ubi* with it; therefore Body cannot act upon Spirit. And if it cannot act upon it, then by virtue of the first Consequence it cannot cause any Sensation in it; since if it did, it must act upon it. Besides, Body can act only upon Body; for it can act only upon what it *touches*, and it can touch nothing but Body, according to that of *Lucretius*, *Tangere enim & tangi nisi Corpus nulla potest res.*

37. More I might add, but these few Considerations, among many others that crowd for admittanc

mittance in so copious an Argument, may be sufficient to shew, that Bodies are not the Causes of our Sensations. And yet, that we regularly have them upon their Impressions, is as plain, by *Experience*, as the other is by *Reason*. It follows then, that they are only positively annex'd to them by the settled Will and establish'd Order of some other Being. That is, in other Words, that Bodies are only the *Conditions* or *Occasions* of our Sensations, but that some other Being is the true Efficient *Cause* of them.

38. Who that Being is, we need not either go far to seek, or seek far to find. He must be a Spiritual Being in the first place; this being an Effect, as we have shewn beyond the Order and Proportion of Body to produce. He must again be a Being that fully and thoroughly understands our Frame, and that has an efficacious Power to work upon it, and change the State and Manner of it. Besides he must know all the Motions of Bodies, and the very Critical Moment, when they make any Impressions upon ours; the precise Degree of the Impression, and the very Instant when it ceases. The Moment, that he may know exactly when to give us a Sensation. The *Degree*, that he may know both how to *Specify* it, and how to *Proportion* it. The *Ceasing* of it, that he may know when to withdraw his Hand, and suspend the Operation, that so the Impression and the Sensation may begin and end together. All this he must have a perfect Knowledge of, and that at all Times

Times, and in all Places of the World, and throughout the vast number of Rational Creatures that are in it, that so they may all Communicate in the same Sensations upon the like Impressions. But now what Being can we suppose duly qualify'd for all this; but a Being of infinite Knowledge and of an Almighty Power, and whose Will is infallibly effective, of whatsoever his Wisdom approves and prescribes? And indeed who so fit to modify our Beings, or change the State or Manner of their Existence, as the great Author of them, the Divine Artist that made them, and who sees in those intelligible Reasons, those Ideal Measures whereby he made them, of what Modifications they are capable?

39. Whatever then the inveterate prejudice of Sense, or those forward Judgments which Men from their Infancy (when their Sensations are strong and their Reason weak) are wont to make upon it, may suggest to the contrary, our Reason and Philosophy must conclude, tho' it be call'd *New* for so doing; that God only is the cause of our Sensations, and that the Movements of the Body do not act upon the Soul any otherwise than by his Will; that is, I mean, any otherwise than as he has established, into a settled Law, to touch the Soul with certain Sentiments or Feelings, as often as exterior Objects shall make certain Impressions upon the Body. And as the Movements of the Body are only occasions of certain Thoughts in the

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Soul; so whether the Thoughts of the Soul are not also in the like Proportion, only occasions of the Movements of the Body, according to that Law of Reciprocation which the *Cartesians* suppose between these two Principles of our Composition, and wherein they make their *Union* to consist, I leave to be considered. It seems very strange, that the Soul, which has no immediate Power over the least Body in the Universe, should yet be able, by a bare act of her Will, so freely and readily to move her *own*: For if she does really move her *own*, why is it that she cannot move others, that are equally moveable, as well? You'll say, because she is not so *united* to others, as to her *own*. Yes, every whit as much united to others as to her *own*, if by *Union* you mean any real *Contact*, or *Cohesion* of Substances, since she is so *United* to neither. But if by *United* you mean, which seems to be the only intelligible Notion of the *Union* of Soul and Body, that there is a positive *Connexion* established by the Author of Nature, between the Thoughts of the one, and the Motions of the other, then I confess she is not so *United* to other *Bodies* as to her *own*; but then must not you confess again in your turn, that according to this her *Thoughts*, are not the proper *Causes*, but only the *Occasions* of those Motions, since if they were, the Question will still return, Why can't she move other *Bodies* as well?

40. But

40. But suppose the Soul's Ability to move that Portion of Matter, which is call'd her Body, were in any Sense accountable by her *Union* with it ; yet what shall we say as to the particular *Kinds* of those Motions, and the *Determination* of them ? That what I Eat and Drink cannot digest, and that what is digested cannot be turn'd into Blood, Spirits, and Flesh without certain intestine Motions, this I well know : But what kind of Motions those are by which this great Work of the Animal Oeconomy is carried on, that I know not ; and were it to stay for the orders of my Will before it were perform'd, it would never be done. And so again, to the Motion of any one of my Fingers, 'tis necessary that the Spirits be directed precisely to that Finger which I would have moved. But can the Soul, which is ignorant of the interiour Mechanism of her own Body among such a multitude of Pipes and Chaneles, determine the Spirits so exactly and so instantaneously through that very Nerve, and to that very Muscle which serves for that purpose ? And is it not then necessary, that this should be done by a more skilful and infallible Conduct, that so I may not will the Motion of such a Finger in vain ? And is it not hence reasonable to conclude, that tho' the motion of my Finger does indeed follow upon my willing, that it should be moved ; yet that my Will is not the true and proper *Cause*, but only the Occasion or *Condition* of that Motion ? But my Subject re-

calls me from going on any further with this. I only Occasionally hint these few things, leaving the Pursuance of them to those who have Leisure and Inclination to enter upon a Speculation, which would afford no ordinary Entertainment to a Philosophical Mind, nor advantage to the most useful of all Sciences, that I mean, of *Knowing ones self*.

41. But whatever Power the Soul may be allow'd to have over her Body, yet I can by no means think it consistent either with the Spiritual Nature of our Souls, or that Natural Immortality which is founded upon it, that Bodies should be able to act upon *them*. And I would desire those who are so forward to ascribe our Sensations to Bodies, as the real efficient Causes of them, heedfully to consider, whether the distinction of Soul and Body, can be preserv'd, or the Immortality of the former can be maintain'd upon that Supposition. For my part, I think 'tis but too evident that it cannot. Body can act only upon Body, and therefore if Body can act upon my Soul, is it not then plain that my Soul is Corporeal? I know not how to separate the consequence from the Principle, and must accordingly look upon it not only as absurd, but as Impious, and a little reconcileable to the Interests of Religion, as to *Philosophical* Truth. And I cannot but wonder that since the consequence is so generally and justly disclaim'd, the Principle from whence it so clearly, necessarily, and immediately follows,

lows, should be in such Credit and Allowance. But, *Tanta est vis veter nosarum Opinionum, & diu defensæ atq; Creditæ falsitatis*, as St. Austin speaks.

42. Perhaps my Admiration may proceed from my Ignorance. But however give me leave to wonder again, that Men, who in other Respects, seem to want no due Sense of the Excellency of humane Nature, and are indeed so jealous of the Dignity of their Souls, as not to allow Beasts to share with them in that *Reason* which is made their Character and Privilege, (tho' they will not deny them some degrees of Thought) should yet so far degrade them at the same time, as to subject them, and, as it were, *Prostitute* them to *Bodies*, and make them depend upon them for their well or ill Being. I say, to make Bodies so far above them, as to have it in their power to do them Good or Hurt, to give them Pleasure or Pain, to make the state of their Being better or worse; in one word, to be the Authors of their Happiness, or of their Misery. There are Consequences of no very friendly Aspect to Religion, that may be drawn from this part also: But leaving them, as obvious to the Consideration of my Reader, that which I reflect upon at present, is only that Men should so strangely degrade themselves of their Natural Eminence, as to submit their Souls to the Power and Operation of Bodies. But what is it that the Pride of human Nature will not do? Or to what low Degrees of *Voluntary Humility*

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will it not condescend, rather than acknowledge our dependance upon God in the whole State and Manner of our Being, as well as in Being it self?

43. Not but that some have ventured very far in questioning the *latter*. For tho' they could not but own (because indeed the very Infirmity of their Nature confesses it) that they depend upon God as to the first derivation or receiving of their Being from him, yet they can dispute whether they do or no, and think it too much that they should, as to the continual upholding and preservation of that Being; and as to the Divine Co-operation and Concourse with them in all their Actions, tho' perhaps it be demonstrable upon Metaphysical Grounds, that the very Notion of a Creature includes both. But however there is something peculiar in this Case, that lessens the strangeness of it. Men question or deny their dependance upon God *here*, because they fansie, that if once made, and indued with such and such Powers, they are then sufficient of *themselves* to set up for Being and Operation, and so dismiss their Maker from any further attendance upon them, as having no occasion for him. But now in the other Case that concerns our *manner* of Being, I know none that pretend (as indeed there is no Foundation for it) to be the *Authors* of their own *Sensations*. Here 'tis plain they must own themselves to be *Passive*, and to owe a Dependance somewhere. But alas (such is the Corruption
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of humane Nature) we are generally too far from God to be willing that he should be so near unto us, that in him we should Live, Move, and have our whole Being. And therefore rather than acknowledge our selves dependent upon *Him* for our Sensations, we take hold, as Men in Distress, of *Primum Obvium*, what first comes in our way, and ascribe them to Bodies, without considering how much we debase our selves by so doing, or the no Proportion between such *Causes* and such *Effects*. The sum then of the whole Matter will come to this: If the Soul be Body, it can have no such thing as Sensation, because Matter is not capable of Thought. But if (what on both sides is supposed) it be a Spiritual Substance, then it cannot receive it from Body. Tho' then Bodies may be the *Causes* of those Impressions which are made upon our Bodies; and those Impressions may be occasions of those Sentiments which we feel in our Souls, yet 'tis God only who is the true Cause that produces them upon those occasions.

44. And that with a Conduct that carries in it the Marks and Expresses of infinite Wisdom and Goodness, as well as of Power. For it being necessary for the Natural Preservation of that Body to which my Soul is United, and in whose welfare she is concerned, that she should not be wholly ignorant of what is done to it by those various impressions which other Bodies, according to the Laws of Motion, estab-

blished in the World make upon it; and that because these different impressions of other Bodies have different Effects upon hers; some of them tending to its Good, and some to its Hurt; by *Hurt*, meaning not the Sentiment of Hurt, but only the Dissolution of its Structure, or the Disorder of the *Machine*, so as to indispose it either wholly, or in part, for the Functions of Life: I say, upon these Considerations it being necessary that I should know, if not what Bodies are in themselves; yet what they are to me, or what Relation they have to my Body, as to the Mechanical Good or Evil of it; that so I may either joyn my self to them, or avoid them, as there shall be occasion. And there being again but two possible ways of knowing this, either by Ideal Perception, or by Sentiment; that is, either by examining and considering the Nature or Internal Constitution of other Bodies, the Contexture of their Parts, Bulk, Figure, Degree of Motion, &c. together with the Relation or Proportion that all these bear to the Make and Temper of my own Body, or by having a different *Feeling* within, as the Impression is which is made without, my Soul receiving a new Modification as that of her Body is alter'd by the incursion of other Bodies. And the first of these Ways, besides its being too anxious and ingaging, and apt to detain the Soul (which was made for higher Employments) too much in the Contemplation of things beneath her, being also too slow and tedious,

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(since if I were not to quit the Fire till I had gone through the Philosophy of it, I should be burnt) and by reason of the invincible Difficulties of it, and the numerous returns of the occasions no way united to the Proportion of our narrow Faculties; and indeed, to say all at once, utterly *impracticable*, it was necessary I should be advertized of the Relations other Bodies bear to mine, and of the Congruity and Discongruity of their Impressions, by a quicker and more compendious Method. And accordingly the Wise and Good Author of my Being has not left it to my Reason to explore the Nature of sensible Objects, and thence to conclude what Effects they would have upon a Body so disposed as mine is (which if *possible* could not be done without infinite trouble) but has established some general Laws, whereby upon certain Impressions, I find my self touch'd with certain Sentiments, preventing all use of Thought or Consideration about the occasions of them: Which Sentiments, because Pleasure and Pain are the Natural Marks of Good and Evil, are either Easy or Uneasy, Pleasing or Displeasing, according as the difference of the Impression requires.

45. I say, as the Difference of the Impression requires. For tho' there be no Proportion in general between Motion and Sensation, and tho' there be nothing in the particular Impressions themselves resembling those particular Sensations, which we have in Consequence of them

them; the Impression which is follow'd with Pleasure, differing only in Degree from that which is follow'd with Pain; yet forasmuch as in reference to the good or bad State of the Body they differ *Essentially*, as putting the parts of the Machine into divers Configurations, naturally tending to the Preservation or Dissolution of it: It is fit that these Impressions, tho' only gradually different in themselves, and so of themselves indifferent to any Sentiment, or none at all, should yet be attended with Sensations Essentially, or Specifically different, such as Pleasure and Pain, as much as if there were all that Natural Correspondence or Connexion between them that is commonly imagin'd.

46. This suggests to us at once an occasion to move a Question, and a Measure whereby to resolve it. It may here be demanded, Are then the Impressions of Bodies merely Positive and Arbitrary Conditions of our Sensations; or is there not rather a kind of sensible *Congruity* between the one and the other? To which, according to the premised Account, I Answser, That they are only *Conditions* in opposition to a proper Causal Efficency, is, I think, what may absolutely be affirm'd. But whether purely Positive and Arbitrary or no, must be answer'd by a Distinction. If by purely Positive and Arbitrary Conditions be meant, that there is no real Analogy, or (abstracting from the Divine Order and Constitution about it) necessary Connexion between such Impressions, and such

such Sensations; so they are purely Positive and Arbitrary Conditions. For most assuredly there is nothing in those Impressions that either resembles the following Sensations, or that Naturally and Necessarily infers them. But if by their being purely Positive and Arbitrary Conditions be meant, that there is no greater *Reason* why God in Consideration of the good of the Body, should touch the Soul with such a Sentiment upon such an Impression, rather than with another, or with its contrary; in this respect as I do not, so I need not say, that they are purely Positive and Arbitrary Conditions, since that *greater Reason* is taken, not from the Relation which the Impression has to the Sentiment (which is none at all), but only from the Relation which such a Sentiment has to such a State or Disposition of the Body, which supposing it is the Will of God to have preserved, it is necessary he should give me such a Sentiment as shall naturally admonish me to avoid whatever Impression is injurious to it, tho' there be *otherwise* no manner of *Congruity* between that Sentiment and that Impression.

47. And thus we have seen what Sensation is, how it differs from Idea, and whence it proceeds; but before we dismiss the Consideration of it, I think it would be a great Omission here not to remark that the *Errors* of the *Senses* (as they are more commonly than properly called) are indeed nothing else but those wrong Judgments which we make upon our Sensations

ons or sensible Perceptions, or else truely I know not what to understand by them, but must reckon it among some other forms of speaking, which tho' customarily used, or for that reason presumed to be well understood, are yet without any distinct or intelligible meaning. For Error being no more nor no less than a wrong Judgment, 'tis impossible that Sense should be strictly capable of erring, as having no Capacity of Judgment belonging to it. That therefore which is call'd an Error of Sense, is really an Error of the Mind, giving a false Judgment upon the occasion of what is truely perceiv'd. For as Error in the general is a wrong Judgment, so then 'tis an *Error of Sense* (to speak as the World does) when this wrong Judgment proceeds in Consequence of a Sensation, of which sensible Errors we may consider two sorts, some that respect the Objects without us, and some that respect the Sensation it self. The former are they that are the Subjects of Common Discourse, and 'tis what People generally mean when they talk of the Errors of the Senses. But tho' the former sort of sensible Errors be most talkt of, yet the latter is that which Men are most guilty of, and which I take to be of the most considerable Consequence. Not that there is any room for Error, or possibility of erring as to Sensation, absolutely and in it self consider'd. For what I feel, or am conscious of to my self that I feel, that I do certainly feel, and consequently cannot err in judging

judging that I feel it; as neither can I in judging that I feel Pleasure, when indeed I feel Pain, or that I feel Heat, when indeed I feel Cold, not because such a Judgment would not be an Error, but because 'tis impossible I should so *judge*, and that because these Sentiments wherewith my Soul is modify'd, are as distinct from one another, as are any of the Modalities of Matter; as a Circle suppose is from a Square, and therefore I cannot mistake one for the other. So that in this respect *Sentiment* is every whit as clear as *Idea*; when therefore I speak of those Errors of Sense that respect the Sensation it self, I would be understood of Sensation *Relatively* consider'd, or with Relation to external Objects. The first of which Errors is (that which we have been already Confuting) to suppose that our Sensations do proceed from those Objects, as the real Effects of them, because 'tis at their Presence, and in consequence of their Impressions that we have them, which is an Error of much greater Absurdity (besides the badness of its Consequences) than to fancy a Body that is Cubical to be round, because it is in some degrees of distance, an occasion of that appearance; or than when one thing by the transposition of one's Fingers shall seem two, &c. This latter being only an Error in *Fact*, or concerning a *Contingent* Truth, in thinking that to be which really is not, whereas the other is an Error in *Theory* or concerning a *Necessary* Truth, in thinking that to be which is *Ideally* impossible.

48. But there is another Error with respect to the Sensation it self, of no less Absurdity, nor better Consequence, than the former, and that is when we attribute our Sensations to Bodies, not I mean as the *Causes*, but as the *Subjects* of them, by supposing that there are certain Qualities in Bodies, resembling those Sentiments which we have by their occasion; so making that which in reality is only a Sentiment in our selves to become a sensible Quality in *them*, and so transferring, as it were, our Sentiments from our selves to *them*. A strange Confusion, and yet so very ordinary, that the generality of Mankind never think otherwise, and are withal so uncapable of having other apprehensions, that instead of being better inform'd by your Philosophy, they shall be ready to think you mad if you tell them that there is no heat in Fire, no sweetness in Sugar, no taste in Salt, no smell in a Rose, no light in the Air, no colour in the Rain-bow, &c. And yet not a Man of these will say, if he considers what he says, that there is any *Pain* in a Needle or a Knife. But why so? Do they not feel Pain when a Knife cuts them, as well as Heat when they approach the Fire? Yes, all a-like; but they see the Bulk and Figure of the Knife, and how it pierces and enters into their Flesh, they see the presumed Cause of the Sentiment which affects their Souls, and the real Cause of the Impression which is made upon their Bodies, and accordingly dream of nothing beyond what appears

appears ; whereas the Particles of the Fire being too minute to be sensibly discern'd, and so the manner of the Impression (tho' really as mechanical as the other) being here indiscoverable, they presently have recourse (as 'tis Natural to do in all Cases, where we are ignorant of the true Cause of any effect) to a certain *Occult Quality* in the Fire, call'd *Heat*, resembling, as they imagine, the sentiment of Heat, whereof they are conscious in themselves. And accordingly 'tis observable, that this imagination, as common as it is, obtains only as to *In-sensible Bodies*, and never where the parts that make the Impression, and the Motion whereby they make it sensibly appear. For who ever thought of any thing like Pleasure in a *Feather* that tickles his Hand ? The Rustick here is as far from any such Imagination as the finest *Cartesian* of 'em all. And yet every body almost imagines a sweet Smell, as something inherent in a *Rose*. And why ? but only because the parts that make the impression upon the Hand are visibly perceiv'd ; whereas those that strike the Nerves and Fibres of the Nose are not. And so here our Ignorance takes Refuge in a *Quality*, which in the other case the most fanciful Head never thought of. But then this serves to lay open the whole Fallacy of the Matter ; as also to discover how inconsistent Men are with themselves, since they cannot attribute Heat to Fire, or Sweetness to a Rose, upon any Principle that will not equally oblige them

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to ascribe Pain to a Knife, or Pleasure to a Feather, there being the same Reason for the one that is for the other.

49. But indeed there is Reason for neither; for if we examine the Nature of Bodies either by our Senses, or by our Understandings, we shall find there none of those things which upon their impression we *feel* in our *selves*, and by a false and confuse Judgment upon that Sensation ascribe to *them*, there being nothing either Visible or Conceivable in *them* but only Magnitude, Figure, Motion, Contexture of Parts, &c. And therefore, tho' partly for Brevity and Dispatch-sake, and partly to comply with the use of Conversation, we call one Hot, and another Sweet, &c. because we should not be understood by the World if we did not speak its Language; yet 'tis plain, that these and the like Denominations can signify nothing really in Bodies: I will not say, with the Author of Humane Understanding, but a *Power* to produce these Sensations in us, it being as clear and evident as any thing can well be in Philosophy, that they have no such Power: But this I say, that they can signify nothing intelligibly in Bodies, but only such a Contexture of Parts as is naturally apt to make such an Impression; not as has any Likeness or Congruity with such a Sentiment, but with which, according to the positive establishment of that Almighty Being at whose disposal we stand, such a Sentiment is annex'd. Thus Heat as it is

is in the Fire, is not such a Heat as we feel (for then we must suppose it to have Sense and Perception) but only that which occasions that Heat which we feel. And so Light in the Sun is not the sentiment of Light, but that which occasions that Sentiment. And what that is, is the business of Philosophy to consider. But as to the *Sentiment* of Light that cannot be defined or described, but must be felt only; which plainly shews, that these are two things. But then tho' this argues a great Defect in our Knowledge, that we cannot make intelligible by a Definition, what we feel, as well as what we Ideally perceive; yet there is this to comfort our Ignorance, that our Philosophy of *Bodies* may be compleat without it, since these things as they are in *Sentiment* do not belong to *Bodies*.

49. This is easily conceivable in all those sensible Qualities which are usually ascribed to them, and lookt upon as inherent in them, except only in *Colour*. And here indeed in those that are not far advanced in Speculation and as far removed from Prejudice, Imagination will be apt to stand out against the Answers of the purest Reason, and to revolt from her Authority, representing *Colour*, at least as something really inherent in Bodies, as being unwilling to divest them of what is so charming and agreeable. The Ground of the illusion is, because Colour belongs to *Vision*; wherein, as was before observed, there is a Concomitancy of Idea

with Sentiment, whereas in our other Senses there is only the latter. Now the never failing Concomitancy of these two things in Vision, makes us apt to confound one with the other, what we feel with what we see, or Ideally perceive, and so to make our Sentiment enter into the formality of our Idea, and to consider it as an Essential part of it. And since we Naturally refer our Ideas to the Objects that are without us, thinking that we see the Objects when indeed we see only the Ideas that represent them, this makes that we refer our Sentiments with them ; and accordingly the Object, besides its proper Nature or Essence, becomes invested with a sensible Quality, and we think we see this or that *Colour* in it, as plainly as we do the Object it self.

50. And thus our Imagination has dress'd up a fine notional Being (for indeed I look upon these sensible Qualities, as subjected in Bodies, to be as much *Entia Rationis*, as any of those which pass for such in the account of the Schools) and we cannot well blame her if she grow fond of, and loth to part with a *Creature* of her own, and that so beautiful a one too. But if we can but obtain leave of our Prejudices (with which perhaps we have no Contest so great as in the present instance) to consider things rationally and freely, we shall find that what we call *Colour* in Bodies ; and for the sake of which we are so passionately affected to some of them, is indeed no natural Reality of theirs,
but

but only an artificial Paint or Varnish of our own Fancies: For however things may appear to us, by reason of our mixing our Sentiments with our Ideas, we have no reason to think that there is any thing in Bodies besides Bulk, Motion, Figure, Texture of Parts, &c. Nor consequently that there is any such thing as *Colour* in them, as that signifies any *Modification* of Matter distinct from the other.

51. Colour then in Bodies can mean nothing else but the Texture of their Parts; nor can that Texture be said to be Colour any otherwise than *Fundamentally* speaking, in as much as by reason of that Texture they have an aptness; I do not say to make an Impression themselves, but so to return a certain fine Matter to our Eyes, as shall make such an Impression upon them, as by the Institution of Nature, or rather Will of its Author, shall serve to excite in us the sense of Colour. For I must note something peculiar again in this Sentiment that is not in the rest. The sense of Heat, Sweetness, &c. is occasioned by the immediate impression of those Bodies, which are denominated Hot, Sweet, &c. but the sense of Colour is not occasioned immediately by the Bodies said to be Colour'd, but 'tis by the immediate Impression of some other Matter of a much finer Consistence, that this Sense is excited, to which the Bodies said to be Colour'd, contribute no otherwise than as they are, by reason of their Texture, the Ground of that Impression;

R 2 which

which Remark is the more worthy to be observed, because, when it is so, it will serve to set two Propositions in an intelligible View, which otherwise appear not only very Confuse, but Inconsistent. As suppose, when we say, That Colour is the Texture of Bodies, and that Colour is the Reflection of Light. These accounts of Colour seem too different to be both true, and yet the difference is not so great, but what a distinction will reconcile. If we speak of the remote and mediate Occasion, then Colour is the Texture of Bodies ; that is, 'tis the Texture of Bodies into which the Sense or Sentiment of Colour is to be resolv'd, as its ultimate Ground and Foundation. But if we speak of the next and immediate Occasion, then 'tis as true to say that Colour is the Reflection of Light, since it is that which, in its return from the reflecting Bodies, makes that immediate Impression, upon which the sense of Colour arises in us, and which we should have, tho' there were no such Bodies in the World (which shews that Colour is not in *them*) supposing that fine Matter could be so objected to our Eyes, as it is now. But since it cannot, 'tis necessary there should be such Bodies, without which we should have the sense of *Light* only, and not of *Colour*.

52. For Colour seems to be the same with Light, only with some Addition or Improvement, and to differ no otherwise than *Modally* from it. For as a certain subtle Matter in its direct

direct Incidency, is Light ; that is, I mean, *Materially* considered, as serving to excite in us the Sentiment of Light, which, in contradistinction to the other, may be call'd Light *Formal*, so the very same subtle Matter in its return, as it rebounds to the Eye from some other Matter, that will not transmit it (therefore call'd *Opake*) is *Colour*, as serving by the difference of the impression, to affect us with a different Sensation, and as the Texture of the Body is that returns it, it is *such* or *such* a Colour, So that Colour seems to be only a Modification of Light, resulting from the change of its direct Incidence, into a Reflex one ; and as the Modification differs, so is the difference of the Colour. And accordingly we find, that as when there is no *Light*, or no *Body* to reflect it, or which comes to the same, such a one as by the *right* Situation of its Pores, transmits instead of reflecting it (therefore call'd *Transparent*) there is no Colour at all ; so when the Texture of the Body that reflects it is changed, it thereby assumes a *different* Colour, which seems even sensibly to demonstrate that Colour, with the whole difference of it is to be resolved into the Texture of Bodies, as its ultimate Ground. And indeed 'tis not conceivable according to the Ideas we have of Bodies, how a piece of Red Cloth should differ from one that is Blue, as such, any otherwise than in that its minute Parts lie in a different Position, whereby the Light being return'd after a different manner,

makes a different Impression, and by that occasions a different Sentiment, which perhaps may be almost as intelligible an account of Colour, as to say, either that 'tis *Id quod Movet Perspicuum Actu*, or that 'tis *Terminus Perspicui in Corpore Terminato*.

53. But to strike a through Light into this whole matter at once: There are three things in Colour, which tho' few consider as distinct, are yet very carefully to be distinguished by every one that will have a right Conception of it. There is 1st. of all the Impression: There is 2^{dly}. the Sentiment that follows the Impression: And there is 3^{dly}. a certain Texture of Parts in the Body, said to be coloured, which is the ground of the Impression, and whereby it is Modified. Now the Impression is *from* Body, and the Texture is *in* it; but as for the Sentiment of Colour, or Colours, as we sense it, that is neither from Body nor in Body, but in the Mind. And this account of Colour (allowing only for the disadvantage of my Expression, which upon few occasions I have found so difficult to make clear, as upon the present) I think to be very right as to the general notion of it; and if we could but go so far into the *Detail*, as to define in particular what kind of *Texture* or *Impression* that is upon which the diversity of Colours depends (towards which *Descartes* has made great openings in that Mechanical and truly admirable Explication which he gives us of the *Rain-bow*) there would be

be nothing further wanting to make the Doctrine of Colour perfect, that is, I mean as it relates to the *Object*, which is as far as our Philosophy is concern'd, or at least can with modesty pretend to go. For as for Colour, consider'd as a *Sentiment*, so it is to be felt only, and not disputed, and that an Idiot can do as well as a Philosopher.

54. But which of these two was he, if one may be so bold as to ask, that first found out that memorable division of Colours into *Real* and *Apparent*? I know which perhaps I should be tempted most to suspect, if I did not meet with it in some otherwise considerable Philosophers, according to whom that Colour is apparent, only which arises from the various Reflection of Light, as suppose in the Clouds, or in the Rain-bow. And that Real which is in the Subject, and remains there even when the Light is taken away, tho' it cannot be seen without it, as suppose in Gold, or any other mixt Body. What strange distinctions do some Men make only for want of *Distinguishing*? For if Colour be taken *formally*, as it is in Sentiment, then 'tis plain, that all Colours in all Bodies, of what kind soever, are only Apparent, Fictitious or Imaginary, there being, as we have shown, no such thing really in them. But if Colour be taken materially, only for a certain Contexture of Parts, which so modifies that Reflection of Light, which an Opake Body makes (for 'tis not the Texture, but the Body that makes the

Reflection (the Texture only modifies it) as to be an occasion of such a Sentiment; in this sense all Colours are real, even those which they call apparent, or else how come they to appear? For that they could not do without such a certain Reflection of Light, as there could be no such Reflection, unless the Body that returned it had such a Texture. So that in this respect (which is the only one wherein we can allow any such thing as Colours in Bodies) there is no difference, as to *reality*, between the colour of the *Rain-bow* and that of a *Diamond*, tho', as to *duration*, it be more permanent in the one than in the other, or having parts that will hold longer in the same posture for the reflection of Light after the same manner. For indeed the Colour of the Diamond is as much owing to the reflection of Light as that of the *Rain-bow*.

55. But are there then no Colours in the *Dark*? Yes, the Philosophers of the School will tell you that there are, tho' we do not see them. And indeed having presumed Colours to be something really existing in Bodies, 'tis but a pursuance of their Principle to say that they are in the *Dark*, since it would be a strange kind of Reality that is extinct with every setting, and revives again with every rising Sun. But if one should assume the boldnes to ask them, how they come to know that there are any Colours in the *Dark*, since they do not then see them? They can give no other Answer

swer but what depends upon the thing in dispute, *viz.* The *Reality* of those Colours, which since we have shewn to be a mere Imagination, 'tis plain that the other can be no better. But to answer this Question a little more distinctly, 'tis certain we cannot have the *Sensation* of Colour in the Dark, since the having this Sensation depends upon an Impression which *Light* only can make. But as for Colour in *Bodies*, I suppose they have just as much in the Dark as they have in the Light, and no more. For if Colour be taken formally according to that appearance which it has in our Sentiment of it, so it is not in Bodies in the Dark: Not as if the Darkness did deprive them of it, as some may be apt to interpret that of the Poet.----*Nox abstulit atra Colores*, which is better Poetry than Philosophy, if understood of any thing but our *Sensations*) but because they never had it. For Colour, in the formality of it, is not in Bodies in the Dark, nor in the Light neither, nor indeed at all. But if by Colour in Bodies be meant no more than such a Texture or Disposition of their Parts, 'tis true, we may suppose them to retain the same *Texture* in the Dark, or else we should not, by their occasion, have the Sensation of the same Colours upon the return of Light. But then this will signifie no more than that such Colours are in them only *Fundamentally*; that is, that there is that in them in the Dark, which will occasion in us the sense of such or such Colours in the Light. And they

they have my leave to multiply as many of these Colours in Bodies as they please, whether in the Light or in the Dark, since diversity of Colours, as it relates to Bodies, can signifie no other than diversity of Texture. And if by these Principles that part of Beauty which is made to consist in *Complexion*, as they call it, be more fatally ruin'd than by the unkindest Disease, and all that is real in it be reduced to *Feature* or *Proportion*, I hope the Sex that is no less distinguish'd by Goodness than Beauty, will pardon the rudeness of a Philosopher, whose severe Obligations to Truth will not allow him to be so complaisant in his Representations, as the *Painter* or the *Looking-glass*.

56. I conclude therefore that none of those sensible Qualities which the Philosophy of the School, as well as the Imagination of the Vulgar is pleased to attribute to Bodies, such as Heat, Cold, Sweetness, Bitterness, Smells, Tasts, &c. nor even *Colour* among the rest (tho' that seems to shew the fairest pretence of any of them all) have any real existence in Bodies. And yet 'tis as certain on the other hand, that they are not self-subsistent Beings, but must be conceiv'd to depend upon something else as their Subject; that is, they are not Substances, but modes or manners of Being. And since they are not Modifications of Bodies (which if our Ideas of them are true, are capable of no other than Figure and Motion) it follows, that

Part II. *the Ideal World, &c.* 251
that they are indeed Modifications of our
Minds or *Sentiments*.

57. Indeed we need not argue after this manner, if we had as clear an Idea of our Souls as we have of Body. For then, as we only consult the Idea of Body to know what Modifications it is capable of, and do not argue thus, Figure is not a Modification of Spirit, therefore it is a Modification of Body: So to know what are the Modifications of our Spirit, or of what it is capable, we need only directly consult its Idea, and not use such an indirect way of proceeding as to reason thus. The sensible Qualities which Philosophers speak of, are not Modifications of Body, and therefore they are Modifications of our Spirit, or *Sentiments*. *Descartes* indeed contends, that the Mind is more evidently known or *knowable* than the Body, which I shall not stick to grant him as to the *Existence* of it, since whatever Argument I can make use of to assure my self of the existence of any *Body*; that very Argument will more immediately and more strongly prove the existence of my own *Mind*; but if he means (as he seems to do) as to the *Essence* or Nature of it; that I think is very false, and appears plainly to be so by this very consideration. For otherwise, if the *Essence* of the Mind were more evident than that of the Body, to what purpose should we take such a compass, as to consult the Idea of Body, to know what are the Modifications of the Mind?

And

And yet thus we are fain to do, which sufficiently convinces that we have not so clear an Idea of our Souls as we have of Bodies ; and indeed that we have no clear Idea of our Souls at all, since if we had, we might barely, by attending to that Idea, know (and that even without *Experience*) what Modifications they are capable of, as well as by consulting the Idea of Matter, what are the Modes which are incident

to that. * 'Tis clear then, that we have no clear Idea of our Souls, and because we have not, we are fain to argue thus indirectly from these sensible Qualities not being Modifications of Body, to their being Modifications of our Minds.

But however, tho' this Argument be not so direct as if we had proved it from the Idea of our own Souls immediately ; yet it is no less, or at least sufficiently concluding, it being a plain consequence, that if they are not Modifications of Body, they must be Modifications of our Souls, or Sentiments in our Minds. And therefore to attribute these sensible Qualities to Bodies as the subjects of them, is to confound the Modalities of Matter and Spirit, by transferring that to Bodies which is a Sentiment in our Souls, one of the worst errors of Sense we can be guilty of, and whereby we plainly shew, that we understand neither our *selves* nor *Bodies*.

58. There now two Reflections that may be made upon the occasion of the Premises, and perhaps 'tis of some consequence to Morality, that they should not be omitted. And therefore (as much haste as we are in to proceed to other thing) we'll just touch upon them, leaving their further improvement to the Contemplative Reader. Reflect then first of all, what a dead unactive thing Matter is, and withal, how poor and empty the Material is in comparison of the * intellectual World. And accordingly, whether such an unactive empty Being, that is so without Power or Force, and without Form and Void, can be a fit or reasonable Object of thy Love? What Power or Efficacy may be attributed to *Second Causes*, as they are called, or what force one Body may have to move another, I shall not now dispute; but 'tis plain that Bodies cannot act upon our Souls, nor cause in them the least Pleasure or the least Pain, the lowest Taste, or the faintest Smell, or any other Sensation. 'Tis not the Fire that gives thee Heat, nor the Sun that gives thee either Heat or Light; nor yet the Sun against a watry Cloud, or as he brings back the Day from the Rosy East, that entertains thee with delightsome Colours. The Fruits of *Eden*, tho' not one

* By intellectual World here is not meant the same as the intelligible World, which are very different from each other, tho' perhap; every one may not heed it: For intellectual World signifies the World of *Spirits*; whereas by intelligible World we mean the World of *Ideas*.

one of them had been *forbidden*, could not have oblige^d thee with one Taste; nor can all the Spices of *Arabia* now bestow upon thee one Smell. These are but imaginary Causes of real Effects, phantaſtick Powers, mere Idols of our Imagination, as very Idols as any of the Heathen Deities, that were presum'd to preside over such and such things, and to have them in their Gift and Disposal, as a God of Wisdom, or a God of Love. Idols that are kept up by the fansies of the Vulgar, as the other were by the Fictions of the Poets; in one word, Idols that, as St. *Paul* expresses it, *are nothing in the World.*

Besides they are Poor and Empty, as well as Impotent and Unactive; and as they cannot cause any Sentiment in *us*, so neither have they any thing resembling our Sentiments in *themselves*. They have none of those sensible Qualities, which the prejudice of the common People has so liberally indued them with, and which, by the Authority of the Schools, have been so long confirm'd upon them. Those Odours, those Savours, nay, even that *Light* and those *Colours* which are imagin'd to be in Bodies, are really not in them, but in our selves. And yet we Court them and Commend them, and say that one shines, and another has a fine Perfume, &c. But they, poor Creatures, have none of those Finenesses, Excellencies, or Beauties (*Figure* only excepted) which we think we see in them, and for which we admire them, but

but are, as it were, a mere *Caput Mortuum*, or *Terra Damnata* in the Language of the Sons of *Hermes*, utterly void and destitute of all those agreeable Prettinesses, those charming Graces which the Poetical imagination of Philosophers, like the Passion of Lovers, has confer'd upon them, and the *Blushes* of the Morning are as much a Fiction as *Aurora* it self. Indeed 'tis all Fiction, Complement, Fallacy, Dream, Imposture, and Man walks in a *vain shew*, among Cheats and Delusions, empty Representations, and false Appearances, and the World is to him as some *enchanted* Place, where he is abused by resemblances of things that are not, and is imposed upon by all his Senses. For in short, the Perfections of material Beings are the mere Creatures of his Fansie; those Beauties which he thinks he perceives without, are really in himself, and he carries about him the World that he admires. So that in this respect that of the wise Preacher will be found to contain a philosophical as well as a moral Truth; *Vanity of Vanities, all is Vanity.*

But now whether Beings that are so utterly impotent as not being able to affect our Souls with the least pleasure, and withal so poor, empty and unfurnished of all that is pleasant or agreeable, can be worthy of our Love, or proper Objects for it (that is I mean of Love strictly taken as it imports not the bare desiring a thing for *use*, but the desiring it for it self as a true Good, according to St. *Austin's* Noti-
on

Solilog. lib. 2. c. 13. lib. 10. Ques. 35. on of Love, *Quod non propter se amatur non amatur.* And again, *Nihil aliud est amare quam propter seipsum rem aliquam appetere;*

I think may deserve to be considered. 'Tis not pretended to be denied, but that these things, as insignificant as they are, either to us, or in themselves, may yet be loved in a large and popular way of speaking, as that signifies the willing or desiring them for their *use*, as being occasions of good to us, in which sense I should not scruple to say, that I love a good Room, or a good Fire in it: But that which I would have consider'd is, whether these things can be fit Objects of our Love in the stricter sense of Love, as it means the desiring a thing for it self, or its own intrinsic Goodness or Excellency, since if our Philosophy be right, it appears plainly that they are not our true Goods, or Objects, that are really perfective of our Beings, in any kind or degree whatsoever.

I must needs own my self to be of St. *Austin's* mind, that nothing can properly be said to be loved, but what is loved for it self. And it seems clear again, that nothing can justly be loved for it self, but either *Pleasure*, or the *cause* of Pleasure. Pleasure, as perfecting our Natures *formally*, and the cause of it as perfecting them *efficiently*. But as for that which is only the *occasion* of my having that Sentiment, that indeed I may *use*, and desire for its use; but how

how such a thing can be said to be a due and proper Object of my Love, notwithstanding the late Instructions I have had upon this point, I still want to be inform'd. But whatever be determin'd concerning this Matter; this however may be offer'd more securely, that could we but unmask Nature, and strip it of all those false Ornaments wherewith our prejudic'd Imagination has cloathed it, and present Bodies to our view, as they are in their naked selves; if we could take them, as I may say, in their *Undress*, and see them as they are in their *pure Naturals*, without Light, without Colour, without Heat, without Taste, without Smell, or any of those agreeable Qualities which recommend them to us, and withal, as altogether destitute of any real Power to cause any such Sentiments in us, sure those that contend most for the love of these things, and are most enamour'd of them, would find themselves much otherwise affected to them than they are, if affected at all. And sure the most passionate Amorist, could he have such a sight as this of the Face he so Idolizes (which yet is the true Philosophick view of it) he would think it no more like that Image which he had drest up of it in his own Fancy, than a coarse Cloath is like the fine Picture which is drawn upon it. And how would he wonder what was become of those engaging Charms that had so captivated his Heart? And how would such a faithful and unflattering representation of his beloved Object

abate and deaden, if not wholly annihilate his Passion?

59. Reflect again in the second place, what a great and excellent Being the Soul of Man is, and how large and diffusive are its Capacities. Not so great indeed as to have in it self, that is, in its own *Essence*, the Ideas of all things, so as to be able to see all things, by consulting the Perfections of its own Nature, and to be, as it were, an *Intelligible* World to its self. No, let not the Pride or Ambition of our Nature make us so vain as to pretend to what is so much above the Capacity of it. This is the incommunicable Prerogative of the universal Being, whose Name is *I am*, and whose infinite *Essence* comprehends all that is, and who when as yet there was not any thing but himself, saw all things in the Bosom of his own Ideality, and *Called those things that were not as tho' they were*. But thus far we may, without Arrogance, pretend, that all those pleasing and entertaining Appearances of external Nature, for which we so admire it, are really in our selves, and indeed no other than the several Modalities of our own Souls, or the different manners of Being wherein they exist. That that *Light* which the Wise Man thought so sweet, and those *Colours* which the same Person found so unhappily charming in his sight; that those *Savour*s which so please, and too often enslave the *Taste*, and those *Odours* which so refresh the *Smell*, and that *Musick* which so engages and even ravishes

ravishes the Ear, that all these are in the very Soul it self, and spring up from the fruitful and rich Fund of her own Being, whereby she becomes all things by *Feeling*, in a much better sense than the Philosopher says she does by * *Understanding*, so that she may be said to be, tho' not an *Intelligible*, yet a kind of *sensible* World to her self.

* *Intelletus intel-*
ligendo fit Omnia.

We are commonly presumed indeed to have but *Five Senses*, as they call them, that is, as I understand it, so many general ways of receiving certain Perceptions in Consequence of certain Impressions made by outward Objects upon the Body. But how many more we may be capable of, if the Power of the Soul were wholly reduced to act, who can say? We see 'tis but a *Touch* upon certain parts of the Body that have an Organical Texture fit for that purpose, that awakens those Senses which we have. And if God please to enlarge the *Machine* by adding a Spring or Wheel more, that is, I mean by adding other Organs fitted for other Impressions; what Imagination can conceive what new *Senses* might rise up in us? This however must be allow'd even as the Frame of Humane Nature stands at present, that tho' our Senses are but few in the general, yet the Particulars under those Generals are innumerable. For what Arithmetick can reckon up the several sorts of Tasts, or Smells, or Colours, &c. We feel new and new Sentiments con-

tinually arising in us upon new Impressions; the Fruits and Productions of the Earth are not more numerous or various than are those Savours and Odours which we experience, and what more we might if God should create, not new Organs of Sense in us, but only new Bodies to make different Impressions upon those we have already, is a vast Abyss which no line of Thought can ever fathom. But then consider what a great and noble Being this Soul of ours is, and how large is its Capacity, that carries inclosed in its single self the beauties of a whole World; those I mean which we ascribe to it, and distribute among the several parts of it, and withal think a sufficient Furniture for the adorning of that immense Fabrick. Consider also of what great Happiness or Misery she is capable, that can be so variously affected; so many ways pleased or displeased, and that without going out of her self, or exceeding the Circle of her own Essence. For it is not reasonably to be doubted, but that God who causes these Sentiments in her by the Impressions of Bodies, can, if he please, cause the same and more without them, since, according to the foregoing Account, there is no connexion, but what is *Positive*, between the one and the other. In fine, from what we actually feel, and from what we may further conceive as possible, it seems reasonable to think that the capacity of Spirit is as large or larger than that of Body, and its Modifications rather more

more numerous, and consequently that the Soul is capable of as many or more Sentiments than Matter is of *Figures*; and if we had but as clear an Idea of our Souls, as we have of Matter, and so could see what those Modifications of it were in themselves, which make this or that Sentiment; and what Relation and Proportion they carry to one another (as we do in *Figures*) there would hence arise a new *Science*, which, tho' I know not as yet by what Name to call, would yet perhaps deserve the Honour of the principal School, as being in its Principles no less certain, but in its Compass it may be more Extensive, and in its Entertainment much more ingaging than even *Mathematicks* it self.

60. But 'tis for this very Reason, perhaps, that we have no such Idea. This is the Conjecture of a Person most highly to be respected for the greatness and clearness of his Thoughts, which he expresses with a sublimity of Style, not easily to match'd, when he brings in the Eternal Wisdom thus informing her Disciple of the Reasons why she hides the Idea of our Souls at present from us. " Be-

" cause the Idea of a Soul is an *Meditat. Chrestien.*

" Object so great, and so apt *Page 152.*

" to ravish Spirits with its

" Beauty, that if thou hadst an Idea of thy

" Soul, thou would'st be able no longer to

" think of any thing else. For if the Idea of

" Extension, which represents only Bodies,

S 3 " does

“ does so strongly affect Naturalists and Ma-
“ thematicians, that they oftentimes forget all
“ their Duties to contemplate it. If a Ma-
“ thematician has so much delight when he
“ compares bignesses among themselves there-
“ by to discover their Relations, that he often
“ sacrifices his Pleasures and his Health to find
“ out the properties of a Line: What applica-
“ tion would not Men bestow upon the Re-
“ search of the properties of their own Being,
“ and a Being infinitely more noble than Bodies?
“ What Pleasure would they not take in com-
“ paring among themselves by a clear view of
“ the Understanding so many different Modi-
“ fications, whereof the bare sentiment, how-
“ ever feeble and confuse, does so strange-
“ ly busie and employ them? For thou must
“ know that the Soul contains in her self all
“ that thou seest fine or beautiful in the World,
“ and which thou art wont to attribute to the
“ Objects that environ thee. Those Colours,
“ those Odours, those Savours, with an infi-
“ nity of other Sentiments wherewith thou
“ hast not yet been touch'd, are no other than
“ Modifications of thy own Substance. That
“ Harmony which so raises thee, is not in the
“ Air which strikes the Ear; and those infi-
“ nite Pleasures (whereof the greatest Volup-
“ tuaries have but a feeble Sentiment) are all
“ included in the capacity of thy Soul. But
“ now if thou hadst a clear Idea of thy self,
“ if thou didst see in me that Archetypal
“ Spirit

“ Spirit; upon which thou wast form’d, thou
“ would’st discover so many Beauties, and so
“ many Truths in contemplating it, that thou
“ would’st neglect all thy Devoits. Thou
“ would’st discover with an extream Joy, that
“ thou would’st be capable of enjoying an
“ infinity of Pleasures. Thou woud’st have a
“ clear knowledge of their Nature; thou
“ would’st be incessantly comparing them a-
“ mong them selves, and thou would’st discover
“ Truths which would appear to thee so wor-
“ thy of thy Application, that wholly wrapt
“ up and absorpt in the Contemplation of they
“ own Being; full of thy self, of thy Gran-
“ dure, of thy Excellency, and of thy Beau-
“ ty, thou would’st be no longer able to think
“ of any thing besides. But my Son, God has
“ not made thee to think of nothing but thy self.
“ He has made thee for *Himself*. Wherefore I
“ shall not discover to thee the Idea of thy
“ Being, till that happy time when the view
“ of the Essence of thy God himself shall de-
“ face and eclipse all thy Beauties, and make
“ thee despise all that thou art, that thou
“ may’st think only of contemplating *Him*.

Happy Time indeed, when we shall know
both God and our selves; and our selves in God,
whose superlative Beauty will not suffer us to
grow proud of our own. Then may we be
trusted with the Knowledge of our selves,
without any danger of being puffed up by it,
when that glorious Essence, wherein we shall

take a view of our selves, is so infinitely transcending all that we have, or are in our selves: Now our feeble Eyes would be dazzled with our own Light, and we should fall in Love with the dear Image of our own Being; but when the Looking-glass shall be so much more charmingly beautiful than the Face, we may then securely behold our selves in it. In the mean time let us esteem that the best Knowledge of our selves to have a deep sense of our Infirmities, and not be ashamed of that Ignorance which is the Guardian of

St. August. Con-
fes. Lib. 10. Cap.
5.

our Humility. *Confitear ergo quid de me Sciam, Confitear & quid de me Nesciam.* *Quoniam & quod de me Scio, te mihi lucente Scio, & quod de me Nescio, tam diu Nescio, donec fiant tenebra mea sicut Meridies in Vultu tuo.*

C H A P. IV.

An Entrance upon the Explication of the manner of our Thinking, containing a General Distribution of Intelligible Objects into their several kinds.

1. **T**H E whole Theory of Humane Understanding, as Extensive as it is, seems commodiously reducible to these two general Questions. What Thought is, and how,

or

or after what manner we think or understand. Of the former of these we have by God's Assistance already given a large and particular Account ; so particular, that I think I may say, we have, as it were, separated the parts of Thought by *Section*, and read a Metaphysical, shall I call it, or Anatomical Lecture upon every part, in order to a more accurate Comprehension of the whole. Let us advance now by the favourable Aid, and, as we humbly hope, under the propitious Conduct of him who has brought us hitherto, to the consideration of what remains, *viz.* to inquire into the manner how we think or understand, and see whether we can render a true, or at least, an intelligible Account of that great *Arcanum* in Philosophy, which is so very necessary, and has been so long wanting, to the knowledge of our selves, which indeed is the best Knowledge ; and such, as in this respect, has the advantage of all other Sciences, in that while they elevate us above Men, this serves to humble us before God.

2. But now when I pretend to explain, or rather to make inquiry how we think, my meaning is not how we perform that Intellectual Operation, which we call Thought. Not but that this is very proper to be consider'd in this Theory, which indeed is not absolutely Perfect and Intire without it. But I profess my self at present utterly uncapable of giving any account of this Matter; and finding

ing no improvement upon any Application of my Mind to it, have reason to think I shall always so continue, which obliges me to intreat my Reader to accept of our Theory without it; and either to excuse this unavoidable Defect, or to supply it. For my own part I cannot do it, and therefore in pretending to inquire *how we Think*, my meaning precisely and determinately is, what it is which by it self terminates our Understanding, or is the *immediate Object* of our Thought. For tho' every thing that truly is, be some way or other Intelligible; and so the Object of Thought, (intelligibility being an Affection belonging to Being as such) yet every Being does not terminate our Thought by it self, and so is not the immediate Object of it; which implies again that there are some things which are so, which indeed will be found to be true, some things being intelligible immediately by themselves. For which reason in attempting to explain the manner of Humane Understanding, I chuse rather to inquire what is the immediate Object of our Thought, than whence we have our Ideas, or what those Ideas are whereby we understand, or the like: For tho' all our Ideas are immediate Objects of Thought, yet all the immediate Objects of our Thought are not Ideas, there being some things which, as we shall see, are Intelligible without them. So that immediate Object of Thought is something larger than Idea; and I am willing here to express the manner of Understanding,

ing, by that which is most general, and has the greatest Latitude, that so our account of it may be the more comprehensive, and extend to every thing that our understanding is concern'd with. In order to which, since there is so much difference in things, and different things are differently Intelligible, we must first prepare the way by considering the diversity of *Intelligible Objects*, and by ranging them into their respective Orders.

3. But here to make our way open and clear, and to prevent all Confusion and Intanglement, we must carefully distinguish between Objects that are absolutely Intelligible in themselves, which are of the same extent as *Things* (because all things are so Intelligible) and accordingly must be divided as things are, and such Objects as are at present Intelligible by us, or which we perceive. Because there are several things Intelligible in themselves, which yet are not so to us, and whereof we have no Perception, nor perhaps are in this State capable of having any. As Angels, suppose; and our own and other Mens Souls, not to say any thing of the inward Essences of Bodies, or of some Mathematical Truths, (as suppose the exact Proportion between a Circle and a Square) betwixt which and us there seems to be a great Gulph fix'd, whereby they are too remote from the Sphere of her Capacity to be ever accessible by us; however the vain affection of universal Knowledge may make Men unwilling

ling either to confess their Ignorance, or to give over their unsuccessful Inquiries.

4. Now if we take Intelligible Objects in the latter Sense, for such as are Intelligible by *us*, or at present fall under our Perception, then I think the most general division of them will be into those that are *in* the Mind, and those that are *out* of the Mind, it being certain that whatever we now perceive is either one or other of these. I say, whatever we perceive, not whatever is in its self Intelligible. For 'tis evident, that the Mind it self is Intelligible, as well as what is in the Mind, however at present we have no clear Idea of it. And therefore this is not here offer'd as a division of whatever is Intelligible in it self, because indeed it is not adequate to it, but only of what is Intelligible to *us*. For tho' it be large enough to comprise whatever we perceive; yet it is not large enough for whatever is Intelligible, and that because what is Intelligible, is larger than what we perceive.

5. Whatever then is Intelligible to *us*, is either in the Mind, or out of the Mind; for of the Mind it self we have no clear Perception, tho' in it self no less Intelligible than any of those things which we do perceive. The Things that are in the Mind are not our *Ideas*; for they, as will hereafter appear, are really distinct from it, and can no otherwise than *Objectively* be said to be in it; but our *Thoughts* (as Thought is taken formally, abstracting from the Object) of

of what kind soever they be, whether in the way of Volition, or in the way of Perception, and that either Intellectual or Sensible, and so on, according to the foregoing Divisions we have given of Thought. The things that are *out of the Mind*, are all those things that are really distinct from it, and so even our *Ideas* must be consider'd in the number of those things which are out of the Mind; which things are either Material, or Immaterial, or Spiritual, tho' as to the latter we have no Notion or Perception but only of abstract Ideas, and those Intellectual Truths which result from them, and of God the Fountain of all, of whom our Perception is in many respects clear, tho' in more dark, and in all Inadequate and imperfect. But as for other immaterial Beings, such as Angels or Spirits, we know no more of *them*, than we do of our own Souls (that is, I mean, as to any Ideal Perception of their Essence) which is hardly any thing at all. So that there is this difference between the things that are in the Mind, and those that are out of the Mind; that the former are all perceived by us, it being impossible that any thing should be in the Mind without our being conscious of it; whereas many of the things that are out of the Mind, as well as the Mind it self, are by an impenetrable Veil drawn between us and *them*, intercepted from our view.

6. Now as for those Objects which are Intelligible in themselves, there are several ways of dividing these, which yet perhaps will be found some of them to concenter in the reality of the thing, and to differ only formally, and as to the manner of Conception. As when we divide them suppose into God and Creature, or things create and increase, or into Material, or Immaterial, or Spiritual; which Spiritual again may be considered as compleat Beings, as God, Angels, and Humane Souls, under which our own is comprehended, or as certain Perfections of the supreme Being, and immutable Relations that necessarily result from them, that is, in other Words, *Ideas* and *Eternal Truths*. To which may be reduced all abstract and intellectual Objects whatsoever, which so employ our Thoughts, and fill our Discourses, such as, *Virtue*, *Justice*, *Goodness*, *Truth*, &c. It being most certain that these are Intelligible Objects, since both our Thoughts and our Words are conversant about them, and so many Propositions are made concerning them, and withal as certain that they are Objects of a *Spiritual* Nature, since we find nothing material in the Conception of them, tho' they are not compleat Spiritual Beings.

7. We may also consider the Objects of our Understanding as divisible into *Sensible* and *Intellectual*; a Division, which in this seems to differ from the former, in that it regards Objects *not* purely as they are in their own absolute Natures,

Natures, but also with relation to the Understanding, and the manner whereby they are perceived, which is sufficiently different to be a Foundation for such a Distinction. I shall not be so far influenced by the sound of Words, as to say, that by sensible Objects here I intend the *Objects of Sense*, as they are call'd, because indeed I do not well know what that means: But by sensible Objects, I mean those Objects which the Understanding has a Perception of by the Mediation of the Senses, that is more distinctly those Objects which the Understanding perceives in Consequence of certain Impressions which other Bodies make upon certain parts of our Body, whose Organical Texture is fitted for the reception of such Impressions. By Intellectual Objects I mean those Objects which the Mind perceives, without having any such Impressions made upon the Body. For all Objects are Intellectual in a large Sense, as that signifies Objects of the *Understanding*, there being nothing else in us whereby they are perceptible by us; and therefore as by sensible Objects, we must mean those which the Understanding perceives by the occasion of certain bodily Impressions, so by Intellectual Objects here as contradistinctly opposed to sensible, 'tis reasonable we should mean those Objects which the Understanding perceives without the Mediation of such Impressions. Of which sort I know not but that there may be several, and that notwithstanding

ing the Authority of that vulgar Axiom, that there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense; of which I hope hereafter to give a particular and distinct account.

8. To this may be reduced that remarkable

division of Intelligible Objects

*De Trin. Lib. 15.
Cap. 12.*

which is proposed by St. Austin,

when he tells us that there are

two sorts of things that are known, one of those things which the Mind perceives by the Senses of the Body, and another of those which the Mind perceives by it self. *Cum enim duo sint genera rerum quæ sciuntur, unum earum quæ per sensus Corporis percipit Animus, alterum earum quæ per seipsum, &c.* Which Division seems to differ from ours no otherwise than by the manner of the Expression, since those things, which, according to him, the Mind perceives by the Senses of the Body, may be presumed to import the same with our *Sensible Objects*; and those, which the Mind, according to him, perceives by it self, the same with our *Intellectual*. For to distinguish a little upon the latter Phrase *per seipsum*, which is the only Expression that is at all doubtful: If by the Minds perceiving certain Objects *by it self* be meant, that it perceives them without making any the least use of the Service or Ministry of the Body; I question very much whether the Soul, while in Conjunction with the Body, does at any time act so independently from it, even in its

its purest and most abstract Contemplations, as in this sense to perceive any thing *by it self*. For on the contrary, that the Spirits at least, or finer and more active parts of the Blood, are employ'd in all kinds of Thinking, let the Object of it be what it will, seems to me very apparent; both from the sensible diminution and expence of them upon much thinking; as also from the great disadvantage and confusion our Thoughts are under, either when the Spirits are bound up, as in *Sleep*, or irregularly moved, as in a *Fever*. But if by the Minds perceiving certain things *by it self* be meant, that it perceives them without any antecedent Impressions made upon the Organs of the Body, I see not what hinders, but that there may be Objects which the Mind may in this sense perceive *by it self*; which therefore, as being the most reasonable, we may presume to be that which St. *Austin* intended, especially considering that perceiving *by it self* is here opposed by him to perceiving by the senses of the Body. And as that can reasonably signify nothing but perceiving upon certain Impressions which the Body receives in certain of its Organs: So the perceiving *by it self* must signify the same as perceiving without any such Impressions, or else one part of the distinction will not be *Antithetical* to the other. In sum then, to run these Distinctions into one, tho' all Objects be perceiv'd by the Mind only, and in that large sense are *Intellectual*, yet we may suppose some

which the Mind perceives upon certain bodily Impressions ; or as St. *Austin*, *by the senses of the Body*, and those we call sensible Objects ; and others again which the Mind perceives without such Impressions, or as St. *Austin*, *by it self*, and these latter may be call'd Intellectual, which difference in the way and manner of Perception is sufficient to found the distinction of sensible and intellectual Objects, tho' it be the Mind only that truly perceives in both.

9. St. *Austin* has made an improvement of this twofold distinction of intelligible Objects, which is of some concernment to the interest of Philosophick Science in opposition to the pretences of *Septicism*, when he very curiously raises this further Remark upon it, That our Intellectual Perceptions are not liable to those Disputes to which our sensible ones, or rather the Objects of them stand exposed. For he tells us of certain Philosophers that have made many Objections against the senses of the Body ; whereas there are some most firm Perceptions that the Mind has by it self, such as this suppose, I know that I Live, which they were never able to make any doubt of. 'Tis worth the Reader's pains to take a view of the whole in the Author's own words. *Cum enim duo sint genera Rerum que sciuntur, unum earum qua per sensus Corporis percipit Animus, alterum earum qua per Seipsum, Multa illi Philosophi garrierunt, contra Corporis Sensus, Animi autem quasdam Firmissimas per Seipsum Perceptiones quasdam*

quasdam veraram, quale illud est quod dixi, Scio me vivere, nequaquam in dubium vocare potuerunt. Amidst all the Errors then and Illusions of Sense, and the doubts and uncertainties thereby occasion'd, which furnish the Sceptics with Objections against *Science*, there are still, according to *St. Austin*, some things of whose Truth and Certainty there can be no doubt, and those indubitable things are Intellectual Objects, such as the Mind perceives immediately *by it self*, without being beholden to the Senses, or those Corporal Impressions which are made upon them.

10. Not that certainty is so to be confin'd to Intellectual Objects, but that there are some of those which here pass for sensible Objects that do truly partake of it. For to clear this Matter a little further, it is to be noted, That when those corporeal Impressions are made upon the Sense, upon the occasion of which the Mind sees or understands, there is then a twofold Object that may be said to be perceived. The Immediate and the Mediate. The Idea, and that which the Idea represents. As for the Idea, tho' that may, in this respect, be consider'd as a sensible Object, because we are supposed to have the Perception of it upon a sensible Impression; yet this is a certain indubitable, and immutable Nature, a true Object of *Science*, and consequently not liable to any sceptical Doubt. But now as to the thing represented by this Idea, *viz.* Body (which is

what is generally understood by sensible Object, and what St. *Austin* himself was most likely to understand by it) this indeed being of a contingent, uncertain flux and mutable Nature, is not at all qualified to be the Object of Science, which is of Necessaries, and requires an immovable Foundation: And they are such sensible Objects as these, that the doubts of Scepticism only concern, and upon which they may be presumed chiefly to have proceeded. And indeed, if there were no other but such sensible Objects, I do not see how Science can be a maintainable Fort against a Sceptical Siege. But Wisdom has built her House upon stronger Pillars than these, and they that, upon this supposition, go to pull it down, will see nothing ruin'd but their own Endeavours.

CHAP. V.

That some Intelligible Objects, viz. of the immaterial Kind, are seen or understood immediately, or by themselves; with an occasional Argument for the existence of a God, and some devotional Reflections upon the beatifick Vision.

1. Having taken a view of the several sorts of intelligible Objects, as far as was requisite to the purpose of our Theory; let us now, in the next place, proceed to consider more definitely the precise manner, according to which we may with the greatest appearance of Reason, suppose them to be understood by us. In order to which it is to be remarked, that there are two ways, and but two that can possibly be conceiv'd of understanding things, viz. either by themselves, *per seipsum*, as I may say, the things themselves being immediately present to the Mind that is supposed to behold them, or by their Representatives or Ideas. Which distinction St. Austin (whose comprehensive Capacity few things could escape) takes notice of, and expresses by *per Presentiam*, and *per Imagines*, when he tells us, that his Memory was full of innumerable things, either by their *Images*, as of

*Confess. lib. 10.
Cap. 17.*

all Bodies, or by their *Presence*,
as of the *Arts, &c.* *Ecce in Me-*
moria mea Campis & Antris &

Cavernis innumerabilibus, atq; innumerabiliter
plenis innumerabilium rerum generibus, sive per Ima-
gines, sicut Omnium Corporum, sive per Presentiam,
sicut Artium, &c. So then according to this
Metaphysical Father, there are two ways of
things being in the Mind, and consequently of
being understood, either by themselves, or by
their Ideas. Now it seems reasonable to think
that some of them are understood by them-
selves, that is, I mean (to be as distinct as is
possible in expressing what I would have di-
stinctly apprehended) that in the Perception of
some things the immediate Object of our
Thought are the very things themselves.

2. As first of all, to begin at home, Those
things that are in the Mind, as our Thoughts,
whether they are pure Intellec^ttions, or Imagina-
tions, or Sensations, or Desires, Affections, In-
clinations, or whatever they be; these things,
I conceive, are immediately perceiv'd by them-
selves, and that because they are in the Mind,
and so most intimate to it, and indeed more in-
timate than any Ideas can be. There is there-
fore no need of any Ideas in the Perception of
these things, besides that it is not very con-
ceivable how Ideas should be able to represent
them. But not to insist upon this, since it is
not yet apparent what those Ideas are which
are the Objects of our Thoughts, it may suffice
for

for the present, that there is here no need or occasion of them. For tho' the Soul turns her dark side, as I may say, to her self, as having no clear view of her own Essence, that dear Self, whereof she is so blindly fond, yet she can reflect upon her own Actings, and upon her own Sensations, and need not go out of her self, for the Perception of any of these, because they are in her self. How ignorant forever she may be of her self, or of things that are without her, she cannot but be conscious of what passes within, of what she does, or of what she feels done to her, of Thoughts and Sentiments, tho' as not having an Ideal view of her self, she may not be able to know, perhaps, what that Modification of her Essence is wherein this or that Sentiment does consist.

3. Now as to the things that are without the Mind, no sooner do we step out of our selves, but we launch out into a vast Sea of intelligible Objects, where we see no Shore, and can sound no bottom. These are either Spiritual, or Corporeal, Intellectual, or Sensible. As for those of them which are Spiritual and Intellectual, as great a Friend as I am to Ideas, and of as much importance as I think them to be, not only to Humane Understanding, but even to the Sciences themselves, yet I find it most reasonable, if not necessary, to hold, That some of these things are by themselves immediately Intelligible, and also so understood by us, that they are not seen by any intelligible Species, or

Idea representing them to our Minds, but that the very things themselves, by a *Real Presence*, as I may say, are the immediate Objects of our Perception, whenever we have any Perception of them.

*Confes. Lib. 10.
Cap. 10.*

*In Memoriam
recondimus non Imagines eārum,
sed ipsas*, as St. Austin speaks.

4. In the Head of these *Self-intelligible Objects* let us with all Reverence place the Great and ever Blessed God, who is the best and most perfective Object of our Understandings, whose Vision is in every degree Beatifick, and whom to know fully is *Eternal Life*, and that because he is known by *Himself*. Indeed we commonly talk of the *Idea* of God, and of our having an Idea of him ; and a Philosopher of great Name, tho' in my poor Opinion not so great as he deserves, has offer'd a Demonstration of his existence from his Idea. And 'tis true indeed we may be said in a looser and more popular Sense, to have an Idea of God, as that means only on Objective Conception of him at large, or so much of his infinite Nature, or Essence, as we can rightly conceive. But then when 'tis said we have an Idea of God, the Term Idea, as I conceive with Submission to better Judgments, must not be here taken as when applied to created Beings ; as suppose when I say I have an Idea of a Man, or of a Horse, because then 'twou'd import that as such Creatures are understood by something, that is distinct

stinct from them, and we are said to perceive *them*, in as much as we perceive what is intelligibly representative of them, so in like manner that God is also understood by something that is really distinct from him, something that is not God, and that we perceive his Divine Essence no otherwise than as we perceive that which Ideally represents it, which I can by no means admit. God as he is the most Intelligible Object, so is he Intelligible in the most perfect manner, and as he understands all things immediately in himself, so also is he immediately Intelligible by himself, and 'tis by himself as the immediate Object of our Thought, that we perceive all that we do, or shall ever perceive of him. For which Opinion, as novel or strange as it may appear to those who have been used to another way of Thinking, or of Speaking in Divine Matters, I seem not to want most convincing Reasons.

5. In the first place, let it be consider'd what was but now last hinted. God is the most Intelligible Object, as being the greatest Reality. So far I reason with *Aquinas*, and have the Warrant of his Authority both for my Satisfaction, and for my Protection. *Cum unumquodq; sit Cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, Deus qui est Actus Purus,* Part. 10. Quest. 12.
Art. 1.

absq; omni permixtione Potentia, quantum in se, Maxime Cognoscibilis est. Well, but then upon this ground I further argue, If God as being a pure Act be the most Intelligible Object

Object, then he must be intelligible in the most perfect manner, or else he will not be, what we suppose, the most Intelligible Object. But now it seems plain that for a thing to be Intelligible by another, is not to be Intelligible after so perfect a manner as to be immediately Intelligible in and by it self. And therefore whatever necessity there may be of Ideas for the Understanding of other things, we have reason to conclude that God is by himself immediately Intelligible, and to be seen by his own Light, as being himself that pure and perfect Light, in which there is no Darkness at all. To which I add, that since (as is

* *Page 155.* shewn in the former part of this * Theory) God knows the *Creatures* in himself, as know-

ing them when they were only possible and had no Existence but in the Bosom of his own Ideality, there can be no question but that he understands *Himself* by *himself*. And indeed, if he did not, he must then not only borrow his Light and Knowledge from something else, because something else would then be the immediate Object of his Thought, but *that* something else must also be supposed able to represent God fully and perfectly to himself (since the knowledge which he has of himself is full and perfect;) both which are extreamly absurd and misbecoming the Perfection of the Divine Nature to suppose. It is therefore necessary to say that

God

God understands himself by himself, and consequently that he is by himself immediately intelligible.

6. Well, but you'll say, tho' God be intelligible by himself, yet it does not thence follow, that we so understand him, because it is not necessary that we should understand him in the most perfect manner. I grant, it is not necessary we should understand him after the most perfect manner *Absolutely* speaking, as that takes in the degrees and extent of our Knowledge; nay indeed 'tis impossible that we should, because we should then *comprehend* him, which a finite Capacity as ours is can never do. But whether or no, as finite as we are, we may not understand him after the most perfect manner in a *certain Respect*, viz. as to the *Immediateness* of the Perception, is another Question. And tho' it does not follow that we understand him after this manner, because he is so intelligible in himself; yet 'tis a great Point gain'd, that this way of understanding him is absolutely Possible, and that we do actually so understand and perceive him, I have other Reasons to evince, such as are taken not from the Perfection of our intellectual Faculties, but from the peculiar Nature of the intelligible Object, which *need* not, and which *cannot* be any otherwise understood.

7. First there is no need of any Idea, as in other things, to represent God to our Minds: For God is Essentially, and therefore most intimately

timately present to our Souls, more intimate-
ly indeed than any intelligible Species or Idea
that is distinct from him can be, as being above
all, through all, and in all. The Union we
have with God is far more strict than what we
have with Bodies, or with Spirits either, for in
him we Live, Move and have our Being. We
indeed are often absent from him, but he is al-
ways present with us, and in our Union with
him, consists our Life, our Light, and our whole
Felicity. As much as we endeavour to shun
and avoid him, we can never fly from him, and
as willing as we may be that he should depart
from us, we can never be wholly quit of
him; and 'tis well we cannot, since, if he were
never so little distant from us, we should in-
stantly cease to be. But then what occasion
we should have of any *Idea* to represent a Being
to our Minds that is so essentially present to
them, I do not perceive; and as for the reason-
ableness of assigning any without occasion, that
I perceive as little, as not understanding why
Ideas, any more than other Beings, should be
multiplied without necessity.

8. But then *2dly*, as there is no need of any
Idea for the representation of the Divine Es-
sence to our Minds; so 'tis absolutely impos-
sible that any Idea should be able to represent
it, and therefore God must be perceiv'd imme-
diately by himself, or not at all. *To whom will*
ye liken me, says the holy one? is as truly applica-
ble to Ideas of all sorts, even the most Spiritual
or

or Intellectual, as to Corporeal *Images* or Representations ; and accordingly all such Ideas of God are as much Idols of the Imagination, as the other are of the Sense. We may beat the Field of Nature over and over for Ideas, or employ *Intellectus Agens* to forge them for us ; but still we shall find that there is nothing in the sensible, nor yet in the intellectual World that can represent God. He indeed, by reason of the infinity and universality of his Essence cannot but represent other things, but for the same reason nothing else can represent him, there being no proportion between Finite and Infinite. He cannot therefore be known by the mediation of any Similitude or Resemblance distinct from himself, as other things are, because not representable by any Image ; but by him who is the *Image* of the invisible God, his own Eternal, Coequal and Consubstantial Word, which is the same as to be known by *himself*.

9. That he shall be so known by us hereafter : This single Consideration may be sufficient even to demonstrate, because our Happiness does consist in the Knowledge of him. For our Happiness must consist in the highest operation of the Mind about the best Object, and therefore in the Knowledge of God, which is accordingly call'd the *Beatific Vision*. And so much that saying of our Divine Master, is, by the Angel of the Schools, supposed to import, *This is Life Eternal, that they might know* *Joh 17. 3.*
thee

thee the only true God, &c. But now if our Happiness does consist in the Knowledge or Vision of God (which I take for one and the same, since by Vision, whenever applied to God, must be meant that which is *Intellectual*) then it necessarily follows, that God must be known immediately by himself, since if we do not know him by himself, but by the Mediation of some intelligible Species or Idea, then either we shall not be happy at all, or our happiness will consist in something that is not God, even that intelligible Species whereby God is represented to the Mind, and which (upon that Supposition) is the immediate Object of it. Both which being Errors in *Faith* as well as in *Philosophy*, we are obliged to conclude that our knowledge of God shall be immediate, or *per Essentiam*, as

the Schools speak. And does

1 John 3. 2.

not the Scripture intimate the same? St. John tells us that we

shall see him as he is. But now we do not see him as he is, unless we see him by himself; because, as we have shewn, no Image or Idea of

him, that is distinct from him, can represent him as he is. And

1 Cor. 13. 12.

St. Paul tells us, That we shall

know hereafter as we are known. But neither do we know him as we are known, unless we know him by himself, and that because 'tis in and by himself, even in his own Ideal Reasons, that God knows us and all his Creatures, as has

been

been abundantly proved in the former part. But now, if this shall be the manner of our knowing God hereafter, to know him immediately by himself; I see not why it should be supposed, that we know him any otherwise now, there being no reason to make our present knowledge of God to differ from our future, but only in *Degree*, as imperfect differs from perfect, which also is the difference which St. Paul assigns, when he describes our present Knowledge by *knowing in part*, and by *seeing darkly*.

10. It may, perhaps, be pretended, that he assigns a greater difference, because he says, not only that we see *darkly*, but that we see *through a glass* darkly. He does so, and this has given occasion to the Schools to distinguish of a certain *Enigmatical* or *Specular* Vision, in opposition to that Vision of God which is by his *Essence*, of which more by and by. In the mean while it may be material to observe, that the Schools themselves, tho' they talk of a certain *Light* call'd the *Light of Glory*, which they suppose necessary to strengthen and fortifie the Mind for that Vision of God which is eminently Beatifick (grounding this their Opinion upon those words of the Psalmist, *In thy light shall we see light*); yet they will not allow that the Divine *Essence* either is, or can be seen or known by the *Mediation* of any *Similitude*, as their great Doctor maintains expresly, and proves at large. Only Psal. 36. 9.

Sum. Theol. Part
1. a. Q. 12. Art. 2.

Only they suppose, at the same time, a sort of *Ænigmatical* or *Specular Vision*, as I said before, which they contradistingue to that Vision of God, which is by the *Essence*, as if that *Ænigmatical Vision* were by *Similitude*. But in the first place I see not how they are herein consistent with themselves: For either we do not know God at all (which even their supposition of an *Ænigmatick Vision* will not permit them to say, or if we have any knowledge of him, then 'tis his *Essence* that we know, how imperfectly soever it be, because God and his *Essence*; are the same. And if we know his *Essence* then by their own *Doctrine* and *Argument* we must know it *per Essentiam*, because they say that the *Essence* of God is not knowable by any *Similitude*. So that to know the *Essence* of God, and to know it *per Essentiam*, will, by their own *Principles*, resolve into the same. But if they will say, that we have no knowledge of the *Divine Essence* in any degree, then I see not how it can be said, that we know God at all, and then what becomes of their *Ænigmatical Vision* that way? To be short, if we have no knowledge of God at all, then we do not know him so much as *Specularly* or *Ænigmatically*; but if we do know him in some measure (as that very distinction of theirs supposes) then we must know him by himself, because 'tis his *Essence* that we know, which, by their own express *Doctrine*,

Doctrine is not otherwise intelligible than by it self. And consequently this Scholastick Hypothesis of an *Ænigmatical* Vision of God as contradistinguish'd to that Vision of him which is immediate or by his Essence, is neither solid nor self-consistent. I say, as *Contradistinguish'd*; for I pretend not to deny, but that our present knowledge of God may be said to be Specular or *Ænigmatical*, as that signifies only the general imperfection or obscurity of it at large, in opposition to that clear beatifick Sight of him which we shall have hereafter (which is all I suppose that the Apostle means by that figurative Expression of his, upon which this distinction is grounded, of our *seeing now through a Glass darkly*). but as for any *Ænigmatical* knowledge of God, as it stands in contradivision against the knowing of him by himself, or his own Essence, and so implies the knowing him by some Similitude or Resemblance that is distinct from him, such an *Ænigmatical* Knowledge I can by no means admit of. No, as imperfect as our Notions and Conceptions are of that glorious Being, and as dark as the Glass is through which we see him, yet, if we have any true knowledge of him, as I suppose we have (or else all Discourse of him will be impertinent, and *Theology* as *Science* falsely so call'd) it must be by himself, that is, he himself must be the immediate Object of that knowledge, all knowledge of him by the Mediation of any representing Image or Similitude, be-
U ing,

ing, as we have shewn, both *needleſ* and *im-
possible*.

11. I conclude therefore, that there is no *Specular* or *Ænigmatical* Vision of God in opposition to seeing him by himself; and that however different our present knowledge of him may be from our future in other respects, and particularly as to the degrees of clearness; yet that 'tis God himself, and not any Idea of him, distinct from him that is the immediate Object of our Minds in both. 'Tis true our knowledge of God is in this Life but very dark and obscure (as indeed it is fit it should be, since otherwise we should antedate our Felicity, and enjoy our Reward even while we were doing our Work;) but then the reason of that Darkness, as I conceive, is not that we see any other but him, but because we see him so imperfectly as we do. Hereafter our Faculties will be stronger, and God's Manifestations of himself more open and liberal, and so our Darkness will be turned into Light, and our Vision of him will be so clear as to be truly *Beatific*; but still whether we see in the Dark or in the Light, we see *Him* only, and not him in his *like*, or in that which is intelligibly representative of him. By this I presume it is sufficiently clear what I mean, and that what I have here proposed concerning the manner of our knowing God is most reasonable in it self, as well as most worthy of him; and if this should ruin one of those Demonstrations which

Descartes

Descartes has offered for his Existence, I cannot help it, and that it does so according to the Form and Posture wherein it stands, I shall here by the way take occasion briefly to shew.

12. The Argument that I mean, is that which is placed first in his *Meditations*, and last in his *Principles*; and whereof, as well as I can Collect, and as briefly as I can Comprize the force of it, this is the sum. All that is in the Idea Objectively or Representatively, must be in the Cause really, either in the way of Formality, or in the way of Eminence. And consequently the greater the Objective Perfection of any of our Ideas is, its Cause must still be so much the greater. And that because there must be at least as much in the total efficient Cause as there is in the Effect, since the Effect cannot have any of its reallity but from the Cause, nor the Cause give it unless it has it itself. And therefore since we have in us an Idea of an Immense Objective Reality, we must conclude that there is some Archetypal Being answerable to that Idea, that is, which has really all that Perfection which the Idea has Objectively, it being otherwise impossible that we should have any such Idea, which is the same as to conclude that there is a God. And all by virtue of this general Principle, that whatever is in the Effect, must be some way or other in its total efficient Cause. This is the substance of his Argument, if I understand it; and I wish

it were as conclusive as the great *Author* of it (for I know not any just ground I had to say, as I do in my Metaphysical Essay, that he was beholden for it to St. *Austin* and the *Platonists*) supposed it to be. And indeed as for the general Principle upon which he argues; *viz.* That whatever is in the Effect must be one way or other in the Cause, I acknowledge the Truth and Necessity of it, and he has herein the whole Logick and Metaphysics of the School concurring with him. But the fundamental Fault of this Demonstration; and that which indeed makes it none, is that it all proceeds upon this false, tho' common, Supposition, that we perceive God, as we do other things, by an Idea that is really distinct from him, and indeed that the Idea of God is one of his *Effects*. So he plainly supposes when he argues from our having such a certain Idea that therefore there must be a Being answerable to that Idea, and that because the Cause must needs be equal to the Effect. For tho' in this he may not perhaps imply *formally*, that this Idea is the Effect of God (since then he would suppose the Existence of that God which he was to prove) yet he implies as formally as is possible, that this Idea is an Effect of some Cause, and that that Cause, whatever it be, must be adequately equal to it; and since it cannot be equal to it unless it be God; the Resolution of this, in the reality of the thing, will be that this Idea is the Effect of God, because an Effect of that Cause which

which is commensurate to the Objective Reality of it, which *God* only is. And this he more openly acknowledges in the winding up of the Argument as 'tis manag'd in his 3d Meditation, where he supposes *God* in the Creation of *Man*, to have put this Idea of himself into him, that it might be as a *Mark* of the *Artificer* impress'd upon his *Work*, and that this *Mark* does not really differ from the *Work* itself, as being part of that *Similitude* of *God* wherein *Man* was made. So that the *Idea* of *God* in *Man*, according to this great Author, is a thing really distinct from *God*, and as much his *Effect* as *Man* himself is.

13. Now I confess were the Case as he supposes, if *God* were to be perceived by us as other things are, by a proper *Idea*; that is, by something that is really distinct from him, and intelligibly representative of him, or if that *Idea*, whereby *God* is perceived, were the *effect* of any *Cause*, then indeed his Argument, from the Existence of a *God*, from such an *Idea* might, for ought I know, hold good, and that in virtue of the Principle upon which it is grounded, *viz.* That the *Cause* must be equal to the *Effect*. But now this Supposition appears by the Premises to be false, since we have therein shewn that *God*, as he is a self-intelligible Object, so is he seen and known by us, not by any *Idea* that is distinct from him, but immediately by *Himself*. And therefore the Supposition of the Argument failing, I see not

how to save the Argument from falling with it, at least in the form and posture in which it stands, wherein I think the best part of it is the *Conclusion*.

14. I say, according to the Form wherein it stands. For tho' *so* it appears not to conclude, yet after all, it is not perhaps so desperate, but that with a little amendment, it may be improvable into a Demonstration. The Argument I take to be right enough in the main, that is, as to the general intention of it, and to need only to be somewhat rectified in the Form and Manner of it, to make it Conclusive. For if instead of supposing us to have such an *Idea* of God as he talks of, *viz.* such a Representative of him as is really distinct from him, and effected by him, he had only supposed us in the general to have a Notion or Perception of God, this would have been a certain and evident Supposition. We find it true in Fact and by Experience, that we have a Notion or Perception of such a Being, or that such a Being is Objectively in our Minds. And his own, not to say the common, Supposition includes it; since to perceive God by the Mediation of an Idea, is certainly to have a Notion or Perception of him. Besides that, all Discourse concerning God, yea the very Question concerning his Existence, supposes this. We may then lay down this for a certain Supposition, that we have a Notion or Perception of such a Being as we call God. But then if to this

this be farther added what we have before shewn, that we perceive him immediately by himself, or that himself is the immediate Object of our Thought, it must necessarily follow that *He is*, since otherwise he could not possibly be perceived by us. For tho' it does not follow from our having a Notion or Perception of *Creatures*, that therefore *they* are, because 'tis possible we may see *them* in some other superior and more perfect Being that eminently and ideally contains them; yet if (which is here supposed) we have any Notion or Perception of *God*, it must necessarily and immediately follow that he is, it being impossible we should see him in any other Being that is either superior to him, or really different from him. If we have any intellectual Sight of him, 'tis by himself that we see him; and if so, then the immediate Conclusion is that he must necessarily be, and that not by virtue of his Principle, that the Cause must be equal to the Effect (which, tho' true in it self, would be here impertinently applied) but by another no less evident, *viz.* That that which is not cannot be perceived; or, if you will, that more general one, That of nothing there can be no Affection. And now I hope I have done the Cause maintain'd by this great Philosopher, no Injury by taking away one of the Pillars whereby he endeavour'd to support it, since I have substituted another in the place of it, and I submit it to the Consideration and Judgment of the rational

tional World, those particularly who have been exercised in Abstract Thoughts and Metaphysical Reasonings, whether this be the most clear, simple and direct Method of proving that there is a God.

15. And thus, according to the measure of our poor Conceptions we have endeavoured to represent the general manner of our understanding the best and greatest of all intelligible Objects, upon consideration of which we find no occasion for any Ideas, but that 'tis necessary to suppose it Immediate, that we perceive him not by any *Representative*, but by Himself. And indeed, I know not whether there be any thing else that is so perceived besides him, I mean of those things that are *really* distinct from him. Perhaps 'tis the peculiar Privilege of that great and independant Being who exists by himself, and centers upon his own Fulness and Sufficiency, to be understood also by himself; and, as being the true intelligible Light, in whom there is no Darkness at all, to be *seen immediately*. However there are two things more, which, because not *really*, but only *formally* distinct from him, may also be consider'd as self-intelligible Objects, and those are *Ideas*, and *eternal Truths*.

16. First the *Divine Ideas*. These, if we do at all perceive (which depends upon considerations to be produced in their place) 'tis reasonable to suppose, that we perceive them by themselves, and that in great measure upon the

the foregoing Grounds: To which I add, That since whatever is perceived, is perceived either by itself, or in some other; 'tis plain, unless we will run on to Infinity, that something must be perceived by itself. And if something must be perceived by itself, then why should not these Ideas be supposed as capable, and as worthy of that Privilege as any thing else that can be assigned? But if we will suppose them to be perceived by something else, then however that something else at least, whatever it be, must be perceived by it self, by which we shall gain nothing, but only the exchanging of a very easie for a more difficult Supposition, besides the difficulty of conceiving what that something should be that should represent these Ideas to us, or indeed that any thing can do it. Besides that, 'tis against the very supposition and intention of Ideas, of what kind soever they be, to be perceived by the Mediation of other things. For Ideas, at least as to * us, are not put for any other end or purpose, but as *Principia Cognitio-
nis*, that other things might be known by *them*. But then if *they* too must be known by other things, then we have *Ideas* of *Ideas*, which will either lead us on in an infinite length, or about in an endless Circle. But if other things are known by *them*, then they are supposed to be known by themselves.

* I say, as to us: For with respect to God, they may, be considered also as *Principia Opera-
tionis*, according to the distinction of Aquinas.

17. 2dly. *Eternal Truths*: This is a necessary Consequence of the other: For since Eternal Truths (as was shewn in the former part of this Theory) are in the reality of the thing, tho' not in the formality of Consideration, the same with these Ideas, if these Ideas are perceived by themselves, then eternal Truths must also be perceived by themselves, that is, if they are perceived at all. This Condition I put for the present, because it was put in the other instance, that so the Conclusion might not exceed what was in the Premises. But I shall soon take it away again: For indeed we may argue more positively here than in the other case. There we argued Conditionally and with suspense, that the Divine Ideas are perceiv'd by themselves, if at all. But we need not interpose that Caution as to *Eternal Truths*; for 'tis confess'd that we do actually perceive these, and also very plain that we do perceive them, as being the Objects of Science; and therefore we may conclude, that we do actually perceive them by themselves, since they are the same in reality with the Divine Ideas which cannot be any otherwise perceived. And by the way (to anticipate a little what we shall hereafter have occasion more particularly to insist upon) since we have an intellectual view of Eternal Truths; this may be improved into an Argument to shew that we do indeed perceive the Divine Ideas also. But this I leave for the present with my thoughtful Reader, because I would not divert from the thing in hand.

hand. In pursuance of which I further remark, that 'tis not very possible to conceive (if I may measure other Mens Understandings by my own) that Eternal Truths should be perceiv'd by any *Representative*. For Eternal Truths are also necessary Truths, and so much is supposed in their being the Objects of *Science*. But now I see not how any thing that is Temporary or Contingent should be able to represent what is Necessary and Eternal; that is, I mean so to represent it as with respect to it, to do the Office of an *Intelligible Species*, so that in understanding the one, we may be truly said to understand the other. For as for other grosser and more imperfect Representations, the *Hieroglyphicks* of the Imagination, they are nothing to the purpose. But now all things besides Eternal Truths, that is, I mean, that are really different from them, are Temporary and Contingent, and so consequently cannot reasonably be supposed capable of representing them after an Ideal or Intelligible manner; which one Consideration by the way may serve to shew (as I elsewhere observe) that the true Light of our Minds, whatever it be, cannot be a Created Light, whether Body or Spirit: For the Light of our Minds, that true Light which is the universal Luminary of the Intellectual World, or as St. John expresses it, that enlightens every Man that comes into this, must exhibit to our Minds necessary and eternal Truths, or else it would be extreamly defective in

in its Office, these Truths being the principal Objects of Humane Knowledge, and about which that most eminent kind of it is employed, which we call *Science*. But now this a Created Light can never do, if 'twere for no other reason than because Temporal and Contingent, the necessary Condition of every Creature. And because it is so (to resume our Thred) it seems most reasonable to conclude, that we see not Eternal Truths by any *Representative* Similitude, but in all the knowledge which we have of them, they themselves are the immediate Objects of our Thought, and that we see them by themselves, as we do God, who is Truth it self.

18. But do we not see these Truths in God, and how then do we see them by themselves? It is very true, we do indeed see these Truths in God, and 'tis as true that we see them by themselves, against which our seeing them in God is (rightly understood) no just Objection. We see these Truths in God, and that because they are in God, and 'tis necessary that we should see them where they are. But we do not see them in God as some other things may perhaps be supposed to be seen in God, that is, by any thing in the Divine Essence that is *Representative* of them. Tho' after all, if we did so perceive them, still we should not perceive them (as we do other things) by something really distinct from them, and that because, however formally different, yet materially and really considered

sidered, they are the same with God. And indeed it would be a strange thing (as necessary as the mediate way of Perception is in other cases) if Truth, which is the very Light of our Souls, and that which perfects our Understandings, and makes us Wise and Knowing, should need the illustration of any thing else, to render it perceptible to us. So true even in this Sense is that of St. Austin

Lumen illud, unde Anima tan- Enarratio in Ps. 7.

*quam lucerna accenduntur, non
alieno, sed proprio Splendore præfulget, quod est
ipsa veritas.*

19. We have now gone through the number of self-intelligible Objects, at least, of those that are certainly and necessarily so. Wherein we have not wandred out of the Sphere of the Divine Essence, that perfect and stupendous Sphere, and therefore the more perfect because it has no *Circumference*. And how shall we now go out of a Circle which is at once so comprehensive, and so charming? How shall we leave thee, the most glorious and delightful of all the Scenes of Thought? Or how will any other Subject relish after thee? Or how will our dazzled Eyes be able so much as to see any thing else coming out of the brightness of thy Light! Stay glorious Object, we cannot yet leave thee, *abide with us, for it is even*, and lighten our Darkness that we may *see* thee. Why should we hasten to descend from the Mount of thy Glory, it is good to be here, and to

to enjoy so much of Heaven as thou makest upon Earth ? It is good to be here, or indeed any where where thou art ; and tho' we cannot find either a Tongue, or a Language to express thy Wonders, yet at least to dwell a while in a silent Contemplation of that immense Excellency, the *Vision* of which will hereafter be our *Happiness*.

But then think if thou canst, O my Soul, what a great and glorious Beauty must that be, the very sight of which will make thee happy, whose Vision is truly Beatifick, in whose very Presence is fullness of Joy, and whom to know is Eternal Life !

But we know him now, and that too by himself, and yet we are not happy. Both these indeed are true ; we find the one so by Experience, and the other by Reason, and by this alone we may be admonish'd to consider how very imperfect our knowledge of him is in this Life, since it can consist with so much Misery and Sin. We know him indeed now, and the greatest Pleasure that we can relish is to know and contemplate him ; but we neither do nor can know him now, as we shall know him hereafter, when we shall see him in the Light of his Glory. Now we see him through a Glass darkly, but then Face to Face. Now we know him in part, but then shall we know him even as we our selves are known. Now we see him as we can, with feeble Eyes, and in an obscure Light, but then our view of him

Words of Wonder and Astonishment, and that carry a Heaven in their sound ! How great are thou, O God, and how great are thy Rewards ! Blessed State, tremendous Happiness ! Who is able to think of thee without Amazement, or to speak of thee without Confusion, or to enjoy thee without the Invigorations of the Celestial Comforts, those Divine Cordials of Living Water that issue out from the Throne ! But with thee, O Lord, is the Well of Life, and in thy Light shall we see Light. For 'tis thou, O Lord, must strengthen our weak Faculties, or else we shall not be able to indure thy Majestick Presence, at which the very Angels tremble and veil their Faces, but oppressed with Glory, shall even faint under our Enjoyments, and wish to shade our Eyes from thy too powerful and overcoming Light.

But, O Lord, what is Man, that thou should'st have such respect unto him, or the Son of Man, that thou should'st so far regard him, as to admit him to thy Beatifick Presence, to the Vision of thy self, and to fortifie him for the bearing of it, that so the *Bush*, where thou art, may not wast or be consumed with the Flame of thy Glory !

The Vision of God, O what a Vision must that be ! To see thee, who art infinitely Great, and infinitely Good, and infinitely Happy, and that

that in thy self, in the comprehensive view of thy own infinite Greatness and Goodness ! To see thee who art Being it self, and the Fountain of it ; who art Truth it self, and the Light of our Minds, and the Life of our Hearts, and the Centre of our Desires, and the ultimate End of our Natures ; who art an Infinite Good, all Good, even Goodness it self ! To see all this, and to see it clearly, and to have all those inconceivable Beauties unveiled to us, for which Angels incessantly praise thee, and which thou thy self hast been contemplating from all Eternity with infinite Pleasure and Complacency : What a strange Vision must this be, and what strange Effects must it have upon our Souls !

To make us *Wise*. For how Wise and Knowing must he needs be, that sees thee the true intelligible Light, the best and greatest Object of Thought ! Thee who possessest the Ideas of all things, and who therefore art all ! Thee who art immense and boundless Truth, and with whom *Wisdom* dwells, even the eternal *Wisdom* that sitteth by thy Throne, and was with thee when thou mad'st the World ! And to see also thy eternal and con-substantial *Word*, the universal Reason, in whom are hid all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge, and who

* *Cuius Particione fit Sapiens quacunq; Anima fit vere Sapiens.* St. Austin de *Consensu Evangelistarum.* Lib. 1. Cap. 23.

is that very *Wisdom* that in-lightens our Minds, and by * Participation of which every one is *Wise* that is truly *Wise*. And to see him also who is personal

sonal Love, even thy eternal Spirit, the Divine Author and Giver of Life. And to see how these Blessed three Concentre in one; what an instructive View, what a scientifick Vision must this be! Now we take a great deal of Pains for a little Knowledge, and are at the mercy of a Fever or a Bruise whether we shall keep that little, but then a sudden Light shall break in upon our Minds that shall dispel all Darknes, and clear all Mysteries, and remove all Difficulties, and we shall know without Study, and be learned without Libraries, and keep and increase our Knowledge for ever. And how shall we then despise all that is here call'd *Science*, or *Learning*, that of the Memory and Imagination especially, *Bookish Learning*, when we shall see Original Truth, and be always quenching our intellectual Thirst where the pure Springs of Wisdom rise? For then shall be the great intellectual Feast, when he shall sit at the Table, which Wisdom her self has furnish'd, and shall eat of the Bread, and drink of the Wine which she has mingled.

2dly. To make us *Good*. For then shall we behold thee in the Beauty of Holiness, or rather the Beauty of Holines in thee, and the very sight of that ravishing Appearance, will, by a Celestial Contagion, conform us to thy adorable Perfections, transfuse a deiform Temper into our Souls, assimilate us to thy Image, and make us truly partakers of thy Divine Nature, and so we shall be *like* thee, because we

shall see thee as thou art. And because thou are infinitely Beautiful the sight of thee will so inflame our Hearts with thy Love that we shall love thee with a Love worthy of thee, with all our Heart, Soul, Mind and Strength ; and the more we see thee, still the more we shall burn with Love towards thee ; and the more we Love thee, the more we shall still covet to resemble thee, and endeavour to be like thee, that so we may the better enjoy thee, and be more and more Happy in thee. And thus we with open Face beholding the Glory of the Lord, shall be changed into the same Image from Glory to Glory.

The things of this World the less they are known, the more they are valued, and our Love of them is founded upon our Ignorance of them. Ignorance is indeed in these things the Mother of Devotion, and the more we improve our Acquaintance with them the more we despise them, and that because of their Vanity, and those Defects which we discover in them. But O my God, thy infinite Perfections will endure the Light and stand the Test of the most illuminated Intelligence, and that knowledge which lessens the value of other things, will improve our Esteem, and raise our Passion for thy Excellencies.

And O that Men did thus truly know thee ! O that they had but one glimpse of thy excellent Glory ! Then would they never offend thee, then would they forever adore and love thee,

Part II. the Ideal World, &c. 307

thee, then would they resolve upon any Terms to enjoy thee, as they that *will be* Rich do to enjoy the World, they would even lay hold upon eternal Life, offer violence to the Kingdom of Heaven, and take Happiness by force. They would never revolt from thee, but would ever continue thine.

For that also is another Effect of this beatifick View. The Blessed that behold thy Face are thereby confirmed in good beyond all possibility of declining from it. For the Vision of thy glorious Essence has the influence of the most efficacious *Grace*, both to determine them to good, and also to confirm them in it * For thy Essence is the very Essence of Goodness, and those that clearly see it will be as much influenc'd by it, as those that do not see it are by the general Appearance of Good. And as there is now no possibility of Aversion from good in common, so there will be then no declining from thee. Happy Vision that putteth an end to † Sin, when shall we partake of thy Security, Blessed Light that chasest away the works of Darkness, when wilt thou arise upon us? Thou shalt shew us thy Glory, O Lord, and then we shall ever adhere to thee. In the mean time

* *Essentia Dei est ipsa Essentia Bonitatis.*
Unde hoc modo se habet Angelus videns Deum ad ipsum, sicut se habet quicunq; non videns Deum ad communem rationem Boni.
Aquinas. Part 1.
Q. 62. Art. 8.

† *Tunc non peccabimus, cum illam faciem viderimus qua vincit Omnes Concupiscentias.* St. Aust. Serm. 49. De Temp. Cap. 9.

time give us thy Grace so to use our *Liberty*, that we may have the Reward to lose it in this happy *Necessity*.

3dly. To make us *Happy*. For how can we be otherwise when we have a clear and intimate Vision of thee; and the highest Operation of our Nature is employ'd upon the most perfect Object of it? Thou, O Lord, art the best and greatest intelligible Good, and we are Intellectual Beings, whose noblest Faculty is our Understanding, and therefore thy Vision must needs be truly *Beatifick*, and to know thee can be no less than eternal Life. Thou art all Good, and therefore they that enjoy thee, must needs acquiesce in thee. The most Covetous cannot but here be satisfied; for thy Perfection is an immense Sea, and in thee every Faculty will find its proper Object, and every Desire its full Contentment. We shall be abundantly satisfied with the Fatness of thy House, and thou shalt make us Drink of the River of thy Pleasures: A River that will thoroughly quench that Thirst which the Waters that we draw out of our own Cisterns do but inflame, and which can never be drawn dry, as being fed by the everlasting Springs of thy infinite Sufficiency. We shall then love and delight in what we see, and have what we love, and shall be ever ravished with the Contemplation of thy Beauty, and dwell in the Communion of thy ineffable Joys, and in the embraces of thy Love,

Love, and shall eternally Praise and Adore thy Goodness. *Amen. Halleluja.*

But, O my God, there is a *Beatifick Temper* as well as a *Beatifick Vision*, and Heaven imports not only an outward Possession, but an inward State and Disposition of Mind. Thy Kingdom is in great measure within us, and as great a good as thou art, every Soul howsoever disposed, is not qualified to enjoy thee. There must be a Wedding Garment provided for the Marriage Feast. O Sanctifie us therefore and Purifie us by thy Grace, that we may be *meet Partakers* of the Inheritance of the Saints in Light, and help us to behold thy Face now in Righteousness, that when we awake up after thy Likeness, we may be satisfied with it.

C H A P. VI.

That all Material Objects, and perhaps most Spiritual ones, are seen or understood by the Mediation of Ideas.

1. **W**E have in the foregoing Chapter given an Account of certain Objects that are Self-intelligible, and which are perceived by themselves. And they are all of the *Immaterial* Kind, within which Boundary, as we have hitherto confined our selves, so I see not

how we can ever pass beyond it. Not that there appears any necessity to suppose, as we shall further observe by and by, that all Objects that are of this Order, are understood by us after this manner, but that there are no other so understood but they. For as for material Objects, or things of a Corporeal Nature, that they cannot be understood immediately, or by themselves, there are several Reasons to maintain, and such as are both clear in themselves, and distinct from one another.

2. First of all because these Material Objects are without the Mind. I call them *Objects* because I suppose them to be some way or other Intelligible, but that they are not Intelligible by themselves, I think this very Consideration is sufficient to evince. For since there is a necessity of some Union between the Act, or rather the Power acting and its Objects; 'tis plain, that whatever is perceived or understood, must be some way or other present to the Mind. And accordingly the Union of the thing perceived with the perceptive Power, is by *Aquinas* made as necessary to Perception as the perceptive Power it self, when he tells us, That to Vision, both Sensible and Intellectual, two things are requisite, *viz.* the visive Power, and the Union of the thing seen with the Sight. Because there is no actual Vision, but by this,

* Part 1. Quest. 12. Art. 2. that the thing seen is some way or other in the Seer. * *Ad visionem tam sensibilem quam Intellectualem,*

Intellectualem, duo requiruntur, Scilicet virtus visiva, & unio rei visa cum visu. Non enim sit visio in actu, nisi per hoc, quod res visa quodammodo est in vidente. Well, but then, if whatever is understood must be some way or other present to the Mind, because no Power can act upon an Object that is utterly distant from it, then by the same Proportion whatever is understood by it self, must by it self be immediately present to the Mind. But now 'tis plain, that material Objects have not with the Mind any such intimate Presence or Union. And accordingly, continues the same Doctor in the same place, That in Corporeal things it is apparent that the things seen cannot be in the Seer by its own Essence, but only by its Similitude. As for instance, the Similitude of a Stone is in the Eye, by which there is actual vision, and not the very substance of the Stone it self. And therefore we may conclude since material Objects are not by themselves immediately present to the Mind, that therefore they are not by themselves immediately perceived by it. For as where there is no Union at all of the Intelligible Object with the Intellective Power, there can be no Perception at all; so where there is no immediate Union, there can be no immediate Perception.

3. But then again *adly*, as these material Objects are without the Mind, so also are they utterly *disproportionate* to it, and therefore 'tis not reasonable to suppose, that they are imme-

diatey perceived by it, or that in the Perception which we have of them, these very things themselves are the immediate Objects that terminate that Perception. That there should be a due Proportion between the Power and its proper Object in general, and consequently between the Understanding and what is immediately perceived by it (according to that Maxim allowed by *Aquinas*, *Cognosentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam Proportionem*) seems but a reasonable Supposition. And the Schools themselves are so far convinced of the reasonableness of it; that tho' they derive our Ideas from the material Species, which sensible Objects (as they imagine) impress upon the Senses, yet they find it necessary to contrive a way whereby these material Species after their admission into the common Sensory, may be refined and spiritualized before they are presented to the Understanding, *viz.* by the help of what they call *Intellectus Agens*, whose Office it is (and work enough in all reason) to purifie and refine these Species or Phantasms, that so from Material and sensible they may become (by a strange *Transubstantiation*) Immaterial and Intelligible. 'Tis besides our present purpose to lay open the Absurdity of this miserable Device, all that I think *concerning* at present to Remark, is that hereby the Schools seem to acknowledge the necessity of there being some Proportion between the Understanding and its immediate Object, since these Species of a material

terial Extraction must be transform'd into a like Nature with that of the Mind, in order to their being Intelligible by it. And accordingly before this Transmutation they are called Sensible and not Intelligible Species; which seems to imply, that nothing can be the immediate Object of the Mind, but what is of a Nature proportionate to it. But now there seems to be no manner of Proportion between the Mind and things Material, between Thought and Extension, or between a thinking and an extended Substance, which, according to the Ideas we have of them, we cannot but conceive to be as disproportionate to each other as any two things can possibly be, as differing in the whole kind, and removed from each other, as I may say, by the whole *Diameter* of Being. And therefore I propose it to be considered, whether from hence also we may not reasonably infer, that material Things are not Self-intelligible, nor consequently the immediate Objects of the Mind. For in all Thought there must be Union between the Object and the Faculty, and nothing can be the immediate Object of the Mind but what is immediately united to the Mind. But how there can be any such Union between a thinking Being and an extended Being, is not, I think, to be conceived.

4. But besides that, we may see how much Philosophy is concerned in the issue of this Question; 'tis further to be considered, that if material

material Things were perceived immediately by themselves, there would be no *Physical Science*: For Science is concerning things necessary and immutable, and therefore as if there were nothing but Bodies (as the old Philosophers according to *Aquinas* were of Opinion) there would be no Science (as they also upon that Supposition are said to have inferr'd,) and that because these things are all Contingent, and in continual flux; so supposing there be other things of a more stable Nature (as for that very reason there necessarily must) yet if material Beings are not known by those other things, but by themselves, still there would be no Science with regard to those Beings. The case as to them would be the same as before; for as those other things, whose Nature is fixed and permanent, are the Foundations of Science, as we have largely shewn in the former Part, so all the Science that is must be with respect to those Foundations. 'Tis true indeed, that the Position of Ideas does sufficiently salve the Notion of Science in the general against the pretences of Scepticism grounded upon the instability of sensible Objects, and 'twas for that very end that *Plato* is said to have had recourse to them; but yet if material Beings are supposed to be perceived immediately and by themselves, the old Sceptical Objection taken from the mutable State of external Nature, considered with the Immutability that Science requires in its Object, will in great measure again return,

Part II. the Ideal World, &c. 315

return, and still as to these *Physical* things at least there will be no Science. For the salving of which it is therefore necessary, that material Beings should be perceived not by themselves, but by their Ideas, and that in this Sense also we should think of *Corporeal* things, according to *Incorporeal Reasons*, as St. Austin expresses it, since 'tis only according to those *Incorporeal Reasons* that they have, that immutability which Science requires.

De Trin. Lib. 12. C. 2.

5. And in all this I go very much according to the Principles of the great Ideal Philosopher, and maintainer of Science; if *Thomas Aquinas* may be allow'd to be a competent Judge of them, who thus represents this whole Matter. The first Philosophers, says he, who inquired concerning the Natures of things, thought there was nothing in the World but Body. And because they saw that all Bodies were Moveable, and thought they were in continual flux, they were of Opinion that we could have no certainty concerning the Nature of things, &c. But now *Plato* coming upon these, that he might salve our having a certain Intellectual Knowledge of Truth, supposed besides these Corporal Things another kind of Beings separate from Matter and Motion, which he called Species or Ideas, by participation, whereof every one of those Singul-
Sam. Theol. Part. 1. Ques. 84. Art. 1.
lars

lars and Sensibles, is said to be either a Man, or a Horse, or the like. And accordingly he maintained that Sciences and Definitions, and whatever appertains to the Act of the Understanding, was not to be referred to those sensible Bodies; but to those immaterial and separate Beings, and that so the Soul did not understand those Corporal Things, but the separate Species of those Corporal Things. Which account, as 'tis perhaps one of the fairest Representations of *Plato's* Ideal System that one shall meet with; so I take it to be very right in it self, both as to the necessity of Ideas for the salving of Sciences in the general, and also as to our knowledge of Corporeal Beings by them. For that I presume is what is meant by the Soul's not understanding Corporal Things, not as tho' she did not understand them at all (for then there would be no Physical Science that way) but that she does not understand them immediately, or by themselves, but by their Ideas; which indeed I think to be the right account of the Matter; and for this, among other Reasons, since otherwise I see not how *Natural Science* (whose Object must be as steady and immutable as that of any other) can be either clearly conceived, or with satisfaction maintain'd against a *Sceptical* Opposer. With whom, as much concerned as I am for the interest of the Sciences, and tho' I were much better instructed in them than I am, I should not be

be very forward to ingage, but upon the supposition of *Ideas*.

6. I am the more sparing in this Argument because I have said several things relating to it elsewhere, which the Reader for his better satisfaction is desired to compare with the present Account. However to clear this Matter yet once more, if possible, to the Capacity of the meanest Person whose Curiosity shall have led him thus far in the perusal of this Work, I offer this short Reasoning to his longer Consideration. Science is only of Necessaries and Immutables. Things are Necessary and Immutable only as they are in Idea. Therefore things only as they are in Idea, are the Objects of Science. Or more explicitly thus: To have any Science of material Things, is to know certain, universal, necessary, eternal and immutable Truths concerning them; for if it be not concerning *them*, then 'tis not Physical Science, but of some other kind. But how concerning *them*? Not as in Nature, for so they are Mutable and Contingent, and so cannot be the Subjects of necessary and immutable Relations, such as these Truths are supposed to be. If then we know any such Truths concerning them it must be concerning them, as they are in Idea, or according to their Ideal Reasons. And therefore we must see and perceive them as they are in their Ideas, whenever we know or affirm such Truths concerning them, or else 'tis plain that we can have no true Science of them.

7. There

7. There is one Consideration more which may be added to the rest, and that is, that if material Things were seen or perceived by themselves, then they would be a true Light to our Minds, as being the intelligible Form of our Understandings, and that whereby they become actually Intelligent, and consequently would be truly perfective of them, and indeed superior to them. For as the Ideas of these things are Perfective of our Minds, supposing, as we do, that we see them by Ideas; so if we see them by themselves, then the things themselves would be to our Minds what we suppose their Ideas to be. For whatever is the immediate Object of the Mind is the Perfection of it, as informing it. And therefore, when *Aquinas* had urged this Objection to himself against God's knowing other things besides himself, that the thing understood is the Perfection of the Intelligent, and that therefore if God did understand other things besides himself, then something else would be the Perfection of God, and consequently more noble than himself, 'tis remarkable that he had no other way to bring himself off; but by distinguishing of a twofold *Intellectum*, the Primary, as I may call it, or *Inelligible Species*, which according to him (because he supposes no other to be the immediate Object of the Mind) is the Perfection of the Understanding, and the Secondary, that is, the thing it self whose the Species is, and by saying, that God understands other things

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no otherwise than as the Species of them are contained in his own Essence, which is the same as to say, that he understands other things, no otherwise than by himself, or else he could not justly infer as he does; that it does not therefore follow, that any thing else is the Perfection of the Divine Intellect, besides the very Essence of God himself. His words are, *Dicendum quod Intellectum est Perfectio Intelligentis, non quidem secundum suam substanziam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam est in Intellectu, ut Forma & Perfectio ejus. Lapis enim non est in animâ, sed Species ejus. Ea vero que sunt alia à Deo, intelliguntur à Deo, in quantum Essentia Dei Continet Species eorum. Unde non Sequitur quod aliud aliud sit Perfectio Divini Intellectus, quam ipsa Essentia Dei.*

*Sum. Theol. Part 1.
Ques. 14. Art. 5.*

Observe here, that his limitation of that Maxim of the Objection, *The thing understood is the Perfection of the Intelligent*, to the intelligible Species of the thing, is from his supposing that only to be the immediate Object of the Mind; which implies, that if the thing itself were so, that also would be its Perfection for the same reason. Observe again, that he makes those Species, whereby God knows other things, to be no other than the Divine Ideas, which is in effect, that he knows other things by himself only, and that left otherwise something else besides himself, should be a Perfection to him: Wherein he plainly confesses, that the immediate Object

ject of the Mind, whatever it be, is the Perfection of it, even of the Divine Mind it self; only he denies any thing to be the immediate Object of God's Understanding besides his own Essence, that so nothing may be a Perfection to him but himself: Which, I think, is as sound Divinity as Metaphysics, most worthy of God; and I was about to say of another Celestial Attestation from him, *Bene Scripsisti de me Thoma.*

8. Upon these Considerations it appears to be a Conclusion, tho' somewhat against the suggestions of Sense, yet very much according to Reason; that Matter is not an Object self-visible, or self intelligible; that 'tis not the immediate Object of our Sight, or of our Thought, of sensible, or of intellectual Vision, but that of it self and by it self, it is utterly Dark, Invisible and Unintelligible. So that as God is that Light in which there is no Darkness at all; so Matter, on the contrary, may be said to be darkness wherein there is no light at all: A pure and an unmixed Darkness, being no more able to enlighten the Mind, than it is to act upon it, or cause any Sentiment in it, but as utterly *invisible* as 'tis *ineffacious*, and so every unperfective of our Natures, and incapable of being the good of our Souls.

9. So far is Matter from being able to think or understand, that it is not of it self so much as *Intelligible*, and were it not for those *incorporeal Reasons*, or Ideas whereby it comes under

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Our Cognisance, it would remain an unknown, unseen, and unthought of Being in the World. But then is it not strange that That which can give no *Light* to our Understandings, should yet be able to impart so much *Heat* to our Affections? And yet thus it is: All the Thought, all the Care, all the Labour, all the Passion, and all the Contention of Mankind is about these poor material Things, which are Darkness to our Understandings, and beneath the Application of our Wills, as having none of those Beauties which we fondly dream of, and admire in them. And yet these dark unintelligible Entities, these intellectual Cyphers, these Idols that are nothing at all in the intelligible World, are the great concern of this. These mean and ignoble Essences, as much inferior to our Souls, as superior to nothing, and which the great Author of them and us seems to have cast into a *Shade*, as the less regardable Pieces of his Workmanship, and to have hid from the view of our Minds, as unworthy of the adhesion of our Hearts; these are the things which we foolishly grow inamoured of, and blindly fall in love with, renouncing even the Beatifick Objects of the Glory that shall be revealed for the enjoyment of them. Besides, these poor Beings are accounted by us the only substantial Realities, and accordingly we call them our *Goods*, and our Treasures, while in the mean time, those far more excellent and noble Essences of the intelligible World, the Ideal

Reasons whereby we have the very Perception and Knowledge of them, which were when *they* were not, and would remain if *they* were remanded to their nothing again; these are esteemed by us as *Chimæras* and *Metaphysical Nothings*; or at least, as thin slender Beings that have no more Substance than a Shadow, or an Image in the Glass. So much does Man act by Sense, tho' he be distinguish'd by Reason, and so much even in this sense also does he love Darkness rather than Light.

10. But from Morality again to our Metaphysics; we have shewn that material Things are not perceptible or intelligible by themselves, and consequently that they must be known by their Ideas, there being but these two possible ways of knowing any intelligible Object. And indeed this is the great and principal Use of Ideas to represent *material* Things to our Minds, which are not able to represent themselves to light us, as I may say, in the *Dark*, and to serve as Stars to conduct us through the black Night of the Corporeal World. And perhaps when we shall come to know what these Ideas are, we shall not refuse the direction of such Guides, nor think it unworthy of us, or unbecoming the Dignity of our Natures to allow that such things as these should be the Light of our Minds, and Perfective of our Understands, tho' Matter cannot be allowed to be so. In the mean time before we proceed any further, there are two or three Remarks which may be raised from

from the Premises by way of *Corollary*, and which the Reader would do well to take in his way, and into his Consideration.

First then, since we have shewn material Things are not to be perceived immediately by themselves, but by their Ideas, whether this does not prove the necessity of such Ideas, and so whether this may not be superadded to the Considerations contained in the former part of this Work, as a further Confirmation of the Truth and Reality of an Ideal or Intelligible World.

In the next place, since material Things cannot be the immediate Objects of Thought, we may hence justly gather, that then Ideas which are the immediate Objects of Thought, of what kind so ever they be as to the Speciality of them, are certainly in the general not *Material*, that is, I mean Essentially consider'd; for as to their being representatively Material, that may very well consist with their essential Spirituality.

Again lastly, since material Things are not only perceived by Ideas, but that otherwise there can be no Science concerning them, and since these Ideas are the true and sole Objects of that Science, we may hence further commend it to be observed concerning the Nature of these Ideas, that (whatever they be) they must in the general, not only be Spiritual and Immaterial, but also Necessary and Immutable, since otherwise they would be no more fit to be the

Objects of Science, than those Beings which by them are represented to our Minds; and so, tho' we had Ideas, yet still we should have no Science. And thus far by way of Prelibration concerning the Nature of our Ideas, from the Consideration of the manner of our perceiving material Things by them.

11. Now as to *Spiritual* things, we have already shewn that some of them are intelligible by themselves, in taking account of which we have gone however no farther than what is contained within the Divine Essence. And indeed I know not whether we can safely advance one step further or no. For tho' there be no Self-intelligible Objects, but what are Spiritual, yet it does not follow, that therefore all Spiritual Objects are Self-intelligible. On the contrary, perhaps there may be greater Reason to think that they are not. We cannot indeed be so positive here as in the other Case, and things must be determined as they will bear; but it seems most congruous to suppose that God is the only Self-intelligible Object, and that no other Substance but his falls under our direct and immediate View, and that all Creatures, Spiritual as well as Material, are perceived by Ideas, that so God only may be the Light of our Minds, and the Perfection of our Understandings.

12. Besides, tho' Spiritual Beings are more proportionate to our Minds than such as are Material, and accordingly may be conceived

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as more capable of Union with them, and also as more fit to inlighthen and perfect them as an intelligible Form ; so that in these three Respects there seems not altogether that inconvenience in admitting the immediate Perceptibility of Spirits as of Bodies ; yet still the Argument as to *Science* seems to press here as much as in the other *Cafe* ; so that if Spirits were perceived by themselves, and not by Ideas, there would be as little Foundation to erect any Science concerning them, as concerning Bodies upon the like supposition. For tho' 'tis confess'd they are far more Noble and Excellent Beings than Bodies, yet it must be confessed too, that as Creatures they are not less Temporary, Contingent, and in themselves Mutable, than the other, and consequently in that regard at least, not qualified to be the Objects of Science, unless perceived by Ideas, as we suppose Bodies to be.

13. Besides again, as to our own Souls, which make no inconsiderable Figure in the World of Spirits, it seems highly reasonable, almost necessary to think that they are to be perceived only by their Ideas, as Bodies are, since, if they were Self-intelligible, we should, methinks, have a clear Perception of them *now*, which yet we find we have not, as intimately united, as we are with our selves : Whereof I know not what other account to give but that the Ideas of them, whereby only they are to be perceived, are hid from us. And if our own Souls

are perceived not by themselves, but by their Ideas, I know not why we should not think the same of all other Created Spirits. It seems therefore upon the whole to be most probable that God is the only Self-intelligible Object, discernible by his own Light, and that all Created Beings, whether Material or Immaterial, are intelligible only in the Ideal way of Perception, by those intelligible Species which represent them to our Understandings. From all which we are naturally led to Remark, how ill the manner of Humane Understanding has been consider'd in the Schools, since that Specular and *Ænigmatical* Vision, which they suppose us to have of God, if it holds any where, is indeed true only of *Creatures*.

14. And thus having shewn what Objects are perceived immediately by themselves, and what by the Mediation of Ideas, the next thing we have to consider will be (and a very great thing indeed it is) what those Ideas are by which these mediately Intelligible Objects are perceived by us; upon which Inquiry we shall make an entrance in the next Chapter. All that I shall do towards it in this, shall be only to set down the several sorts of Ideas, which either have been, or may be assigned as the formal Principles of our Knowledge, whereby we either have been, or may be supposed to perceive things, and to which the several Hypotheses concerning the way and manner of Humane Understanding may be referr'd. Now of these

these I think *M. Malebranche* has laid out a very just and comprehensive Division, when he says, That it is absolutely necessary, that those Ideas which we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects, which we do not perceive by themselves, should come from those very Bodies, or from those Objects: Or that our Soul has a power of producing those Ideas: Or that God has produced them with the Soul when he Created it: Or that he produces them whensoever we think upon any Object: Or that the Soul has, in her self, all those Perfections which she sees in those Bodies: Or, in fine, that she be united with an all-perfect Being, and that includes in himself, after an universal manner, all the Perfections of Created Beings. This Enumeration seems so full and adequate, that we cannot well doubt, but that the true way of our understanding the Objects that are now under Consideration, is contained within the compass of it. And accordingly I think the best method to find out what that is, will be to proceed upon the same Heads, by intermixing with what this great Man either here, or elsewhere says upon each of them, some further Reflections of our own, as there shall be occasion. For indeed I should be very unjust to my Argument, as well as unkind to my self, should I refuse what Light or Assistance I may receive in the management of it from so great a Head. And truly, considering what moderate assistance I have had hitherto in the Prosecution of this Work from other

Mens Thoughts, as writing upon a Subject which few Men have thought much about, I have the less reason to decline it now. And besides, having travelled so much alone in the former Stages, a little Company now towards the close of the Journey may be convenient ; wherefore having so good a Companion, let us forthwith advance upon the foregoing Heads, only taking the liberty to word them a little otherwise than they are expressed here, that we may the better accommodate them to the Coextexture of our Discourse, and make them fall in the more aptly with the order of our general Design.

C H A P. VII.

That the Ideas whereby we perceive such Objects as are mediately Intelligible, do not come from those Objects; with some occasional Considerations upon the Intellectus Agens of the Schools, Mr. Lock's Principle of Sensation, and that Scholastick Maxim, That there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense.

1. **I**N that part of our Account of Humane Understanding which concerns the *manner* of it, the Reader was made acquainted, that in inquiring *how* we understand, our design was to inquire what was the immediate Object of Thought in our Perception of things. Now this we have shewn to be the very things themselves in some Intelligible Objects, as in God, Ideas, and eternal Truths. In our Perception of these things the immediate Object of our Thought are the very things themselves. But now as to things that are out of God, those of them that are Material, we have shewn to be known by Ideas, as also according to the greatest probability, those also that are Spiritual, as Angels and Humane Souls. And here not

not the things themselves ; but the Ideas of them are the immediate Objects of our Perception. Now as to those things which are *Self-intelligible*, I look upon the manner of our knowing *them* to be already sufficiently accounted for ; since whence 'tis shewn, that such or such things are perceived immediately by themselves, 'tis as much as need, or indeed can well be said of them. But as to those things which are known by Ideas, the greatest part of the Enquiry remains yet still behind, and that is to consider, according to the best light we have in this State of Darkness, what those Ideas are whereby we have the knowledge of them. Towards the Resolution of which grand Question, I think we may reasonably make our entry with this plain Assertion, *That the Ideas whereby we perceive such Objects as are mediately Intelligible, do not come from those Objects.*

2. So I chuse to express the Proposition of the Chapter, rather than to say with our Author, *That material Objects do not send forth any Species that resemble them.* And that because this latter is not, as I conceive, so properly the Proposition that is to be proved, as one of the mediums of proving it. For having made an enumeration of the several ways of our perceiving things, that is, of the several sorts of Ideas, whereby we may be supposed to perceive them, and being now to consider by which of them they are perceived, I think the train and purfiance of our Discourse requires that we should say,

say, that the Ideas, whereby we perceive such Objects, do not come from those Objects, rather than that such Objects do not send forth any. Besides, I chuse to say, *Objects mediately Intelligible*, rather than *Material Objects*, partly because I would distinguish them against those Objects which are Intelligible by themselves, and not by Ideas, and partly because of the greater Latitude of the Expression, which being more general, will take in Spiritual as well as material Beings; some of which Spiritual Beings (*viz.* all that are Created) we have supposed to be of the number of mediately Intelligible Objects. These *M. Malebranohe* has here left out, confining himself to such Objects as are Material, not because he thought those were the only Objects which were to be known by Ideas (for he intimates the contrary when he says, I believe there is no Substance purely Intelligible but that of God, that there is no seeing any thing with Evidence, but in his Light, and that the Union of Spirits cannot render them visible) but, as I suppose, because he thought we had at present no Ideas of any other; which, I believe, is very right. But yet however, since Spirits are supposed to be Intelligible only by their Ideas as well as Bodies, and since we shall at least hereafter have an Ideal Perception of them, as well as of the other, upon this Consideration; as also, that our Discourse may be more just and intire in all its parts, we shall first make good our Proposition with

with respect to *them*, shewing that the Ideas whereby Spiritual Beings are perceived, whenever they are perceived, are not derived from those beings.

3. And that they are not, is so plain and obvious, that we need not stay long upon the proof of it ; the contrary Supposition being not only inconsistent with the Notion of these Beings, but also destructive of their real Natures. For if these Spiritual Beings do send forth any Species resembling them from their own Substance, as they must do if the Ideas, whereby they are perceived, do come from them, then 'tis plain that they are divisible : And if so, then a double Absurdity will follow ; one by way of direct Progress from the Cause to the Effect, and another by way of Regress from the Effect to the Cause. 1st. That they are Corruptible, Corruption being the effect of Division. And then 2^{dly}. That they are also Extended, Extention being the ground of Divisibility. And so our supposed immortal Spirits will become really mortal Bodies : Whereby it is plain, that if Spiritual Beings, such as Angels or Humane Souls (for God is not at all concerned in this Discourse) be perceived by Ideas, 'tis not by any Ideas derived from *themselves*, that they are perceived.

4. Proceed we now to shew the same as to material Objects, *viz.* That the Ideas whereby we perceive them, are not from those Objects. For which Assertion, as contrary as it is to the Principles

Principles of the common Philosophy, I seem to have two very clear and distinct Reasons.

1st. Because material Objects do not send forth from them any Species resembling themselves.

2dly. Because supposing they did, yet they could not be perceived by such Species.

The First of these is that which *M. Malebranche* has undertaken to maintain, in opposition to the *Peripatetick Philosophy*, which, as he observes, holds the Emission of such Species from Bodies. Tho' that is not the only Philosophy that does so, for he might have observed the same, if he had pleased, of the *Epicurean*, which teaches also the Emission of certain fine and subtile Images from the Surface of Bodies continually flying up and down the Air, and that with a celerity of Motion swifter than the Beams of the Sun. And 'tis by these volatile Images that they pretend to explain *Vision*, to which they suppose them absolutely necessary. For so the great Recorder and Embellisher of that Philosophy boldly Sings of these Images; as boldly as if he had seen Bodies stripping and divesting themselves of these their outer Coats, and that as plainly as he saw the Bodies themselves.

*Dico igitur rerum Effigies tenuesq; Figuras
Mittier ab rebus, summo de Corpore earum.*

*Qua quasi Membrana, vel Cortex Nominanda 'est,
Quod Speciem, ac formam Similem gerit ejus Imago,
Quotiescumq; cluet de Corpore fusa vagari.*

Lucretius. Lib. Quart. Oxford edit. P. 192.

Again,

*Et quasi Multa brevi Spatio summittere debet
Lumina Sol, ut perpetuo sint Omnia plena,
Sic a rebus item simili ratione necesse 'est
Temporis in punto rerum simulacra ferantur
Multa Modis Multis, in Cunctas undiq; partes.*

P. 198.

Again,

*Nonne vides Citius debere, & longius ire
Multiplexq; loci spaciū transcurrere eodem
Tempore, quo Solis per volgant lumina Cælum?*

P. 200.

Once more let us here him,

*Esse in imaginibus quapropter Causa videtur
Cernendi, neq; posse sine his res ulla videri, &c.*

P. 201.

But as fond as this Philosophick Poet, or rather Poetical Philosopher, of these Images issuing forth from Bodies, and as much *Idols* as they are of many other Philosophers, who are, or should be Votaries of *Severer Muses*, it seems
very

very Absurd and Unphilosophical, upon many Considerations, to suppose any such things which Mr. *Malebranche* shews.

1st. From the *Impenetrability* of Bodies, such as he justly supposes these Species to be, since Bodies cannot send out from them Species of a Nature different from themselves. And accordingly, as he observes, 'tis commonly said by Philosophers, that these Species are Gross and Material, by way of distinction from those *express* Species which are Spiritualized. These *impress* Species of Objects must then be little Bodies. And therefore they cannot penetrate themselves, nor all those intermedial Spaces between the Earth and the Heavens, which must be all full of them. Whence 'tis obvious to conclude, that they must needs bruise and grind one another, as one passes on one side, and another on the other, and that so they cannot render Objects visible.

Upon this Head he further considers, that from one and the same Point of view one may see a vast number of Objects, and that therefore the Species of all those Bodies ought to meet in one Point, which, because of their *Impenetrability*, as being extended, is impossible. And this he further improves by adding, that there is not only a great number of the vastest Objects to be seen from the same Point ; but that also there is no one Point in all the vast Spaces of the World, from whence one may not discover almost an infinite number of Objects, and

and those not less than the Sun, the Moon, and the Heavens. And that therefore there is no Point in all the World, but where the Species of all these things must be supposed to meet ; which is against all appearance of Truth.

2dly. From the variation which happen to the Species. For 'tis certain that the nearer the Object, the Species must be the greater, since the Object appears greater to us. But now what should diminish this Species, and what becomes of those parts which composed it when it was greater ? But that which in this way is most inconceivable, is that if one looks at this Object with a Microscope, the Species becomes on a sudden five or six hundred times bigger than it was before ; since by what parts it should be so augmented in an instant is not to be conceived.

3dly. From the instance of a perfect Cube ;

† He means I suppose, as they are in the bottom of the Eye, since the Image of the Cube that is projected upon the Retina (supposing any such to be painted there) must be like a Cube in *Perspective* whose sides are unequal.

which when one looks upon all the † Species of its sides, are unequal, and yet one sees all its sides equally square. In like manner, when in a Picture one looks upon oval Figures and Parallelograms, which to be sure cannot send forth Species but what are of the like Figure, and yet one sees there only Circles and

Squares. The force of the former Argument concerning the Cube (as I understand it) consists

sists in this. That which I see has its sides equally square: But the Species (if any such there be) must be unequally so, as in Perspective; therefore the Species is not that which I see.

Lastly, From the unconceivableness of supposing, that a Body that does not sensibly diminish should always send forth from it self Species on all sides, and should incessantly replenish with them vast Spaces all round about, and that with a swiftness not to be imagin'd. For in the very instant that an

* hidden Object discovers it + I suppose he self, one may see it many millions of Leagues on every

side: Besides that, it seems very strange, that Bodies that are very Active, as the Air and some others, should not have the force to send out any such Images that resemble them, when this is supposed to be done by Bodies that are gross, hard and unactive.

5. These Considerations I have here thrown together, because the Author has been pleased to range them under this formal Head, *viz.* That *Material Objects do not send forth any resembling Species*, tho' I think we must divide them again; since, if I may presume to rectifie any thing in so great a Man, and who generally writes with so much clearness and exactness, they will be found perhaps most of them to belong to the other, as directly proving the Conclusion itself; That *Bodies are not perceived by Species that proceed from them*, rather than that

there is no Precession of any such Species, as will appear by the Application which we shall by and by make of them to that purpose. Indeed I think that there is but one of these Arguments that distinctly proves the Thesis of the Chapter, that Bodies do not emit any Species, and that is the *last*, taken from the sensible Diminution that must needs arrive to them if they did ; which indeed seems very convincing, and the more because it is an Appeal to Sense as well as to Reason.

6. But before we leave this Point, I would offer another Consideration upon it. If Bodies send forth any Species that resemble them, then the parts of those Species (for I suppose them to be Corporeal) must be Coexistent, that so the Species may be intire in all its parts, or else it will not carry a due resemblance of the Body whose Species it is supposed to be. Whence I infer again, That the corresponding Parts of those Bodies which constitute those Species, must fly off from the Surface of those Bodies all at once, since otherwise some parts will be wanting to the Species while it has others, and so it will be no Species at all, as not being intire. But now it seems impossible that Bodies should thus intirely and simultaneously strip and uncase themselves of these their outer Coats or Membranes (as *Lucretius* calls them) and consequently, that we should have any such intire Prints and Images of them, and that because even Bodies that are of one simple

ple specifick Substance are not equally divisible in all their parts, and so not *uniformly volatile*, as being of a firmer and closer Contexture in some parts than in others. Much less can this be in Bodies that are compounded of several sorts of Substances, which yet are as visible as those that are most simple. For instance, I will suppose a Statue of a Man, whose Feet and Legs shall be of Iron, the Trunk of Wood, and the Head of Wax. Now I would offer it to be considered by any thinking Person, whether this so compounded Statue can send forth any Species like it self, since the parts whereof it is composed, and whereof the Species must be composed too, being of a Texture so very various, and consequently so differently volatile, cannot fly off all at the same time, but will take their leave some sooner and some later, some in one manner and some in another, according as they can disengage themselves from their several Holds. But then how a just and intire Species should be the result of so unequal and tumultuous an Effluxion of Parts will require some labour to conceive, and perhaps more than the Hypothesis it self is worth. For indeed I look upon this Notion of Bodies sending forth these Images of themselves (next to those substantial Forms which they are supposed to have *within* them) to be as whimsical and phantastical an Amusement as one can well meet with among all the Romantick Imaginations of the School-Philosophy; and I cannot but wonder

that so many learned Men would so seriously and gravely take up, or rather sit down with so childish and so extravagant a Phancy ; and among the rest my Lord Bacon, who supposes a kind of Eradication of visible Species from Bodies, and compares them to

Opuscula Postbuma *Odours. Videntur Species V-*
 Page 136. *sibilium esse tanquam Emissiones*
Radiorum a Corpore visibili instar

fere Odorum ; especially considering the no advantage of it if it should be granted. For that I go next to shew, *viz.*

7. 2dly. That supposing Bodies to emit from them any such resembling Species, yet 'tis impossible that they should be perceived by them. Now here come in the rest of M. Malebranche's Arguments, as I shall shew distinctly by a short Application of them.

As first of all, if Bodies are perceived by these Species, then these Species must penetrate themselves, and all the intermedial Species between the Earth and the Heavens. But this they cannot do as being Corporeal and Impenetrable. *Ergo.*

Again, if Bodies are perceived by those Species which come from them, then all those intermedial Species must be full of them, because they may any where be perceived. But if so, then by their various justlings and encounters, they must needs infringe and disorder one another, so as to be no longer capable of representing the Bodies from whence they came.

Again,

Again, if Bodies are seen by Species of their own sending forth, then a vast number of these Species must be supposed to meet together in one and the same Point, and that because from one and the same Point multitudes of Objects are discoverable. But this they cannot do, as being extended and impenetrable. *Ergo.* Besides, that there is also no assignable Point, wherein they must not meet.

Again, there is a great deal of variety in the intelligible Species, whereby Bodies are perceived, which sometimes appear bigger, and sometimes less, according as the distance is, or as they are seen with or without a Glass. If then Bodies are seen by their own Species, then all this great and sometimes very sudden change must be in those Species. But this is utterly unaccountable, *Ergo.*

Again lastly, if Bodies were seen by Species of their own; then since they cannot send forth Species of a different Figure from themselves, these Species would always resemble them, and consequently when we look upon an Oval or a Parallelogram we should never see a Circle or a Square. But Experience shews us the contrary, therefore. Or thus,

The Species which comes from Bodies must always resemble those Bodies it comes from.

But the intelligible Species whereby I perceive Bodies, or which I see when I look upon them, does not always resemble them.

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Therefore the intelligible Species, whereby I perceive Bodies is not the Species which comes from those Bodies.

8. I would desire the intelligent Reader to renew his Consideration of these Arguments (especially the last) as they stand now in this form, since, if they miss'd him, or he them before ; yet the different Dress and Posture, and perhaps some Light and Advantage, which we have given them, may now at least render them effectual to convince him, if he be not too much under the power of his Prejudices, that the Species whereby material Objects are perceived, cannot possibly be any Species derived from *them*, and that even supposing the derivation of any such Species from them.

9. But for his better satisfaction I would request him further to consider with me, that tho' we should suppose Bodies to be so fruitful as to beget, or rather to bring forth Species in their own Form and Likeness (which indeed would be a *Monstrous Birth*, tho' duly proportioned) yet 'tis impossible that these thin subtil Images, to which Vapor or Smoke must be of a gross Consistence, should without a Miracle, retain their Form, whereby they resemble those Bodies, and whereby only they can be supposed capable of representing them, so much as for one moment : For they must pass oftentimes through vast lengths of Air, and that, as their *Epicurean Patron* observes with an incredibile

dible swiftness, that so they may be present to the Eye in the very instant that it looks toward far distant Objects ; and the ordinary motion of the Air (setting aside the Tempests of the great Sea) together with that swift motion of their own, must needs disturb, disperse and scatter them immediately, so that these tender vanishing Off-springs will have that for their fate which was the wish of Job, *To die from the very Womb.* And therefore we may with a little alteration, apply that to these fleeting shades above, which the Poet says of these below.

— *Frustra Spectata Oculos eludet Imago,
Par levibus ventis, volucris, simillima Somno.*

10. This is a sensible Argument ; but if he is for one that is more abstract, let him recollect what was touch'd upon another occasion in the former part of this Theory. It will readily be allowed, that those Figures which Mathematicians describe upon Paper or any other Matter are not Mathematically exact ; and yet when we look upon these Figures we have Ideas of Figures exactly right, of perfect Circles and perfect Squares, &c. But now 'tis impossible we should have these Ideas from those material Figures, because those Figures cannot send forth Ideas more perfect than themselves, and that because the effect cannot be

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more perfect than its Cause, since then the Cause would give that to the Effect which it has not it self, which is impossible. The Sum and the Form of this Argument is this.

Bodies cannot send forth any Species or Ideas more perfect than themselves.

But the Ideas we have of some Bodies are more perfect than any thing that is to be found in those Bodies.

Therefore the Ideas we have of those Bodies do not proceed from those Bodies.

11. But to conclude this Head, and at once to clear this Matter to full satisfaction; I shall add one Consideration more to prove that supposing (what so many learned Men so strongly fancy and so weakly maintain) that material Objects do send forth certain consimilar Species or Images of themselves; yet 'tis impossible that they should be perceived by them, and that is in fine because they are *Corporeal*. I know some Philosophers talk of I know not what *intentional* Species, and of their successive Generating and *Spawning* each other, after their first Emission from the Object, throughout the several Points of the Medium. Which *Intentional* Species (so called, I think, because the sense *tends* to its Object by their means) tho' said to be material as inhering in a Corporeal Subject; yet being by them supposed to be a certain *Quality* or *Accident*, must by consequence be

be really somewhat Immortal. For a Corporeal Accident, with these Philosophers, signifies not an Accident that is a Body (for then it would be a Substance and not an Accident) but an Accident inhering in a Body, in Contradiction to the Accidents that are in Spiritual Beings. It is to little purpose to go to shew an Hypothesis not to be true in Fact, which in the very notion of it is not so much as Intelligible. And therefore notwithstanding the many pretty things that are said of these *Intentional Species*, I shall take the liberty to suppose all Species that come from Bodies (if any such there be) to be Corporeal, as concluding it impossible that they should send forth any Species of a different Nature from themselves; tho' if they did, these Men have taken care that no advantage should be made of it, it being impossible that an Accident or Quality should represent a substantial Being. And therefore upon all Considerations, I cannot but think that the Epicurean Philosophers, who, when they hold the Emanation of consimilar Images from Bodies, do at the same time suppose them Corporeal, are much more consistent with themselves than these *Intentional* Men, who contradict both their own Design, and the Nature of things at once, it being a plain staring impossibility as any in Nature, that there should be any Emanation from Body but what is Corporeal. And such one would be ready to think the *Aristoteleans* should hold these Species to be by their calling

calling them Material, and by what they intimate concerning the grossness of them, and from their setting up a particular Faculty in the Soul on purpose for the refining and spiritualizing of them. And yet if we examine and compare the accounts of these Men more carefully (as one must do sometimes to know their true meaning) we shall, I think, find that they are for the *Intentional* way, that their Species are Accidents, not substantial Emanations, and that they are Corporeal only as they are inherent in a Corporeal Subject; which seems to be the difference between the *Aristotelian* and the *Epicurean* Hypothesis. But however if they do not hold them to be Corporeal in the strictest and grossest sense, 'tis most certain that they ought, it being above the possibilities of Nature, and against all the light of Reason, that any thing should be the Off-spring of Body but what is truly Corporeal, that is, I mean a real Body.

12. But now of these Species, supposing any to come from Bodies, must be Corporeal, then 'tis clear upon a new Consideration, distinct from those before insisted upon, that they cannot be perceived by them. For if Bodies are perceived by these Species, then these Species must be perceived by themselves, and so be the very formal Principle of Thought, and the immediate Object of the Mind. But now we have already proved in the foregoing Chapter, that Matter cannot be perceived by itself, or be the immediate

immediate Object of the Mind. And if Matter cannot be the immediate Object of the Mind, then material Species or Ideas cannot, and that because material Ideas are Matter. And if material Species cannot be the immediate Object of Thought, then 'tis plain again, that those Species or Ideas, which are the immediate Object of Thought (as those must be whereby Bodies are perceived) cannot be material, and consequently cannot come from Bodies, since if they did they would be material, and as such, not capable of being self-intelligible, or immediately objected to the Mind. The very *Corporeity* then of these Species makes it impossible, that Bodies should be perceived by them, and that because it utterly unqualifies them for being the immediate Objects of the Mind themselves, as they must be if by them Bodies are perceived. And to this purpose I further Remark, That if that kind of Corporeity, which the *Aristotelian* Philosophy ascribes to these Species, as slender as it is, does yet indispose them for being *Intelligible*, as in their own Opinion it does, till they are refined from it; much more then must this gross Corporeity, which really belongs to them, be an invincible Bar against their being the Objects of the Mind, which can perceive nothing immediately, but what has as Affinity and Proportion with its own Nature. And accordingly 'tis remarkable, that even Monsieur *Bernier* himself

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in the excellent Abstract which he has given us of *Gassendus's Philosophy*, found it necessary to go so far into this Sentiment as to say, that the Species, (which, according to him, is only a certain Ply or Trace in the Brain) is not the very thing perceived, but only the occasion of our seeing that whereby we receive it.

13. And will not the Philosophers of the School be as free to acknowledge the same of *their Species*, tho' not so grossly Corporeal as either those of *Epicurus*, or those of M. *Bernier*, viz. That they are not the very things that the Mind perceives? Yes, I presume, and more, as to those of them which are *Impressed*. But then by the help of *intellectus Agens* (was well I had not said *Hocus Pocus*) they come in with another sort of Species form'd out of these, which they, for that reason I suppose, call *Express'd*; and these are the Species which the Mind has for its proper Object in the contemplation of things. But that this great Business may be fully comprehended, we must set down their intire Hypothesis concerning the way of Humane Understanding, which, as far as I understand it, is briefly this. They suppose the Soul to be a pure Power, and of it self indifferent for the Perception either of this thing or that, and so to need to be actuated and determined for the Perception of things by *Intelligible Species*, which are to the Mind as a formal Principle of Knowledge, by which it is carried to one Object rather than another. And thus far no doubt but they are right, that is, I mean as to all those

those Objects that are not *Self-intelligible*, for the Perception of which there is a necessity of Ideas, or as they call them, *Intelligible Species*. All the difficulty is how to come by them. Now here then they suppose that outward Objects do send forth certain resemblances of themselves, which they call Species; which Species (if I take them right) are not as M. *Malebranche* seems to think, and as I once thought my self, substantial Emanations, but a sort of Corporeal Accidents or Qualities, and because they are imprinted by the Objects they come from upon the outward Senses, they are therefore in this first State call'd *Impress'd Species, Images, or Phantasms*. But then being as yet consider'd as Material, and so by reason of their grossness no way proportion'd to the Mind, they are allow'd to pass no further than the outward Senses, or the Phancy or common Sense at farthest. So that as yet notwithstanding the vast Fertility of outward Objects in sending in Species, the Understanding has no Intelligible Object to contemplate. Nor is it ever like to have any, unless some very extraordinary way be found out for a supply. Here then they are forc'd to suppose (and a very good Expedient they think it is) a twofold Understanding in the Intellective Faculty, one *Agent*, and the other *Patient*. And tho' the latter be that which they properly and simply call the Understanding, as being that whereby the very formal act of Intellection is performed; yet the former they account of necessary

necessary Use, as serving to the Act of Intellection, whereof it is not capable it self, by the forming of Intelligible Species for that purpose. For that is the proper Office of this *Agent Intellect*, to serve as an *under-labourer* to that which is Patient, to work, as I may say, at the other's *Forge*, and to hammer out for it Intelligible Species ; which no doubt

* For so Homer of
Achilles, Τέρπετο δέν
χρέοσσιν ἐχεν δεῖ
ἀγλαὰ δηρε. Iliad. 19.

the other receives as joyfully as the * *Gracian Hero* did the Armour made him by *Vulcan*. Now these Species are

formed out of the other by the dexterity of *Intellectus Agens*, which refines them and spiritualizes them till from material Phantasms they become Intelligible Species. And then they assume the more honourable Title of *express Species*, because they are express'd and wrought off from those material Phantasms which were first imprinted on the sense. And 'tis by these express Species that the Mind is supposed to perceive all material Objects. And now they have so richly set up the Understanding with a stock of Ideas, it must be her own fault if ever she *Break* ; for external Objects have an inexhaustible Fecundity, and are continually sending in more and more Grist to the Mill ; so that unless *Intellectus Agens* grow lazy and idle, 'tis impossible she should ever want Intellectual Provision.

14. 'Tis a sign Philosophers are hard put to't when they must intrench upon the Province of *Poets*, and use *Fiction* for the support of an Hypothesis. But we have already ruin'd so much of this Romantick System, that we need now only consider this one rare Expedient, upon which they lay the great stress of it, *viz.* The transmutation of these sensible, and as such by their own Confession unintelligible Species, into spiritual and intelligible Ideas, by the Operation of *Intellectus Agens*. And here, not to be long ingaged in fighting with Wind-mills, besides the general oddness and extravagance of the Supposition, I have these few Exceptions to offer distinctly against it.

First, It is at least a very strong Presumption, and what cannot but give any considering Man a just Prejudice against this scholastick Device of an *Intellectus Agens*, that we are not at all conscious to our selves of our having any such intellectual Power or Faculty in us, nor of any of those strange Operations which are ascribed to it, nor of any of those wonderful Effects which are supposed to be done by it. We are conscious of the other Powers and Operations of the Soul, tho' we have no Idea of the Soul itself. We find by Reflection that we Understand, Will, Sense, Imagine, Remember, &c. But of this Agency of the Mind in making and forming Ideas we have no manner of Consciousness, tho' we enter into our selves never so often, and reflect upon what passes within us never so attentively.

tentively. But then that there should be all this working in the Soul, and that she should have a Power to do such extraordinary Feats, and yet know nothing of the Matter, is a very strange thing, and in all appearance too strange to be true.

Again, 'Tis against the Nature of the Understanding, according to the common Notion Men have of it, to make its own Object: For the proper busines of the Understanding (as the very Name imports) is to *Understand*, which implies no *Agency* in it, but only what is *Immanent*, and terminates in itself. But as for any *Transient Agency*, such as works an alteration in the Object, that belongs not to the Understanding, according to the Notion we have of that Faculty, and further we cannot go. And accordingly 'tis observable, that God himself, whose Understanding to be sure can want no Activity that any Understanding can have, is yet both represented and conceived by us to make the World, not by his Understanding (any otherwise than as the Ideas of his eternal Wisdom serve him for Exemplars in the formation of things) but by his *Will* or Power.

Again, As 'tis against the *Nature* of the Understanding to exert any *Transient Agency* upon the Object, so certainly it must needs be above her *Power* to convert a material Being, tho' but an *Accident* into a Spiritual. Above her *Power*, not only as Understanding, but as a created and finite Faculty. For this is such a vast change in the

the nature of things, that one cannot well conceive how it should be so much as absolutely Possible. But however, if it be Possible in itself, we have no reason to think it should be so to such weak impotent Faculties as ours, especially considering that we do not find that we have any such Power as this over the nature of things in any other instance. For the *Philosophers Stone*, as they call it, whereby viler Materials are pretended to be turn'd into Gold, were it true, is but a Fool to the great Metaphysical Elixir, *Intellectus Agens*.

But after all the worst of it is, That supposing the Understanding were able to work such a Change in the nature of things, as to convert a material and sensible Phantasm into a spiritual and intelligible Species or Idea ; yet this great performance would be to no manner of purpose, nor turn to any account, as not answering the main End for which it is intended : Because this Species after all the Refinements and Purifications which it shall be supposed to have undergone in this *Intellectual Purgatory*, would still be no more at best than a *Spiritual Accident*, and so 'tis expressly call'd by an Orthodox Author of their own. But then however it might be simply Intelligible in itself, as an immaterial Object at large, yet 'tis impossible it should serve as an intelligible Species for the Perception of other things ; so that material Objects should be perceived by it, and that because an Accident, tho' Spiritualized, can

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never represent a *Substance*. Which, by the way, among those many other Considerations that have been offered by Learned Men, may, to very good purpose, be applied to shew the Popish Doctrine of *Transubstantiation* to be an utter Absurdity and Impossibility upon a plain Philosophical Ground. For here we are told, That after the substantial Conversion of the Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, the Species of the Bread and Wine remain; by virtue of which remaining Species, that which is really the Substance of Christ's Body appears still to us as Bread and Wine. But now, besides all that has been said against these Species, it is farther to be considered, that upon the supposition of this Doctrine, as well as by the general Principles of the Men that hold it, these *Elementary Species* must be *Accidents*, since all that is *Substantial* in the Elements is supposed to become another thing. For what was the substance of Bread, is now the substance of the Body of Christ; and therefore if any thing of the Bread remains after the substance of it is gone, that can be nothing else but the *Accidents*; but the Species, they say, remain. Therefore 'tis plain, that according to them these Species can be no other than Accidents. Material ones in their own Original Nature, and as they come to our Eyes from the Body that sends them to us; and tho' we should suppose them to be never so much Spiritualized afterwards, yet still they will be but *Spiritual*

tual Accidents. But then I say, 'tis impossible, that these Accidents should serve as Intelligible Species to represent Bread and Wine to us; so that in seeing the former we may be truly said to see, or have the appearance of the latter, and that for this plain, and even upon their own Grounds most convincing Reason; because an Accident, be it Material, or be it Immaterial, can never represent a Substance, as being a sort of Entity, according to themselves, of an Order and Nature wholly different from it.

15. Well, but after all (to return to the Prosecution of our Argument) is there nothing then that comes to us from material Objects? Yes, no doubt there is a fine and subtle Evolution of Particles which is continually working off from them, that which in the Bodies of Animals we call *Perspiration*, and in Bodies of an Earthy Concretion, *Vapour* or *Exhalation*, occasion'd partly by the intestin Motion of those Particles, and partly by the soliciting Motion of adjacent or circumambient Bodies, among which the *menstruum* of the Air, and the heat of the Sun may perhaps be of most considerable Influence. So that were our Senses acute enough to discern it, in all probability most Bodies would be found to have an *Atmosphere* round about them as well as the Earth. But then the Efflux of these Particles, as was before observed, must needs be very loose, tumultuous and disorderly, so as not to carry the Form or *Portraiture* of those Bodies from whence

they proceed, or if there could be any such Form supposed in these Particles, they must immediately lose it again in their very trajectation through the Air, whose resistence being increased by the swiftness and pernicity of their Motion, would so disturb and dismember them that they would come to the Eye in quite another Figure than that wherein they first took Wing.

16. Well, but if we open our Eyes shall we not find yet something else to come to them from Bodies? Yes there is *Light*, a certain subtle Ethereal Matter that comes to us from Bodies, not as from a productive Principle, as the Species are supposed to do (unless in those Bodies which are Luminous, and then it falls under the like Consideration with other substantial Emanations or Effluvias) but only as a *Term* from whence: That is, the Light is reflected from all such Bodies as by reason of the *right* situation of their Pores do not transmit it, and in its return from them meets with our Eyes, and strikes them with a nice and most delicate touch, passing through their several Coats and Humours in certain Lines or Chains of fine Matter, which we call *Rays*; some of which go on in their Trajectation directly, and others with variety of Refraction, according as their first Incidence upon the Surface or outer Coat of the Eye (call'd the *Cornea*) is either Perpendicular or Oblique, till they strike upon the Filaments of the Optick Nerve, which deduce their Original

Original from the Brain, and terminate in the back-part of the Eye, lining or investing the bottom of it with that fine membrane which is known by the name of the *Retina*. Here the wonderful stroke is made upon which such great things depend, and to which we owe one of the greatest Pleasures of our Lives. And now Light is at our Journeys end, arrived at its *non ultra*, there being no Part beyond the bottom of the Eye of a Contexture disposed to transmit it any further. But tho' this is as far as it can *go*, yet this is not as much as it can *do*. For by this stroke upon the *Retina* an Impression or Movement is communicated to the Brain, which is the last receiver of all sensible Impressions, and the immediate Organ of Vision as of all the other Senſes. And now Light has done all that it can well be conceived to *do*, and is at the end, not only of its *Journy*, but of its *Action* too.

17. 'Tis true indeed, there is something else *done*: For this Movement of the Brain is accompanied with a certain Sentiment, that which we call *Colour*. For as that subtle Matter which strikes upon the Eye, in its direct Incidence as it comes from the luminous Body, is *Light*; so the same subtle Matter in its reflex Incidence, as it rebounds from other Bodies, is *Colour*; that is, has the Sentiment of Colour consequent to it. And this Sentiment is also accompanied with an *Idea*, which tho' really distinct from the other, is yet perceived at the

same time that the other is felt, and the Mind is conscious of both, at the same time that the Eyes are directed to the outward Object, and impressed upon by the Light which is reflected from it. And this I take to be what we call *Seeing*. But neither is this Movement the real cause of that Sentiment; nor is the Light which comes to us from Bodies, the Idea of those Bodies, or that intelligible Species whereby we perceive them. 'Tis true indeed, we are said to see things *by Light*; and 'tis very right, if rightly understood. We do indeed see things *by Light*, as by an *Occasion*, in as much as we have an Idea of a material Object presented to our Minds upon the impression which Light makes upon our Eyes, but Light it self is not that Idea.

18. So far from being so, that it is not I think very conceivable (if I may measure other Peoples Understandings by my own) how Light should be so much as a *material Species*, or *Image*; that is, I mean how the Light that is reflected to us from any Body, should by that Reflection have its Rays cast into such a System as to express the Form, or carry a material Resemblance of that Body, especially if it be a Body variously Figured and Organized. For all that can be supposed towards it, I think, is that Rays of Light should be distinctly sent from all the Points of the Object, which we shall not be difficult to grant. And then indeed, since the Object is supposed to have its Parts

Parts of an unequal situation, some of them more protuberant, and some more depressed; the consequence of this will be, that the Rays, as they are continued or measured from the Eye to the Object, will be of an unequal Proportion (which, tho' it implies some general Analogy with it, yet this seems far from an express Resemblance) but still the Rays as they are continued from the Object to the Eye, that is the *extremities* of the Rays, which are the only parts of them wherewith the Eye is concerned, will not have that inequality of Incidence upon the *Retina*, but will fall upon that Membrane in equal lengths as upon a level, or * thereabouts. But now that the Rays of Light, so equally incident, should carry the resemblance of a Body whose Parts are so unequally extent, he must have a very strong Imagination, and such as is very happy in finding out the similitudes and agreements of Things that can conceive.

* I say thereabouts, because the extremity of the *Retina* may perhaps be a little incurv'd.

19. But (to omit nothing that may deserve to be considered) tho' Light be not itself the very Species or Image of the Bodies it comes from; yet may it not do the Office of a *Limner* or *Engraver* to delineate or describe the Image of them in the bottom of the Eye; so indeed we are told by the *Optical Men*, and accordingly that Latitude of the *Retina*, upon which the Rays of Light act, is compared to a *Painters Cloth*,

Cloth, and the Conjunction of these two Cones or Pyramidal Structures of Rays which have the Crystallin for their common Basis, and whereof the one has its Point upon the Object, and the other upon the *Retina*, is call'd the Optick *Pencil*, as being the instrument whereby the Pictures or Images of things are delineated in the Eye. But now how Light should be able to delineate any such Images there (tho' it be pity Men should be robb'd of so pleasant a Conceit) I must needs confess is to me a very dark Mystery. For all that can be pretended for it is only this, That the Rays that come from the divers Points of the reflecting Object do fall upon so many opposite corresponding Points of the *Retina*. But now what's this to the delineation of an *Image*? For in the first place, 'tis not, I think, to be conceived, that such subtile and fine spun Threds as those of Light, especially when reflected from an Opake Body (whereby their force is vastly abated from what it was in their first and direct Incidence as they were shot forth from their lucid Fountain) and after they have pass'd too through so many different Mediums in the Eye, and suffer'd so many Refractions, by reason of their Diversity, should yet have so much force as to make any real Print or Impression there. Tho' supposing they could, yet it is not easie to be conceived, that from hence should result a true Image of the Body that reflects them; and that because of the equality of those Prints, it being not

not supposable that the Prints should carry an exact proportion of Depth to the respective extancy or subfidency of the Parts of the Object, especially considering that oftentimes those Parts which are more extant, and so by reason of their nearness should make a deeper Print, may yet, by reason of the matter whereof they consist, be less apt to reflect the Light. So then Light cannot delineate the Object upon the Eye by way of *Sculpture*, or as an Engraver. And therefore if it does it at all, it must be supposed to do it by way of *Peinture*, or as a Limner. Not as if the substance of the Light, or that fine Matter which comes directly from the Luminous, and by Reflection from the Opake Body, were dawb'd off (*illineretur* I would say in Latin) upon the *Retina*, as the Stuff wherewith the Limner Paints, is upon the Cloth. That would be gross and ridiculous. But only that the Rays still touching and continually playing upon the Eye, should, by the immediate Contact of their Incidence, delineate a Picture there. But this is as inconceivable as the other: For unless we could suppose a Point able to represent a Line, 'tis plain there can be no just similitude between so many little Pecks made by an equal Incidence upon a plain and organisical Body, which has Profundity as well as Length and Breadth, and some of whose Parts are more extant than others. Neither will the practice of *Perspective* rightly considered, be able to furnish them with a pertinent Objection to the contrary.

contrary. It may perhaps be pretended, that the Lines which are drawn by Painters, have that very Incidence we are speaking of, and yet that they are true Images and Pictures of Organical Bodies, and accordingly we call one a Man, and another a Horse, &c. I grant indeed, that their Incidence is such, but then for that very reason because it is so, I deny that they are true and perfect Images or Representations of those things, whose Pictures they are said to be: And 'tis utterly impossible that they should. And he must not understand what *Perspective* means, that shall pretend that they are. On the contrary, by the very Principles of this Science, 'tis supposed, that they are not. For tho' *Perspective* be said to be an Art that teaches to represent visible Objects as they appear to us; yet this is not to be so understood, as if it did exhibit to us in the very Lines themselves which it sets before us, a just Image or Representation of the Object, but only that it teaches us to trace certain Lineaments after such a manner that they shall appear to our Eyes as the Objects themselves would appear; that is, to express it more distinctly, that shall give or excite in us the same Idea, that the Object itself, if present, would do. For these things, as well as all others, are supposed to be seen not by themselves immediately, but by their Ideas. But then 'tis not the Lines themselves, but that Appearance or Idea which I have at the sensible view of them, which

which is the true and proper Image of the Object. The Lines themselves are not even by the Principles of *Perspective*, wherein Painters exhibit Bodies variously rising or subsiding upon a plain Surface, and are obliged to change and commute one Figure for another, to the end that they may appear in their natural Form and Posture, as to Paint Circles like Eclipses, Squares by Losanges, &c. For indeed *Perspective* is in this respect no better than a mere Cheat, or an Art of Deceiving: Not but that the Rules of it are Geometrically certain, but that it is an Art that teaches to deceive our Eyes, and put a Trick or Fallacy upon the best of our Senses, its great Address consisting in this, to find out ways to make things appear otherwise than they truly and really are; that is, like the Objects, when indeed they are not true Resemblances of them, and so to make us pass such Judgments upon them, as indeed we ought not in strictness to make, and which our Reason, if we attend to it, will oblige us to correct. If it be said, that tho' these Images in the Eye are not *just* Images, yet why may they not serve to represent as well as those in *Perspective*? I answer first, That the Cases are no way parallel, there being this difference between them, That the Images in *Perspective* are not supposed to be themselves the very immediate Objects of Vision (since even according to the common Philosophy, things are seen not by themselves, but by their Species) but only to be the occasions

sions of our having that Idea which is so, and which is the only true Image that represents the Object to the Mind. Whereas these pretended Images in the Eye, by the general Tenor of that Hypothesis we are now examining, which holds, that Bodies are perceived by Species that come from them, should be *themselves* the immediate Object of Perception; and that which truly represents, as an Idea, which they cannot do unless they be just and perfect Images: Nor yet then neither, for Reasons which we shall by and by assign. But after all, if you will have these *ocular Images* indeed to represent as those do in *Perspective* (as if they represent at all they must) I shall only mind you to consider how that is, and to remember, that then 'tis not the Images, but the Ideas occasioned by them, which are the immediate Objects of the Mind, and the true Representatives of what it perceives; which is to give up the very Point for which we are contending.

20. But suppose the Images of things could be thus faithfully and readily drawn upon the *Retina* by the Pencil of Light (which then should have my Vote before a *Zeuxes* or an *Apelles*, an *Angelo*, or a *Vandike*, for the finest Painter in the World,) yet after all these Images could not be the immediate Objects of the Mind, nor consequently the true intelligible Species or Ideas whereby things are perceived, and that for the same common Reason, that the other Species

Species before mentioned cannot, *viz.* because of their *Corporeity*. But besides the incapacity of these Images to be the Object of our intellectual View, that they are not actually and in fact the very Images which the Mind sees, and whereby she perceives outward Objects, there want not very convincing Reasons to satisfie any one that will duly consider them. For if these Images described, as is supposed by the Manusculture or Peinture of Light in the Fund of the Eye, are the very Images which we see, as they must be if by them material Objects are perceived; then since we have two Eyes, in each of which the Image of the Object is supposed to be described (for you must know Light is a very ready Painter, and can as soon draw two Pictures as one) we must of necessity see two Images, and so things would appear double to us. Why they do not in fact do so, there may perhaps be good Reasons assigned, but not, I think, upon this *Hypothesis*. For to resolve the apparent simplicity of Objects into the Re-union which the Impressions made in the Eyes, have afterward in the Brain by reason of the Coition of the Optick Nerves; by means of which each Optick Axis terminates in the same Point, according to the way of *Rohault* and *Legrand*, or else into the joyn-termination of the Axes of Vision of both Eyes in one and the same Point of the Object, as *M. Regis* chuses rather to explain it: I say, these Accounts however otherwise rational in them-

themselves, and worthy of their ingenious Authors, would yet, I think, be very impertinently applied here. These indeed, may, for ought I know, be good Reasons why, notwithstanding the duplicity of the Impression we may yet have but one single Idea ; that is, supposing something else to be that Idea, and that the Impression is only the occasion of exciting it ; but if the Images made in the Eye are the very things which we immediately perceive, then 'tis plain that we must have two Ideas upon turning our Eyes towards one Object (which is what we are to understand by seeing double) and that because we shall then see *two Images*.

21. But besides the double appearance of a single Object, 'tis further to be considered, that if these material Images in the Eye are the very Ideas which and whereby we see and perceive ; then besides that things could not be represented to us either bigger or lesser than those Images, which would not only contract but confound their appearances, they would also appear to us in a contrary Posture and Situation, Men would seem to us with their Heads downwards and their Feet upwards, &c. And that because these Images, supposing any such to be in the Eye, must needs be inverted, by reason of the necessary Intersection or Decussation of the oblique Rays, whereby that Impression which is made in the lower part of the Eye must come from the upper part of the Object, and that which

which is made in the upper part of the Eye, must come from the lower part of the Object; and so in like manner as to Right and Left, is all know who understand any thing of the Laws of *Radiation*. I say thus it must be, if these are the Images which we see. But thus it is not; and therefore I conclude, that these are not the Images which, or whereby we see.

22. Neither indeed do the Men I am now concern'd with, say that they are. On the contrary, tho' for Reasons best known to themselves, they have been pleased to set up *Light* or a *Limner*; and suppose the Images of things to be drawn in the Eye by its shining Pencil, and so as one would think, seem to prepare for a resolution of Vision that way, *viz.* by supposing those Images to be the Objects of it; in like manner, as the other Philosophers say of their *Species*, whether Substantial or Intentional, yet, when it comes to the pinch, there is not a Man of them that I know of, that is so hardy as to pretend that these material Images are the very Images that we see; but they begin to talk of other *Spiritual* Images as the true Objects of Vision, and that which enders us *formally* seeing. And accordingly the great Raifer and Improver of the Optical Science, tho' he is pleased in his *Dioptrics* to comply so far with the common Herd of Philosophers, as to suppose such Images of things, yet which is very remarkable) he takes care to let

let us know over and over that he thought there was no necessity of them, either as to Sense in general, or Vision in Particular. In which latter he is so far from supposing these Images to be the very Idea which the Soul contemplates, that he does not make them to be so much as the occasions of it. As indeed there was no reason that he should : For if there be no need of them as Objects, there will be less need of them as Occasions, since the *Motions* that are impressed upon the Nerves, and by them derived to the Brain, will serve for that purpose as well as the most exquisite Pictures in the World. And accordingly 'tis into those *Motions* that he resolves Vision, supposing them to serve by the institution of Nature, for the exciting such and such senses of things in us : Wherein, I think he is very much in the right. But then, if these material Images in the Eye are not the very Idea which we contemplate, nor yet that whereby it is excited in us ; that is, if they are neither the Object perceived, nor the occasion of our perceiving it, then to what purpose they should serve, is past my Skill to apprehend.

23. The sum then is, we have considered the several ways whereby material Objects may be supposed to send forth Species, which are reducible to these three; the *Aristotelian* way which is by intentional Species ; the *Epicurean* way, which is by substantial Emanations, and (which seems to be the last reserve of this Hypothesis;) the

the way of the *Optical Men*, which is by the Reflection of Light. And we have further shewn, that it is not reasonable to suppose, that there are any Species or Images sent forth from Bodies the two first ways, and that it is not intelligible how there should be any in the Third. Or supposing that there are, yet we have this shewn in common of all of them, that 'tis impossible that things should be perceived by any such Species. And therefore we may now conclude, that the Ideas whereby we perceive material Objects, do not come from those Objects. I have stay'd the longer upon this Matter, because it is the most commonly received Hypothesis concerning the Origin of our Ideas, and withal, by far the most Plausible; and since it is so, I was willing to place it in all its Lights; and to give it a full and through Discussion in all the several Branches of it, whereby, besides the laying open a very popular Error, we may make this further advantage, to reflect what a slender Foundation in Reason some very common and long authorized Opinions will be found to have, when they come to be examin'd. And consequently what great reason we have to examine well every thing that we receive, unless the Authority upon which we receive it be infallible, and then indeed we have only to examine whether that which demands our Assent, be indeed proposed to us by such an Authority.

24. I should now take leave of this Argument, but that I find my self fairly invited by the occasion of it, to offer a short Reflection or two upon the Principles here laid down, whereby we may be assisted to make a better Judgment than otherwise we could well do, upon two considerable Things. One is the Account which Mr. *Lock* gives of the Origin of our Ideas by the Senses. And the other is that celebrated Maxim of the Schools, That *there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense*: But before I meddle with either of them, I would beg leave only to premise, that according to what we have before discours'd, we have no Ideas strictly and properly speaking but of material Objects. I say properly speaking: For if Idea be taken in a large Sense only for the thing that is thought upon, as 'tis thought upon, or as it has an Objective being in the Understanding, then indeed we may be said to have as many Ideas as there are intelligible Objects, since whatever we understand is some way or other in the Understanding, and in this Sense we may be said to have an Idea even of God himself. But if Idea be taken according to its strict Propriety, as we have hitherto used it, for that whereby we perceive any Being, as by its *Intelligible Representative*; in this Sense, I think, we may truly say, that we have at present no Ideas but of such Beings as are Material. For as for Spiritual Beings, some of them, *viz.* Angels and humane Souls, we do not perceive at all;

all; and as for those which we do, we perceive them as I have shewn, not by Idea, but by their own immediate selves. So that if our Ideas be from our Senses, 'tis only the Ideas which we have of Bodies.

25. This being premised, I say, first as to the Principle from whence Mr. *Lock* derives our Ideas, that if by our having our Ideas from our Senses, his meaning be, that sensible Objects do send or convey Ideas from themselves to our Minds by the mediation of the Senses, as the most commonly receiv'd Opinion concerning their Original supposes; I say, if this be what he means (as indeed I once thought, and the rather because he expresses himself much after the same manner as the Schools do whose known meaning this is, according to that Maxim quoted by *Aquinas* from *Aristotle's* *Metaphyficks*, *Principium No- stræ Cognitionis est à Sensu*) then it appears by the whole Tenour of this Discourse, that he has derived our Ideas from a false Original. But if his meaning be, as perhaps it may (for indeed his way of expressing himself upon this occasion is not so clear, but that one may pardonably mistake him) that sensible Objects do by the Impression which they make upon our outward Senses serve to excite Ideas in our Minds, so that we are beholding to them as the *occasions* of our having such Ideas: I say, if this be all that he means by pretending to make Sense the Original and Source

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of our Ideas, I think there is nothing either so dangerous, or so *extraordinary* in it, but that we may, without scruple, in great measure, allow it him. For tho' our Ideas do not come from sensible Objects, as any genuine *Issue* or *Production* of theirs, nor are so much as the causal Result of any of their Impressions, yet there is no Absurdity in supposing that the Author of Nature may establish a Connexion between certain sensible Impressions, and certain *Ideas*, as well as between such Impressions and certain *Sensations*. Nay, we find by experience, that it is so in Fact, that upon the Impressions of sensible Objects we have naturally arising in us the Ideas of those Objects, as in *Seeing*, wherein, as was before noted, Idea and Sentiment go together. Nay, we not only have certain Ideas upon certain sensible Impressions; but there is reason to think that we cannot ordinarily have them without them, as it is again in the case of *Sensation*: So that I very much question if a Man had never seen a Horse or a Dog, that is, had an Idea of them upon such a certain sensible Impression (for that I call *seeing*) whether he would or could ever have had any Idea of those Animals. Thus much therefore may be granted him, tho' whether it be so in all our Ideas, may, perhaps, admit of a reasonable Debate, particularly as to the Idea of *Extension*. For tho' we cannot have the Ideas of particular Bodies, without some impression one time or other received from these Bodies; yet whether the

the Idea of Matter in general, *Intelligible Extension*, be not an Idea always present with us, independently upon any Bodily Impression; and if so, whether again we may not be able so to modifie it in our Thoughts, as to have the Ideas of certain Mathematical Figures, may deserve to be considered. But however this be (for I am not concern'd much to insist upon it) the Author is to be put in Mind, as well as those that read him, not to look upon this (if this be his meaning) as any peculiar Hypothesis, either concerning the Origin or Nature of our Ideas, or the manner of our Understanding by them: For let our Ideas be what they will, as to their Nature, or whence they will, as to their true Principle or Cause, it may still be said of them, that we ordinarily have them, or at least perceive them by our Senses, according to this latter meaning of that Proposition. And accordingly I did not think fit to enlarge the Division laid down concerning the several ways of Humane Understanding, or kinds of Ideas whereby we understand, by the Addition of this as an Hypothesis distinct from the rest, because indeed it is a sort of a *Transcendental*, too common to all to be set up in opposition to any, and so the Division is compleat without it.

26. Come we next to that famous Axiom of the Schools, that there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense. This has been variously disputed, and may still

be so without any hopes of coming to a final Issue of the Question, till the sense of it be better settled than it is ; for I think it is very loose and indeterminate as it stands, and consequently very dark and obscure : But by the light of the foregoing Measures it will be much clearer what Judgment is to be made of it. For if, when they say there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense, their meaning be that there is nothing in the Understanding but what came first from sensible Objects, and was by them transmitted and convey'd through the Senses ; that is, through the Organs of Sense to the Mind, 'tis apparent by the Premises, that their Maxim so understood is to be rejected, since it is so far from being thus true that *every* thing that is in the Understanding was first in the Sense ; that indeed, according to this meaning, there is *nothing* in the Understanding that was first in the Sense. But if they mean no more than this, that there is nothing in the Understanding, or to express it more clearly, that the Understanding *perceives nothing*, but by the occasion of sensible Impressions ; this may in great measure be allow'd, as was said in the other instance, tho', perhaps, not altogether so freely or so far in this case as in the other, because indeed (which is of observable importance) this Proposition is much larger in its extent than the other, that going no further than our Ideas, whereas this takes in all intelligible Objects, even *whatever* the Mind perceives.

perceives. But we perceive *God*, tho' we have not properly any Idea of him ; and it is not very easie to conceive how the Perception of a Being that is intimately present to our Minds, and whom accordingly we perceive by himself, should depend upon any sensible Motions and Impressions made upon the Body. We have also Ideas of pure Intellect as well as of Imagination ; such I mean as are representatively Immaterial, and so seem to carry no relation to Matter or Motion, such as the Ideas of Order, Truth, Justice, Goodness, Being, &c. with a numerous multitude of such Abstract and purely intelligible Objects of Metaphysical and Moral Consideration. There are also eternal Truths which we perceive, especially those which result from these purely intelligible Ideas ; and 'tis not so very congruous to think, that the Perception of these things should be owing to, or depend upon the Impressions of Matter, nor indeed that any thing else should, but only the Ideas of those *Bodies* by which the Impression is made. It seems to be suitable and proportionable enough, that Bodies, by their several Motions and Impressions should serve as occasions to raise in us the Ideas of themselves ; but that the Perception we have of the other intelligible Objects which have no Affinity with Matter or Relation to it, should depend upon the Impressions of it, seems not so congruous or reasonable to suppose. As it does neither to suppose, that a thinking Being as Man is, and that has at least one intelligible

gible Object always intimately present with him to think of, should yet have no manner of Thought or Perception, but remain as stupid as a Block of Marble, supposing either his Organs not to have been dispos'd for sensible Impressions, or that he has been always in a *vacuum* where no such Impressions could be made; which yet must be maintain'd, if according to this latter meaning of the Proposition, it be universally true, that there is nothing in the Understanding but what was first in the Sense. But however this Matter be determin'd, 'tis sufficient to our present purpose, if the Ideas whereby we understand, do not come to us from *sensible Objects*, which seems to have been abundantly proved.

C H A P. VIII.

That the Ideas whereby we understand, are not the Productions of our own Souls.

1. **H**aving dry'd up that great Fountain of Ideas, which is supposed to be in sensible Objects; so that there appears no hope or possibility of our being ever furnish'd with them that way, we are concern'd to carry our Inquiry further, and to consider whether that *Ideal Spring*, which fails without, may not possi-
bly

bly be found to arise within our selves ; that is, whether the Ideas, which are the immediate Objects of our Thought, and whereby we understand, be not of the Soul's own producing, which is the Hypothesis that comes next in order to be examin'd, and because it is a very wild and extravagant one, and such as has not much to say for itself, it will require the less room for its Discussion.

2. Indeed of itself it hardly deserves any ; for when things are apparently true or false, there is no need of either proving or disproving them. But however since this is at least one conceivable way of accounting for the manner of Humane Understanding, by supposing that the Ideas whereby we understand are produced by our own Souls, 'tis fit and reasonable, if not out of regard to the *Hypothesis*, yet at least to do justice to our Theory, that it should be considered among the rest. And to shew that it cannot possibly be a true account concerning the Origin of our Ideas, I shall briefly lay the Refutation of it upon these two distinct Grounds.

1st. That the Soul has no power of producing the Ideas of those things which she perceives.

2dly. That supposing she had such a Power, yet she would never use it for the Production of them.

3. First

3. First the Soul has no such Power. 'Tis indeed very strange, that she should and we know nothing of it, as was observ'd in the case of *Intellectus Agens*. And 'tis again very strange, that any should so far forget themselves, and the infirmity of their Nature, as to ascribe any such Power to her. That which makes Men ready to do so, as Mr. *Malebranche* well observes, is the ordinary Conjunction of our Ideas with our Wills. Men have no sooner a Mind to think of such things, but the Ideas of them are present with them ; whence they are ready to conclude, that That Will of theirs which generally accompanies the presence of these Ideas is the true cause of them, in virtue of that general Principle so ordinary with most People, that what is Concomitant with any effect, is the Cause of it, supposing the true Cause to be unknown. Whereas if Men would not be so hasty and precipitous in their Judgments ; the most that can be concluded from this ordinary Concomitancy of Ideas with our Wills, is only that according to the Order and Institution of Nature, our Will is ordinarily necessary to the having those Ideas, and not that it is the true Cause of them.

4. But that the Soul has no Power to produce its Ideas Mr. *Malebranche* shews, because such a Production (however mollify'd or qualify'd by those that Patronize this Opinion) is a strict and proper *Creation*, and that because these Ideas are true *Realities*, as having real Properties,

perties, and as being really different one from another, and as representing things that are wholly different. For 'tis plain that nothing can have no Propriety ; that one nothing cannot differ from another nothing, and that nothing cannot represent something. To which another Consideration may be added no less convincing than any of these, and that is, that Ideas are the Objects of our Thought, and that which formally terminates the intellectual View of the Mind ; and therefore if they be not truly and properly *Realities*, then 'tis plain, that nothing is the Object of our Thoughts, and accordingly when we think we think upon nothing, and so I have thought upon nothing all this while, which, if I mistake not, is the same as to say I have not thought at all. This Consideration Mr. *Malebranche*

touches upon * elsewhere, ^{* Entretiens sur la métaphysique. Page 12.} and expresses thus. *I think upon a great many things, upon a Number, upon a Circle, upon a House, upon such and such Beings, upon Being itself. Therefore all this is, at least at the time when I think upon them. Assuredly when I think upon a Circle, upon a Number, upon Being, or upon Infinite, or upon such a Finite Being, I perceive Realities. For if the Circle, which I perceive, were nothing, then in thinking upon it, I should think upon nothing.*

5. 'Tis to be attended here for the right understanding of this, that there is no necessity that whatever is thought upon should be a real something.

something in itself. Indeed when we think upon God, it follows that he must needs be so, and that because, as we have shewn, he is perceived by himself, and therefore he must be in himself, or else he could not be perceived at all. But as to other Beings there is no necessity from their being thought of, that they should be something real in *themselves*. No, in this sense I can think upon things that are not, that is, that are not in *themselves*; and I actually do so when I think upon a perfectly right Line or Circle. And 'tis certain that God thought upon his Creatures before they were, or else they would never have been. But however 'tis necessary to affirm, that whatever I think of must be a real something, one way or other, either in *it self*, or in its *Idea*, or else 'tis plain, that I think upon nothing. Nay, it is necessary that it must be real in its *Idea*; or that the *Idea* be real in *it self*, and that because 'tis the *Idea* that is the immediate, and indeed, in strictness, the only proper Object of Thought, and therefore the *Idea* must really be, or be something real, or else 'tis plain again, that I think upon nothing. 'Tis plain then, that our Ideas have a true Reality, and therefore the Production of them would be no less than a true and proper Creation: And therefore unless we will be so impiously vain in our Imaginations, as to assume to our selves a *Creative* Power, we must not pretend to an Ability of producing our Ideas. And indeed he must have a very empty Under-

Understanding, that shall think that way to furnish it. No, if we were not to see but by striking a Light to our selves, we must for ever be in the Dark. Which State, tho' less pleasing, would yet perhaps be more safe than to be the Authors of our own Light, it being much to be fear'd that Man who is already so apt to be puffed up with that Knowledge which consists only in the Contemplation and Perception of Ideas, would have too great a Temptation to Pride, if those Ideas, which are the Objects of his Understanding, were also the Creatures of his Will.

6. But besides the general Impotency and Disability of Man to *Create*, there is another more peculiar Consideration that may be added to shew, that he cannot possibly produce the Ideas whereby he understands, and that is because they are not in themselves of a *producible Nature*: For whatsoever is produced is Temporary and Contingent, and Mutable. But the Ideas whereby we understand, whatever they may be in the precise *Speciality* of their Nature (which is not yet to be determin'd) are for certain in the General, Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, as being (as we have shewn) the *Objects of Science*, and the only stable Ground and Foundation, which it has for its Stay and Support. And therefore again we cannot produce them, and that because they are absolutely improductible. Which Argument, by the way, will hold as well to shew that they cannot be the Product

Product of *external Objects*, or material Beings ; nay, it will serve as well to shew that they do not fall under the productive Power even of God himself, nor have any causal dependance upon his Will. And since eternal Truths are the relations of these Necessary, Eternal and Immutable Ideas, it may hence be further infer'd, that they also are no more capable of being made or produced by God, or of having any such dependance upon his Will, than the other. Which Remark here naturally offers it self against the *Cartesian* Notion of the *Positivit*y of Truth. But to come back again to the Point in hand, that we have no power to produce our Ideas, we may be sufficiently satisfied by experimental Reflection. Since, if we had a power to bring them into Being, we must (*à fortiori*) retain the same Power over them when they are in Being, and so must be able to change and alter them : But we find we cannot alter them, or make them any otherwise than they are. Whence we may again conclude, that we neither do nor can produce them. But after all, to what purpose should we produce them, since there can be no Production of them, but what presupposes them ? Which leads me to observe,

7. 2dly. That tho' the Soul should be allow'd a Power of producing her Ideas, yet 'tis reasonable to think it should be a dormant and unactive Power, since she would never use it for the Production of them. This Mr. *Malebranche* handsomely

andsomely illustrates by the Similitude of a Painter: For, says he, even as a Painter, how killful soever in his Art, cannot represent an Animal which he never saw, and of which he never had any Idea: So a Man cannot form an Idea of an Object, if he does not know it before; that is to say, if he has not already an Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will. But if he has already an Idea of it, then he knows that Object, and so has no occasion to form a new Idea of it. From whence he infers, that 'tis therefore in vain to attribute to the Soul a Power of producing its Ideas. And I think very justly; for when the Power is without us, the asserting of it must needs be without Reason.

8. This last Argument wants not so much as any further Confirmation as a little clearing, that so the full force of it may the better appear. In order to which 'tis to be observ'd, that Mr. *Malebranche* seems to take Idea here *Relatively*, or according to its Ideal or Representative Being, when he argues, that the Mind cannot make an Idea of an Object, whereof it has already no Idea, any more than a Painter can draw a Picture of an unknown Creature. And thus indeed he Reasons rightly. But the Argument might have been laid otherwise, and will hold as well of Idea *absolutely* consider'd, or according to that reality of Being which it has in itself, without respect to any thing out of itself. And we may as well say, that the Mind

Mind cannot form an Idea without having some Idea of what it forms ; that is, that cannot form an Idea without having an Idea of that Idea ; as that it cannot form an Idea of any Object without having an Idea of that particular Object. And then as if the Mind had already an Idea of that Idea she is to make there will be no need of making it even, the Argument runs the other way : So that Idea at least, which is the Model of her Work must be supposed as always pre-existent to it and so cannot be effected by it. The Result which put together, will resolve into this double Consequence, that the making of the second Idea is superfluous, and that the making of the first is impossible. Either of which, but especially both together, is, I think, a sufficient Ground whereon to lay the weight of this Conclusion *That the Ideas whereby we understand, are not the Productions of our own Souls.*

C H A P. IX.

*That the Ideas whereby we understand
are not Created in us by God.*

1. **W**hen Natural and Humane Means fail, 'tis both Natural and Ordinary to have recourse to a supernatural Cause. And therefore since our Ideas, as we have shewn, are not derived to us from material Objects, nor yet are of our own producing, it may be proper in the next place to enquire whether they may not be produced in us by God, whether the Author of our Natures be not also the cause of our Ideas?

2. This is the Cause which Men often neglect and overlook when they *should* resolve things by it, and as often fly to it when they should *not*, when things are otherwise accountable. God indeed is the cause of our *Sensations*, and there is a necessity of resolving them into the settled and standing Order of his efficacious Will, if we will give any intelligible account of them. But as for our *Ideas*, as they are of a very different Consideration in themselves, so do they require a very different Resolution. It may indeed be no inconsistent Thought to suppose, in the general, that God who made us thinking and intelligent Creatures, should some way or other furnish us with those Ideas where-

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by we think and understand (which is all that is reasonable in this *Supposition*) but that this should be by the way of an *efficient Causality*, as by producing or creating Ideas in us, is, I think, a very gross and unphilosophical Thought, as will distinctly be made appear by considering, that if our Ideas are produced by God, either they must be once for all concreated with us, or they must be created occasionally whenever we want them, that is, as often as we think or would think of any Object. But neither of these is reasonable to suppose, *Ergo*, &c.

3. That the first of these is not reasonable M. *Malebranche* shews from the infinite variety and multiplicity of Ideas, which must needs be supposed in proportion to the like variety and diversity of Things in the World. But he confines himself to the consideration of simple Figures, whereof it is certain that the number is infinite. Nay, if we instance in one only, as an *Ellipsis*, there can be no doubt but that we may conceive an infinite number of different kinds of them, only by considering, that one of its Diameters may be lengthen'd out to infinity, while the other continues always the same. So in like manner as to a *Triangle*, since the height of it may be augmented or diminish'd infinitely, that side which is the Basis remaining always the same, 'tis plain we may conceive infinite kinds of them too: Yea, as he observes, the Mind does in some sort *perceive* this infinite number of Triangles, tho' we cannot *imagine* but

but a very few of them, nor can we at the same time have particular and distinct Ideas of many Triangles of different kinds. But however 'tis to be Remark'd, that this general Idea which the Mind has of this number of Triangles of divers kinds does suffice to prove, That if we don't conceive all these different Triangles by particular Ideas : In one word, if we comprehend not Infinite, 'tis not from defect of Ideas, or that Infinite is not present to us, but only for want of Capacity and Extention of Mind. For if a Man should apply himself to consider the Properties of all the different kinds of Triangles, tho' he should continue this Study to all Eternity, he would never want new and particular Ideas, but his Mind would be wearied to no purpose. What is said of Triangles may also (as he observes) be applied to Figures of Five, Six, a Hundred, a Thousand, or ten Thousand Sides, and so on to Infinity. But now (says he) if the Sides of a Triangle having infinite Relations one with the other, make Triangles of infinite kinds ; 'tis easie to see that four, five, or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences, since they are capable of a greater number of Relations and Combinations of their sides, than simple Triangles are. So then he concludes that the Mind has an infinite number of Ideas, nay, that it has as many infinite numbers of Ideas as there are different Figures to be considered ; so that since there is an infinite number of different Figures,

Figures, it is necessary that the Mind, if 'twere only for the knowledge of Figures, should have an infinitely infinite number of Ideas.

4. But now in the first place 'tis not at all probable (as our Author observes) that God should Create so many things with the Mind of a Man. Especially considering that there is a more simple and easie way of accounting for this Matter: For as God always acts by the most simple ways, it does not seem reasonable to admit the Creation of an infinite number of Beings for the explaining how we know Objects, since this difficulty is resolvable in a more easie and natural way. And indeed I must needs say, that this *Concreation* of such numberless numbers of Ideas with us, is so extravagant and romantick a Notion, that as 'tis enough to ridicule the Doctrine of *Creation*, seriously to propose it; so if there be any other possible, or at least tolerable Account to be given of the manner of Humane Understanding, the very oddness and improbability of the supposition, would be enough to forbid one to take up with this.

5. But indeed there is more than a high *Improbability* (tho' our Author here takes no notice of any more) that lies against this Hypothesis, as we shall see by and by. In the mean time let us observe with him *2dly*, That tho' we should suppose the Mind to have a Stock or Magazine of Ideas, in all the abundance requisite for the Perception of things, yet it would be exceeding

exceeding difficult to explain how the Soul could make choice of them for the representation of them to herself; for instance, how she could perceive the Sun when it was present to the Eyes of the Body. For since the Sun does not impress any Image of itself upon the Brain, or at least (to speak with our Author) the Image which it impresses there does not at all resemble the Idea which we have of it; nay, even since the Soul does not perceive so much as the movement which the Sun makes in the bottom of the Eye and in the Brain, it is not to be conceived that it should exactly Divine, among such an infinite number of Ideas, which it must represent to itself to imagine, or to see the Sun. So that I think there is good reason why this Hypothesis, which accounts for the manner of Humane Understanding in the way of *Concretion* of Ideas, should be rejected, partly because of the utter improbability that God should Create such a multitude of Beings with every Humane Soul, and partly because it is so very unconceivable how she should be able upon all occasions so readily to apply them to her use, if she had such a stock of them concreted with her. To all which I would add this further Consideration, whether these *Concreate* Ideas are not the same with what they call *Innate Ideas*, and consequently whether those Arguments which prove against the one, are not equally conclusive against the other.

6. But now as to the *Occasional* way of Creation, that is, that God should Create ever Moment as many new Ideas as we perceive different Objects ; this, if not too extravagant to be seriously held, is yet certainly much too extravagant to need to be so refuted. But yet however (as M. *Malebranche* notes) it has already had its Confutation in the former, and may be further convinced of Falshood by this peculiar Consideration, That it is necessary that at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things, since at all times we can will to think of all things, which we could not do if we did not already perceive them Confusely, that is to say, if an infinite number of Ideas were not present to our Mind : For we cannot will to think of an Object utterly unknown, or whereof we have no Idea. The Argument is a little involv'd, and therefore we will make it more explicit by reducing it to form ; which is this,

If at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things, then Ideas are not Created in us every moment that we think.

But at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things ;

Therefore Ideas are not Created in us every moment that we think.

The Major or Consequence is plain and clear.
The Minor is proved thus.

If at all times we can will to think of all things, then at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things :

But at all times we can will to think of all things ;

Therefore at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things.

The Consequence, which is the only dubitable part, is again proved by this Enthymeme.

We cannot will to think of what is utterly unknown to us, or whereof we have no manner of Idea.

And therefore if at all times we can will to think of all things, 'tis plain, that at all times we actually have in us the Ideas of all things.

And so to return ; if we have always actually in us the Ideas of all things, then by virtue of the Consequence of the first Syllogism, the Ideas of them are not Created in us every moment as we have occasion to think of them ; which was the point to be proved in this 2d Part of the Argument. And then since our

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Ideas are neither concreated, nor yet occasionally created, it follows that they are not created at all, which was the Point to be proved in the whole.

7. This Argument proceeds from the removal of all the Species to the removal of the Kind, that is, from shewing the Absurdity of supposing our Ideas to be Created by God, thus, or thus, to the Absurdity of supposing them to be Created by him at all. But there is a shorter and more demonstrative way of proving this general Conclusion, that our Ideas are not Created by God, and that is, because they are not in themselves of a creable Nature. Were they at all Created, I should not doubt to attribute the Creation of them to God, as thinking it more reasonable that they should be his Creatures than ours. But indeed they are not at all Created, nor at all capable of being so, and that for the reason before-mentioned, because they are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, which no Creature can possibly be, as involving in it both Novelty, Contingency, and Mutability of Being. *Mutability*, because the Omnipotent Cause that gives it Being, cannot want Power to change the manner of it. *Contingency*, because God being absolutely Perfect in himself, and sufficient for his own Happiness, cannot be under any necessity of producing any thing out of himself, and so the Creature cannot be a necessary Emanation from him. And lastly, *Novelty of Being*, and that because

because to Create being to produce out of nothing, it must be of the reason of Creation that not Being should go before Being, or that what is Created should first be nothing, or first not be, and consequently if it ever be, it must begin to be, and so cannot be Eternal. Creation then is inconsistent with Eternity, and consequently, that which is Eternal cannot be Created. And accordingly for this Reason it is that we may conclude the *Generation* of the *World* not to be a proper *Creation*, because it is *Eternal*; and so also the *Word* itself may be concluded not to be a Creature, but truly and essentially God; for the same Reason, even as some of the ancient Fathers are observed to have argued,

C H A P. X.

That the Ideas whereby we understand are not the Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls. Or that the Mind does not perceive things by Contemplating her own Perfections or Modalities.

1. WE have now made a considerable Progress in the search of those Ideas whereby we understand, which we have sought both far and near, both at home and abroad, and there remain now not many *Fields* more which we have not beaten. But before we go any further, let us return once more to ourselves, and see whether the Mind needs any thing else but it self for the Perception of Objects, whether it does not perceive them in itself, or if you will by itself, by considering or contemplating the Perfections of her own Essence, and so whether those Perfections may not be the Ideas whereby we understand. Perhaps after all this it may be, and therefore let this be our next Enquiry, left, as it happens in some other cases, we seek that intellectual Light abroad which we have in our selves; like the Man who with a great deal of care and diligent Circumspection

on looks about after the Candle which he has all the while upon his own Head.

2. This indeed is very much our case in the Business of *Sensation*. Here we are either so ignorant or so forgetful of our selves as to imagine *that* Heat, that Sweetness, that Colour (with other sensible Qualities as they are call'd) to be something really inherent in the things that are without us, which indeed are only in our selves, as being no other than certain Modifications of our own Spirits, existing sometimes in one State or Manner of Being, and sometimes in another. For indeed (so great is the Capacity of our Souls) our Sensations are all within our selves, and there it is that the Mind really perceives them, tho' by a confuse and false Judgment, she is apt to fancy that she perceives them in the Objects that are about her. But she cannot perceive them where they are not. She perceives them therefore in her self, and that because they are of a very different Nature from our Ideas, as representing nothing to the Mind that is without, resembling themselves, and as being indeed no other than Modifications of the Mind itself, as Mr. *Malebranche* well remarks. Here therefore we need go no further than our selves, and that because they are of our selves, and in our selves, and even our very selves, as being only modally distinct from us : For Pleasure and Pain, &c. differ no otherwise from us, than as we our selves in one State or Manner of Being differ from our

our selves in another State or Manner of Being. As to our Sensations then the Case is clear that they are all in the Soul itself, and there it is that we are to look for them, and not go abroad for that which we have at home, or seek our selves out of our selves. And here, if any where, that of the Poet is of remarkable importance.

— *Ne te Quaeris extra.*

But now whether it be so as to our Ideas which represent something answerable and corresponding to them out of the Mind ; that is, whether these Ideas be in the Mind as our Sensations are (for that they are in some sense in the Mind, as being the immediate Objects of it, is readily granted) that is, whether they are the Perfections of it ; so that we need only consult our selves, or the several essential Degrees of our own Being to represent things to us that are without us, and so may be said to perceive things in our selves, and to see by our own Light, is quite another Question, and that because our Ideas are very different from our Sensations.

3. 'Tis true indeed, that this is the most perfect and most independent way of Understanding. And therefore if no less than that will content us, and we have so much of the *Luciferian Ambition*, as to aspire to be like to the most High, we cannot take a more compendious or effectual method to compass it, than by assuming

ing to our selves a privilege of understanding things in this manner. For 'tis most certain that this is the Divine way of Understanding. God sees all things in himself (as

we have shewn in the former Page 155.

Part of this Theory) and there-

fore must be concluded to have the Ideas of all things in himself, and the Ideas whereby he understands them, are no other than the Essential Perfections of his own Mind; that is, the Mind of God, as Intelligent, understands things by contemplating the several Perfections of the same Divine Mind as *Intelligible*; so that he understands things not by any proper Species of theirs distinct from himself, but by his own Essence (according to the express Doctrine of *Aquinas*) and so is sufficient to himself for his Knowledge as well as *Happiness*, being his own Intelligible as well as Beatifick Object. 'Tis highly Decorous that it *should* be so, and indeed, absolutely necessary that it *must* be so. For in short, God must have the Ideas of all things before he made them, or else he could never have made them, and those Ideas, however formally distinguishable, must have a real Identity with himself, and that because before the Creation of things, we can suppose nothing to have been in actual Being but himself. Or,

as Mr. Malebranche is pleased to *Recherche de la*
Verite. lib. 3. c. 4. express it, *It is certain that there was none but God only before the World was Created, and that he could not make it without Knowledge*

ledge and without Idea; and that consequently those Ideas which God had of the World are not at all different (I suppose he means diverse) from himself. It is then clear, that this is and must be God's way of understanding things, to see them in himself, by contemplating the several intelligible Perfections of his own omniform Essence. For as all things are in God *Secundum modum Intelligibilem*, after an Intelligible manner, as *Aquinas* speaks, by those intelligible Perfections of his which represent them: So these intelligible Perfections of his Essence are the very Ideas whereby he understands them. So that if our aim be to climb so high upon the Tree of Knowledge as to be as God, this I confess is indeed our ready way for it. But then methinks that very Consideration should strike an awful Reverence into it, and as a flaming Sword deter us from breaking in upon it. We should look upon this way of understanding as *Sacred*, and think it not only a proud, but a sacrilegious Hypothesis to pretend to it. And indeed I must needs say, that were there no other Argument to forbid its Admission, that this is God's way of understanding is to me a just Prejudice that it cannot be ours, since we are removed from him at so vast a distance, that our Ways are not as his Ways, nor yet our *Thoughts* as his *Thoughts*.

4. But the Matter is capable of a stronger enforcement. For besides the great Decency and Reasonableness that the most perfect way of Understanding

Understanding should be appropriated to the most perfect Being, we may further consider with M. Malebranche, that since we are Finite, we do not contain in our selves all Beings, as God does whom we may call universal Being, or simply *He that is*, even as he stiles himself. And therefore since the Mind of Man can know all Beings, even Infinite Beings, and does not contain them ; this is a certain proof that it does not see their Essence in itself. For the Mind does not only perceive sometimes one thing and sometimes another successively, but it actually perceives Infinite, tho' it does not comprehend it, as was observ'd before. So that not being actually Infinite, nor capable of infinite Modifications at once, it is absolutely impossible that it should see in itself that which is not in it self. Whence it is plain, that it does not see the Essences of things by contemplating its own Perfections, or by modifying itself after a different manner.

5. This last Expression puts me in mind of another way which this Hypothesis of seeing things in our selves has in reserve, which is that the Ideas whereby we understand, are no other than the *Modalities* of our own Souls, or that the Modalities of the Soul are essentially representative of Objects that are different from it ; so that the Soul thinks or represents things to herself only by modifying her own Substance diversly, sometimes after one manner, and sometimes after another. Whether the Author of

of that old saying, *Intellectus Intelligendo fit Omnia*, that the Mind by (or rather in) Understanding becomes all things, might not have some confuse *Parturiency* of this Notion in their Thoughts, I leave to be consider'd. But if we cannot find this Notion in the ancient Schools, let us go to the *Sorbonne*; for there we have M. *Arnauld* in his Book of true and false Ideas (as I learn from the Answer to it, not having the Book itself by me) appearing openly and expressly for it. Which shews how natural the vanity of affecting Self-sufficiency and Independence is to Man, how loath he is to go out of himself for his Ideas, how willing to advance himself into a condition of Resemblance with God, and to be some way or other an *Intelligible World* to himself. And since he cannot be so by the standing essential Perfections of his Nature, which is apparently too limited to comprehend in itself, whatever is in the material or sensible World, rather than fail, he will make an Intellectual *Proteus* of his Soul, and suppose it by the different forms or manners of Being which it takes to itself, to represent such Objects as are out of itself.

6. But this is plainly to confound the most distinct things in the World, our *Sensations* with our *Ideas*. It is true indeed, that our *Sensations*, as representing nothing to the Mind that is either out of it, or distinct from it, are really no other than certain *Modalities* of the Soul, or (since Modes do not differ as to the thing from the

the Substance whose Modes they are) no other than the very Soul itself, existing thus, or thus, according to the several manners of Being whereof it is capable. But the case is far otherwise as to our *Ideas*. They, as representing to us real Beings that are without the Soul and distinct from it, cannot be the Modalities of the Soul. And that first of all for this plain Reason, because no Modality can represent any such Beings, any more than an Accident can represent a Substance, as was said before. And accordingly we find that Pleasure and Pain, &c. do not represent any thing but themselves.

7. But besides we contemplate our Ideas as something that is itself distinct from us, as well as Representative of what is so. As is plain in the Ideas which we have of Extension, or of certain Figures, as suppose a Circle or a Square, or of certain Bodies, as suppose the Sun. That Idea which I have when I look towards the Sun, or, if you will, that Sun which I immediately see (for as for the material Sun that is not visible by it self) is at the time of my doing so considered by me as something distinct from me; and I find it not in my Power to conceive any otherwise of it. Therefore it is not a Modality of my own Soul. For besides that it would be to speak against our Light and inward Conscience to say that it was; 'tis clear that we cannot conceive the Modality of any Substance as a Being distinct from that Substance. As for Example, we cannot conceive a Circle as a Being

ing different from Extension whose Modality it is. The Argument is this, We cannot conceive a Modality as a Being distinct from its Substance: But our Ideas are conceived as Beings distinct from our Souls. Therefore our Ideas are not the Modalities of our Souls.

8. And that they are not, a little further Reflection upon what passes there will abundantly discover to us. For if we consider, we may observe, that we have a clear Intellectual view and knowledge of our *Ideas*. We contemplate them in so bright a Light, that we can discern their Properties, compare them one with another, and discover the Relations that are between them. As is plain in the Ideas of Figures: But now we have no such knowledge of our *Modifications*. As the Soul knows not its own Being, so neither does it *know* the Modalities of it, but only *feels* them by a confuse Sentiment; and accordingly cannot discern what Properties or Relation they are capable of, or so much as compare them one with another. For can we compare Heat with Taft, or Smell with Colour? And yet why not as well as our Ideas, if either one were the same as the other, or if we had the same knowledge of the one as we have of the other. But then, since we have a clear knowledge of our Ideas, but not of our Modalities, it is plain that our Ideas cannot be the Modalities of the Soul, since if they were, they would be as dark and intelligible to us as the Modalities of the Soul are, than which nothing

nothing in Nature is more retired from the view of the Mind: Which still increases the Paradox of supposing these Modalities to be *Essentially Representative*, it being strangely absurd to suppose, that to be representative of other Objects to the Understanding, which cannot represent itself.

9. But we need only reflect upon some of our Ideas to be satisfied that they cannot be the Modalities of our Souls. For some of our Ideas are general: We think upon a Circle or a Triangle in general, tho' tis a contradiction that the Soul should have a modification in *general*. The Modality must be as the Substance is, and therefore the Modality of a particular Being cannot but be particular. But I think upon a Circle in general; that is, the Objective Reality, or Idea of my Thought, is a Circle in general: Therefore the Objective Reality or Idea of that Circle cannot be a Modality of my Soul, unless you could suppose that the Modification of a particular Being could be a universal Modification. Besides that, after all, if our Ideas were the Modalities of our Souls, it would be a desperate Problem to account for, how we who cannot Modifie our Souls as we please, can yet think upon what we will. Indeed supposing our Ideas and the Modifications of our Souls to be (as indeed they are) distinct things, there will be no difficulty in conceiving that we who have no Power over our Modifications, may yet have our Ideas at command, to contemplate them

them when we please. But if our Modifications are those very Ideas, then as far as I apprehend, it must follow, that as we have it not in our Power to Modify our Souls as we will, so neither can we think upon what we will, because we think by Ideas.

10. But I must not deprive my Reader of that Argument for which St. *Austin* has laid the Ground in what he so often inculcates concerning

De libero Arbitrio
lib. 2. c. 12. ing the Community of Truth, particularly when he says, *Quapropter nullo Modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem hec omnia qua incommutabiliter vera sunt Continentem, quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam, vel cuiusquam hominis, sed omnibus incommutabilia vera carentibus, tanquam miris Modis Secretum & Publicum lumen praesto esse ac se praebere Communiter. Omne autem quod Communiter Omnibus ratiocinantibus atq; intelligentibus praesto est, ad ullius eorum proprie Naturam pertinere quis dixerit?* Wherefore you will by no means deny, that there is an immutable Truth, containing all those things which are immutably true, which you cannot call Thine or Mine, or any particular Mans, but that it is present at hand, and exhibits itself in common to all that behold the things that are immutably true, as a Light, which after a wonderful manner, is at once both secret and publick: But that which is present in common to all that reason and understand, who will say, that it belongs properly

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ly to the nature of any one of them. And so again, *Quod ergo unum verum videmus ambo singulis Mentibus,* ibid. cap. 10.

nonne utriq; nostrum Commune est? That one Truth therefore which we both see with each of our Minds, is it not common to both of us? These are very remarkable words, importing the universality and community of Truth, and they may, with a little Suppliment, be improved into a very considerable Argument. And Mr. *Malebranche* has supplied that part which was wanting so well, that between St. *Austin* and him the Argument runs full and intire. That we see all by one common Light, or that That one Truth which we all see, each by his own Mind, is common to us all; that's the Proposition of St. *Austin*. But now to this * M. *Malebranche* adds, But the Modalities of our Minds are proper and particular to them. And therefore it is necessary that Ideas or Truths, which are only the Relations that are between Ideas, should be something else than our own proper Modalities. There must be an immutable and universal Nature which communicates itself to all Minds, without dividing itself among them; and which may be, as St. *Austin* expresses it, *Miris Modis Secretum & Publicum lumen*, at once, after a wonderful manner, both a secret and a publick Light.

* See his Answer to Mr. *Arnauld's* Book of true and false Ideas, Page 100. where the Argument is intire.

11. These few Arguments which I have here laid together, and whose Heads I have so far opened as to let the Reader into a more through consideration of them, may be sufficient to shew this new Account of Humane Understanding to be as false as any of the rest, which resolves our Ideas into the supposed *essentially Representative Modalities* of our own Souls. But whoever will see this whole Matter more amply laid open, and indeed almost in its full Light, let him consult **M. Malebranche's** excellent Answer to Mr. **Arnauld's** Book of true and false Ideas, to whose Assistance I acknowledge my self beholding for many things in the management of this Argument. For the greater Confirmation of which I shall add yet this further Consideration, that 'tis absolutely impossible that our Ideas should be the Modalities of our Souls, because we are Temporary, Contingent and Mutable Beings; whereas the Ideas whereby we think and understand (as I have already observed upon another occasion, and shall hereafter again insist upon) are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, partly as being the Objects of Science, and partly as they are the ground, of necessary and eternal Truths, which are no other than the Relations that are between Ideas, or those very Ideas themselves, as related to one another. We see eternal Truths, and therefore also the Ideas from which they result, those Truths not differing really from those Ideas. But now eternal Truths cannot result from Ideas that are

are not Eternal ; and therefore the Ideas which we see are also Eternal : But the Ideas *which* we see, are to be sure the same with the Ideas *by* which we see. And therefore again, if the Ideas *which* we see are Eternal, consequently the Ideas *by* which we see are also Eternal. But then this plainly demonstrates, that these Ideas cannot possibly be the Modalities of our own Souls, no, nor yet their Essential Perfections neither ; and indeed, that we cannot with either Reason, Modesty, or Piety, pretend to be at all a Light to our selves, or to understand things by any Ideal Reasons of our own proper Nature, but must leave that as a Privilege peculiar to the infinitely great and blessed God, whose glorious Name be Hallowed and Adored by all his Creatures for ever. *Amen.*

12. And so much to convince *Philosophers*. But now for the satisfaction of *Divines*, I think it may not be amiss, before we conclude this Point, briefly to represent how far we have St. *Austin's* Authority on our side. It cannot be reasonably expected from the simplicity of the Age wherein he lived, that he should enter so far into the speciality of the Question, as to determine particularly and precisely that the Ideas whereby we understand are not either the Essential Perfections, or Modalities of our own Souls ; but he says, that which in the generality of it extends to both, since he that absolutely denies the Genus denies also all the Species that are contained under it. And *that* this great Fa-

ther does over and over, being very positive and

Expos. in Psal. 143. express in this general Doctrine, that Man is not a Light to himself.

Anima per seipsum non lucet (says he) *quia humiliter & veraciter cantat, tu illuminabis lucernam meam Domine.* Deus meus illumina Tenebras meas, & apud te, inquit, fons vita, in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Non in lumine nostro, sed in lumine tuo. Nam & Oculi nostri lumina vocantur, & tamen lux extrinsecus desit, etiam fani & patentes in tenebris remanebunt.

De verbis Domini, Serm. 8. Again, *Dic quia tu tibi Lumen non es. Ut multum, Oculus es, lumen non es.*

Quid prodest patens & sanus Oculus, si lumen desit? Ergo dic, à te tibi lumen non esse, & clama quod Scriptum est. *Tu illuminabis lucernam meam Domine.* Lumine tuo Domine illuminabis tenebras meas. Mea enim nihil nisi tenebra. *Tu autem Lumen fugans tenebras, illuminans me.* Non à me mihi lumen existens, sed lumen non Participans nisi in Te.

De verbis Apostoli, Serm. 30. Again, *Non sum mihi ipse Lumen, nam si essem nunquam errassem.*

Again, *Lumen tibi esse non potes, non potes, non potes.*

Again, *Vis nosse quid es? Tenebra.* Then a little after, *Tenebra in te Lux in Domino.* Quia non tibi potes lucere, accedendo illuminaris, rece-
dendo tenebraris. *Quia non tibi lumen tu ipse es, aliunde illuminaris.*

And

And thus you see 'tis the plain and express Doctrine of this great Father of the Christian Church, and he delivers it with as much Zeal and Vehemence as if it were an Article of the Christian Faith, that we are not a Light to our selves, but are illuminated from elsewhere: That of our selves we are mere Darkness: That at most we are but *Eye*, non *Light*, *Oculus es, lumen non es*; which indeed is very finely expressed, as much as to say, That we are to our selves an intelligent Faculty, but not the intelligible Object or Idea. And therefore I cannot but wonder, that a Man so much in the Discipleship of St. *Austin* as Monsieur *Arnauld*, should set up his Modalities essentially Representative as an Ideal Light in the Soul, so directly in opposition to his express Doctrine, as well as great Authority. Especially considering that he herein opposes the Doctor of the Schools no less than the Doctor of the Church, whose express Conclusion it is, that God only, as being virtually all things, knows all things by his Essence. But that the Soul by its own Essence knows nothing. *Solus Deus, cum sit virtualiter Omnia, Cognoscit per Essentiam suam Omnia. Anima autem nulla per Essentiam Cognoscit.*

Sum. Theol. Parti 1. Quæs. 84. Art. 2.

Again, in the same place very expressly and remarkably to our purpose, he says, That if there be any Understanding which knows all things by its Essence, it must be that whose Essence

sence has all things immaterially in itself, even as the Ancients supposed the Essence of the Soul to be actually compounded of the Principles of all material things, that it might understand all things. But this he tells us is proper to God, that his Essence be immaterially comprehensive of all things, inasmuch as the effects do virtually pre-exist in their Cause. And accordingly he concludes, That God only understands all things by his own Essence, and that this way of Understanding does not belong either to Men or Angels. His words are, *Si aliquis Intellectus est qui per Essentiam suam Cognoscit Omnia, oportet quod essentia ejus habeat in se immaterialiter Omnia, sicut antiqui posuerunt Essentiam animæ actu Componi ex Principiis Omnis Materialium, ut Cognosceret Omnia. Hoc autem est proprium Dei, ut sua Essentia sit immaterialiter Comprehensiva Omnis, prout Effectus virtute præexistent in Causa. Solus igitur Deus per Essentiam suam Omnia intelligit, non autem Anima Humana, neq; etiam Angelus.*

13. Upon this very considerable Testimony I remark (lest some of my Readers should happen to overlook it) that it seems according to Aquinas it was an Hypothesis among the Ancients, that the Soul consisted of, and so had in it the Principles of all material Things. And that which put them upon so odd an Hypothesis, it seems was, that they might thereby render an Account of the possibility of our Understanding things, which, according to them, must be supposed

supposed to be done by virtue of those material Principles, serving the Soul in the Nature of Ideas for the understanding material Objects: Which falls in very much with what we have here expressed by the Soul's understanding things by its own *essential Perfections*; only that this Hypothesis is a little more particular, and a great deal more gross, in supposing these Essential Perfections of the Soul to be *Material*. But by this we may see what shifts Men were put to to give an account of the manner of Humane Understanding, and with what fottish Extravagances they will take up, rather than go out of themselves for the Light of their Minds, or acknowledge themselves beholden to any other Ideas than what the Perfections of their own Natures can furnish them with: Nay, rather than fail, will even debase those Natures, and place them on a level with the Beasts that perish, rather than ascribe their Illumination to any thing superiour to themselves, or that is even distinct from themselves, chusing rather to be a self-sufficient independent Body, than a dependent Spirit. And indeed, so natural is the vanity of affecting Self-sufficiency and Independence, that even *Man* has the Ambition to aspire to it, and that poor impotent Creature who cannot Live, Move, or have any Being without another, would yet pretend to *understand* by himself. But this is a privilege which our judicious School-Divine thinks too great to be allowed either to Men or Angels, and fit to be

be reserv'd only to God himself. And since he has with so good Judgment lodged it in *him*, here, with all Humility and Adoration let us leave it, as an incommunicable Branch of his Royal Prerogative, and a Flower of his Imperial Crown, without being either so impious as to deny this superexcellent way of understanding to *Him*, or so foolishly vain as to assume it to *our selves*. For in this sense also we may truly fay with the Psalmist, *Such knowledge is too wonderful and too excellent for us, we cannot attain unto it.*

14. We have here gone over a great deal of Ground, and have now but one Field more to beat, and so begin to draw near, if not to what we seek after, yet at least to the end of our Enquiry, since if we do not find what we look for here, we must e'en give over all Hopes of finding it any where, and sit down in a satisfied and quiet (tho' not lazy) ignorance of the manner of our Knowledge, contenting our selves with the possession of the thing. But tho' we have found no satisfaction in any of the foregoing Ways or Attempts for the unfolding this mysterious Secret of our Intellectual Nature, unless it be that only of *Scio me hactenus nihil Scire*, it would however be too soon to give over yet, so long as there is room for any further search: For if we will find Knowledge and Understanding, we must (as the wise King advises) seek for it as for Silver, and search for it as for hid Treasures. And therefore having examin'd the

the four first Hypothesis of our Division, and discover'd the insufficiency and falsehood of them, let us now apply our selves to the Consideration of that which remains. And that our access to it may be the more gradual and less surprising, before we offer any thing more immediate and direct, we will first interpose a Chapter concerning the possibility of it, which is as follows.

C H A P. XI.

That 'tis possible that the Ideas whereby we understand, may be the Divine Ideas, and consequently that there is no necessity of having recourse to any other.

1. **T**H O whatever is possible is not forthwith actually true, yet whatever is actually true must be possible, and consequently possibility is one step towards actual Truth: And a very considerable step too it is in some cases. If God be a possible Being, that is, whose Nature or Essence implies no contradiction or Repugnance that he should be, then it necessarily follows that he actually is, since, if he were not, it would be utterly impossible that he should

should ever be. That's one Case, and a very rare and singular one it is (as all things concerning God are;) for here the possibility plainly and immediately infers the Act; and perhaps 'tis the only case wherein it evidently does so. But there is another case wherein it bids fair for the recommending it, and that is when the possibility seems to lie only on one side. 'Tis true indeed, that mere naked possibility, tho' presupposed to the actual truth of a thing as the Ground and Foundation of it, will go but a very little way in Argument towards the inferring it, there being many things in themselves possible, which yet never were, nor perhaps ever shall be. But when all other ways of solving an apparent Effect that can well be conceiv'd, seem desperate and impossible, then to say that it may admit of a Solution in this or that way, is a considerable *Offer*, and if proved, a considerable *Argument*. And therefore since it is so, and we have shewn all the other Suppositions or conceivable Accounts concerning the way and manner of Humane Understanding to be false, it will be a great Point gain'd if we can prove that which remains to be so much as *possible*, and that 'tis at least so much as that (whatever becomes of the actual truth of it) is the Conclusion which is here undertaken to be proved.

2. The Position of this Chapter involves a supposition. It is here supposed that there are *Divine Ideas*, or that God has in himself the Ideas

deas of all things. This I beg leave to suppose here, because I have already given a large and professed Account of it in the former Part of this Theory. But if the Reader of this Part (which I can by no means advise) should happen to be a stranger to the other, or should have forgot it, and not be willing to renew the perusal of it, he may take this short hint in his way for his present satisfaction. God when he made the World must have the Ideas of those Creatures which he made, or else he could not have made them: And since when he made them there was nothing in actual Being besides himself, those Ideas cannot be conceiv'd as any thing really distinct from his own Essence, but only as the several intelligible Degrees or Perfections of it, and so he has the Ideas of all things in *himself*. And accordingly these Ideas as being really Co-essential with him, tho' representative of things without him, I call *Divine Ideas*. This is what I would here suppose. That which is here asserted, is, that 'tis possible that these Divine Ideas may be the very Ideas whereby we think or understand, or (as I have otherwise expressed it) that are the immediate Objects of our Thoughts in the Perception of things.

4. Now of the possibility of this there can be no reasonable doubt if we consider in the first place, that these Ideas are in themselves most Intelligible, and so fit to be the immediate Objects of Thought, or else nothing can be so.

God

God is the most Intelligible Object in himself: For as *Aquinas* well argues, since every thing is Intelligible so far as it is in Act, God who is the most pure Act without the least mixture of Potentiality, must be in himself most Intelligible. And therefore since these Ideas of things which are in God, have a real Identity with the Divine Essence (as by the Doctrine of the Schools themselves, every thing that is in him is concluded to have) it follows that they must be in themselves of the most Intelligible Nature: Which may also be argued from their most perfect Spirituality, and the great proportionableness which they thereby have to the Mind or Understanding.

4. But we are further to consider, That as these Ideas are by reason of the Spirituality and Divinity of them most Intelligible in themselves, so nothing hinders from the nature of the thing, but that they may be Intelligible to us: And that because they are intimately present with us, and have an immediate Union with our Minds. 'Tis most certain that God himself hath so; and accordingly the Apostle in his Discourse with the *Athenian* Philosophers takes notice (which he would not do if it had

Act 17. not been Strictly and Philosophically true) that *He is not far from every one of us*, and that *in him we live, and move, and have our being*. And therefore since these Ideas in the reality of their Nature are the same with God, it follows that *they*

they must be as intimately present, and as immediately united to us as God is, and so must be Intelligible to *us* as well as in *themselves*.

5. There wants one Consideration more to fill up the Argument, and that is, that as these Ideas are Intelligible to us; so if we do understand them, we shall not fail to understand other things *by* them, and that because they are in themselves essentially Representative of all other things, as being the exemplary Measures whereby they were made, and the Intelligible Forms whereby they were known and designed before they were made. When therefore these Ideas are perceived or understood, those other things which were made by them, are understood in them as far as they are capable of being understood at all, and that because these Ideas are the Intelligible Reasons or Essences of those things, and the ground of all those Eternal Truths that are affirm'd of them, as well as of those Sciences which respect those Truths, as we have shewn at large in the former part of this System.

6. Now these three things are sufficient to conclude our Point. For when we say, that 'tis possible that the Divine Ideas may be the Ideas whereby we understand, the meaning more explicitly will resolve into this, that we may understand *them*, and other things *by* them. Now as for the understanding *them*, the possibility of this appears partly from their being in themselves of an Intelligible Nature, and

partly from the immediate Union and intimate Presence which they have with our Minds. And as for the understanding other things *by* them, the possibility of this likewise appears from the Essential Representativeness of their Nature, whereby they express all that belongs to the real Essence, and that 'tis properly *Intelligible* in things; that is in other words, we may for any thing that appears to the contrary, understand these Ideas in themselves, because of their *absolute* Nature as they are Essential Perfections of God, and we may understand other things *by* them, because of their *Relative* Nature, or as they are Ideas representative of things that are out of God. And since in these two things consists the full of what is intended by our understanding by the Divine Ideas, *viz.* That we should understand *them*, and other things *by* them, and both these appear to be possible, it therefore clearly follows, that 'tis possible that we may understand by those Ideas, or else there will be no Ideas by which it will be possible for us to understand; and that because 'tis impossible there should be any that are either more Intelligible in themselves, or more intimately present to us, or more representative of other things. So that I think we have sufficient warrant to conclude, that these Ideas are every way qualified to be the immediate Objects of our Thoughts, and that there is nothing *in them* that should hinder us from understanding *by* them.

7. All that can here be to any purpose Ob-
jected, is, Whether there may not be an hin-
drance or incapacity in *ourselves*, by reason of
the disproportion of our Faculties to so excellent
an Object, tho' there be no impossibility from
the Object itself. But this can be no Objection
if we can consider, first, That the Question at
present is not concerning the Act, but the Pos-
sibility, and as to this, there can be no reason
to question but that God, who, as our Religion
teaches us to believe, will discover himself to us
hereafter, may, if he so pleases, discover him-
self to us now. But besides we are to consider
2dly. That God does discover himself to us now ;
for we have an Intellectual View or Perception
of him even in this Life, tho' not by abundance
of degrees so clear and perfect as we hope to
have hereafter, when our Vision of him shall be
Beatifick. But however, some Perception of
him we have, and that which we have is Di-
rect, Immediate and Essential: For God, as we
have shewn above, cannot be known by any I-
dea distinct from himself, as other things are,
and therefore we must know him by himself ;
and how imperfect soever that Knowledge be,
his own Divine Essence is the immediate Object
of it, or else 'tis plain that we have no Notion
at all of him. But then if we can have any In-
tellectual Sight (tho' never so imperfect) of the
Absolute Nature of God, much more may we see
his *Relative* Nature, or that in him which re-
pects *Creatures* ; that is, the Divine Ideas, al-
ways

ways supposing that it be this Pleasure to reveal them to us; which, whether it be or no, is an Enquiry that lies beyond our present Concern, which goes no further than the absolute possibility of the thing.

8. And for the fuller Confirmation of this, it may not be improper to be further considered, That these are the Ideas which are the immediate Objects of the Divine Intellect, that God both understands *them*, and his Creatures *by* them, and that it is the Intelligible World that represents to him the *Natural*. For as God has the Ideas of all things that he has made in himself,

according to that of St *Austin*,

*In the Appendix
of his Sermons.
Serm. 10.*

Deus habet intus quicquid Operatur Foris : He has within what-

ever he works without; so he

knows them all by those Ideas. For he knows all things in himself, as sufficing for his own Light as well as Happiness, and if he knows all things in himself, it must be by *that* of himself which relates to what is out of himself, even those Intellegible Perfections of his Essence that are representative of whatever does or can exist without it, which is what we intend by the Divine Ideas. But then if God understands by these Ideas, then it seems things may be thus understood, and so this is in the general a possible and truly conceivable way of understanding. But then besides, if these are the Ideas by which God understands, why may not we understand by the same? If this be his way

of

of understanding why may it not also be ours ? 'Tis true indeed, it would be a vain Presumption to think that we should be able to understand as he does in one sense ; that is, that as he understands all things in *himself*, so we should be also able to understand things in *ourselves*, because this would import a very high Perfection in *us*. But this hinders not but that as God understands all things in himself, so we may understand all things in *Him*, because then all the Perfection that is in this way Understanding redounds to God.

9. But then to wind up this whole Matter, if it be possible (as I think by a due Consideration of the Premises, it will appear that it is) that the Ideas whereby we understand may be the Divine Ideas, then it evidently follows, that there is no absolute Necessity (at least from the Nature of the thing) of our having recourse to any other, and that even tho' we should suppose other ways to be as possible as this. 'Tis true indeed, I know not any other way that we can have recourse to ; but supposing we could, there would yet however be no absolute Necessity of our taking up with it, so long as this is acknowledged to be possible. But whether this be actually the very way of Humane Understanding or no, the mere possibility of it is not sufficient of itself to determine. That depends upon other Measures, the Consideration of which we shall adjourn to the following Chapter.

C H A P. XII.

Wherein is considered what Reasons there are to think that the Divine Ideas are actually the Ideas whereby we understand. With some explanatory Account of this Ideal System.

1. "Tis no small satisfaction to a pensive Traveller after he has wandered up and down through wild Deserts and Pathless Woods, and has in vain attempted many cragged Hills and inaccessible Rocks and Precipices, at length to fall into a *passable way*, tho' he knows not yet whether it will lead him, or whether it be the right way or no. To apply this to our present Case, I need only say, that after some tryal made upon the several Hypotheses of Humane Understanding, we have at length found one that is *Possible* and *Intelligible*, which is more than can be said of any of the rest, and what, after so many vain and fruitless Enquiries, may be lookt upon as a considerable Atchievement. I do not mean in respect of my own Abilities so as to value my self as a *Discoverer*, but in respect of the thing itself, it being indeed a very considerable and clearing thing to meet with any Light after so much Darkness, tho' it be only the *glimpse of a possibility*. And so much indeed I shall not doubt to affirm, that we have found ; but

but whether this way of Understanding which we affirm to be possible, be the very actual way whereby we understand, is a Question that is not to be determin'd without that *Modesty* and *Reserve* which is due both to the Sublimity of the Argument, and the Infirmitiy of him that handles it.

2. There is a twofold *Reserve* which is to be used in our speculative Researches. One that respects the *Things* that we have under Consideration, and another that respects that degree of *Affent* wherewith we adhere to them. That which concerns the *Things* themselves, is that we don't *Outer la matiere* (as the French speak) push things too far, over stretch the Matter, or indulge our inquisitive Humour too much about things that are greatly removed from us, or much above us, and that lie in the Dark ; but that we govern our Curiosity within reasonable Bounds, contenting ourselves with being *Wise unto Sobriety*. That *Reserve* which concerns our *Affent*, is again capable of being considered two ways, *1st.* That we forbear * giving it to any thing but what is clear and evident, since every thing that has the appearance of Truth, is not always true. *2dly.* That when we do inwardly give it, as finding it reasonable so to do, we use not however any undue Freedom in the manner of expressing our *Affent*, by being too Positive or Dogmatical in our Affirmations, which favours of too much Confidence and

* That is absolu-
tely.

Reliance upon our own Judgments, and is therefore in decency to be avoided, tho' we think ourselves never so much in the right. I have endeavour'd to govern myself by these measures in this Theory, and I hope this is the Temper which I have hitherto used; and I must strangely forget myself and my Argument too, should I now in this Part of it begin to discontinue it; and therefore tho' we have been somewhat positive in affirming the simple *possibility* of our Understanding by the Divine Ideas (because indeed I think 'tis very clear that we may so understand) yet that we *actually* do understand by them, I shall not take upon me absolutely to affirm. The Question *How we understand*, is too difficult and abstruse to be peremptorily decided by me, or by any Man else. I pretend only to examine which of all the conceivable ways of it appears to be most reasonable, which is enough to answer the design of a modest Theory, and to satisfie all reasonable Curiosity either in the Writer or in the Reader. And accordingly having shewn it to be absolutely possible that we may understand by the Divine Ideas; I now proceed to consider what rational Grounds and Inducements there are to think that we do actually so understand.

3. To set out then, the first rational Ground that may be offer'd for this way of Understanding, is, because all other ways that we can think of appear upon a fair examination to be false and impossible. We have shewn that it is not reasonable

onable to think there are any Ideas but the Divine Ideas ; and supposing that there were, yet that we do not understand by them, nay, that they cannot be the Ideas whereby we understand. And we have further shewn not only that there are Divine Ideas, but that there is a possibility of our understanding by them. But then since the other ways are false, whether that alone be not sufficient to conclude this to be true, especially since it appears otherwise to be possible. For as we argued in the Chap. foregoing after this manner , This way is possible, therefore no other is necessary ; so whether we may not now as well argue thus ; the other ways of understanding are impossible, therefore this is necessary, is what I should think deserves to be well weighed by every Reader that is not in too much haste to consider.

4. The Traveller who by consulting his Map, or otherwise is competently satisfied that the way to such a Place must lie within the compass of five Roads, and afterwards upon trial finds four of them not to be passable, has he not great reason to conclude without any further enquiry, that the fifth which remains is the right, especially if he perceives it to lie open and fair ? But now how does our Case differ from his, and if *he* may so conclude, then why may not *we* ? For the Syllogism would be no other than this. The Ideas whereby we understand, must be either such as come from external Objects, or such as are produced by ourselves, or created by God, or

Or the Essential Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls, or lastly the Divine Ideas. But they are not any of the former ; therefore they are the last : Which Conclusion being as true, the Premises, whoever will not submit to stands oblig'd to shew, either that there is some other way of understanding which we have not mention'd, and so that our Enumeration is not just ; or that one of the other which we have mention'd may possibly be it. And indeed I do not well perceive how either of them can be done ; and therefore the Argument must be allow'd, or at least I see not how it can be answer'd.

5. This last Argument proceeds from the exclusion or removal of other ways to the position of this as the only way of understanding that remains, and indeed that is possible. But now to argue more nearly from the Nature of the thing itself. The Ideas whereby we understand are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable. But there are no Ideas so qualified but the Divine ; therefore the Ideas whereby we understand are the Divine Ideas. This Argument we have already used upon another occasion *viz.*, to shew that our Ideas are neither produced by ourselves, nor created by God, nor yet the Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls. But it is as applicable to this purpose to shew what they are, as well as what they are not, to shew them to be Divine, as well as not to be any thing Created ; for 'tis, I think very plain,

that

that That must be Divine, whatever is necessary, Eternal and Immutable; so that we need not be at the pains to prove that part of the Argument. But now as to the other, that the Ideas whereby we understand are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable; this seems demonstrable two ways, which, tho' we have already touch'd upon, we shall here briefly, and if we can distinctly resume, not without some improvement as well as variety.

6. The first way is from their being the Objects of *Science*: It is with consent allow'd, that *Science* is of *Necessaries*, &c. Therefore things as they are in Nature are not the Objects of it. Therefore the *Science* which we have of things respects only the *Ideas* of those things, or else 'tis plain that we can have no *Science* of them. But then again, since *Science* is of *Necessaries*, therefore the *Ideas* of those things are necessary, &c. And then since these *Ideas* of things are also the *Ideas* whereby we understand them, as being supposed to be the Objects of that *Science* which we have of them, it seems thence to follow by an equality of Consequence, that therefore the *Ideas* whereby we understand are also necessary, &c. For *Science* is of *Necessaries*, and therefore, as if there were no *Ideas* there could be no *Science*: So if we did not know things by those *Ideas*, we could have no *Science* of those things; but if we do know things by their *Ideas*, then the *Ideas* of those things are also *our Ideas*, or the *Ideas* whereby we understand them, and consequently the one

will

will be as necessary as the other : So that the Argument will now run distinctly in this form.

The Ideas whereby we understand are the Objects of Science:

But the Object of Science is necessary, &c.

Therefore the Ideas whereby we understand, are necessary, &c.

Besides, we understand things by their Ideas, therefore in short, the Ideas of things are the same with the Ideas by which we understand.

7. But before we give any further Proof of the Conclusion of this Argument, there is another way of proving the major Proposition of it, *viz.* That the Ideas whereby we understand are the Objects of Science, we have shewn that material Beings are not in themselves, or by themselves at all Intelligible ; therefore all the Knowledge or Perception which we have of them is by their Ideas. And therefore the Ideas whereby we perceive those Beings are again the Objects of all that Science which we have of them. And that not only because the things in themselves have not that immutable stediness which *Science* requires in its Object, which is the ground upon which the last Argument proceeds) but because they are not in themselves so much as *Absolutely*, or at all *Intelligible*.

ble. And indeed since we perceive these things only by their Ideas, it seems plainly impossible that the Science which we have of them should be concern'd any further than those Ideas whereby we perceive them. So that what we call the Knowledge of *Things*, is in strictness no other than the Perception of our own *Ideas*.

8. Which is further confirm'd by that very considerable Maxim of the Metaphysical School, that the actual existence of things is not necessary to Science, or as Suarez expresses it, *Disput. 1. Sct. 5. Num. 39.* that *Science Abstracts* from it. 'Tis true it does so: Not indeed from all Existence, or from Existence absolutely (for then Science would have nothing real for its Object) but from Existence in a certain respect, as it signifies the actual Existence of things in Nature. From that it does Abstract, and accordingly the existence of things in this Sense is not at all necessary to Science, but wholly accidental; that is, it is not necessary to Science, that the Object of it should *so* exist. For whether things do thus exist or not, our Science of them is, or may be the same, as is plain in the Science of *Geometry*, which is concerning such Lines and Figures as have no real Existence in Nature, at least according to that exactness of Perfection wherein that Science considers them as I have * formerly observ'd to another purpose. But then this one Consideration seems sufficient to demonstrate

* See the 1st. Part of this Theory, Page 51.

monstrate that the things themselves, as they exist in Nature, are not the proper Objects of that Science which we are said to have of them. For what can be more plain, things as they naturally exist cannot be the Objects of our Science, and that because our Science considers them according to a State or Degree of Perfection on which they have not as they naturally exist. Here then our Science does not only *abstract from Existence*; but (what is much more considerable) is concerning things that have no real Existence in Nature at all. Tho' if it did only abstract from the real Existence of things in Nature, that would be sufficient to prove that those things cannot be the Objects of it: Because upon the supposition of this Abstraction it would be indifferent to Science (as indeed it is) whether these things did exist or no, and so our Science of them would continue the same, even tho' they were annihilated, which can never be said of the real Object of Science. It seems then a plain rational Collection, that the things in Nature are not that real Object. And therefore all the Science which we have of them, must be resolved into those Ideas whereby we perceive them, as being the only true and proper Objects of that Science. Which again proves those Ideas to be Necessary, Eternal and Immutable.

9. The other way of proving the same Conclusion, is from their being, as the Objects of Science, so also the ground of *Eternal Truths.*
These

These Truths are no other in general, but certain immutable Relations of things. But what things? Not things that exist in Nature: For these things are Contingent, Temporary and Mutable; and 'tis impossible (as we have abundantly shewn in the former Part) that such things should be the Subjects of Necessary, Eternal and Immutable Relations. Therefore they are the Relations of Ideas, and those Ideas must be as Necessary, as Eternal, and as Immutable as those Truths are which result from them, it being impossible that eternal Truths should result from Ideas that are not Eternal. So indeed we speak according to the *formality* of the thing; but indeed in the *Reality* of it, these Eternal Truths are the same with Ideas, as all Relations are with their Subjects and Terms. And therefore again, these Ideas are Necessary, Eternal, &c. as having a real Identity with eternal Truths.

10. Well, but how does it appear that these Ideas are *our* Ideas? Why, we see these eternal Truths, we contemplate them, and have a clear Intellectual view of them, and therefore also of those necessary and immutable Ideas which are the ground of them, those Truths being not really (tho' formally) different from those Ideas. But then, as I said before, the Ideas *which* we see, must be the same with the Ideas *by* which we see, and that because being essentially Representative, in seeing them we are supposed to see what is represented by them. And therefore

fore, if the Ideas which we see are Eternal, consequently the Ideas by which we see are also Eternal. And now we seem to have proved all that is necessary to infer our Conclusion. For if the Ideas whereby we understand are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, as they appear to be from this double Consideration, as they are the Objects of Science, and as they are the ground of eternal Truths, then the Ideas whereby we understand, and which are the immediate Objects of our Mind, cannot reasonably be thought to be any other than the Divine Ideas, and that by virtue of that Principle which is the common Basis of the whole Argument (and which seems too clear to need any Proof it self) *viz.* that there is nothing Necessary, Eternal, or Immutable, but the Divine Nature.

11. But besides, our Ideas are very great things, not only in themselves, as representing whatever is Intelligible in other things, but also with respect to us who understand them; for they are the Principles of our Intelligence, the Light of our Minds, and the Perfection of our rational Natures. Not indeed the *formal* Perfection of them, which consists not in the Ideas themselves, but in the *Perception* of those Ideas (for the formal Perfection of the Mind, however otherwise dependent upon that which is without her, is always some Operation of her own) but they are the *Objective* Perfection, or that which perfects, meliorates, and improves our Intellectual Natures by way of Object, or

as

as Objects do their Powers or Faculties, which are employ'd about them. For as the Perfection of the Understanding consists in Knowledge, so all our Knowledge consists in the Perception of our Ideas. They are the immediate Objects of the Mind, and consequently all the knowledge which she has of Created Things, as various and as extensive as it is, lies within the compass of their lucid Sphere. It may indeed come short of it, or be retrench'd within it; but it cannot possibly exceed it, or pass beyond the limits of it. We cannot understand what we have no Idea of, and that because we understand by our Ideas. Our knowledge must needs fail us whenever our Ideas do, and that because our Ideas are the immediate Objects of our Knowledge. But then that which is the immediate Object of the Mind is the Perfection of it, as informing it, and rendering it actually intelligent, which therefore argues our Ideas to be the Perfection of our Minds: Which by the way, if it was not the true Reason, may yet serve for a very rational Account of that Platonick Notion (otherwise not so easie to comprehend) that the Happiness of the Soul consists in the *Contemplation of Ideas*, which seems also espoused by St. Austin, when speaking of these Ideas, and of the sight which the Soul has of them, he has these remarkable words, *Quarum visione fit beatissima.* Tho' indeed I think this is to be understood in a

*Lib. Octoginta tri-
um Questionum Quest
46.*

qualify'd Sense: For exactly speaking the supreme Happiness of the Soul cannot consist in the Contemplation of *Ideas*, since Ideas, as Divine as they are, import not the Essence of God as it is absolutely in itself, but only as it relates to Creatures, as we have shewn in the former Part. Whereas our Supreme Happiness consists in our Vision of God, as he is according to his absolute Nature, or as he is in himself, that which St. John calls *the seeing him as he is*. But perhaps St. Austin might not so minutely weigh this, or by *most Happy* might mean no more than very Happy: And that indeed is very true: For as there is a great deal of Pleasure in Knowledge; so a clear contemplation of Ideas will go a great way towards Happiness, and that because these Ideas are the proper and immediate Objects of the Mind, and so *truly*, tho' not *most* Perfective of it. And accordingly Aquinas maintains that God understands other things by his own Ideas, or by the Species of them contain'd in his own Essence, and that to obviate the inconvenience urged in the Objection, *viz.* That if he understood other things something else would be a Perfection to him that is not himself: Which supposes that his own Ideas are a Perfection to him, as being the immediate Objects of his Mind; and for the like reason, so will our Ideas be to our Minds. But then (which is the result of all this) I would offer it to be consider'd, whether God be not the only true good of our Souls, and consequently

quently whether any thing can be safely admitted to be the Perfection of our Minds but what is *Divine*. And accordingly as *Aquinas* supposes God to understand by his own Ideas, lest other things should be a Perfection to *him*; so whether it be not as reasonable to suppose that we understand by those same Ideas of his, lest any thing besides God should be a Perfection to *our* Natures, or a Light to our Minds.

12. But 'tis further Considerable, that our Ideas are not only the Light of our Minds, but a common and universal Light, a Light that is as general and as diffused as the Intellectual Nature, that extends as far as there is any Faculty to see it, and that shines even in the Darkness, tho' it be not comprehended by it. Those many great and fine things which St. *Austin* has said of the Community and Universality of Truth, are equally applicable to our Ideas, as being of the same real Nature with it. As for Truth he must be a great stranger to her, and to himself too, that shall look upon it as a Possession in *Peculiar*. Truth is no Man's Property or Inclosure, but a common and publick Benefit. She dwells indeed in every Man, and has an Oracle in every Breast, but is confin'd to no Man, nor to any Place or Time, but is always and every where Intelligible, and to every one, as being at once a secret and a publick Light, as St. *Austin* speaks. That Truth which I contemplate is not mine, since another may contemplate it as well as I,

and that Truth which another contemplates is not his, since I may contemplate it as well he. Yea, we shall see the same Truths, and tho' *Mine* and *Thine* be a necessary distinction in the enjoyment of lesser Goods, which can not be Communicated at once to many, yet we enjoy the greatest Blessings all in common, and there is no division of Truth, tho' there be of the Languages wherein we express it. The Curse that multiplied the latter has left the former still one, simple and intire; and tho' there is such a national variety in Tongues, yet in the Retirements of the Mind there is

more Conformity, since the

* *Intus in Domicilio
Cogitationis nec He-
breæ nec Græca nec La-
tina, nec Barbaræ ve-
ritas. St. Aug. Con-
fess. L. 11. C. 13.*

* Truth that dwells there is neither Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor Barbarous, but speaks one simple, uniform and universal Language, and

such as is intelligible to the whole World. But now our Ideas being the same in the Reality of the thing with Truth; all this which we here say of Truth will be as truly applicable to our Ideas. And consequently we may say of *them*, that *they* also are Common, Universal, Unconfined, and Omnipresent. And we find by experience, that we have all the same common Ideas, tho' we do not equally attend to them, view them with the same distinctness, and order, and dispose them alike in our Thoughts. In this indeed there is an infinite variety according to the different Capacities of Men, and the

the as different Use and Application of those Capacities, and from hence proceeds all that Diversity which is in *Thinking*. But as to the Ideas themselves, they are the same in all Minds, as appears by our being able by agreement to unite them to certain sensible Signs, and by the use of those Signs to excite those Ideas. And indeed all *Speech* supposes this; for unless we had all the same Ideas in our Minds, 'tis impossible we should be able to discourse or maintain any Conversation with one another. I do not say, that we have always the same Ideas whenever we use the same Signs, or rather that we always use the same Signs for the same Ideas. But however our Ideas must be the same in themselves, or we must absolutely have the same Ideas in common between us, or else they would not be capable of being signify'd by a common Sign, and so we could never converse together, because we should have always different Ideas, tho' we used the same Signs, which would be to converse in Words and not in Thoughts, like Parrots, and not like Men. 'Tis plain then that we must have the same Ideas, tho' we do not always use the same Signs to express them, as in those that speak different Languages, nor yet always intend the same Idea by the same Sign, as in those that talk Falaciously and Ambiguously in the same. But still I say the Ideas must be the same in themselves, or else we could not talk at all.

Which seems to argue an intelligible as well as a sensible Luminary ; that there is a Sun for Minds as well as for Bodies, and that we see all in one common Light with our Understandings; as well as with our Eyes ; that is, that there is an universal, intelligible Nature which communicates itself to all Minds, without dividing itself to any. But then whether this common, universal, unconfined Light can be any thing less than *Divine*; or whether this universal Nature which so undividedly Communicates itself to all that is Intellectual, can be any thing less than *God*; And accordingly whether this again does not prove, that the Ideas whereby we understand are the Divine Ideas, I leave to be considered by as many as think it worth their while to know how they understand ; which, one would think, should be one of the first Questions that should engage the Curiosity of a rational Mind.

13. But what if after all we should take a shorter Line to our Point, by arguing thus, The Truths which we see are Divine Truths, therefore the Ideas which we see are also Divine Ideas. For as we have already argued the necessary and immutable Nature of our Ideas from the necessity and immutability of Truth, and from that necessary and immutable Nature of theirs infer'd their Divinity, because nothing can be Necessary or Immutable but what is Divine : So why may we not more directly and immediately argue the Divinity of our Ideas from the Divinity of Truth? For as for the *Antecedent* of the Argument

gument we have abundantly shewn in the former Part that Truth is of a Nature truly Divine, according to the express Doctrine of St. Austin. And as for the Connexion between the Antecedent and the Consequent, that depends upon two things which we have also already shewn, and are therefore now only to recollect; one is, that Truth is in reality the same with the Ideas from which it results: And the other is, that these Ideas are also *our* Ideas, or the Ideas which we see, and which are the immediate Objects of our Thought and Perception, and that because we see these Truths which are supposed to be really the same in Nature with these Ideas: Therefore we see also these Ideas; and therefore if the Truths which we see are Divine Truths, it seems a reasonable Conclusion to infer, that then the Ideas whereby we understand are of a Nature no less Divine.

14. But the Argument may be propos'd as directly and with the same Compendiousness in relation to *Science*, as we have here done it with respect to *Truth*. Before we argued, that our Ideas were necessary, because the Objects of Science, and Divine, because Necessary. But now we may proceed more immediately from their being the Objects of Science to their being Divine. The Objects of Science are the Divine Ideas: But our Ideas are the Objects of our Science; therefore our Ideas are the Divine Ideas. The first Proposition seems abundantly clear from the Na-

ture of Science; which, as it must be of Ideas, because of the Contingency and Mutability of all things in *Nature*; so those Ideas must be the *Divine Ideas* for the same reason, as is obvious to be Collected. Then as to the second Proposition (upon which the main stress of the Argument rests) *viz.* That our Ideas are the Objects of our Science, this we have in great Measure shewn already, and may now further consider, That as 'tis plain that the things in Nature cannot be so because of their Contingency and Mutability; so supposing they were never so Necessary and Immutable, yet since we know them not by themselves but by their Ideas (which are then *our Ideas*) still they cannot be however the *immediate Objects* of our Science, which must resolve into the Perception of our own Ideas: Therefore our own Ideas are at least the *immediate Object* of our Science. And since the Objects of Science are supposed to be the *Divine Ideas*, therefore again, the Ideas whereby we understand, are the *Divine Ideas*.

15. After all, it seems reasonable to think, that if things are understood by Ideas, (as we now suppose, and is generally granted that they are) they should be understood by the same Ideas by which they were made, especially since that is an Intelligible, and the only Intelligible way of understanding them. But now things were made by the *Divine Ideas*, as we have shewn in the former Part. And therefore

fore even upon this Consideration, it seems a reasonable Thought to suppose, that they are also understood by the same Divine Ideas, even by that Intelligible World which we have there so largely described. For since Ideas, according to the Remark of

Aquinas, may be considered *Part 1. Ques. 15.*
Art. 3.

Speculatively as the Princi-

oles of the Knowledge of Things, as well as practically, as the Principles of their Factio or Formation (in the former of which respects they:may be call'd *Reasons*, as in the latter *Exemplars*) why we should divide the Principle of *Knowledge* from the Principle of *Factio*, by supposing things to be made by one sort of Ideas, and understood by another sort, I know no good Reason, especially since we can find no such other sort of Ideas, by which it is possible they may be understood. To which we may add, that unless we perceive things by the very same Ideas whereby they were made, there will be no Consequence from the distinction of our Ideas to the distinction of Things, as was observed before, and so we shall have no mark whereby to distinguish them, which is not to be supposed.

16. That which we have here expressed by our Understanding by the Divine Ideas, M. *Malebranche* is pleased to express by our seeing all things in God; which way of speaking is also not altogether *unscholastick*, as appears from that Question put by *Aquinas*, *Utrum videntes Deum per*

per essentiam, Omnia in Deo videant, and may, for ought I know, be very right, if rightly understood. But there lies the Danger, and therefore I must beg leave to *prefer* the other way of speaking which we have hitherto used, not only as more clear and determinate in itself, but also as less offensive to common Ears, who by the sound of our seeing all things in God, may be tempted to imagine not only that the things themselves are immediately and properly seen, which rather *strikes* in with the vulgar Presumption, than *opposes* it; but (which perhaps is that which has drawn so much Prejudice upon this Notion) that things as they are in Nature, are really in God, and that they are seen in him, according to those sensible Appearances which we have of them, by reason of those Sensations which always accompany our Ideas in Vision; whereas by our seeing things in God, no more is to be understood, nor does the Author of this Expression understand any more by it, than that as things are in God after an intelligible manner, *viz.* by those essential Perfections or Ideas of his which represent them; so they are those Divine Ideas which are the immediate Objects of our Thoughts in our Perception of Things, which we are supposed to understand by those Divine Ideas, as far as they are capable of being at all understood by us. For the sensible World is not Intelligible immediately by itself, and therefore 'tis necessary there

there should be some Intelligible World or other by which it may be understood, which Intelligible World, according to this Hypothesis, are the Divine Ideas. Or, things in Nature are not Intelligible in themselves, as is plain from their distance and disunion from our Minds, and the absurdity of supposing that our Souls should quit our Bodies, and travel over vast Spaces of Air to make a visit to the Sun and Stars, whenever we take a view of those far distant Objects; therefore they must be understood by something that has a more immediate Union with our Minds, and which represents these things to it, that is by their Ideas. And so the sensible must be seen or understood by an Intelligible Sun, which represents that to the Mind which cannot represent itself. And so much is generally granted in effect, tho' not in these Terms. 'Tis generally allow'd, that the things without us are not perceived immediately by themselves, but by their Ideas. The only Question is, by *what Ideas*, or what these Ideas are! Here we divide, some assign one sort of Ideas, and some another sort. So that all that this Hypothesis of *seeing things in God*, adds to the Vulgar, or has peculiar to itself from any of the rest, is precisely this only, that these Ideas are the Divine Ideas, or that the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we understand. And therefore since this is the true Sense into which that Hypothesis must be resolved, I thought fit to

to express it so at first, to prevent any Cavils or Misapprehensions, to which the other way of speaking might be apt to expose it, with Men that judge of Propositions by their Sound rather than by their Sense.

17. But however there are *two things* which we may, and must in the very strictness of the Expression be said to see, or perceive in God, there being no other instructive way of expressing it; and those are Ideas and Eternal Truths. The Reason of the Difference is, because other things being not perceiv'd by themselves, but by their Ideas, this leads to enquire *by what Ideas?* To which when we say, *by the Divine Ideas*, the Question is properly and directly answer'd. But now Ideas are not perceiv'd by Ideas again, nor are Eternal Truths (as we have shewn) perceiv'd after an Ideal manner, by any thing that represents them to our Minds, as being *self-intelligible Objects*. And therefore we cannot say that they are perceiv'd by the Divine Ideas, since they are not at all *Ideally* perceiv'd. And therefore if we will say any thing that is particularly instructive (for to say that they are perceiv'd *by themselves*, is too general) we must say that they are perceiv'd in God: As indeed 'tis most plain and certain that they are so perceiv'd. For being, as we here suppose, *self-intelligible*, they must be perceiv'd where they are. But they are in God: And therefore 'tis necessary that in Him they must be perceiv'd. And so far we may be positive, that

that whatever is Eternal, all necessary and immutable Natures, with whatever Relations that are between them, or Result from them, must be perceiv'd in God, and that because they are in God, who only is Necessary, Immutable, and Eternal; which, by the way, plainly demonstrates that there is a God, as also that the Divine Essence may be, nay actually is, in some degree the immediate Object of our intellectual View even in this Life. But as for things that are *without*, Contingent Beings, Sensible Objects, Creatures, it may be more proper to say, that they are seen by the Divine *Ideas*, nor can they be rightly said to be seen in God (as not being really in him) any otherwise than as that signifies that they are seen or understood by those Ideas which in God are representative of them.

18. But however since M. *Malebranche* thinks fit so to express this Notion, let us take a compendious View of those Arguments whereby he endeavours to make it appear reasonable; which may be added to what we have already offer'd, as a new Set of Auxiliary Considerations that come in for the further Confirmation of this Hypothesis, that the Ideas whereby we understand are the Divine Ideas. I shall therefore give my Reader a sight of his Reasons, with some Improvements of my own as there shall be Occasion.

19. Supposing then the Possibility of our seeing things in God, partly because God has in himself

himself the Ideas of all things which he has created, and partly because he is intimately united to our Souls by his Presence: I say, supposing upon this double Consideration, that the Mind *may* see in God the Works of God, if he please to discover to it that in himself which represent them, he proves it most reasonable to think that he will do so, rather than create an infinite number of Ideas in every Mind.

First, From the *Simplicity* of the Divine Operation. For it appears not only from Reason, but from the whole Oeconomy of Nature, that God never does that by very difficult ways, which may be done by ways that are simple and easie. God does nothing in vain, and without Reason. That which Characterizes *his* Wisdom, and *his* Power, is not to do little Things by great Means: That's against Reason, and is the Character of a limited Intelligence. But, on the contrary, to do great Things by simple and easie Means: 'Tis thus that with Extension alone he produces whatever we see admirable in Nature, and even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals. For as for those who will needs have substantial Forms, Faculties, and Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from the Organs of their Body, in order to the performance of their Functions, they do in effect suppose God to be short in his Understanding, or that he is not able to effect those admirable things by Extension only. They measure the Power of God, and his Sovereign Wisdom, *by*

by the Littleness of their own Understanding. And therefore since God *may* make our Minds see all things barely by willing that they should see what is in the midst of themselves, that is, what there is in him that has a Relation to those things, and which represents them, there is no Appearance at all that he should do it otherwise, and that for this purpose he should produce as many Infinities of infinite Numbers of Ideas as there are created Minds. The Force of this Argument, if we take a more collective View of it, will, as I conceive, resolve into this. God acts by the most simple ways that are possible. And therefore since to make us understand by exhibiting to our Minds his own Ideas, is possible in it self, and also a much more simple way than to create Ideas on purpose for that End, 'tis in all reason to be presumed that that is the way whereby we understand *rather* than the other. And indeed I see not what is wanting in the Argument to make it conclude: Only perhaps we may enlarge the Conclusion beyond a Comparative to an Absolute Extent, by casting the Argument into this Form.

God acts by the most simple ways that are possible. But to make us understand by the Divine Ideas, is the most simple way of making us understand that is possible.

Therefore the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby God makes us understand.

I leave the Reader to consider whether this Argument concludes or no, tho' I confess I see not which Proposition in it he can reasonably deny. For tho' (as was noted before) from the bare possibility of this way we cannot justly infer the Actuality of it; yet when 'tis consider'd, that it is of all others the most *simple*, as well as *possible* in *itself*, this will go a great way in recommending the actual Truth of it to any one that can attentively stay his Thoughts upon the Perfection of God, and the most wise and perfect manner whereby he proceeds in all his Operations, whether of *Grace* or *Nature*. And besides, to give this Argument a further improvement, tho' from the supposed possibility of any other way of Humane Understanding, it would not follow that this is not necessary, because among several ways or means that in themselves are equally possible, one only with respect to the Agent may be necessary upon the account of its Simplicity; yet if this appear to be in itself possible, considering that it is also the most simple too, there can be no necessity pretended for any other; and consequently no reason why any other should be assigned: For as God *cannot* do any thing in vain, so neither *should* we. And I think Ideas any more than other Beings, are not to be multiplied without necessity.

20. Before we pass over this Argument, I would crave leave by the way to interpose a further Reflection, and it is upon that (in my Judgment very remarkable) Passage which our excellent Author has occasionally dropp'd concerning the Souls of Brutes, when he says, *That those who would needs have Souls in Animals different from their Blood and bodily Organs, in order to the performance of their Functions, do in effect suppose God not able to effect those admirable things by Extension only.* The reason of which Consequence may not perhaps lie open to every Reader; but it depends upon the same common Principle, the simplicity of the Divine way of Procedure. God is here supposed to act after the most *simple* manner, that is, not to employ more means than are necessary for the obtaining his end, not to do any thing superfluously, not to use more means when fewer will do, or greater means when lesser will do; in one word, to come at his Point by the shortest Line, and consequently if it be possible to make Brutes perform what they do, by Matter and Motion only, not to indue them with any higher Principle. Therefore, those who suppose a Principle of Thought in Brutes for the performance of their Functions, do by consequence suppose, or must be obliged to say, that God cannot procure those Effects by Matter and Motion only, since, if he could, that being the most simple way, he must by virtue of this Principle, in all rea-

son be presumed to do it. But now, that it is impossible for an infinitely wise and powerful God, by an apt disposition of Matter and Motion (that which we call *Mechanism*) to make Brutes have those Appearances which we observe in them, what considering Man will maintain? And if it be possible for the Actions of Brutes to be thus performed, then considering the simplicity of this way whether the possibility of it may not be added to what we have before discoursed upon this Occasion, as another Argument to conclude it true. And the same may in proportion be applied to our present Question concerning the Ideas whereby we understand.

21. The next Consideration which the Author insists upon to make it appear reasonable, is that we see things, because God wills that That which is in him, which represents them, should be discover'd to us, and not because we have as many Ideas created with us as we are capable of seeing Things, is because this places created Spirits in an intire dependance upon God, and the greatest that can be. Since upon this Supposition, we cannot only see nothing but what is willing we should see, but we can see nothing but what God himself makes us see; to which purpose he quotes

2 Cor. 3. 5. that of St. Paul to the *Corinthians*, That we are not sufficient of our selves to think any thing as of our selves, but our sufficiency is of God. Telling us that

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that it is God himself that enlightens Philosophers in that Knowledge which ungrateful Men call Natural, tho' it comes to them only from Heaven. *For God has shewed*

it unto them. That it is He *Rom. 1. 19.*

that is properly the Light of the Mind, and the *Father of* *Jam. 1. 17.*

Lights, as he is expressly call'd by St. *James.* That it is he who instructs Men in Science, *that teaches*

Man Knowledge. In a word, *Psal. 94. 10.*

that He is the *true Light, which enlightens all those that come into this World,* according to the

like Saying of the *Evangelist St. John.* Which last Text (to which he might have added what goes before, *and the Life was the Light of Men*) appears to me to be the most to his purpose; and indeed I cannot but think it of considerable Importance, and that it is not capable of being illustrated by any Interpretation so fully as by this; *viz.* That the Eternal *Word and Wisdom of God* is our Light, not only *efficiently*, as assisting our Intellectual Faculties, but *Objectively*, as being himself the immediate Object of our Minds, by those Ideas or Reasons of Things which are contain'd in him. Especially, considering that the same Divine Person of whom it is here said, That he is the *true Light* that lighteth every Man that comes into the World, is pleased also to say of himself, That he is the *Truth.*

22. For the farther Inforcement of this last Argument, the Author remarks that it is not easie to comprehend distinctly the Dependence which our Minds have upon God in all their particular Actions, supposing that they have all that which we distinctly know to be necessary for them in order to act, or that they have the Ideas of all things present with them of their own.

For as for that general and confuse Word, *Concourse*, by which Men pretend to explain the Dependence which Creatures have upon God, that does not awaken any distinct Idea in an attentive Mind. And yet 'tis very necessary that Men should distinctly know how they can do nothing without God. And indeed however our Dependence upon God in the Business of Understanding may be otherwise explainable, yet I must needs confess my self so far of our Author's Mind, as to think that it is in no way so conspicuous as in this. For should it be alledg'd (which is all that I know of that can be said in the Case) that we depend upon God *immediately* (for as for a *Remote* Dependence, concerning that there can be no Question) as to the *Formal Act* of Thinking, wherein we may be supposed to be assisted by the Divine Concurrence enabling us to exert it, according to the way of the Schools ; yet however it must needs be allow'd, that our Dependence is not so great if we depend upon him only as to the *Act*, as it would be if we depend upon him for

for the *Act* and *Object* too; and I know not whether the one may not be as necessary as the other, that so *God* may have the intire Glory of our Thoughts, the Creature nothing to boast of; and that those Words of St. *Paul* may be every way verify'd, that *we are not sufficient of our selves to think any thing as of our selves, but that our sufficiency is of God.* To whom be Glory.

23. But to return again to our Author, who draws his next Argument (upon which he lays great stress) from the manner of our perceiving things. We find by Experience, that when we have a Mind to think upon any particular thing, we forthwith cast our view upon all Beings, and then afterwards apply our selves to the Consideration of the Object we propose to think on. But now it is certain, that we cannot desire to see any Object, but that we must see it already, altho' confusely and in general. And therefore since we may desire to see all Beings, sometimes one, and sometimes another, it is certain that all Beings are present to our Minds; and it seems that all Beings cannot be present to our Minds any otherwise, than because *God* is present to them, who in the Simplicity of his Being contains all Beings.

24. He remarks, moreover, under this Head of Argument, that the Mind, in all probability, would not be capable of representing to it self the universal Ideas of Kinds and Species, unles it saw all Beings included in one. For every

Creature being a particular Being, we cannot say, that we see any thing created, when we see, for Instance, a Triangle in general. And he thinks that we cannot well give an Account of the manner, how the Mind knows several Abstract and General Truths, unless it be by the Presence of him that can enlighten the Mind by an infinite variety of Ways.

25. He continues farther, that the Best, the most Sublime, the most Solid, and the first Proof of the Existence of God, or that which supposes the fewest of things, is the Idea which we have of Infinite. For it is plain that the Mind does perceive Infinite, tho' it does not comprehend it, and that it has a very distinct *Idea* of God, which it cannot have but by the Union which it has with him: Since it is not to be conceiv'd, that the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect, such as that which we have of God, should be any thing that is created. The Sense of which Argument, or at least that which is necessary, by way of Supplement, to compleat it, seems to be this, that in the Perception which we have of God, the Divine Essence it self is the immediate Object of that Perception, it being impossible that any thing that is not God should represent him to our Thoughts, or that he should be perceiv'd by any *Idea* distinct from himself, according to what we have before discours'd. Therefore God himself is the immediate Object of our Minds; and if so, then it seems reasonable to think that the Divine

vine Ideas are so too; and that as we immediately perceive God, so we perceive Things in God, *viz.* by those Ideas of his which represent them.

26. He adds another Argument in this Place, which, with those that are used to the abstracter ways of Reasoning, may perhaps pass, he thinks, for a Demonstration. It is impossible that God should have any other Principal End of his Actions but Himself. Therefore it is necessary that not only our Natural Love, that is, the Motion which he produces in our Mind, should tend toward *him*, but moreover that the Knowledge and the Light which he gives it, should make us know something that is in *him*: For whatever comes from God, can only be for God. Should God create a Spirit, and give it for an Idea, or for the immediate Object of its Knowledge, the Sun, God would then, he conceives, create that Spirit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun, and not for himself. God cannot therefore create a Mind to know his Works, unless that Mind does in some manner see God in seeing his Works. So that unless we did in some manner see God, we should see nothing, even as if we did not love God, that is, if God did not continually impress upon us the Love of Good in general, we should love nothing. For that Love being our Will, we can love nothing, nor will any thing without him, since we cannot love particular Goods, but by determining towards those Goods, that

Movement of Love which God gives us towards himself: So that as we love nothing but by that necessary Love which we have for God, so we see nothing but by that natural Knowledge which we have of God. And so all the particular Ideas which we have of Creatures, are no other than Limitations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures, are only Determinations of that Movement which we have towards the Creator.

27. This last Argument will perhaps require more Attention of Thought, to comprehend the full Moment and Importance of it, than most Readers are able or will be willing to bestow upon it. However I do not think it will be to much purpose to go about to make it clearer by any farther Illustration: For as for those who either want Capacity, or are not used to abstract Speculations, all the Illustrations in the World will hardly make them Masters of it. And as for those who have applied themselves much to the way of Meditation, they will easily penetrate the Force of it by their own Attention. And accordingly with them I leave it to consider of it, as it lies before them, while in the mean time I proceed to take an Account of what our Author has farther added concerning this way of Human Understanding, in the *Illustrations* which he has given us upon that Occasion.

28. His first Argument is taken from the Universality of that Reason, whereof Man is Partaker,

Partaker. It is agreed, says he, that all Men are capable of knowing Truth, and even the least enlighten'd among the Philosophers, do consent that Man partakes of a certain Reason, which they do not determine: Therefore it is, that they define him to be an Animal partaking of Reason; for there is no body but knows, at least confusely, that the essential Difference of Man consists in the necessary Union which he has with the universal Reason; tho' who it is that includes this Reason, is what Men neither ordinarily know, nor are much concern'd to discover. I see such and such Truths, and I am sure that there is no Body in the World but who may see the same as well as my self. But I do not see these Truths in the Minds of others, nor again do they see them in mine; therefore it is necessary that there be an universal Reason that enlightens me, and all other intelligent Beings: For if the Reason which I consult, were not the same which answers to the *Chinese*, it is evident that I could not be so certain as I am, that the *Chinese* did see the same Truths that I see. There is therefore a Sovereign and Universal Reason which all Men consult whenever they enter into themselves, upon which occasion he cites that remarkable Passage of St. *Austin*, which indeed is very opposite to the purpose, *Si ambo videmus, &c.* If we both see that it is true what you say, and we both see that it is true what I say, where, I pray, is it that we see it? Why, neither I in you,

you, nor you in me, but both of us in that very incommutable Truth which is superiour to our Minds.

29. He argues again from the *Necessity* and *Immutability* of that Reason which we consult. It is certain that the Ideas of things are Immutable, and that Eternal Truths and Laws are necessary. It is impossible that they should not be such as they are. But I see nothing in my self that is Immutable or Necessary. I might not be, or not be what I am. 'Tis possible there may be Spirits that are not at all like me; and yet I am well assured there can not be any [Spirits that see other Truths or other Laws than those which I see: For every Spirit must needs see that two and two make four, and that one's Friend is to be preferr'd before one's Dog: Therefore it is necessary to conclude, that the Reason which all Minds do consult, is a necessary and immutable Reason.

30. He argues further from the *Infinity* of the same Reason. The Mind of Man clearly conceives that there are, or may be an infinite number of intelligible Triangles, Tetragons, Pentagons, and other of the like Figures. It does not only conceive that the Ideas of Figures will never be wanting to it, and that it shall always discover new ones, tho' it should eternally apply itself to those sort of Ideas only, but it also perceives Infinity in Extension. The Mind sees clearly that the number which multiplied

tiplied by itself, produces 5, or any of the numbers between 4 and 9, between 9 and 16, between 16 and 25, &c. is a Quantity, a Relation, a Fraction, whose Terms contain more Figures than can be made from one Pole of the World to the other. It perceives clearly that 'tis a Relation such as God only can comprehend, and that 'tis impossible to express it exactly, because to express it requires a Fraction whose two Terms are Infinite. Many like Examples might be assigned; from whence it may be concluded, not only that the Mind of Man is limited, but that the Reason which he consults is Infinite. For, in fine, the Mind clearly sees Infinity in this Reason, tho' it does not comprehend it, since it can compare incommensurable Numbers with one another, and discern their Relations, tho' it cannot compare them with Unity; or to consider only what is most sensible, 'tis plain that the Reason which Man consults is Infinite, since we can never exhaust it, and it has always something to answer upon whatever demand.

31. But now to subsume (for what he has hitherto premised is but one part of the Argument) these are all Divine Characters. And therefore if it be true that the Reason whereof all Men participate, is *Universal, Immutable, Necessary, Infinite*, it is certain that it is not at all different from that of God himself: For it must be an infinite and universal Being only that includes in himself an universal and infinite

infinite Reason. All Creatures are particular Beings, therefore the universal Reason is not Created. No Creatures are Infinite, therefore again Infinite Reason is not a Creature. But the Reason which we consult is not only Universal and Infinite, it is also Necessary and Independent, and in one sense we conceive it as more Independent than God himself: For God cannot act but according to this Reason: He in some sense depends upon it: He must consult and follow it; but God consults none but himself, he depends upon nothing; this Reason therefore is not distinct from himself, it is therefore Co-eternal and Co-substantial with him. We see clearly that God

cannot punish an Innocent; That is, Innocent that he cannot subject * Spirits. Spirits to Bodies, that he is ob-

liged to follow Order. Therefore we see the very Rule, the Order, the Reason, the Wisdom of God: For what other Wisdom than that of God is it possible we should see, when we fear not to say, that God himself is obliged to follow it?

32. But after all, can we conceive a Wisdom that is not the Wisdom of God? *Solomon*, who speaks so well of Wisdom, does he distinguish of two sorts of it? Does he not teach us that the Wisdom which is Co-eternal with God himself, and by which he established that Order which we see in his Works, is the very same Wisdom which presides over all

all Spirits, and which Legislators consult to make just and reasonable Laws? And for this he appeals to the eighth Chapter of the *Proverbs*, and, as I humbly conceive, very pertinently to his purpose: For indeed I find it very difficult not to think that whoever shall attentively read and consider that Chapter (with good part of that which follows) will find these two distinct things very clear and observable in it. 1. That the Wisdom there spoken of, by the Characters which are given of it, appears plainly to be no other than the *Divine Wisdom*, even the *Eternal Word*, the second Person of the Blessed Trinity, who is elsewhere call'd *The Wisdom of God*; not as *in-lighening him Efficiently*, but *Objectively*, as being the *Eternal Object* of his Contemplation and Knowledge, in which he sees *himself*, as being the brightness of his Glory, and the express Image of his Person, and in which he also sees all his *Works*, and all that he *can* work, and calls those things that be not as tho' they were, as being present to him by this his Co-essential Word and Wisdom which has the eternal Reasons and Ideas of them, in whom all Fulness dwells, and in whom are hid all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge, even those *Thesauri rerum Intelligibilium*, those immense and infinite Treasures of intelligible Things, which according to St. *Austin* are contained in the *Wisdom of God.* 2dly. That

De Civ. Dei. Lib.
11. Cap. 10.

this

this Divine Wisdom is represented here as that Wisdom which God consults, and whereby he directs and conducts himself in the ordering of his Works, and also as that very Wisdom which teaches, instructs, and enlightens Men, to which purpose it is very remarkable that the same Person who elsewhere says of himself, *I am Truth*, says here, *I am Understanding*. So that in short God and we are here represented as seeing by the same Light, and that Light as Divine; and he that is the Wisdom of the Father, and was possessed by him in the beginning of his Ways, delights also to

be with the Sons of Men, * tho' in different degrees of Relation, as being the common Light of the World, but the Bridegroom of his Church.

* Which may serve to lay a Foundation for the distinction of the Light of Nature and the Light of Grace. The Light of Nature according

to the Principles of

this Theory, being that Light with which the Divine Word enlightens all Men *objectively* by itself. The Light of Grace that wherewith he enlightens his Church *efficiently* by his Spirit.

33. Upon this occasion, I cannot, without some admiration, remark the strange harmonical Correspondence that is between this Chapter of the *Proverbs*, and the first of St. John's *Gospel*: *In the beginning was the word*, says St. John. Answerably to which says *Solomon*, in the Person of the Divine Wisdom here, *The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his*

his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning or ever the Earth was. When there were no depths I was brought forth, &c. Again, says St. John, The word was with God. And says Wisdom here, then was I by him. Again, says St. John, And the Word was God. Agreeably to which, Wisdom is here said to be brought up with him, whereby she figuratively denotes herself to be Co-eternal, and consequently Co-essential with God. Again, says St. John, All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made. And here also Wisdom is represented as assistant to God, in the Creation of the World, by her Presence. When he prepared the Heavens, I was there, &c. And when he appointed the Foundations of the Earth, then was I by him. That is, in all reasonable Construction, as a Co-assistant for the more orderly Direction, and apt Disposition of his great Work: As is thus handsomly represented by the Christian * Poet.

* Vida.

—Deus aethereos cum mundi excuderet Orbes,
Aerasq; plagas conflaret: Cumq; liquores,
Et circumfusas laticum suspenderet undas,
Libraretq; suo tellurem pondere nixam,
Inq; vicem validis connecteret omnia vincis,
Ipse aderas Operi indulgens, nutu omnia firmans,
Omnia componens. Sine te nihil: Omnis ubiq;
Est per te Decor, & rerum pulcherrimus Ordo.

Again,

Again, says St. John, *In him was Life*. And says Wisdom here, *Whoso findeth me, findeth Life*. But St. John farther says, that this Life was the Light of Men. And here the Divine Wisdom echoes it to him again, *Counsel is mine, and sound Wisdom, I am Understanding*. By me *Kings reign, and Princes decree Justice*. *I lead in the way of Righteousness, in the midst of the Paths of Judgment*. St. John says again, that this Light shineth in the Darkness. And Wisdom is here represented, as crying and calling to the Simple and Foolish, *O ye Simple, understand Wisdom, and ye Fools be ye of an understanding Heart*. As also in the Chapter following, as inviting Fools to her Intellectual Banquet, *Whoso is simple, let him turn in hither*: As for him that wants Understanding, she says to him, *Come eat of my Bread, and drink of the Wine which I have mingled*. In fine, St. John proclaims the Eternal Word as the true Light of the World, that lighteth every Man that comes into it: In answer to which, besides what was already noted to this purpose, Wisdom here farther says, that her Delights are with the Sons of Men. And accordingly she exhorts them to hearken unto her, to hear Instruction, and be wise, leaving with them this encouraging Benediction, *Blessed is the Man that heareth me, watching daily at my Gates, waiting at the Posts of my Doors*; that is, (if my Reader will accept of my Paraphrase upon the Text) that minds and heeds me, consults, studies, and contemplates me, and

and attends constantly to my inward Light, waiting for the pure Answers of Interior Truth, and diligently improving all Opportunities, which he enjoys under the Direction of so near and so Divine a Teacher, of growing wiser and better.

34. But that which I would here principally remark, is, that as the Harmonical Consent of these two Divine Writers in so many Counterparts, shews, that they spoke from the same Spirit; so it seems a good Presumption, that they also spoke concerning the same *thing*, and that *Wisdom* here with *Solomon* is the very same that the *Word* is with *St. John*: As also that *St. John's Word* signifies no other than *Solomon's Wisdom*, according to the better Importance of the Original, λόγος, which certainly does not answer to *Verbum* (the Counterpart of that being ἔννοια) but to *Sermo* or *Ratio*, however the Latin Interpreters, without any reason from either Grammar or Divinity, came to render it otherwise. And I farther note that in both they are *Substantial*, and in both *Divine*, and that this Divine, Substantial Wisdom, or Word (or I take them to be only different Expressions for one and the same thing) are in both made to be the *Light of Men*. And accordingly the Philosophy of *Solomon's Devotion* is no less considerable, than the Piety of it, who when he prays for Wisdom, particularizes that very Divine Wisdom which is here consider'd, as being with God, and co-assistent to him in the For-

mation of his Works, *Give me Wisdom that sitteth by thy Throne.* And again, says he, *Wisdom was with thee, which knoweth thy Works, and was present when thou madest the World, O send her out of thy Holy Heavens, and from the Throne of thy Glory, &c.* Wherein the wise Prince, no less Philosophical than Devout, seems to desire to have a more intimate Union with the Divine *Word*, so as to partake more liberally of the Communications of its Ideal Light and Truth, or else it will not be very easie to put any intelligible Sense upon what he says, so as to make him pray not only with the *Spirit*, but with the *Understanding* also.

35. And indeed to what *Word* or *Wisdom* should he address himself for Illumination, but to that *Word* and *Wisdom* which has the Ideas of all things, and in which shine those Eternal and Immutable Truths that result from those Ideas? Philosophers may talk of their *Verbum Mentis*, the *Word* of the *Mind*; but there is no *Word* of the *Mind* that I know of, but the *Word* of the *Eternal Mind*. For sure that *Word* which is the *Wisdom* of *God*, is fittest to be also the *Light* of *Men*. Even that Divine *Word* which was incarnate, that was first with *God* and afterwards with us, that became sensibl because we were not wholly intellectual, and that put on a *Cloud* of *Flesh*, because we could not so well endure to behold his naked *Glory* full of *Grace* and *Truth*. For then it was that

the

the great Intelligible *Sun* suffer'd an Abatement of his Splendor to accommodate his Light to the infirmities of our Eyes, and (to allude to an Expression of St. *Austin*) became, as it were, a *Moon* to comfort and refresh our Night. *Carnis Ma-*

In Psal. 73.

nifestatione tanquam Luna consolans Noctem. And that Divine Wisdøm who was Bread above to the Angels (to allude to another Expression of his) became Milk below for the Nourishment of our Infant Understandings.

Oportebat ut Mensa illa Ange-

*De Temp. Sermo
127.*

lorum lactesceret, & ad Par-

vulos perveniret.

36. But now we talk of the Angels, it will be a thing of some importance to the Point in Hand, to remark, that it is the positive and express Doctrine of St. *Austin*, that God is the Light of their Understandings, and particularly that they see things in his Divine Word or Wisdom.

De Diversis Sermis

9.

Nunquid Angelis Codices sunt

Necessarii? Videndo legunt, vident enim ipsam veritatem, & illo Fonte satiantur unde nos irrogamur. Here he supposes Angels to have no need of Books, because they read by seeing; that is by seeing God (for otherwise all reading is by seeing) whose Vision illuminates them, as being the Vision of Truth itself. Again, speaking of the Word that was in the Beginning, that was with God, and that was God, he breaks out into this passionate strain of Divine

*De Diversis Sermo
49.*

Rhetorick, O Cibus & Panis
Angelorum, de te implentur
Angeli, de te satiantur & non

fastidiunt. De te vivunt, de te sapiunt, de te beati sunt. *Ubi es propter me? In Diversorio angusto, in pannis, in præsepio, &c.* Here he makes the Angels to depend upon the *Word*, as much for their Light and Knowledge, as for their Life and Happiness. Again, speaking of the Creation of Angels as reducible under that Text, *Let there be Light, and there was Light*, he has

*De Civ. Dei, Lib.
11. Cap. 9.*

these remarkable words, *Si recte in hac luce creatio intelligi-
tur Angelorum, profecto facti sunt*

*participes lucis æternæ, qua est ipsa incommutabilis
Sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt Omnia, quem
dicimus unigenitum Dei Filium, ut ea luce illumi-
nati quâ Creati fierent Lux, & vocarentur Dies
participatione incommutabilis Lucis & Dei, quod est
verbum Dei, per quod & ipsi, & omnia facta sunt.
Lumen quippe verum quod illuminat omnem ho-
minem in hunc mundum venientem, hoc illuminat
& omnem Angelum mundum, ut sit Lux non in
Seipso, sed in Deo. I cannot stand to mark out
all that may deserve Consideration in this, up-
on many accounts very observable Passage, only
here are three things which every Reader
should observe, 1. In General, that he makes
the Angels not to be Light in themselves. 2.
That according to him they are made par-
takers of the Eternal Light. 3. That that Light
is the immutable Wisdom or Word of God. A-
gain,*

gain, says he, speaking of the
 Angels, *Ab eis consultitur In-
 commutabilis veritas, tanquam* <sup>De Civ. Dei, Lib.
 16. Cap. 6.</sup>

*Lex Eterna in illâ eorum Curiâ Superna. Neq;
 enim sibi ipsis sunt veritas, sed Creatricis participes
 veritatis, ad illam moventur tanquam ad fontem
 vita, ut quod non habent ex ipsis, capiant ex
 ipsa.* Where, besides the notion itself of God's
 being a Light to Angelical Understandings,
 which is obvious to be observ'd, you have
 also the very manner of expressing it, in that
 they are said to *Consult* the immutable Truth.
 To all which I add, That he expressly tells us,

That the Angels do know the Creature in the
 Wisdom of God, as in the Art whereby it is
 made. From these places it

is clear, that according to St. <sup>De Civ. Dei, Lib.
 11. Cap. 29.</sup>

Austin, the Divine Word or
 Wisdom is the Light of Angels, and that they
 see and understand things in it. And so the
 Schools also have thought fit to say after him,
 in the account which they give us of that
 Morning-Knowledge which they ascribe to the
 Angels. Well, but now, if the eternal Word
 and Wisdom of God be the Light of Angels,
 why should it not also be the Light of Men,
 and if they see by it why should not we too?
 It does not seem very Congruous to suppose
 that they should see by one Light, and we by
 another. There is but one Sun for Bodies,
 and why then should there be two for Spirits,
 especially since the same that inlightens the

one may also inlighten the other, were the number of them infinitely greater than it is. It is true indeed, the Angels have in this the advantage of us, that we do not see so well as they, neither as to the clearness, nor as to the extent of our Sight, but methinks we should both see the same *things*, and have the same immediate Object for our Understandings: For otherwise, if the Reason which we consult be not the very same which answers to them, then besides the incongruity of our seeing by different Lights, I would further offer it to be consider'd, whether the same Argument which M. *Malebranche* uses with regard to the *Chinese*, be not every whit as true in respect of the *Angels*; that is, that we cannot be certainly assured that they see the same Truths that we do, and so, for ought we know, they may have an Arithmetick and Geometry quite different from ours, and there may be Sciences of Men and Angels as well as Tongues.

37. But after all, since Wisdom has so liberally furnish'd her Table, why should we straiten her Guests, by confining it to the Angels only, especially since they do not devour what they eat, but what satisfies their intellectual Hunger

St. Auft. de Temp. ger remains as intire as before
Sermo 127. to feed and satisfie ours. *Man-*
ducant Angeli, manducant Su-
perne virtutes, manducant Cœlestes Spiritus, man-
ducant & saginantur, & integrum manet quod eos
satiat & letificat. Wisdom herself cries as if
she

she fear'd her Table would not be sufficiently furnish'd with Guests, *Come eat of my Bread, and drink of the Wine which I have mingled*; and we, it seems, are afraid lest she should have too many, and accordingly very mannerly withdraw: But perhaps with more Modesty than Reason; for the Treasures of Ideal Light are inexhaustible, and the number of Spectators would only add to the *Magnificence*, without indangering the *Sufficiency* of the intellectual Feast. For her Celestial Bread cannot wast, nor can the Springs of her Wine fail. And therefore it seems every way most reasonable to think, that the same Divine Word that is the Light of Angels, inlightens us too, that we all eat of the same Spiritual Meat, and all drink of the same Spiritual Drink: So that in this Sense also *Man does eat Angels Food*. And therefore St. Austin was very consistent with himself when having said, *vident ipsam veritatem*, he immediately adds upon it, *& illo fonte satijsur unde nos * irroga-*
mur. Supposing the same Fountain to be common to both with this only difference, which is only of Degrees, that we have only some refreshing Dews or Sprinklings of that lucid Fountain whereof they enjoy the full Sa-
tiety.

I suppose it should be *irrigamur*, or *irre-
 ramur.*

38. But this Consideration taken from the manner of the Angelical Knowledge holds yet more strongly in respect of the *Divine*. For

as to the manner of that, it is, I think, unquestionably certain, and the Authority of the Schools, as well as the manifold Reason of the thing will allow me to say so, that God is a Light to himself, his own Intelligible Object, and that he sees and knows all things in himself, even in his Eternal and Co-essential *Word*, which is therefore very significantly, and with great propriety said to be his *Wisdom*, as being the

immediate Object of his eternal Contemplation at once * expressive of himself, and of all his Creatures, and containing all those Ideas and immutable Truths which fur-

nish Matter for Science, and are sufficient to employ even an infinite Mind. God therefore understands all things in his *Word*, even as he made all things by his *Word*. But then the same Consideration will return again, tho' perhaps with more force than in the other Case, to make it appear most reasonable that we understand so too. For besides that, that *Word* which is the *Wisdom* of God is in itself fittest (as I noted before) to be the Light of Men, if it be not actually and *de facto* so; but God and we see by different Lights, and that Reason which answers to us when we meditate with Attention, be not the same which he consults, then how are we sure that we see the same Truths that he does, nay, how indeed that we see any Truths at all, and that

we

* *Verbum ejus est, Expressum non solum Patri sed etiam Creaturam.* Aquinas Part 1. Quæst 34. Art. 3.

we are not deceived even in our clearest Perceptions? And what advantage this may give either to the Sceptical against *Science*, or to the Libertin and Profane against *Morality* and *Religion*, I leave to the professed Friends of both to consider, and whether for the avoiding such fatal and ruinous Consequences it be not most advisable to suppose, that God and we see by the same common Light, and that That eternal Word, which is the Wisdom of the Father, is also our Wisdom too, the great intelligible Sun of the whole Rational World, and that true Light that inlightens every Man that comes into this, πνεῦν σοφία ὁ λόγος *S. 8.*

39. Nor need any one fear lest this should place us upon a level with God in respect of Knowledge. There will still be a vast and a sufficient Difference between our way of Understanding and his. 'Tis true indeed, we have upon this Hypothesis the very same *Word* for the immediate Object of our Understandings that God himself has; but this *Word* is ours only by Union of Presence, whereas it is his by Identity of Essence, and accordingly God is said to *possess* the eternal Wisdom, to enjoy it as his own, whereas our Communion with it is expressed by her *delighting to be with the Sons of Men*. Again, we only apprehend that *Word*, and that very imperfectly, which God fully and perfectly comprehends. And again, in the last place, God sees all things in himself; whereas we see things in *Him*; and because we do

do so, tho' it should be allowed that we both see by the same common Light ; yet this is so far from equalizing our way of Understanding with God's, that on the contrary, it most eminently shews how immediately and intirely we depend upon him; and what blind unintelligent Creatures we should be without him, that he is much more necessary to our Minds than the Sun is to our Eyes ; that we should have no Knowledge, nor even so much as Thought, but be all over Intellectual Night and Darkness, if his Divine Light did not shine upon our Understandings. In fine, That we are not sufficient of our selves, as the Apostle speaks, to think any thing as of our selves, but that our *whole* sufficiency is of God. And sure, that which tends so abundantly to set forth our Dependence upon God, must be very ignorantly and impertinently pretended to make us equal with him ; nay, it cannot be pretended to equal us with the *Humane Soul of Jesus Christ*, in whom the fulness of the God-head is said to dwell Bodily, and who by an adorable Confosiation of the Humane Nature with the Divine subsisted by the *Word*, and had a personal Union with it, and so was partaker of its Light without measure. To say, that the Knowledge of Jesus Christ as Man was *Infinite*, would, I conceive, not be convenient. But we may say of it, what the *Cartesians* say of the Extension of the World, that it is *Indefinite*, that tho' we do and must acknowledge some Bounds in it, yet we know

know not well where to fix them, or when to stop. And therefore, tho' the same Divine Word that inlightned him, be suppos'd also to inlighten us; yet there is no Necessity, nor indeed Possibility that it should inlighten us so much as it inlightned him; and therefore we may say what a certain Scholastick Writer of some Account in his time, and that seems no Enemy to the present Hypothesis, quotes from *Hugo de Sancto Victore. Quod*

si omnes hac Sapientia sapiunt *Bradwardin de causa*
Dei, Lib. 3. Cap. 40.
P. 773.
quicunq; sapiunt, multo magis

hac Sapientia sapuit illa anima
qua ipsi Sapientia unita fuit. Nor does it equal us with our Brother-Intelligences the *Angels*, nor yet even with *one another*, since, tho' we are supposed to see all by the same common Light, yet we may partake of it in different degrees, according to the different measure of our Capacities, and the attention wherewith we apply them. And therefore we may say again what the same profound Doctor quotes

from the same Author, *Una Sa-* *Ibid.*

pientia est qua omnes sapiunt, nec tamen uno modo
sapiunt, quia participando sapiunt.

40. We are upon an infinite Subject, and 'tis not to be expected that I should drain it; but there is one Consideration more which I think fit to add, and the rather because I have already made use of it upon another Occasion. It was observ'd before concerning our *Ideas* that they are Objectively Perfective of our Minds, and

and thence deduc'd as a reasonable Conclusion that they were no other than Divine. Now the same may be said as to *Truth*. Man is capable of a twofold Perfection, Moral and Intellectual: And as the Love of good perfects his Mind morally, so the knowledge of Truth perfects it intellectually. But now if Truth were not in itself of a Nature apt to perfect the Mind, 'tis impossible that the knowledge of it should be any Perfection to it, any more than the profoundest Ignorance. The knowledge of an unperfective Object can be no intellectual Perfection, even as the Love of an unperfective Object can be no moral Perfection. For Knowledge is the formal Perfection of the Mind, and all formal Perfection does suppose that which is Objective, even as formal Happiness supposes objective Happiness, that is, something in the Object that is apt to meliorate the Being of him that enjoys it. But now Truth is no otherwise to be enjoy'd than by the knowledge of it; and accordingly that formal Perfection which accrues to the Mind by the knowledge of Truth, must suppose also some Objective Perfection; that is, something in the Nature of Truth that has an aptness to perfect the Nature of him that contemplates it. If then the knowledge of Truth perfects the Mind in the way of Form, Truth itself must be supposed to be Perfective of it in the way of Object. But now nothing can *thus* perfect the Mind, but what is superior to the Mind. Indeed there is no necessity that what

formally

formally perfects the Mind should be superior to it; for an Act or Operation of its own, or a certain Modification of its Being, that which we call a Sentiment or Sensation may be the *formal* Perfection of it. But that which perfects the Mind as an *Object* must of necessity be something that is above it. Therefore the Truth that we see, and in the Perception of which a new Perfection accrues to our Minds, is something superior to the Mind. But now as nothing is below the Mind but Body, so as St. *Austin* observes, nothing is above it but God. *Nihil potenterius ista Creatura que Mens dicitur Rationalis, Nihil bac Creatura sublimius. Quicquid supra istam est, jam Creator est.* ^{Expos. in Evangel. S. Joan. Tract. 23.} Therefore the Truth which we perceive, and become more perfect in the Perception of is something *Divine* in its Nature. Or if you should say, that the *Angels* are of a Nature superior to the rational Mind (tho' you see St. *Austin* was of another Opinion) and consequently that there is no necessity that what is superior to the Mind, should be God; yet this would signify no great matter in the main. For the Argument would but be set a little further off for the present, to return again upon us another way. For as the *Angels* see Truth as well as we; so 'tis certain that the Truth which they see, is a Perfection to their Minds as well as it is to ours. Therefore at least the Truth which the *Angels* see is Divine. And then, since, as I noted before, it is not reasonable

sonable to think, that they should see one sort of Truth and we another; from hence we are furnish'd with a very rational Ground to infer again, that therefore the Truth which we see, is also Divine.

41. But as concerning the Divinity of Truth, there are many other Arguments to demonstrate that such as are taken from its Necessity, Eternity, Immutability, Independency, &c. as I have shewn at large in the former Part of this Theory, to which the Reader is desired to have recourse. In the mean time to reconcile him the better to this, I shall present him with a Passage out of M. Malebranche, wherein he touches upon the same Ground upon which we last argued, tho' he expresses himself something

*De la Recherche de
la Verite. Tom. 2.
Cap. 5.*

otherwise, and has not fill'd out the Argument in all the Parts of it. *The whole World*

is convinc'd (says he) that the Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Virtue make the Mind more perfect, and that the blindness of the Mind, and the disorder of the Heart make it more imperfect. The Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Virtue then can be nothing else but the Union of the Mind with God, and a kind of Possession of him. And so the blindness of the Mind and the disorder of the Heart can likewise be nothing else but the separation of the Mind from God, and the Union of that Mind to something that is beneath it, that is to say to the Body, since 'tis this only Union which can make it imperfect and miserable.

Therefore

Therefore to know Truth is to know God, &c. And indeed this I take to be the reason by the way, why the knowledge of Truth does conduce to the Perfection of our Mind, even because it is a sort of Union with God, and does in some degree put us in possession of him who is infinitely Perfect himself, and the source of all Perfection: For as we argued *thus* before from the Effect to the Cause; Truth is Perfective of the Mind, therefore it is Divine: So we may proceed, and that more directly thus from the Cause to the Effect; Truth is Divine, and therefore it is Perfective of the Mind. For if the Question were ask'd, why is Truth Perfective of the Mind that contemplates it? The Answer, I think, must be because it is *Divine*, or if that be not the reason of it, I believe it will not be very easy to assign any, that shall satisfie an attentive Enquirer that examines what Answers he receives. But then since the Divinity of Truth is that which makes it Perfective of the Mind, if the Consequence of this be that no other Truth is really Perfective of it but only what is *Divine*, even that Truth which is founded upon the Divine Ideas, as being the Habitude and Relation that is between them, and accordingly is Necessary, Eternal and Immutable as those Ideas are. I say, if it hence follows, that this Ideal, Necessary and Immutable Truth be the only Soul-perfective Truth, and that all other sorts of Truth, how concerning soever in point of *Usefulness* or *Interest* to be known, can yet

yet give no real Perfection or *Intellectual Improvement* to the Mind that knows them, the *Learned*, who lay so much stress upon the knowledge of these other Truths, valuing them not only for their use (for that in many Cases is allow'd) but for their intrinsick Excellency, and the intellectual Accomplishment and Improvement which the knowledge of them derives upon the Mind, are humbly desir'd to excuse me if I cannot in their favour either alter the Nature, or break the Connexion of things. It seems to me a clear Principle) and, I think it

is in great measure * St. *Austin's*) that the Soul cannot become in any degree more Perfect or Happy, but by the Possession or Participation of God, and therefore as those

Truths which perfect the Soul, must be something Divine; so those Truths which are not Divine (as none but Necessary and Ideal Truths are) cannot perfect the Soul. And therefore, as those that know them ought not to think themselves the wiser, or the more Intellectually improved in their Minds, for the knowledge of them; so those who know them not, ought not, if they would conduct their Studies by Reason, to apply themselves to the knowledge of them, but only upon the account of that accidental Usefulness and Concernment in our Interest which they may sometimes have, and not upon the account of their intrinsick Excellency,

* *Non facit animam beatam nisi unus Deus. Participacione Dei fit beata. Expos. in Evangel. Joan. Taet 23.*

Excellency or Essential Perfectiveness of the Understanding, which is none at all.

42. The Truth then which we see is Divine, as Perfective of the Mind, and is therefore Perfective of the Mind that sees it, because it is Divine. And this perhaps may be one Reason (not to exclude those others which are given by Suarez in his Consideration of this Question, *Unde Oriatur Difficultas veritatem afferendi*) why we meet with so much Difficulty in the contemplation of Truth, and must use so much Attention and Application of Thought to see her as she is in herself, even because of the *Divinity* of her Nature, and the *Corruption* of ours, which makes that at present, we cannot unite ourselves to God without Pain and considerable Effort, as M. *Malebranche* expresses it. But however this be, this at least will bear a more positive Assertion, that if there be not some Truth that in the reality of its Nature is Divine, it will be impossible to give an intelligible Account of a plain Distinction (plain I mean as to the thing, tho' not quite so obvious as to the Reason and Manner) and such as is acknowledged by all the World, and that is the great distinction of *necessary* and *contingent Truth*. But supposing some sort of Truth to be Divine, as resulting from the Divine Ideas, and *formally* consisting in that Relation which is between those Ideas, tho' *really* the same with them, this distinction will be very distinctly accountable:

For we may conceive the matter thus ; Truth,

See more to this purpose in the former part of this Theory, p. 327. See also M. Malebranche *Recherches de la verite.* Tom. 2. Lib. 6. Cap. 5.

according to the formality of it, consists in Relation. There are then as many sorts of Truth as there are of Relations ; and as we may conceive Relations of three sorts, that of one Idea to another Idea, that be-

tween a Thing and its Idea ; and lastly, that which is between Thing and Thing ; so in proportion to this we may also conceive three sorts of Truths ; that which respects Ideas, that which respects Things, and their Ideas, and that which respects Things only. But now these three sorts of Truth, if more generally considered, will lay us a Foundation for that two-fold Order or Distinction of Truth which we are inquiring about. For 'tis plain, that of these three sorts of Truth, those that are between the Divine Ideas themselves are Necessary, Eternal and Immutable, as the Ideas themselves are upon which they are founded ; and so we have the former part of the Distinction. But then as for those Truths which respect created things, or which respect Ideas and those things (for both these come here under one general Consideration) 'tis as plain that they are both Contingent, and subject to all that change, to which the Creature itself is liable, since the Contingency of one of the Terms is sufficient to found a Contingent Relation or Truth. And so we have also the latter part of

the

Part II. *the Ideal World, &c.* 483
the Distinction, which is now, I think, abundantly clear as well as intire.

43. And as these Divine Ideal Truths are (as we have shewn) the only Truths that perfect the Mind; so, as M. *Male-branche* very happily observes, *Recherche de la vertu*. Tom. 2. Lib. 6. Chap. 5. which we endeavour to discover by the sole Exercise of the *Mind*. For we generally make use of our Senses to discover others. We make use of our Eyes and Hands to assure ourselves of the Existence of Things, and to find out the Relations of Equality or Inequality, which are between them. They are only *Ideas* whose Relations the Mind can infallibly know by it self alone, and without the use of the Senses. In which curious and very important Remark these two distinct Things are contained. 1st. That we discover Ideal Truths by the sole Operation of the Mind: For thus we know and can demonstrate, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, not by measuring them (for that way would be as unaccurate as 'tis unartificial) but from an intellectual View and Consideration of the Ideal Natures of these things. 2^{dly}, That these are the *only* Truths which we can so discover: In all other Truths our Senses are concern'd, and we must be beholden to our Eyes, and to our Ears, and to our Hands, for the knowledge we have of them; and a Man would be ridiculous that should go to prove by

mere Reason, that such a one won the Plate at a Horse-Race. In Truths of *Right* we need consult our Reason only: But Truths of *Fact* we must learn by Sense; for as to these, our inward Master that teaches us in the School of the Breast, will give us no answer, tho' we should consult his Divine Oracle never so long: For indeed he has nothing to do with these Truths of Fact, contingent mutable Truths, as not belonging to his Divine Ideas, whereas the Truths of Right, Necessary and Immutable Truths, are no other than the eternal Relations of those very Ideas. And this indeed I take to be the Reason (or else it will be a difficult undertaking to assign any) why necessary and immutable Truths are knowable by the sole intellectual Application of the Mind, and Contingent ones not, *viz.* because these necessary Truths are the Relations of Ideas, and those Ideas are Divine, and our Souls having an Union with these Divine Ideas, or with that Divine Word or Wisdom of God wherein these Ideas are, we need only to apply our Minds to perceive those Ideas which are contained therein, as also those Truths which result from those Ideas. Or in other words, these Truths, by reason of the Divinity of their real Nature, being intimately present to our Minds, there needs only an attentive Application of the Mind to discover them, and to let us into the knowledge of them. But now it being quite otherwise in Contingent Truths; that is, these Truths being not the Relations of

of Ideas, nor contain'd in the Divine Omnipresent Word, nor consequently having this presential Union with our Minds, which the others may be conceived to have, hence it comes to pass that the sole Application of the Mind in the way of rational Speculation will not serve to discover these; but we must come to the knowledge of them some other way, *viz.* by *sensible Information*. Now if this Account be rational (and the intelligent Reader is desired very attentively to weigh it before he pronounces whether it be or no) this again will prove that 'tis by the Union which we have with the eternal Word or Wisdom, that universal Reason that inlightens all Spirits, that we become capable of thinking, that the Truth which we see is Divine, and that the knowledge which we have of Truth, is, in some degree, a participation of the Divine Nature, and a kind of Possession of God himself.

44. But then if so, not to let a thing of this Importance pass without some Reflection, how will this Consideration redound to the *Honour* of the *Sciences*, and serve to advance the Dignity and Glory of them? For as * formal Science, or Science as in the Mind, is nothing else but a clear Perception of Truth: So Objective Science, or Science, as in the Thing, is really that very Truth itself which we perceive. And then since that Truth is of a Divine Extraction, and has a real

* See more concerning this twofold Distinction of Science in the former Part, Page 127.

Divinity in its Nature, what a Divine Thing must all *true* Science be, and what a sublime and noble Employment to be exercised in the Study and Contemplation of it? And how worthy of a rational Mind, of a thinking Creature, who is made and designed for Truth, and therefore naturally desires to *know*, and when he does so dwells with Prudence, and converses with *Wisdom*, sits down with her at her intellectual Feast, and eats the Bread (even the living Bread of Truth) and drinks the Wine which she has mingled. For the Study of the Sciences is a natural Abstraction of the Mind from the Creature, and a Conversion of it towards God and his Divine Light, and so much as any Man comprehends of them, so much he comprehends of the Divine Nature, and has a kind of Beatifick Possession and Enjoyment of it. For to apply ones self to the Sciences, is the same as to contemplate Truth, and to contemplate Truth is indeed to contemplate God. Divinity then is a larger Study than Men are ordinarily aware of; there is something of it diffused throughout all the

Sciences, and a good Philosopher is a *Natural* Divine as well as a lover of God; which may serve to shew us, by the

^{"Tis St. Austin's saying, *Verus Philosopher est Amator Dei.*} way, with how little Knowledge and true Light (how flaming soever their Zeal may be) those People would talk who should go to cry down and disparage Science under the opprobrious Terms of *vain Philosophy*, and *Carnal Reason*, &c.

It

It is true indeed, there is such a thing as vain Philosophy, and there is but too much of it in the World, but then 'tis that which is Chimerical and Imaginary, and is not really what it pretends to be, that which the Apostle calls *Science falsely so call'd*. And this Wisdom of the World is indeed Folly, and that not only with God, but even with truly wise and considering Men. And there is also such a thing as *Carnal Reason*, even that which the Apostle calls a *Flebly Mind*; that is, a Mind that is under the Power and Dominion of Carnal Lusts. And there is also another sort of Carnal Reason, and that is when the Understanding (for Reason must be here taken Subjectively for the Power that Reasons, since to say, that Objective Reason, or Truth is in any sense Carnal, is Nonsense) is so far under the possession of sensible Prejudices and Impressions, as to be blinded and misled by them in the search of Truth. This latter Reason may be said (to distinguish the better of these things) to be Philosophically Carnal, as the other may be said to be morally so. And thus far there may be vain Philosophy and carnal Reason; and because there is a Philosophy that is vain, there is the more need of a true Philosophy to discover the Vanity and Deceit of it. But to say, that true Science is vain, if you speak of formal Science, is a Contradiction, if of Objective, it is so and more: For Objective Science is the same as *Truth*; and to say, that *Truth* is Vain or Carnal, is not only

false and contradictory, but, at least in the Consequence of it, *Impious* and *Heretical*. They therefore who talk against Science say they know not what, and have nothing but the want of it to plead their Excuse. Nor yet are they that *respect* it altogether faultless, since they court it generally as a Humane Accomplishment, without regarding the Divinity of that Truth which they contemplate, or returning Thanks to the eternal Wisdom for the Living Bread wherewith she feeds them. Indeed the Learned and the Ignorant joyn in this, that the one are not sensible of what they *want*, nor the other of what they *have*. And therefore M. *Malebranche* had but too much reason for this Reflection. ‘It is true, that there are a great many People who are perswaded that God is their true Good, who love him as their All, and who ardently desire to increase and fortify that Union which they have with him. But there are but very few who evidently understand, that to know Truth, is to unite themselves to God according to their natural Powers; that it is a kind of Possession of God himself to contemplate the true Ideas of Things; and that the abstracted views of certain general and immutable Truths, which govern all the particular ones, are the Efforts of the Mind, quitting the Body, and uniting itself to God. Metaphysicks, Pure (I suppose he means Speculative) Mathematicks, and all the universal Sciences which regulate and include the particular

' particular ones, as the universal Being includes
' all particular Beings, appear Chimerical to al-
' most all Men, even to those that are Good and
' Pious, as well as to those who have no Love for
' God. Insomuch that I dare hardly say, that
' the Application to these Sciences is the Appli-
' cation of the Mind to God, and that the most
' Pure and Perfect that one is naturally capable
' of. And that 'tis in the view of the intelligi-
' ble World, which these Sciences have for
' their Object, that God himself knows and pro-
' duces this sensible World, from which Bodies
' receive their Life, as Spirits live upon the o-
' ther.

45. He says well, *Live upon the other*: For the Life of the Soul is *Thought*, as the Life of the Body is *Motion*; for I know of no other Life that Body can be conceived to have. And when Spirits think *well*; that is, when the Perceptions of the Understanding are just and clear, and the Consentings of the Will are Regular and Orderly, then the Soul is not only in *Life* but in *Health*; a state or manner of Being which is attended with a Pleasure, which those who have the Sense and inward Feeling of it, only know. And as that which supplies Nourishment to the Life of the Body, is said to be the *Food* of the Body; so that which nourishes and maintains the Life of the Soul, may, in proportion, be said to be the *Food* of the Soul. And then since the Life of the Soul consists in *Thought*, that which is the immediate Object
of

of that Thought, must be the true and proper Food of this intellectual Life. And then again, since, according to the present Hypothesis, the intelligible World with its Ideas and immutable Truths, is supposed to be that Object, it will therefore, upon the same Supposition, be a proper way of speaking (perhaps more proper than figurative) to say, that these Divine Ideas and Ideal Truths are the Food of the Soul, and that the Soul lives upon the Intelligible, as truly as the Body does upon the natural and sensible World. And accordingly, I cannot but think

Prov. 9. it very remarkable, not only that the eternal Wisdom should

talk of killing her Beasts, and furnishing her Table, and invite Men to eat of her Bread, and drink of the Wine which she had mingled, but that he who was that very eternal Word and Wisdom, and who also expressly affirms,

Job. 6. that he is the *Truth*, should else-
where call himself *Bread*, and the

Bread of God, and the Bread that came down from Heaven, the Bread of Life, yea, and the Living Bread. And should also so expressly speak of our eating him, and feeding upon him. For not to exclude what other Theological Senses are usually put upon these Expressions, it must, I think, be allow'd, that they strike in no less surprizingly than agreeably with this Ideal Hypothesis, according to which the Divine Word or Wisdom is the true Spiritual Bread upon which the Soul feeds and lives, as being the immediate

immediate Object of those her intellectual Operations wherein her Life is supposed to consist. And therefore St. Austin makes the Word to be the Food of *Rational Creatures*, *Rationa-lis Creatura Verbo illo tanquam optimo cibo suo pasci-
tur*. *De lib. Arbitrio.* Lib. 3. Cap. 10.

And particularly to be the Bread of Angels: So that, according to him, the whole Intellectual World, Men and Angels, feed and live upon this Bread, this Living, this Immortal, this ever Satisfying, never Perishing Bread of Truth, which is that true Celestial *Manna* wherewith God feeds his *Israel* both in Heaven and in Earth, both in Time and in Eternity.

46. And thus having shewn upon what rational Grounds this Ideal Hypothesis stands, by pointing out some of the chiefest Arguments that may be alledged in its favour. I shall now, for the prevention of all misunderstanding, and such numerous, but unconcerning Objections as may thence arise (for indeed I think those that are, or may be here urged, will be found generally to proceed from a wrong apprehension of that which is truly the Point in Question, and so to conclude quite besides it) add a few things by way of *Explanation* of it. I am not ignorant, that the more Methodical and Artificial way is first to state the right meaning of a Question before we proceed to the proving of either of its Parts. But I should not have been so easily Intelligible in giving the right State of a Question which depends upon so many things, if

if the rational Considerations had not been pre-mised. First, because in those rational Considerations a great many things are contained, which concern the right understanding of it, and which now I need only hint at, whereas otherwise I must have laid them out more at large. Upon which Consideration, if I have made a little bold with the Laws of exact Order and Method for my Reader's Convenience as well as my own, I hope he will pardon me, since to him it cannot be very material in what Order the State of the *Question* (or as now perhaps it ought rather to be call'd, the Explanation of the *Conclusion*) proceeds, so long as he has such an account of it as may serve to let him into an exact Comprehension of what is truly meant and intended by it. By which means he will be the better able to judge both of the Arguments on one side, and of the Objections on the other.

47. When therefore we speak of our seeing or understanding Things in God (that we may not put any thing either upon our selves or others, but what is clear and distinct) the meaning precisely is, as we expressed it at the first, that the Divine Ideas, that is, those Ideas of things which are in God, whereby he knows things, and whereby he produced them, that those very Ideas are the Ideas whereby we understand: Which, if we resolve it into a more explicit Sense, will include these two things. 1. That the Divine Ideas are themselves the immediate Object

Object of our Thoughts and intellectual Perceptions. 2. That other things may be said to be so far (only) seen or perceived by us, as we see those Ideas which represent them. For indeed the Divine Ideas as they are the *Immediate*; 'o strictly speaking are they the *only* true and proper Objects of Thought. As for other things, they cannot in the severity of the Expression, be said to be seen or perceived at all. For when we say, that we see them in their Ideas, all that we can reasonably be supposed to mean, is, that we see them so far forth as we see their Ideas: So that still 'tis not the things themselves, but the Ideas of them which we truly and properly see. And how strange soever this may sound or appear, all those who suppose things to be seen not immediately by themselves, but by their Ideas (as I think the generality of Philosophers do) must be obliged to say the same, *viz.* That they are the *Ideas* of things only which are strictly perceived by us, let those Ideas be of what kind soever you will please to suppose them, since if the things themselves were so seen or perceived, there would be no need of any Ideas at all. All that is peculiar here, is, that these Ideas being in our way supposed to be *Divine*, we are consequently to say, that the proper Objects of our Thought are the *Divine* Ideas. So that according to this Hypothesis, when 'tis said, that we see the *material* World, or any particular part of it in the *intelligible* World, the meaning is not as if the *material*

terial World, or that particular part of it were really and properly seen by us. No, as 'tis the intelligible World which upon this supposition, is the immediate Object of the Mind ; so that *Sun* which we really see, is not that Sun which we turn our bodily Eyes towards. But the Sun which we really see is the *Intelligible Sun*, or the Idea of the Sun. But as for that Sun which our Eyes regard, that as being material and far distant from us, neither is nor can be any otherwise seen by us, than as the Idea of it is presented to our intellectual view : Which therefore is the sole real Object of the Mind, and consequently the only thing we can properly be said to *see*.

48. But for the prevention of all gross and confused Apprehensions, which our Imagination may be apt to suggest to us in this Matter, it is necessary I should further note, and the Reader very heedfully observe, that tho' the Divine Ideas are here supposed to be the Ideas by which we understand, yet this Hypothesis is not so to be conceived as if we did see things in the intelligible World, according as they appear to us in that sensible view which we have of them. No, we see things in the intelligible World, as they are in the intelligible World. But we must not imagine that they are there as they appear to us. No, they are there only by their Ideas ; and consequently 'tis by the Ideas of them that we see them. We see nothing therefore in the Intelligible World relating to things

things out of it, but only the pure and mere Ideas of those things. But things do not appear to us so as they are there, no, nor yet so as they are truly in themselves. The reason of which is, because (as has been remarked before) in the view which we have of sensible Objects, * there is Sentiment as well as Idea. As suppose, in the view of Body there is the

* See Conversations Chretiennes, *Examen* 3. Page 79.

Sentiment of Colour, and the Idea of Extension. Or, when we look suppose on the Sun, there is the Idea of a Circle, and the Sentiment of Light. The Idea represents the pure Essence of the Thing which we are said to see, the Sentiment, perhaps, is a Mark or Indication of its Existence, it being not easie to assign a Reason why God should touch us with a Sentiment upon his exhibiting to us such an Idea, but only to admonish us of the existence of that thing whereof we have an Idea, or that That Idea which he presents to us does represent something Created and actually existing out of himself. And of this the Sentiment may be a kind of natural Mark, as inducing us to believe that the thing perceiv'd is the cause of it, because, upon the presence of the thing to our Minds we have the Sentiment. And this, perhaps, is the reason why these things go together in our Perceptions of sensible Objects. But go together they certainly do, and because they do so, our Sense and Imagination so far impose upon our Understanding,

derstanding, that we confound them one with another, Cloath our Ideas with our Sentiments, or if you will assume our Sentiments into our Ideas as essential Parts of them, and so out of both make up as it were one intire sensible Object. And from this confuse mingling of our Sentiments with our Ideas, it is that things (which we judge of by the Ideas we have of them) come to be invested with certain *Qualities* as we call them, and put on all that sensible Appearance wherewith our Fancies dress them up to us, and wherein we are so accustom'd to consider them, that we hardly know how to abstract from it. But abstract from it we must if we will consider things rightly. 'Tis certain, that God does not see things according to those sensible Appearances which we have of them in himself: Nor do we see them so in him: For he sees them by their Ideas, and so according to this Hypothesis do we. But they are not in their Ideas as they appear to us, no nor in their own real Natures. The short then is, we see nothing in the Intelligible World but the pure Ideas of things, and all the rest we *feel*. And if you will have it in one word a just distribution of each, I think it is this, that the Idea we see in God, but the Sentiment we feel in our selves. And therefore to this

*Recherche de la Vé-
rite.* Tom. 1. Lib.
3. Cap. 6.

purpose says Mr. Malebranche, *Tho' I say that we see material and sensible Things in God, it must be well observ'd, that I do not say that we feel them,*

them, or have the Sensations of them in God, but only that we have them from God who acts in us; for God well knows sensible things, but he does not feel them. When we perceive any sensible Object, there is in our Perception, Sentiment, and pure Idea. The Sentiment is a Modification of our own Soul, and 'tis God that causes it in us: And he can cause it tho' he has it not, because he sees in the Idea which he has of our Soul, that it is capable of it. As for the Idea which is found join'd with the Sentiment, that is in God, and we see it because it is his pleasure to discover it to us. And God joins the Sentiment to the Idea, when the Objects are present, to the end that we may believe them so to be, and so may enter into such Sentiments and Passions as we ought to have in relation to them. To which, as being a full and satisfactory Account of the Matter, I have no more to add, but only from hence further to note,

49. That this will help us to understand how Material, Mutable and Corruptible Things may be said to be seen in God, without imputing any of these Imperfections to him. 'Tis certain there is nothing Material, nothing Mutable, nothing Corruptible in God, and how then can such things be said to be seen in him? There is indeed in this some appearance of difficulty. 'Tis easie enough to conceive that things of an immutable Nature, such as *Ideas* and *eternal Truths* may be seen in God, as indeed it seems necessary to conceive that they must; for where should they be seen else? But as to mutable

K k Things,

Things, to suppose the same of them, will seem perhaps a hard saying, and such as every one will not well know how to receive. But 'tis but strictly to attend to what is meant in this Hypothesis by that way of speaking, and the difficulty vanishes. For tho' these things which are of a Nature so vastly different from the Divine, should be supposed to be seen in God, yet 'tis no otherwise than as they *are* in God. And as they are in God by their Ideas, so 'tis by those Ideas that we are supposed to see them. The seeing them therefore in God signifies no more than that the Ideas of them which are in God, are perceived by us, or that we see that in God which refers to them. So that, properly speaking, we see only the *Ideas* as was said before, they being the immediate Objects that terminate our Intellectual View, and consequently we see nothing really in God but what is indeed *Immutable* (for the Intelligible Essences of things are so) tho' that *Immutable* which we see in God be representative of something mutable that is out of him. There is therefore according to this way of understanding it (which is the true sense of this Ideal Hypothesis) no more real inconvenience in supposing *Mutable*, than there is in supposing *Immutable* Things to be seen in God, since even when we are said to see the former, that whereby we see it, and consequently that which we properly see, is always the latter. But how then, you'll say, are the former seen by us? Why in a ~~secondary~~ and less

less proper Sense, inasmuch as we are supposed to see that which intelligibly represents them; For 'tis still to be remembred, that according to this Hypothesis, the *Intelligible World* is always the immediate Object of our Perception, even in the view which we have of the sensible, and that because we see the Sensible by the Intelligible. And therefore if St. *Austin* confined the Vision of Things in God, only to immutable and incorruptible things, or at least made mention only of such, and that lest the supposition of our seeing mutable Things in God, should imply some Imperfection in him, I think it was an unnecessary scruple: For besides that God must be supposed to see such things in himself or else to be ignorant of them (which would certainly be one of the greatest Imperfections that we could affix to him) if the Ideas of mutable Things are in God, as they must be, or else they could not have been Created by him, where is the real inconvenience in saying, that mutable Things are seen in God, since they are supposed to be seen only by those Ideas? But now as to the Ideas of mutable Things being in God, therein St. *Austin* is express. *Apud te rerum Omnia instabilium, stant causa, & rerum Omnia mutabilium immutabiles manent Origines, & Omnia, irrationabilium & temporalium semperna vivunt Rationes.* And therefore why he should stick to say, that those things are seen in God, whose Ideas he confesses to be

*Confes. Lib. 1.
Cap. 6.*

in him, I see no reason, if indeed he did stick at it. For tho' the things be mutable, yet the Ideas of them are (as he says) immutable, and since they are seen by those Ideas, still that which we really see in God is supposed to be Immutable. And therefore it need be no matter of Question or Debate, whether mutable Things, or only immutable Things are seen in God, since rightly understood both suppositions will resolve into one.

*Reponse au livre
de Mr. Arnauld des
vraies & des Fausses I-
dees. Chap. 7. Pag.
103.*

50. And accordingly Mr. Malebranche in his Debate with M. Arnauld undertakes, by Consideration, not much un-

like these to reconcile a Difficulty that may arise from the *apparent* Difference that is between St. Austin and himself, with relation to the Point now under Consideration: For St. Austin, says he, does not say, that we see sensible Objects in God, but only immutable Natures, as Numbers, and intelligible Extension. I do not say the things which are numbered, nor that Extension which is material: Whereas I have affirm'd that we see in God all things universally which we see by Idea. Now to make it plainly appear, that notwithstanding the seeming diversity of these two Sentiments, there is yet no essential Difference between them, he remarks from the place last quoted out of his Research of Truth and some others, That 'twas always his Supposition that in the Perception which we have of Bodies, there was

was both Sentiment and pure Idea, the Sentiment of Colour, and the Idea of Extension, or, as he calls it, intelligible Extension. And that we see in God the intelligible Extension, and feel in ourselves the Colour, with relation suppose to the Sun, or an Horse, or an intelligible Tree. But now, even according to St. *Austin* Intelligible Extension, which is the Object of Geometry, the Idea by which all Bodies are known, and according to which they were all Created, is no less than Numbers of a Nature Immutable, Necessary, Eternal, and which one cannot see but in God. And by consequence, says he, there is at the bottom no difference between his Sentiment and mine. But that which hindred that Holy Doctor from speaking as I have done, was, That having that Prejudice upon him, that Colours are in the Objects, since we see not Objects but with Colours, he thought that 'twas the Object itself that we see. He could not therefore say, that we saw those Colours in God, which are not at all of a Nature Immutable, Intelligible, and common to all Minds, but a sensible and particular Modification of the Soul, and, according to St. *Austin*, a *Quality* spread upon the Surface of Bodies. But certainly if St. *Austin* had thought, that to see a Tree for instance, it would be sufficient, that God should make us have a Sentiment of Green annex'd after a certain manner to that intelligible Extension, which all Men conceive as clearly as they do Numbers,

he would not have been at all afraid of admitting in God something corruptible or subject to change, in supposing the Ideas of his Works to be the Objects of our Perceptions, when we look upon those his Works: For yet once more, I do not say that we see in God Colours, of which our own Modalities are representative; but intelligible Extension, an immutable Nature, according to St. *Austin*, and to which this Colour is referr'd, or is annex'd by the Laws of Union of Soul and Body, to the end that we may judge that there are Bodies which have some Relation to us, &c. Which account I think to be most nicely fine, and sufficient to satisfie any one that wants neither Penetration nor Reflection to understand it. But the Matter is Subtil, and the Reader must bring some Attention with him as well as the Writer, or else tho' one write never so clearly and intelligibly (which I take to be in a high degree the Talent and Character of this truly great Man) one is not secure of being always understood. And yet the Writer must bear the blame, and be thought obscure, when oftentimes the true fault is either want of Capacity, or want of Attention in the Reader. And 'tis the lot of thoughtful Writers oftentimes to meet with cursory Readers.

51. But for the setting this Theory right in the apprehensions of all that shall think it worthy of their Consideration, there are one or two things more which I am concern'd to mind them

them of. One is, that altho' it be here supposed as the most Rational; and indeed only conceivable Account of the manner of humane Understanding, that the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we understand, as being the immediate Objects of the Mind, yet it will not hence follow, that we see the very Essence of God, because we see all things in him according to the above-stated Sense of that Expression. For tho' the Ideas that are in God are of his Essence, or not any thing really different from it, and so in that Sense may be said to be the Essence of God, according

to that of *Aquinas*, *Idea in Deo* *Part 1. Quæs. 15.*
Art 1.

nihil est aliud quam Dei Essen-

tia; yet 'tis to be consider'd, that they are not the Essence of God purely and absolutely as it is in itself; but as it is in relation to Creatures, according to the several degrees of its Participability whereby it is communicable to them.

And therefore, says *Aquinas*

again, *Ideo habet rationem Idea,*

Ibid.

Secundum quod ad alia comparatur, non autem Se-

cundum quod comparatur ad ipsum Deum. And

therefore tho' these Ideas are really Essential to God, or *quid Divinum*, as every thing that is in God is (for that I take to be the true sense of that Scholastick Maxim, *Quicquid est in Deo est Deus*) yet we cannot in seeing these Ideas be right-

ly said absolutely and simply to see the Essence of God, but only in a certain respect, or so much of it as relates to Creatures. For as Mr. Male-

Conversations Chré-
tiennes. Entretien 3.
P. 73.

branche very Angelically di-
stinguishes upon this occasion,

There is a great deal of difference
between seeing the Essence of God,

and seeing the Essence of things in God: For tho'
we see not any thing but God when we see the Essence
of things in God, we see not God however but with
relation to Creatures. We see not the Perfections of
God, but so far as they represent another thing than
God. So that tho' we see God, and that we cannot
possibly see any thing but him, since God does not con-
serve Spirits but for himself, yet we may say, in a
sense, that we see only Creatures: For altho' God
sees only himself, yet it is certain that he sees Crea-
tures; when he sees that which is in himself that re-
presents them. In like manner, tho' we see nothing
but God by an immediate and direct view, yet we
see in God that which represents them: For as for
Creatures in themselves, they are invisible. Tho'
after all, if it did follow from hence that we
did see the Essence of God, I know not where
the real inconvenience would be. It is indeed
a Consequence which would be ill drawn from
our Ideal Principle, but there is no Absurdity
that I know of in the Consequence itself. On
the contrary, I think it to be (rightly under-
stood) a certain and undeniable Truth. For tho'
we cannot ever comprehend God, nor have
at present a Capacity of making any great or
very clear discoveries of his Nature, which is
hid from us in Clouds and thick Darkness, or
if you will in an inaccessible Light, yet 'tis plain
and

Part II. the Ideal World, &c. 505

and acknowledg'd that we have some Notion and Perception of him, and since (as we have shewn) this Perception of him cannot be by any Idea or intelligible Species that is distinct from him, it follows that we must perceive him immediately by himself, or else 'tis plain that we have no Perception of him at all. But 'tis acknowledg'd and experimentally certain, that we have a Perception of him, and therefore 'tis by himself that we perceive him: Which, as was before remarked, is a clear demonstration of his Existence. And I am confirm'd in this Thought by finding Mr. Malebranch to concur with me in it. But above all (says he) observe that God or Infinite is not visible by an Idea, which represents him. Infinite is to its self its own Idea. It has not any Archetype; It may be known, but it cannot be made. There are none but Creatures, but such and such Beings that are feasible, that are visible by Ideas which represent them, even before that they were made. One may see a Circle, a House, a Sun, whether there be any in actual Being or no: For all that is Finite may be seen in that which is Infinite, which includes the intelligible Ideas of it. But that which is Infinite cannot be seen but in it self; for nothing Finite can represent Infinite. If one therefore thinks upon God, he must of necessity be. Such a particular Being, tho' known, may yet not exist. One may see its Essence without its Existence, its Idea without its Self. But one cannot see the Essence of Infinite without its Existence, the Idea

*Entretiens sur la
metaphysique.* Page
44.

Idea of Being itself without Being: For indeed Being has no Idea that represents him. He has no Archetype that contains all his intelligible Reality. He is to himself his own Archetype, and he contains in himself the Archetype of all Beings. And thus you well perceive that this Proposition, there is a God, is by itself the most clear of all Propositions that affirm Existence of anything. And that it is even as certain as this, I think, therefore I am. These are great and excellent Words, and the sum of them consists of these three distinct Things, That we have some sight of God, That we see him by himself, and that therefore he is. My concern at present is with the second of these: Upon which I remark it as a plain and necessary Conclusion, that therefore we have some intellectual View of the Essence of God even in this Life, how dark and imperfect soever it be, since we see him by himself and not by Idea. And indeed if we did not see God in some degree, as we could not talk of him, so neither do I see how 'tis possible we should *Love* him: For I think it in the general a certain Truth, that we can love nothing but what we see. And therefore as for those places of Scripture which speak of our not seeing God in this Life, I think they must be understood of that clear, full, perfect and glorious Vision of him which is *Beatifick*. And so indeed no Man can see the Face of God in this Life, nor yet in the next neither, without Holiness and Purity of Heart. *Blessed*

are

are the pure in heart for they shall see God. And they only: For without Holiness no Man shall see the Lord.

52. Another thing which I shall add for the right understanding of this Ideal System, and the preventing all imaginary Difficulties and Objections, is concerning the Divinity of *Truth*. How this is to be understood there have been several intimations given up and down in the course of this Work, for the information of all equitable and heedful Readers. But for their better Satisfaction, they are desired to consider this fuller and more recollected Account. Truth cannot be the Effect of God's Will, because all God's Wills do suppose Truth. And therefore 'tis plain from this very Consideration (besides those many others insisted upon in the former Part) that Truth cannot be any thing really different from God. And yet to say that Truth is God, will be a Proposition that is not true *in Sensu Formali*, as the Schools speak. Truth in the formality of it does not imply so much as an absolute Reality, much less can we say that it is formally God. It implies only a Relation of Equality or Inequality, Agreement or Disagreement. But then that Relation being between Ideas, and those Ideas being Divine, and Truth which is a Relation of those Ideas being for that Reason, or as such really the same with them, it must hence follow that Truth must be really something Divine, as having all that real Divinity which

which its Ideas are supposed to have. But yet still we cannot say that Truth is formally God, nor consequently can we be said to see God himself in seeing Truth. And therefore if St. Austin argues us to see God in this Life by the knowledge which we have of eternal Truths,

Recherche de la Vérité. Tom. I. Liv. 3. Chap. 6. and that (according to M. Malebranche) after this manner; Truth is Increased, Immutable, Immense, Eternal above

all things. It is true by itself, it does not derive its Perfection from any thing. It makes Creatures more perfect, and all Spirits naturally desire to know her. But nothing can have all these Perfections but God; therefore Truth is God. But we see these immutable and eternal Truths, therefore we see God. I say, if St. Austin reasons after this manner, he must be equitably and fairly interpreted, or else what he says will not be right; for the most that can in rigour be concluded from his or any other Ground is that Truth is something really Divine, as having a real Identity with what is so, *viz.* the Divine Ideas, and consequently that in seeing Truth we see something

Ibid. Divine. And so much I think is necessary to be said. M. Malebranche indeed seems to distinguish between

seeing God in seeing Truth, and seeing God when we see Truth; in that tho' he will not allow the former, he yet allows the latter: For, says he, first, we do not say that we see

see God in seeing these Truths, as St. *Austin* says; but in seeing the *Ideas* of those Truths. Then he says again, So that according to our Sentiment we see God when we see eternal Truths; not that these Truths are God, but because the Ideas upon which these Truths depend are in God. But indeed, exactly speaking, as I humbly conceive, we cannot be said to see God neither in the seeing of Truth, nor yet *when* we see Truth. And that because the Ideas of eternal Truths, tho' really Divine, are yet no more formally God than Truth itself is. And consequently, tho' in seeing those Truths we also see those Ideas, because of the real Identity that is between them (which is the ground upon which he goes) yet we cannot be properly said to see God, because those *Ideas* are not formally God. The most that can in strictness be pretended, is that we see something Divine, and that indeed we truly do, and may accordingly say as we did before, that the knowledge which we have of Truth, is in some degree a Participation of the Divine Nature, and a kind of Possession of God himself, as being a Possession of something that really belongs to his Essence. From whence it will follow, that this Proposition *There is a God*, is as certain as that there is Truth.

53. There is yet a further Reflection which it may be convenient to throw in to this explanatory Account to make it more full and intire, and that is concerning the *Divine Illumination*.

nation. We oftentimes speak of God's inlightning us, and being our Light, &c. For the right conceiving of which it is to be consider'd that Man is capable of being inlighten'd two ways, *Efficiently* and *Objectively*: And that 'tis God that does both. God inlightens us *Efficiently* by his Spirit, assisting our intellectual Faculties, and purging our Hearts from those Lufts and Prejudices which darken and pervert our apprehensions of things; and, according to this Hypothesis, *Objectively* by his *Wisdom*. The former is what we are to understand by that Grace of Illumination which is spoken of in our common Theology. The latter (at least ordinarily speaking) is not Grace, but, as is here supposed, our natural way of Thinking and Understanding, that whereby we are rational or intelligent Beings. I say, *ordinarily* speaking; for if any one shall think fit to call the Union of this Divine Wisdom to the Humane Nature of Jesus Christ by the name of Grace, I shall not be forward to contend with him. In a larger sense no doubt it is so. And

so Mr. Hooker is pleased to call
Ecclesiastical Poli-
tie. Lib. 5. Page 297. it, when he tells us, that 'The
 'Union of the Flesh, with the
 'Deity, is to that Flesh a gift
 'of principal Grace and Favour.' And indeed
 'tis not to be imagin'd what the Influences and
 Communications of that excellent Grace were,
 nor how unmeasurably the Powers of that
 Soul must needs be illuminated which was so
 inwardly

inwardly united to the very Essential Wisdom of God. Tho' to suppose that the Soul of Jesus Christ, by virtue of this Union, becomes *Omniscient*, would, I conceive, be no more warrantable than to say, that his Body, by virtue of the same Union, is *Omnipresent*. Nay, perhaps the *Ubiquitarians* may of the two have the better Plea. But to return to the Point in Hand, tho' God in both the Senses premised, be here supposed to be our true and sole Light, to inlighthen us Efficiently as well as Objective-ly; yet as it is the latter Sense that belongs to the Consideration of the present Theory, so it is that which we would be understood chiefly to intend.

54. Besides this explanatory Account which we have here given of our *Meaning*, there is another sort of Explanation that might be added, which for distinction sake, we may call an Explanation of the *Thing*, which consists in opening and unfolding the particular manner of it, by shewing how God exhibits his Ideas to our Minds, and how we see and understand them, and all things by them, and particularly whether the intelligible World has such a Relation to that which is Material and Sensible, that there are in it particular and precise Ideas for every thing; as suppose, an intelligible Sun, an intelligible Tree, &c. and that we see one of those precise Ideas whenever we look upon one of those Bodies. Or (as Mr. *Malebranche* seems rather to think) that we

we see things in God by the various and different Application which he makes to our Minds of *Intelligible Extension*, sometimes after one manner, and sometimes after another, in conjunction with those different Sensations which we have with it upon the impression of Bodies, particularly that of *Colour*, which serve to specific, particularize, and distinguish our Ideas, and to make them represent the several *differences* of Bodies, as well as to inform us of their *Existence*. But I shall not so far indulge either my own, or my Readers Curiosity, as to enter into any nice Disquisition of such mysterious Speculations, these being some of those things that belong to the *Reserve* of a Theory; which, tho' it ought to be as clear as the *Day*, as far as it undertakes or pretends to explain, yet to imitate the agreeableness and beauty of it too, ought not to attempt to explain every thing, but to have some *Clouds* mingled with its *Light*. I shall therefore leave every one to conceive of this Matter as he pleases, or as he can. And the rather because it concerns only the *Modality* of the Hypothesis. All that is *Essential* to it, is, that as God contains in himself, after an Intelligible manner, the Perfections of all Beings, both *Actual* and *Possible*, and by these intelligible Perfections or Ideas, knows the Essences of all things (for as for his Knowledge of their *Existence* that depends upon other Principles, with which our present Theory is not so immediately

iately concern'd) so that God is also our true Light, as well as a Light to himself; that those intelligible Perfections of his are the immediate Objects of our Minds, and that so we see and understand the Works of God by the Perfections of their Creator, even by those very Ideas whereby they were made. But as to the precise *Manner* how this is done, this, whatever I may think of it to my self, I pretend not to explain to others, but leave them to conceive of it in such a way as upon their own private Reflection, shall appear to them to be most reasonable. But whether they conceive it in one way or in the other, there is one thing which they are always to remember to carry with them as *common* to both, *viz.* That tho' Sentiment does always accompany Idea in the Vision or Perception which we have of Bodies, yet 'tis the *Idea* only which we *see*; so that the immediate Object of our Thought is always Divine and Immutable, tho' that which we *feel* be as mutable as our selves, as being only a certain manner of our own Being, however apt we may be to confound it with our Ideas, and from thence to transfer it to the things which we perceive by them.

55. And now after all, as to the Way and Manner of Humane Understanding, as we have here represented it; this I am satisfied of, that no Body can, upon just grounds, say, that it is *not* so. Nor do I absolutely and peremptorily say that it is so. I only propose it as an Hypothesis,

pothesis, that exhibits a very rational and conceivable Account of the thing, and such as every way appears to be the most reasonable and consistent of any that has been yet advanced, or that the Mind of Man can frame to itself. That the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we *understand*, seems proved beyond all possibility of reasonable Exception. And this part of the Theory I am in good measure perswaded of, and can hardly forbear being positive in. That which seems more liable to be questioned, as well as more against the Grain of common Prejudice, is whether the same Divine Ideas are also the Ideas whereby we *see*? And here indeed our sensible Prejudices, if we yield to them, will be an Objecti-
on, tho' not only against the Divine Ideas, but against Ideas in general. But then when 'tis remember'd and well consider'd, that according to the account before given concerning *Thought* and *Vision*; Seeing is a sort of Thinking, and but another way of Understanding, as differ-
ing from it only in the manner whereby the Idea is received, and the Degree whereby it is more strongly impressed upon the Mind, it seems most agreeable to Reason, that as the *Subject* of Understanding and Vision is one and the same (the Soul being the common *Subject* of both) so the *Object* should be the same too; and consequently, that as the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we Think and Understand, so the same Divine Ideas should be also the Ideas

deas whereby we See, Seeing being only a certain peculiar way of Understanding.

56. And thus having set this Theory in its true and full Light, with some account of the Grounds and Principles upon which it stands, I now leave it to the Consideration of the rational World, who is desired to judge of it fairly and equitably, and with that allowance which is due to humane Infirmity, as well as very needful to me, according to that Sense which I have of my own; and particularly as to the Conclusion which this last Chapter inclines to favour, the competent Reader (who perhaps is not always the most *Learned*) is desired to judge of it, not only by those rational Considerations which are therein contained, but also by those other preceding ones which are employ'd to shew the utter unconceivable-ness and impossibility of such other ways of resolving the manner of our Understanding, as either are, or may be pretended: For all is to be taken into the Account, and when it is so I am apt to fancy it will weigh pretty heavy; always provided, that the Hand that holds the Scale holds it even, and that there be nothing but *Reason* in the other end of the Balance: For Reason will deal with Reason, but there is no contending against Mens Prejudices, till they themselves will be pleased to lay them down: And indeed till then they are neither fit to reason nor to be reasoned with. But however, tho' I think this to be not only a reasonable

sonable, but the most reasonable, and indeed only intelligible Account of Humane Understanding; yet having a due sense both of my Subject and of my Self, I would not be thought to be Positive or Decretory in it, but only to propose it as an *Hypothesis*, and to be considered rather as an *Enquirer*, than as a Dogmatical *Assertor*. And yet, after all, I shall presume so far, not upon my Capacity, but upon that application of Thought which I have bestowed upon these things, as to say, and I say it not rashly, that if this account of Humane Understanding, or of the Ideas whereby we understand, be not right, I shall pretty much despair of ever coming to know how it is that we understand, or whence, or what our Ideas are. For to say with Mr. *Locke* that we have them from our *Senses*, gives me no satisfaction at all: For if he means that they are derived to our Minds by way of a real Physical Emission from sensible Objects: This, as I have abundantly shewn, is a false account of the Origin of our Ideas. But if he means only that they are *occasion'd* by the impressions which are made by those Objects upon our Organs of Sense, that indeed may be ordinarily true; but then to shew how little a way this will go towards a resolution of the present Theory, there are two things to be remarked, 1st. That there is nothing *Peculiar* in this Account; for it may be applied to any Hypothesis, since let our Ideas be what they will, it may

may be still said of them, that, according to this Sense, we ordinarily have them from our *Senses*. *2dly.* That there is nothing *Instructive* in it. It gives no Light into the main Question that concerns the Theory of Humane Understanding, since, tho' our Senses should be allow'd to be the occasions of our Ideas, it still remains to be inquired what those Ideas are. And as I should think my self little the wiser as to the manner how I understand till this Question be resolved; so I see not how the being told that my Ideas come from my Senses, will help me to resolve it, nor consequently to what great purpose it should serve. I would not be thought to slight or undervalue the performance of this ingenious Author, which I allow to be very valuable and considerable in many respects, and that he has deserved well of the Publick for those many useful Truths which he has clear'd, and those many great Discoveries which he has made in the Intellectual way. But as to the Account which he has given us of *Ideas* (which ought to have been the great Subject of his undertaking, in an *Essay of Humane Understanding*) that, I think, is as Lame and Defective as any thing can well be, since; in that Sense, where in it would have been to the purpose, it appears not to be true, and in that sense where in it is true, it is not much to the purpose. If this Censure be thought too severe, I should be glad to be shewn how to mollifie it. In the

mean time, as to the present Account, that which is the great omission in Mr. *Lock*'s is sufficiently supplied here, by that special Enquiry which we have made into the Nature of those Ideas whereby we understand. So that if our Account be true, it cannot be denied but that it is very much to the purpose. And to convince that it is true, I have offered as much as I think convenient at this time in the way of *Reason*, only there are some few things which I have to offer in the way of *Authority*; for the consideration of which this last ensuing Chapter is purposely designed.

C H A P.

C H A P XIII.

Wherein is consider'd how far the Grounds of this Hypothesis are laid by the Schools, and the Hypothesis itself confirm'd by the Authority of St. Austin : With some concluding Reflections upon the whole, relating to Morality and Religion.

1. **L**abour at once recommends and justifies the indulging ones self some Ease and Refreshment, and therefore after all this toil and travel of *Thought*, let us now a little repose ourselves upon the Bed of *Authority*. I cannot say, that we have that of the Schools on our side as to this latter Part of our Theory, which concerns the manner of *Humane Understanding*. They give a very different Account of it as we have * already shewn, and such, as like the rest of their Philosophy, seems to proceed upon *sensible Prejudices*. And the great Prejudice seems to be this, We have our Ideas upon the presence of sensible Objects, therefore our Ideas are from those Objects. In like manner, as is generally argued in the other Case, we have our Sensations upon the impressions of Bodies ; therefore Bodies are the efficient

* See the 7 Chap. of this 2d Part. at the 13 Paragraph.

cient Causes of those Sensations. And indeed one Consequence is as good as the other, tho', if my Logick be right, neither of them are extraordinary. If they are, *reddat mihi minam Diogenes.*

2. It is true indeed, that the Schools make one very promising advance towards us when they talk of the Souls understanding things in the *eternal Reasons*, which eternal Reasons are with them the same as *Ideas*, according to the promiscuous use of those Terms in St. Austin. But then they fall off again from us by distinguishing of a twofold manner whereby one thing may be said to be known or understood in another. Either as in the *Object that is known*, as when one sees in a Glass the Images that result from it ; and in this Sense, according to them, the Soul does not at present see things in their eternal Reasons, tho' at the same time they allow that the *Blessed* do so, whom they suppose to see God, and in him all things. Or else, as in the *Principle of Knowledge*, as when we say those things are seen in the Sun, which are seen by the Sun. And in this Sense they allow that the Soul knows things in the eternal Reason, by the participation of which we know all things ; and that for this Reason, because that intellectual Light which is in us is nothing else but a certain participated Similitude of the increased Light, wherein the eternal Reasons are contain'd. So that in short, according to the Doctrine of the Schools, we do not

not at present see things in their eternal Reasons *Objectively*, as if those eternal Reasons were the immediate Objects of our Understanding, but only *Casually*, as *Aquinas* is pleased to distinguish.

Part 1. Quæst. 84.
Art. 5.

3. Well, but however in the first place they expressly own that there are such eternal Reasons or Ideas of things, tho' they will not allow them to be the immediate Objects of our Understanding. The Schools are for an intelligible World as well as we, and their intelligible World happens to be the very same with ours. As they are for a World of Ideas, so they place these Ideas in God : And they own not only the Truth, but the Necessity of this Supposition. This *Aquinas* repeats no less than four times in the very same Article. 'Cum omnia sint à Deo, non à Casu Fæcta, Nec cessarium est in ejus mente omnium Ideas præexistere Objective, ad quarum Similitudinem omnia Condita sunt. Again, Necesse est ponere in Mente Divina Ideas. Again, Necesse est ponere Ideas. And again, Quia Mundus non est Casu factus, sed à Deo per Intellectum agente ; Necesse est quod in Mente Divina sit formâ ad Similitudinem cuius Mundus est factus, & in hoc consistit ratio Idæa.' And as they affirm the Ideas of all things to be in God, so they consequently suppose God to make all things, and to know all things

Part 1. Quæst. 15.
Art. 1.

things by those Ideas. But now this will go a great way towards our Ideal System, whereof they may reasonably be thought herein to have laid the grounds, however they came not to build upon them. And that for the like reason that we suppose our selves, in the former Part, to have laid the Foundation of this. And indeed, since they own the Doctrine of the Divine Ideas, than which certainly none can be more representative of things, why should they look out for any other Materials of Thought, or Objects of Understanding, and put themselves to invent I know not what *Intentional Species*, and I know not what *Intellectus Agens*, again to refine those Species into an intelligible State and Temper, with a deal of such Philosophick, or rather Romantick Reverie, especially considering that according to themselves, this shall be the way of our Understanding in the other Life, and that they own the necessity of our Understanding by some Ideas or other even in this?

4. Indeed did they suppose (what I presume the Vulgar do, but what no *Philosophy* that I know of does) that Objects are seen immediately by themselves, then tho' they should hold never so assuredly, that the Ideas of all things are in the *Divine Mind*, it would not be at all strange, if they did not make these Ideas to be the Objects of *ours*: For when things are supposed to be seen by their very selves there is no occasion for the Divine Ideas, nor indeed for any

any other. But now they are as little for the immediate visibility of things as we are, and as much for the necessity of Ideas in order to the Perception of them. As they will not allow the Soul to understand things by its own Essence; so neither by the immediate Essence of the things themselves, but by their *Species*. So that they have their intelligible World again (such as it is) in this sense also as well as we; that is, I mean, that as they acknowledge the Ideas of all things to be in God, as was noted before; so they also stand for the necessity of some Ideas or other, or as they call them *Species*, for the Perception of things. So that still, according to themselves, there is a certain intelligible World, which is the immediate Object of our Thought. But then, why should not the Divine Ideas be this Intelligible World? Why will they apply themselves rather to Bodies for the Light of their Minds, and to their own Souls for a distinct faculty to refine and spiritualize that Light, especially considering those two great Axioms of their own, that God and Nature do nothing in vain, and that 'tis in vain to have that done by more means, which may be done by fewer? But then, why again do they multiply so many other Ideas besides those that are Divine? For since they own these Ideas, and the necessity of our perceiving things by some, would it not be a pursuance of their own Principles, and of that train which they themselves have laid, to suppose these Ideas

Ideas to be the Ideas whereby we understand? Yes it would, but that since the Corruption of Humane Nature Men are afraid to meet with God, and still fly from him as sinning *Adam* did, and would rather suppose a Power in Bodies, as to cause their Sensations, so also to furnish them with Ideas, depend upon themselves, or upon something beneath themselves, rather than owe their dependance to God, or acknowledge him to be either the Light of their Minds, or the only true Good of their Souls.

5. But after all we must not forget (tho' it looks as if they themselves did) that other Maxim of theirs, That Science is of Necessaries and Immutables. It is indeed very right: But then it should be consider'd withal, that Ideas must be the Object of it; and that not only because there can be nothing else in the Nature of things that is Necessary and Immutable, but also because our Ideas are, as themselves allow, the immediate Objects of the Mind, and therefore all Science must unavoidably respect our Ideas and their Relations, as the true Object of it. But then 'tis plain by their own Maxim, that these Ideas must be Necessary and Immutable. And if they can find any such besides the Divine, they must have a good *Invention*, but if not, then by their own Principle they will be oblig'd to acknowledge these to be the Ideas whereby we understand. And indeed when all is considered that might reasonably induce them to it, and that even

ven of their *own*, it is much to be admired how they came not to do it, especially considering how much this Hypothesis of Humane Understanding is favour'd by St. *Austin*, whose Authority is so sacred with them upon other occasions.

6. And this is the Authority (not because I have no other, but because I know no greater) upon which we shall now devolve our selves for the more advantageous Recommendation of the System which is here proposed. St. *Austin*, as I think, was a Man of a large Capacity, and of great Thought and Reflexion, and one, had the Sciences been then as much improved, and the Art of Thinking reduced to such a Method as it is now, from whom we might reasonably have expected the very utmost that the Force of Human Nature could ever have arrived to. There are two sorts of Thinking Men to be observ'd among Writers, not to mention a Third, which amends the Defects of each. Some there are that think pretty much while they are actually writing, but not much at other times; and so their Composition is elaborate, their Method formal, their Expression pretty correct, and their Sentences laid out in harmonical and proportionably returning Periods, and so all goes off with the generality of Readers smoothly and plausibly; but after all, when it comes nicely to be examin'd, there is little or nothing in it, tho' perhaps oftentimes more than there should be, and that because more than is true. Others again

again there are, who think much habitually, and at other times ; but not altogether so much while actually engaged in writing, because it may be they write in haste, or cannot well endure the Fatigue of thinking intensely and writing at the same time : And so accordingly their Thoughts are great, and their Conclusions generally right, as being such as have frequently passed in their Minds before, tho' neither the one be always resolv'd into their proper Principles, nor the other always dispos'd according to the exactest Order ; that is, in short, their Matter is good and substantial, but they are sometimes a little negligent in the manner. Of this latter Character I take St. *Austin* to be : He thought much ; but writing so much as he did, and being otherwise so much employ'd as he was, it cannot be expected that he should be always so just and accurate (as Men are now) in the Disposal and Expression of his Thoughts. Tho' as to the latter, I think it may be properly remarked, that as no Man has said greater Things than he, so none has expressed them more happily than he oftentimes does ; and that not so much because he labour'd to do it, as because with that Fineness of Wit, and Natural Taste of good Sense which he had, he could not well do otherwise. So that upon the whole, and with due allowance for the Disadvantage of the Age wherein he writ, I take him to have been a very Great, as well as a very Good Man, and worthy

worthy of all that Reverence and high Esteem which has been paid to his Name, both in the School and in the Church ; upon which Consideration I the less admire to find him quoted so much as he is, even by those who are the least addicted to Authority, I mean the Modern Philosophers. For indeed this Father stands them in great stead, some of the best Foundations of the new Philosophy being laid in his Principles. And my Opinion is, that if the Schools had follow'd St. *Austin* more than they have done, and *Aristotle* less, they would have left us another System of both ^{Physical} and Metaphysical Doctrine than what the World now possesses.

7. As far therefore as any regard is due to Authority, I think it is due to his : And to render what I shall produce from this Great Man the more considerable, I must premonish my Reader before-hand, that he may have some reason to expect that my Quotations should be very choice, and that he should not look upon this as an ordinary Common-place way of writing. I shall not be so vain as to command any other part of my Work, of whose great Defectiveness I am not insensible ; but I might perhaps without Vanity be allow'd to speak up a little for my Quotations, and especially those from St. *Austin* ; and that because in reading his Works, I was at the Pains to mark out, and make short References to whatsoever appear'd to me of considerable Importance, either in it self,

self, or with relation to the present Theory. But I shall not trouble my Reader with all, but only with a few of the most remarkable Passages, which, without any farther Formality, we will take in the same Order as they lie, leaving the regular Disposal of them to those who have Leisure and Inclination to be more Methodical.

8. The first remarkable Passage which occurs to our purpose is in his *Retractations*; where having said something somewhere concerning Science, as if it were a Recollection of somewhat that was known before, thereby seeming to favour the *Platonick* Notion of Pre-existence, he retracts it, and resolves those right Answers which are given by the Ignorant concerning certain Sciences, when they are aptly interrogated, into the Presence of the Eternal Reason to their Minds, wherein they see those immutable Truths. ‘Quodam loco dixi, quod Disciplinis liberalibus eruditis si ne dubio in se illas Oblivione Obrutas eruunt discendo, &

Retract. Lib. 1. Cap. 4.

‘ quodammodo refodiunt. Sed hoc quoq; im-
‘ prob. Credibilius est enim propterea vera
‘ respondere de quibusdam Disciplinis, etiam
‘ imperitos earum, quando bene interrogantur;
‘ quia præsens est eis, quantum id capere pos-
‘ sunt, Lumen Rationis Æternæ, ubi hæc im-
‘ mutabilia vera conspiciunt, non quod nove-
‘ rant aliquando & Obliti sunt, quod Platonii,
‘ vel talibus visum est. These are very remar-
‘ kable

kable Words, and what are capable of a farther Improvement, as being no less applicable to the great Question of *Innate Notions*. For, as St. *Austin* says here, the right Answers of Ignorant Men, upon a due Interrogation to certain Questions, is not from their having known them formally, and forgotten them since; but because the Light of the eternal Reason is present to them: So it may in like manner be said (or else it will not be very easy what to say) that the ready Assent which is so universally given to certain Truths upon the first proposal of them, is not because those Truths are *Innate*, but because the Light of the eternal Reason, Word, or Wisdom where those Truths are, is present to Mens Minds to be consulted by them upon every occasion: And when they do consult it they cannot but immediately perceive several Truths by it, because of their great intelligibility and plainness to be perceived; and they cannot but assent to what they clearly perceive.

9. He has another very remarkable Passage to the like purpose in the same Book: For having said that the Soul brought with her into the World all the Arts, and that what we call Learning is only Remembring; he here puts in a caution that he would not have this understood in favour either of Transmigration or Pre-existence, as if the Soul should be supposed to have learnt in another Life what it answers to without having learnt it here; since this he says

M m may.

may be, because she is an intellectual Nature, and is united to intelligible and immutable Things. And that she is so made, or is of such a Nature, that when she applies herself to those things to which she is united, or to herself, as far forth as she sees those things, so far she answers rightly concerning these. Which indeed is an excellent Account of the Matter, and what again is as applicable to the Question of *Innate Notions*, as every one that understands any thing of that Question may easily perceive.

His Words are, 'Illud quod

Ibid. Cap. 8. Dixi omnes Artes animam se-
 'cum attulisse mihi videri, nec aliud quicquam
 'esse id quod dicitur discere quam reminisci ac
 'recordari, non sic accipiendum est quasi ex
 'hoc approbetur, animam vel hic in alio Cor-
 'pore, vel alibi sive in Corpore sive extra Cor-
 'pus aliquando vixisse, & ea quæ interrogata
 'respondeat cum hic non didicerit, in alia vita
 'ante didicisse. Fieri enim potest sicut jam in
 'hoc Opere supra diximus (refering to the
 place before-mentioned) ut hoc ideo possit, quia
 'Natura intelligibilis est, & Connectitur non
 'solum Intelligibilibus, verum etiam Immuta-
 'bilibus rebus. Eo Ordine facta est, ut cum se
 'ad eas res movet, quibus connexa est, vel
 'ad seipsum, in quantum eas videt, in tantum
 'de his vera respondeat.

10. Again, in his Confessions he owns God to be the only teacher of Truth, and thence concludes, that what he learnt was from him, because

because it was true. ‘Me. ‘autem jam docueras Deus ^{Confes.} Lib. 5.
 ‘Meus, miris & occultis mo- ^{Cap. 6.}
 ‘dis, & propterea credo quod tu me docueris,
 ‘quoniam verum est, nec quisquam præter te
 ‘alius est Doctor veri,’ &c. As also to be
 the only Light, ‘Hominis A-
 ‘nima quamvis Testimonium ^{Ibid. Lib. 7. Cap.}
 ‘perhibeat de Lumine, non est
 ‘tamen ipsa lumen, sed verbum Dei. Deus est
 ‘lumen verum quod illuminat omnem homi-
 ‘nem venientem in hunc mundum.’ *Again,*
 ‘Non enim lumen nos sumus,
 ‘sed illuminamur à te, ut qui
 ‘suimus aliquando tenebræ,
 ‘sumus lux in te.’ *Again,* ‘Illi
 ‘intelligunt, qui ejus vocem
 ‘acceptam foris, intus cum ve-
 ‘ritate conferunt. *Again,* ‘Ecce
 ‘in te veritas video, &c. *Again,*
 ‘Ipsum est verbum tuum, quod
 ‘& principium est, qui & lo-
 ‘quitur nobis, sicut in Evangelio per Carnem
 ‘ait, & hoc insonuit foris auribus hominum ut
 ‘crederetur, & intus quæreretur, & invenire-
 ‘tur in Æterna veritate ubi omnes Discipulos
 ‘bonus & solus Magister do-
 ‘cet.’ *Again,* ‘O Sapientia
 ‘Dei Lux mentium, &c. *A-*
gain, ‘Si ambo videmus verum
 ‘esse quod dicis, & ambo videmus verum esse
 ‘quod dico, ubi quæso id videmus? Nec ego
 ‘utiq;

‘ utiq; in te, nec tu in me, sed aīmo in ipsa

Ibid. Lib. 13. ‘ quæ supra mentes Nostræ
Cap. 15. ‘ est incommutabili veritate.

‘ Again, speaking of the An-

gels, ‘ Vident faciem tuam Semper, & ibi le-

‘ gunt sine Syllabis temporum, &c. Non clau-

‘ ditur codex eorum, nec plicabitur liber eorum,

‘ quia tu ipse illis hoc es, &c.

Cap. 16.

‘ Again, ‘ Anima mea sicut

‘ terra sine aqua tibi quia sicut se illuminare de

‘ se non potest, ita se satiare de se non potest,

‘ sic enim apud te fons vitæ, quomodo in lumi-

‘ ne tuo videbimus lumen.

De Musica. Lib. 6. Cap. 16. 11. Again, In his Book of

Musick, says he, ‘ In lumine

‘ tuo videbimus lumen, &c. In

‘ lumine scilicet Christo accipendum, qui Sa-

‘ pientia Dei est, & lumen toties appellatur.

Soliloq. Lib. 1. Cap. 1. 12. Again, in his Solilo-

‘ quies. ‘ Deus Intelligibilis lux,

‘ in quo, & à quo, & per quem

‘ intelligibiliter lucent, quæ intelligibiliter lu-

‘ cent omnia. Again, ‘ Exaudi

Ibid. ‘ Deus Mæus, Salus mea, lux

‘ mea, vita mea.

De Magistro, C. 13. Again, In his Book de Ma-

‘ gistro, ‘ De universis quæ in-

‘ telligimus non loquentem qui

‘ personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti præsiden-

‘ tem consulimus veritatem, verbis fortasse ut

‘ consulamus admoniti. Ille autem qui Con-

‘ sulitur, docet, qui in interiori homine habi-

tare

'tare dictus est Christus, id est, incommuta-
 bilis Dei virtus atq; Sempiterna Sapientia.
 'Quam quidem omnis rationalis anima con-
 sulit, sed tantum cuiq; panditur, quantum
 'capere propter propriam, sive malam sive bo-
 nam voluntatem potest. Et si quando fallitur
 'non fit vitio consultæ veritatis, ut neq; hujus
 'quæ foris est lucis vitium est quod corporei
 'oculi sæpe falluntur. *Again,* Cap. 12.
 'De his quæ intelliguntur, in-
 'teriorum veritatem ratione
 'consulimus. *Again*, 'Cum Ibid.
 'de iis agitur quæ mente con-
 'spicimus, id est intellectu atq; ratione, ea
 'quidem loquimur quæ præsentia contuemur
 'in illa interiori luce veritatis qua ipsæ qui dici-
 'tur homo interior illustratur & fruitur. Et hunc
 'quoq; nosfer Auditor, si & ipse illo secreto ac
 'simpli oculo videt, novit quod dico sua Con-
 'templatione non verbis meis. Ergonè hunc
 'quidem doceo vera dicens, vera intuentem?
 'Docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus
 'Deo intus pandente mani-
 'festius. *Again*, 'In iis quæ Cap. 13.
 'mente Cernuntur frustra cernentis loquelas
 'audit quisquis ea cernere non potest, nisi quia
 'talia quamdiu ignorantur utile est Credere.
 'Quisquis autem cernere potest intus est Disci-
 'pulus Veritatis, foris judex
 'loquentis, &c. *Again*, Illi qui Cap. 14.
 'Discipuli vocantur, utrum vera dicta sint a-
 'pud semetipos considerant, interiorum scili-

Ibid. ‘cet illam veritatem pro viri-
bus intuentes. Again, ‘Per
‘ homines signis admonemur & foris, ut ad eum
‘ intro conversi erudiamur, quem diligere &
‘ nosse beata vita est. Again, Ego
Ibid. ‘ vero didici admonitione ver-
‘ borum tuorum nihil aliud verbis quam admoni-
‘ neri hominem ut discat---utrum autem vera
‘ dicantur eum docere solum qui se intus ha-
‘ bitare cum foris loqueretur, admonuit. Quem
‘ jam favente ipso tanto ardentius diligam,
‘ quanto ero in discendo proiectior. Verunta-
‘ men huic Orationi tuae ob hoc habeo Maxi-
‘ me gratiam, quod omnia quae contradicere,
‘ paratus eram præoccupavit atque dissolvit, ni-
‘ hilque abs te derelictum est, quod me dubium
‘ faciebat, de quo non ita mihi responderet se-
‘ cretum illud Oraculum, ut tuis verbis assere-
‘ batur. These Passages are very great, and
very express to our purpose, as indeed is the
design of this whole Book, being a Dialogue
between himself and his Son *Adeodatus*, wherein he shews, that this is not by Mens Words that
we receive Instruction, but from the eternal
Truth, *viz.* Jesus Christ the Word of God,
who informs us inwardly of all Truth, that
so we may understand how truly it is said by
Divine Authority, that we should call no Man
Master upon Earth.

De lib. Arb. Lib. Again, In his Book *de libero Arbitrio*. ‘Donabit quidem ‘Deus, ut Spero, ut tibi vale- ‘am

‘am respondere, vel potius ut ipse tibi eadem,
‘quæ summa omnium Magistra est Veritate in-
‘tus docente, respondeas. *A-*

gain, ‘Veruntamen quæso te Ibid. Cap. 9.

‘quid de ipsa sapientia putas existimandum ?

‘Singulas quasq; suas arbitraris singulos quosq;

‘homines habere Sapientias ? An verq; unam

‘præsto esse communiter omnibus cujus quanto

‘magis quisq; fit particeps, tanto est sapientior ?

Then a little after, ‘Num aliam putas esse sa-

‘pientiam nisi veritatem, in qua cernitur &

‘tenetur summum Bonum ? Then again more

positively, ‘Si summum Bonum omnibus u-

‘num est, Oportet etiam veritatem in qua cer-

‘nitur & tenetur, id est sapientiam omnibus u-

‘nam esse Communem. *A-*

gain, ‘Quod ergo unum ve- Cap. 10.

‘rum videmus ambo singulis

‘mentibus, nonne utriq; no-

‘strum Commune est ? Mani-

‘festissime. *Again*, Hoc ergo

‘verum potest quisq; suum

‘proprium dicere, cum incommutabiliter con-

‘templandum adsit omnibus qui hoc contem-

‘plari valent ? *Again*, ‘Quapro-

‘pter nullo modo Negaveris

Ibid.

Cap. 12.

‘esse incommutabilem veritatem hæc omnia

‘quæ incommutabiliter vera sunt continentem,

‘quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam, vel

‘cujusquam hominis, sed omnibus incommu-

‘tabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris modis

‘secretum & publicum lumen præsto esse ac se

‘præbere communiter. Omne autem quod
‘communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atq; in-
‘telligentibus præsto est, ad ullius eorum pro-

Ibid.

‘præ Naturam pertinere quis

‘dixerit? Again, ‘Tantum

‘mens debet intelligere, quantum proprius ad-
‘moveri atq; inhærente potuerit incommutabili

Cap. 16.

‘veritati. Again, ‘In te ipsum

‘redeas, atq; intelligas te id
‘quod attingis sensibus Corporis probare aut
‘improbare non posse, nisi apud te habeas
‘quasdam Pulchritudinis leges, ad quas referas

Ibid.

‘quæq; pulchra sentis exter-
‘us. Again, ‘O Suavissima

‘Lux purgatae mentis Sapientia---Væ qui se a-
‘vertunt à lumine tuo, & obscuritati suæ dul-

Lib. 3. Cap. 5.

‘citer inhærent. Again, (which
‘is a Passage very remarkable)

he shews that we cannot conceive any thing
better in the Creature which escaped the
thought of him that made it, by this Argu-
ment, because if we see any thing better we
must see it in the Divine Reasons. ‘Neq; enim
‘tu potes aliquid melius in Creatura cogitare,
‘quod Creaturæ Artificem fugerit. Humana
‘quippe anima naturaliter Divinis ex quibus
‘pendet connexa rationibus, cum dicit melius
‘hoc fieret quam illud, si verum dicit, & videt

Ibid.

‘quod dicit, in illis quibus con-

‘nexa est rationibus videt. A-

gain, ‘Non enim Cogitatione videret fuisse fa-
ciendum,

Part II. *the Ideal World, &c.* 537

‘ciendum, nisi in iis rationibus quibus facta
‘sunt omnia. *Again*, ‘Si tu Cap. 16.
‘laudaris videndo quid facere
‘debeas, cum id non videas nisi in illo qui est
‘incommutabilis veritas, quanto magis, &c.

15. *Again*, In his *Book de vera Religione*, ‘Noli foras ire, in De vera Relig.
‘teipsum redi, minteriore ho- Cap. 39.
‘mine habitat veritas. *A*- Ibid. Cap. 49.
gain, ‘Omnia quæ de hac luce
‘mentis nunc à me dicta sunt, nulla alia quam
‘eadem luce manifesta sunt. Per hanc enim
‘intelligo vera esse quæ dicta Cap. 55.
‘sunt. *Again*, Non aliunde
‘Sapiens Angelus, aliunde homo, sed ab una
‘incommutabili Sapientia & Ibid.
‘Veritate. *Again*, Ecce u-
‘num deum colo, unum omnium Principium,
‘& unam Sapientiam, quæ Sapiens est quæcunq;
‘anima Sapiens est.

16. *Again*, In his Epistles.
‘Veritas-lumenq; animæ ratio- Epist. 3. ad Volus.
‘nalis non nisi Deus est. *A*-
gain, ‘Omnibus animis se frui Epist. 56. ad Di-
‘valentibus veritas communi- ofcor.
‘ter præsto est. *Again*, Eo ip- Epist. 120. ad Ho-
‘so quo forinsecus bene admo- norat.
‘nentem Judicio non errante approbamus,
‘quid aliud quam internum lumen Magistrum
‘nos habere testamur? *Again*,
‘Dum tamen firmissimè tene- Epist. 132. ad Flo-
‘as quod etsi aliquid salubri- rentinam.
ter

‘ter per me scire potueris, ille te decebit qui
‘est interioris hominis magister interior, qui in
‘corde tuo tibi ostendit verum esse quod dici-
‘tur, &c.

17. Again, In his Book de Trinitate,
De Trin. Lib. 7. Cap. 2.

‘Cur ergo in Scripturis nunquam fere de sapientia
‘quicquam dicitur, nisi ut ostendatur à Deo
‘genita vel creata. Genita scilicet per quam
‘facta sunt omnia, Creata vero vel facta, si-
‘cut in hominibus, cum ad eam quæ non crea-
‘ta, nec facta, sed genita est, convertuntur &
‘illuminantur. Again, Speaking of the strange-
ness how an unjust Mind should be able to

see what a just Mind is, ‘Illiud
Ibid. Lib. 8. Cap. 6.

‘mirabile est, ut apud se ani-
‘mus videat quod alibi nuf-
‘quam vidit, & verum videat, & ipsum ve-
‘rum scilicet justum animum videat, & sit ipse
‘animus, & non sit justus animus quem apud
‘seipsum videt. Num est aliis animus justus
‘in animo nondum justo? Aut si non est, quem
‘ibi videt, cum videt & dicit quid sit animus
‘justus? An illud quod videt, veritas est in-

Cap. 9. ‘terior præsens animo, &c.

Again, Vivendum sic esse Dei
‘Ministris, non de aliquibus auditum credi-
‘mus, sed intus apud nos vel potius supra nos,

Ibid. ‘in ipsa veritate conspicimus.

Again, In Deo conspicimus
‘incommutabilem formam Justitiae secundum
‘quam

‘quam hominem vivere oportere judicamus. Again, Shewing how the eternal Word differs from the Word of our Mind, or rather that it does not really differ at all, ‘In illa igitur æterna veritate ex Lib. 9. Cap. 7.

‘qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, & secundum quam vel in nobis, vel in Corporibus vera & recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus, atq; inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam, tanquam verbum apud nos habemus, & dicendo intus gignimus, nec à nobis nascendo discedit. The Words are in themselves very excellent, as well as very remarkably pertinent to our present purpose. To which we may add that *Book of Light* which he speaketh of, and wherein he supposes wicked Men to read the immutable Rules of Justice.

18. Again, In that imperfect Treatise which he has *De Genesi ad literam*, speaking of the Wisdom which is in God, he calls it, *Illæ sapientia quæ non participando sapiens est, sed cuius participatione sapiens est anima quæcunq; sapiens est.* And in his other perfect Treatise of that Title he says, ‘Aliud autem est lumen quo illustratur Anima. ---Nam illud ipse Deus est. And, *Inde est quicquid intelligit.*

Lib. 14. Cap. 15.

Cap. 6.

Lib. 12. Cap. 31.

19. Again,

19. Again, in his Book of Evangelical Questions, speaking of the Son of God, he says, 'Ipse est mentis nostræ lumen.

20. Again, in his Book *de Consensu Evangelistarum*, he has these positive words, 'Nos vero, esse *De Consens. Evangel. Lib. 1. Cap. 23.* quandam Summam Dei Sapientiam, cuius participatione

' fit sapiens quæcunq; anima fit verè sapiens,
' non tantum concedimus, verum etiam maxi-

' mè prædicamus. Again, 'Qua-
Lib. 2. Cap. 35. ' propter cum sit ipse Christus

' Sapiencia Dei per quem (ra-
' ther quam) creata sunt omnia, cumq; nulla

' mentes rationabiles sive Angelorum sive ho-
Lib. 3. Cap. 10. ' minum, nisi participatione

' ipsius sapientes fiant. Again,
' Inde rursus pergit ad testimonium Joannis, &
' commendat amicum Sponsi non gaudere nisi
' propter vocem sponsi. Ubi admonet animam
' humanam non de se ipsa sibi lucere nec beari,
' nisi incommutabilis participatione Sapientia.

21. Again, In his Book *de Ci-
De Civ. Dei. Lib. 3. Cap. 1.* vitate Dei, ' Si sapientia Deus
' est, per quem facta sunt om-
' nia sicut Divina autoritas veritasq; monstra-
' vit, verus, Philosophus est amator Dei. Again,
' He owns those Philosophers as coming
nearest to the truth of Christianity, who think

Cap. 9. thus of God, 'Quod & rerum
' Creatarum sit effector, & lu-

‘men cognoscendarum, & Bonum agenda-
rum, quod ab illo, nobis sit & Principium Na-
turæ, & Veritas Doctrinæ, & Fœlicitas Vitæ.

Whom he afterwards calls,

Ibid.

‘Principium nostrum, lumen

‘nostrum, Bonum nostrum. *A-*

gain, Hæc itaq; Causa est cur

‘istos cæteris præferamus, quia cum alii Philo-
sophi ingenia sua studiaq; contrivcrint in re-

‘quirendis rerum Causis, & quinam esset Mo-
dus discendi atq; vivendi, isti Deo Cognito

‘repererunt ubi esset Causa constitutæ univer-
sitatis, & Lux percipiendæ veritatis, & fons

‘bibendæ Fœlicitatis, Sive ergo isti Platonici,
‘sive quincunq; alii quarumlibet gentium Phi-

‘losophi de Deo ista sentiunt, *Again*, Lib. 11. Cap. 10.

‘nobiscum sentiunt. *Again*, Lib. 11. Cap. 10.

‘Neq; enim multæ, sed una

‘Sapientia est, in qua sunt immensi quidam

‘atq; infiniti thesauri rerum intelligibilium, in

‘quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atq; incommu-
‘tabiles rationes rerum, etiam visibilium, qua-

‘per istam factæ sunt. *A-*

gain, Speaking of Angels, ‘Ab Lib. 16. Cap. 6.

‘iis consulitur incommutabi-

‘lis veritas, tanquam lex æterna in illa eorum

‘Curia Superna; neq; enim sibi ipsi sunt veritas,

‘sed creatricis participes veritatis. Ad illam

‘moventur tanquam ad fontem vitæ, ut quod

‘non habent ex seipsis, capiant ex ipsa.

*De util. Cred. C. 22. Again, In his Book de
utilitate Credendi, ' Deus est
veritas nec ullo pacto sapiens
quisquam est, si non veritatem mente contin-
gat.*

*Contra Epist. Ma- 23. Again, In his Book Con-
nicb. Cap. 36. tra Epistolam Manichæi, ' Per
' homines commemoratione ali-
'qua signis verborum fieri potest, Docet autem
'unus verus Magister, ipsa incorruptibilis ve-
'ritas, solus Magister interior, qui etiam jam
'exterior factus est, ut nos ab exterioribus ad
'interiora revocaret.*

*De Pec. Merit. & 24. Again, In his Book de
Remis. Lib. i. Cap. Peccatorum Meritis & Remissione,
25. ' Illud quod in Evangelio posi-
'tum est, erat lumen verum
'quod illuminat omnem hominem, &c. ideo
'dictum est quia nullus hominum illuminatur
'nisi illo lumine veritatis quod Deus est, ne
'quisquam putaret ab eo se illuminari a quo
'aliquid audit ut discat, non dico si quenquam
'magnum hominem, sed nec Angelum ei con-
'tingat habere Doctorem.*

*25. Again, In his Commentaries upon the
Psalms. ' Lumen illud unde ani-
In Psal. 7. ' mæ tanquam lucernæ accen-
'duntur, non alieno, sed proprio splendore præ-
In Psal. 8. ' fulget, quod est ipsa veritas.
' Again, Filius Dei virtus & sa-
'pientia Dei est, qua illustratur omnis quisquis
'veritate*

' veritate sapiens efficitur. *Again*, ' *Est noster sol justitiae* *In Psal. 25.*
 ' veritas Christus, non iste sol qui adoratur à
 ' Paganis & Manichæis, &c. Sed ille alias, cuius
 ' veritate humana natura illustratur, ad quem
 ' gaudent Angeli. *Again*, Upon those words,
Send forth thy Light and thy Truth *In Psal. 42.*
 says he, *Ipse est lux tua & veritas tua.* Hæc nomina duo, res una.
 ' Quid enim aliud lux Dei nisi veritas Dei? Aut
 ' quid veritas Dei nisi lux Dei? Et hoc utrumq;
 ' unus Christus. *Ego sum lux mundi, &c.* Ego
 ' sum via, veritas & vita. *Again*, *In Psal. 57.*
 ' *Videte quid est, Fratres,*
 ' in anima humana. Non habet ex se lumen,
 ' non habet ex se vires. Totum autem quod
 ' pulchrum est in anima, virtus & sapientia est.
 ' Sed nec sapit sibi, nec valet sibi, nec ipsa sibi
 ' lux est, nec ipsa sibi virtus est, est quædam
 ' Origo fonsq; virtutis, est quædam radix sapi-
 ' entiæ, est quædam ut ita dicam regio incommu-
 ' tabilis veritatis. Ab hac anima recedens tene-
 ' bratur accedens illuminatur. *Accedite ad*
 ' eum & illuminamini. *Again*, *In Psal. 118.*
 ' Ut scirent se tanquam lucer-
 ' nas de illo lumine quod immutabiliter lucet,
 ' accensas. Nulla quippe Creatura, quamvis
 ' rationalis & intellectualis, a se ipsa illumina-
 ' tur, sed participatione Sempiternæ veritatis
 ' accenditur. *Again*, ' *Semper foras exis, intro redire de- trectas.* Qui enim te docet intus est. *In Psal. 139.*
 26. *Again*,

*Expos. in Evan.
Joan.*

Tract. 13.

26. Again, In his Exposition on St. John's Gospel. Having occasion to mention those words of the Psalmist, *With thee is the well of life, in thy light we shall see light*; says he, 'In terra aliud est fons, aliud lumen. Sitiens quæris fontem, & ut pervenias ad fontem, quæris lucem. Fons ille ipsa est lux. Sitientibus fons est,

Tract. 15.

'cæco lux est. Again, Hoc ipsum animæ quod Intellectus & Mens dicitur, illuminatur luce Superiore. Jam Superior illa lux, qua Mens humana illu-

Tract. 16.

'minatur Deus est. Again,

Tract. 19.

'Magistrum unum omnes ha-

'bemus, & in una Schola Condiscipuli sumus. Again, Speaking of those words, 'Accedite ad eum & illuminamini, says he, Si ergo accedendo illuminamini, & recedendo tenebramini, non erat

Tract. 20.

'in vobis lumen vestrum, sed

'in Deo vestro. Again, 'Habemus intus Magistrum Christum. Quicquid per aurem vestrum, & os meum capere non potueritis, in corde vestro ad eum convertimini, qui & me docet quod loquor, & vobis quemadmodum dignatur distribuit.

Tract. 23.

Again, 'Insinuavit nobis ani-

'mam humanam & mentem rationalem quæ inest homini, non inest Pecoræ, non vegetari, non beatificari, non illuminari, nisi ab ipsa Substantia Dei. Again,

upon

upon those words, ‘Ego sum lumen mundi,
 ‘qui sequitur me non ambulabit in tenebris,
 ‘sed habebit lumen vitæ, *says* Tract. 34.
he, ‘Non enim sufficit dicere,
 ‘qui me sequitur non ambulabit in tenebris, sed
 ‘habebit lumen; Addidit enim (*rather* etiam) vi-
 ‘tæ. Sicut ibi dictum est quoniam apud te fons
 ‘vitæ. Videte fratres mei quomodo verba domi-
 ‘ni cum illius Psalmi veritate concordent. Et
 ‘ibi lumen positum est cum fonte vitæ, & à do-
 ‘mino dictum est lumen vitæ. In ipsis autem
 ‘usibus Corporalibus aliud est lumen, aliud fons.
 ‘Fontem fauces quærunt, lumen oculi. Quan-
 ‘do sitimus quærimus fontem, quando in tene-
 ‘bris sumus quærimus lumen. Non est sic a-
 ‘pud Deum. Quod lumen est, hoc est fons.
 ‘Qui tibi lucet ut videas, ipse
 ‘tibi manat ut bibas. *Again*, Tract. 54.
 ‘Non sic loquitur veritas, intelligentibus men-
 ‘tibus intus loquitur; sine sono instruit, intelli-
 ‘gibili luce perfundit.

27. *Again*, In his Expositi- Expos. in Epist. 1.
on on the first Epistle of St. St. John. Tract. 3.

‘Sonus verborum no-
 ‘strorum aures percutit, magister intus est. No-
 ‘lite putare quenquam hominem aliquid dicere
 ‘ab homine. Admonere possumus per Strep-
 ‘tum vocis nostræ; si non sit intus qui doceat,
 ‘inanis fit strepitus noster. Adeo fratres vultis
 ‘nosse? Nunquid non Sermonem istum omnes
 ‘audistis? Quam multi hinc indocti exituri
 ‘sunt? Quantum ad me pertinet, omnibus lo-
 ‘cutus sum. Sed quibus unctio illa intus non
 ‘loquitur,

‘ loquitur, quos Spiritus Sanctus non docet, in-
 ‘ docti redeunt. Magisteria forinsecus adjuto-
 ‘ ria quædam sunt, & admonitiones. Cathe-
 ‘ dram in cœlo habet qui corda docet.

28. *Again*, In his Volume of

De Verbis Dom. Sermo. 8.

Sermons.

‘ Dic quia tu tibi
 ‘ lumen non es. Ut multum,
 ‘ oculus es, lumen non es. Dic, à te tibi lumen
 ‘ non esse, & clama quod Scriptum est, tu illu-

De Verbis Apost. Sermo 30.

‘ minabis lucernam meam Do-

‘ mine, &c. *Again*, Non sum

‘ mihi ipse lumen, nam si essem
 ‘ nunquam errasse. *Again*, Lumen tibi esse,
 ‘ non potes, non potes, non potes. *Again*, Illu-
 ‘ minandi sumus, lumen non sumus. *Again*,
 ‘ Vis nosse quid es? Tenebræ. *Again*, Audies
 ‘ ab Apostolo, suistis aliquando tenebræ, nunc
 ‘ autem lux. Sed addit lux. Sed ubi? in Do-
 ‘ mino. Ergo tenebræ in te, lux in Domino,
 ‘ quia non tibi potes lucere, accedendo illumi-
 ‘ naris, recedendo tenebraris, quia non tibi lu-

De Diversis Ser- 9.

‘ men tu ipse es, aliunde illu-

‘ minaris. *Again*, Nunquid

‘ angelis codices sunt necessarii,
 ‘ &c. Absit videndo legunt. Vident enim ip-
 ‘ sam veritatem, & illo fonte satiantur, unde

De Diversis Sermo 40.

‘ nos irrogamur. *Again*, Su-

‘ periori loco propter præconi-
 ‘ um præsidemus, sed in una

‘ Schola Communem magistrum in cœlis habe-
 ‘ mus. *Again*, Conamini co-
 ‘ gitare fratres, lumen verita-
 ‘ tis,

‘ tis, lucem sapientiæ, quomodo ubiq; præsens
‘ est omnibus, &c.

29. There are a few more remarkable Pas-
sages, which because they happen'd to be o-
verlook'd in their proper places, I shall now
add here. ‘ *Errores & falsæ*

‘ *Opiniones vitam contaminant,* *Confes.* Lib. 4.
‘ *Cap. 15.*

‘ *si rationalis mens ipsa vitiosa*

‘ *est, qualis in me tunc erat nesciente alio lu-*

‘ *mine illam illustrandam esse, ut sit Particeps*

‘ *veritatis, quia non est ipsa Na-*

‘ *tura veritatis. Again, Do-*

‘ *cente te Magistro intimo in*

‘ *Schola Pectoris. Again, ‘ U-*

‘ *biq; veritas præsides omnibus*

‘ *consulentibus te simulq; respondes omnibus*

‘ *etiam diversa consulentibus, liquidè tu respon-*

‘ *des, sed non liquidè omnes*

‘ *audiunt. Again, Intus utiq; *Confes.* Lib. 11.
‘ *Cap. 3.**

‘ *mihi, intus in domicilio cogi-*

‘ *tationis, nec Hebræa, nec Græca, nec Latina,*

‘ *nec Barbara veritas, sine oris & linguæ Orga-*

‘ *nis, sine strepitu Syllabarum, diceret, verum*

‘ *dicit. Again, Quis docet *Cap. 8.**

‘ *nos nisi stabilis veritas? Quia*

‘ *& per creaturam mutabilem cum admonemur,*

‘ *ad veritatem stabilem duci-*

‘ *mur. Again, Nec enim al- *De Ordine. Lib. 1.*
‘ *tus Apollo est, qui in spelun-**

‘ *cis, in Montibus, in Nemoribus nidore thuris*

‘ *pecudumq; calamitate concitatus implet in-*

‘ *fanos, sed aliis profecto est, aliis ille altus*

N n 2 ‘ *veridicus,*

‘ veridicus, atq; ipsa (quid enim verbis am-
‘ am) veritas. Cujus vates sunt quicunq; pos-
‘ sunt esse sapientes. *Again*,
De Gen. ad litt. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. ‘ Principium creaturæ intel-
‘ lectualis est *Æterna sapientia*,
‘ quod Principium manens in se incommutabi-
‘ liter, nullo modo cessat occulta inspiratione
‘ vocationis loqui ei *Creaturæ*, cui Principium
‘ est, ut convertatur ad id ex quo est, quod ali-
‘ ter formata ac *Perfecta esse* non possit. Which
last excellent Words let me present to the En-
glish Reader, as *M. Malebranche* translates them.
The eternal Wisdom is the principle of all
Creatures capable of Intelligence. And this
Wisdom remaining always the same never cea-
ses to speak to its Creatures in the secret Recess
of their Reason, that they may turn towards
their Principle. Since there is nothing but the
view of that eternal Wisdom which gives Be-
ing to Spirits that can finish or accomplish
them, and give them the last Perfection where-
of they are capable.

30. If any shall think these Citations from
St. Austin long, they may make them as much
shorter as they please. For my own part I
could easily have stay'd with him longer, not
only because I like his Company, but because
he has abundance more to the like purpose. But
as I would not for my Readers sake go through
with him, so I could not without some de-
nial to my Subject as well as Humour, have
left him much sooner. And now I have, I
hope

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hope to be excused, if not thank'd, for the pains I have been at in making this *Collection*, which, tho' St. *Austin's* Works are common, yet, considering how large they are, and how they may be commonly read, I cannot but think to be of some value and consideration. And I do accordingly recommend it to be considered with as much Heed and Attention, as it is put together with Care and Fidelity. You see here how this great Doctor and Father of the Christian Church espouses the Nation we are upon, and expresses it with great variety, placing it in all its Lights, and that it may be the better seen in them, doing by it as the Masters of *Perspective* do by great Edifices, sometimes giving a view of one side, and sometimes of another, that so the whole Fa-brick may not fail one way or other to come under a distinct view. Some of his Expressions relate to the presence of the Eternal Reason to Mens Minds, some to the Union that the Soul has to the intelligible World. Some again to the impossibility of our being a Light to ourselves, some tend to shew that God only is our Light, Master and Teacher; and particularly the eternal Word or Wisdom of God. Some relate to the interiority of Truth, some to our consulting it, seeing it, and receiving Answers from it, as from a secret Oracle. Some to the Unity of Wisdom, and Community of Truth, and our participation of both Truth and Wisdom. Some to those

Laws of Order and Proportion, those Ideal Measures or Reasons, whereby we judge of the Beauty of things: And some again to our seeing in those very Ideal Reasons, whereby things were made. Some to the Community of Light that is between Angels and Men, nay, even between Men and God himself. Some to the Original which the Word of our Minds takes from the view which we have of the eternal Truth, employing the real Identity between our Word and the eternal Word, inasmuch as the eternal Word is the Object of our Thought. Some to the Divinity of Wisdom, and thence inferring that a true Philosopher or lover of Wisdom, is a lover of God. Some to the superiority of that which enlightens us, that it must be something better and more excellent than the Soul, and that That superiour Light is Divine. Some again to shew that the Object of our Knowledge and of our Happiness is the same; and that as we are not Beati-fy'd, so neither are we Inlightn'd but by the very Substance of God, with other things of like Nature, as the Reader may observe. In fine, here is such variety of Expression, and diversity of Posture, that there is hardly a *side* of our System but what is some way or other turn'd to our view: So that you have not only his *Authority*, but, as it were, his *Comment* and *Paraphrase*. And indeed I cannot but think it a little strange, that a thing so variously and so much inculcated as this is, should so far escape

scape the notice of *Learned Men*, as this seems to have done. And that Men who deal much in Antiquity, and that appear considerable for their Acquaintance with Ecclesiastical Writers, should yet seem to startle at this Notion as a strange singular Amusement. But if so, at what rate do these Men read the *Fathers*? For whatever becomes of the *Reason* of this Notion (whereof some other Men may perhaps be as competent Judges as themselves) yet sure it cannot be pretended to be altogether destitute of *Authority*, or to be so *Novel*, as by their surprize at it, and prejudice against it, they seem to imply. You see that here the Conclusion, or if you will, the *Hypothesis* of this Theory (for I propose it for no more) is in great measure St. *Austin's*, and that we have done little more (I mean as to what concerns our Understanding by the *Divine Ideas*) than to find out Premises for his Conclusion, to resolve it into Principles, dispose it into a right Method, and reduce what lies loosely and at large in the *Sea* of his Writings, into the order of a regular System. But as to the Substance of the thing, there he has been in great measure before-hand with us. And therefore, since what is here proposed to the view, and submitted to the Judgment of the Rational World, is in the main and fundamental Parts of it the express Doctrine of St. *Austin* (who by the way delivers himself much more positively in it than I do) I see no just Foundation for the prejudice

or imputation of Novelty or Singularity, nor should I reasonably expect it from those who pretend to be lovers of *Antiquity*. But if they be indeed so, they should, after all, consider that the most ancient thing is *Truth*, which is always old let it be born into the World when it will, and that if the Proposition of this Theory were never so Novel as to humane Accounts, or with respect to the time of its appearance among Men ; yet this, as every Body knows, is no just Objection in things of a Rational and Philosophical Nature (wherein, as liberty of Philosophizing is indulged, so new discoveries are allowed to be continually made) whatever force it may have in matters of Faith, and that depend upon Divine Revelation. But now this Theory is of as Rational a Nature as any thing that can come well under humane Consideration, and accordingly is to stand or fall purely by Rational Measures : So that indeed I need not to have produced so much Authority for it, were it not out of compliance with the Infirmity of some Men (I beg their pardon for so calling it) who have a natural Prejudice against whatever wants it, tho' otherwise never so rational in itself ; and without to let them see, that, if they please, after all, to think me in an *Extravagance*, I am neither alone in it, nor with ordinary Company.

31. I know no ill Consequence that can be fairly drawn from this Hypothesis rightly understood, so that if it should appear to be an Error,

ror, it would however, I think, be a very harmless one. But I know several good ones, and such as are of the most important Moment. For tho' our System be in itself purely Philosophical, and so has a right to the usual Liberties and Privileges that belong to Matters of that Nature, yet there are some great things of near Concernment to Religion and Morality that depend upon it, as I shall now briefly remark in a few concluding Reflections, which perhaps to those that duly consider them, may have the force of so many *Arguments*.

32. In the first place, if our Hypothesis be true, and the account here given of Humane Understanding right, then it plainly and necessarily follows, that there is a God. I do not say that the Hypothesis itself directly proves it (tho' in some parts of it we have done that too) no, it rather supposes it. But this I say, that if this Hypothesis concerning the manner of our Understanding be true, it clearly and immediately follows that there must needs be a God, and consequently all those rational Considerations which have been offered towards the shewing it to be true, are in effect so many Arguments for that which is the Foundation of all Religion, the Being of a God. It is, I confess, no small Prejudice with me against the other Accounts of Humane Understanding, that they are all of them (except one) consistent with *Atheism*.

Religious and
Moral Inferences
from the foregoing
Principles.

Atheism. The Fool that says in his Heart there is no God, may safely take up with them, and if he be not too much a Fool, may, perhaps, find something in some of them that may be for his purpose, and serve to confirm, or at least to humour him in his Opinion, or rather his Wish. But now this Hypothesis is plain Antipodes to it, and such as no Atheist can hold without a manifest Contradiction, since 'tis by the Union we have with God and his Divine Ideas that we are here supposed capable of Thought and Understanding. From every Act of which we may as well conclude the Divine Existence as our own, it being as plain a Consequence upon this Hypothesis, *I think, therefore, God is; as, I think, therefore I am.*

33. And as this Hypothesis stands in a Diametrical opposition to *Atheism*, so also is it as direct against *Arianism*, as implying the co-essentiality and consubstantiality of the Divine Word with God the Father, since the eternal Word and Wisdom of God is here supposed to be the great Luminary of the whole intellectual World, the sovereign and universal Reason, whereof all Spirits participate, and by participation of whole Ideal Light they become Rational or Intelligent, capable of Thought and Understanding, being only *Eyes* to themselves, as St. *Austin* expresses it, but not *Light*. God only, according to this Hypothesis, is that, and therefore since the Word is here supposed to

to illuminate us, by his Ideas, and by his eternal Truths, it follows, that according to the Principles of this Theory, the Word must be of the very same Essence and Nature with God the Father; and tho' the Person of the one be not the same with the Person of the other, yet that the God-head of the Father and of the Son (as 'tis expressed in the *Athanasian Creed*) is all one, the Glory equal, and the Majesty co-eternal. Besides, it is further to be considered, that as our Ideas are supposed not to be created, so the *Truth*, which we contemplate according to this Hypothesis, is Necessary, Eternal, and Immutable, and consequently not the Creature or Effect of God, and consequently of the same Divine Nature with him. And then since, according to this Hypothesis again, the *Word* is supposed to be this *Truth*, according to what he says also of himself, *I am the way, the truth, and the life*; as also in his Prayer, *Sanctifie them through (or in) thy truth, thy word is truth* ἡ λόγος ἡ ὁρά τὸν ἀληθεῖαν ὁρά (which is not so reasonable to understand of the written Word, as of the personal Word, the Word that St. John speaks of when he says, *In the beginning was the word*, &c. And so St. Austin understands it, *Quid ergo: Sancti-*

fica eos in Veritate, nisi Sancti- Expos. in Evan.

fica eos in me? Et hoc a- Joan. Tract. 103.

pertius insinuare non desinit: Sermo inquit

tuus veritas est, Quid aliud dixit, quam ego veritas

‘veritas sum? Græcum quippe Evangelium
λόγος habet, quod etiam ibi legitur, ubi dictum
est, in Principio erat verbum, &c.) I say,
since the *Word* is here supposed to be that very
Necessary, Eternal and Immutable Truth, it
hence again follows, that the Word is truly
and essentially Divine, and that it was not only
in the beginning with God, but also was God,
as the sacred Evangelist speaks. Indeed as for
those that suppose that Truth is not Necessary
and immutable in itself, and by its own Na-
ture, but made so by the positive Constitution
or Legislation of God; and so, tho' Hypothet-
ically Necessary, is yet absolutely and simply
Contingent; and tho' perhaps the first of the
Creatures, yet suppose it to be really as much
a Creature as any of the rest, made by the
free and arbitrary Will of God, and not in-
gender'd of his Substance by a necessary Ema-
nation from his Being; I say, they that con-
ceive thus of Truth, besides their undermining
and overthrowing the Foundations of Science
and Morality (for if Truth be a positive thing,
then all is overturn'd) they do also in effect,
tho' I hope not apprehensive of that conse-
quence, spoil and divest the *Word* of his Di-
vinity, and that because the *Word* being really
the same with Truth, must undergo the same
fate with it. But now this Divinity of the
Word, upon which the Truth of the *Christian*
Religion does as much depend, as the Truth of
Religion in general does upon the Being of
God,

God, is in our Theory very safely and securely lodged. So that 'tis as impossible for any Man that holds this Hypothesis to be an *Arian*, as to be an *Athiest*.

34. But then again upon the Supposition of this Theory (which methinks should be another advantage to it) we are placed in the greatest and most immediate dependence upon God. If the premised Account of the manner of our Understanding be true, the dependence that we and all other intelligent Beings have upon God, will be found to be as great as a Creature can well be conceiv'd to have upon his Creator, and that it makes us so very dependent upon him, seems to me a strong Presumption that it is true. For as 'tis Metaphysically certain that we depend upon God vastly more than Men, even amongst the Learned, generally imagine, or are willing to believe: So 'tis evident that our dependence upon God has a great influence upon Religion, as being the Ground and Foundation of some of the principal and most weighty Duties of it, which we owe and justly pay to God, not so much perhaps for our first receiving our Being from him, as upon the account of that immediate and continual dependence which we have upon him. So that notwithstanding the bold and forward offers that have been made by some Men towards the setting up the Creature upon a bottom of its own, I cannot but look with a very jealous Eye upon all such Opinions as tend to lessen that essential

sential dependence which we have upon God; and *Darwindm* is to me a *Pelagian* in *Metaphysics*. But now it is far otherwise as to this Theory, wherein that Creaturely dependence upon God, which both Religion and the soundest Metaphysics require, is carried out to its full extent. God is here acknowledged as the only Object that is truly perfective of our Natures, and consequently as our *Light*, as well as our *Good*. We are here supposed to depend upon God, not only for our Being, but for the whole Perfection of it, whether it be in the way of *Idea*, or in the way of *Sentiment*. As we can feel nothing unless he Modifies us, so neither upon the Principles of this System, is it possible that we, or the brightest Intelligence he has created, should be able to know any thing, unless he enlighten us, and that not only Effectively, but Objectively. For in short, as we have our intellectual Faculties from him, so we are here supposed to have our Ideas in him, without which our intellectual Faculties would be as Eyes without Light, and we should be able to see nothing tho' we were all *Mind*. So that in this way of conceiving things, we depend as much upon God for our *Understanding*, as the greatest *Anti-pelagian* could suppose us to do as to our *Will*, as being no more able to think or understand without the Divine *Light*, than we are to Will or Act what is Good without the Divine *Grace*.

35. Again, upon this Hypothesis we are under peculiar engagements of Love and Gratitude towards God, whom we are to regard, not only as our Chief, but as our only Good, the good of our Understandings, as well as the good of our Wills, and to Bless, Thank and Adore him, not only for that rational Nature, and those intellectual Faculties which he has given us, but also for the immediate Illumination of that Nature, and for being himself the luminous and excellent Object of those Faculties. Had God only been the cause of our Pleasure, and something else been the light of our Minds, as 'tis not easie to conceive how God could be said to have made us intirely for himself; so neither is it that he should be so completely our *good*, as he is now: Nor consequently how we could reasonably love him so intirely as now. For still that something else would have a fair pretence to put in for a part in our affectionate and grateful Acknowledgements, since whatever is the Light of our Understandings, is so far perfective of our rational Nature. For the prevention of which competition it appears, by the way, very reasonable that Sentiment and Idea should in this respect also go together, and that the same Divine Being that is the cause of our Pleasure, should also be the Fountain of our Light, that so our whole intellectual Good may concenter in God, as our only perfective and beautifying Object. And so, according to this

this Hypothesis, it is. All our fresh Springs are here supposed to be in him, the Well of *Truth* as well as the Well of *Life*, and God that causes our Sentiments, is here also supposed to furnish us with Ideas, nay, himself to be our intelligible Light. He is therefore now the intire good of our Souls, and consequently the intire Object of our Affection, and there now appears a particular and very emphatical Reason why we should love him with our whole *Mind*, as well as with our *Heart*, *Soul* and *Strength*. In short, this Hypothesis does not send us one way for the furniture of our Knowledge, and another way for the cause of our Sentiments, but he that causes the one, is here supposed to be the Object of the other, and so all Competitions are removed, and God is intirely placed upon the Throne of the Heart: Where let all the intellectual World Love, Bless, Adore and Praise him, for ever and ever, *Amen.*

I.

Sing, then ye bles'd Attendants on his Throne,
Hymns as immortal as your Joys above ;
The Fountain of your Bliss and Knowledge own,
And as you shine with Light, so burn with Love.

II.

Praise the great Author of your brighter Day,
To us below a Star, to you a Sun :
With never silent Harps this Tribute pay,
And Hallelujahs that are still begun.

III.

You see the rising Springs of Life and Light,
Which with a double Tide your Breasts o'erflow,
O praise the beatifick Object of your Sight,
Whose good's your Life, and by whose Light you know.

IV.

You need not fear the exhausting of your Lays,
While you in Song exalt your Heavenly King,
He has a boundless Theme to employ your praise,
As you a whole Eternity to Sing.

O o

The

The *Pagans* that Worshipped the *Sun*, did it, I presume, for his *Light*, as well as for his *Heat*; and truly could I have the same Notion of the *Sun* that they had, and which most People now have, I should think it reasonable if not to Worship him, yet at least to pay him some very peculiar Acknowledgement; and were I to Worship any *Creature*, it would, I think, upon this Supposition, be the *Sun*, which is generally presumed to give us *Light* as well as *Heat*, and by that *Light* to discover to our view the Beauties of the sensible World, which accordingly we are said to see in, and by the *Light* of the *Sun*. But this, as currant as it passes, I take to be a very confuse way of talking, and such as proceeds wholly upon the prejudice of Sense, as most common forms of Expression do. 'Tis false in both the Parts of it; for the *Sun* neither gives us *Light*, nor does *Light* properly discover any Objects to us: For *Light*, that is, that *Light* whereof we are inwardly conscious when the *Sun* Shines, as we say, is a *Sentiment* of our *Souls* (as much as a *Taste* or a *Smell*) upon which the *Sun* has no *Power*. Nor can this *Light*, as being a *Sentiment*, shew or discover any *Object* to us. For 'tis not *Sentiment*, but *Idea*, that is representative of *Objects*. 'Tis not to be hop'd, that *Philosophy* should ever prevail against the Corruptions of *Prejudice* and *Custom*; but if we will speak of things rather as they are, than as they seem, I think

we

we must say, that the material Light of the Sun, or that subtile Matter that issues from it (which is the only Light that the Sun can be truly said to give) striking upon our Eyes, upon this luminous Impression a Sentiment of Light follows, and upon that Sentiment an Idea of Body. And this makes us imagine that 'tis the *Light* that discovers the Body to us, makes it *visible*, as we say, and that we see the Body in, or by the Light of the Sun. And so we do indeed in a large and improper Sense: We see Body inasmuch as we see the Idea which represents it (for properly speaking we do not see Body at all) and we may be said in some sense to see by the Light, inasmuch as the impression of the material Light with that Sentiment of Light which follows upon it, is the occasion of our having that Idea. But neither does the Sun give us that Sentiment, nor does the material Light, or that Sentiment of Light which we feel within our selves, shew or discover to us the Body which we are said to see. No, 'tis the *Idea* only which does that, and 'tis the Idea only which we properly see, and whereby we see, that is, as by a proper *medium*, the Light, whether you take it for the material Light of the Sun, or for the Sentiment of Light, contributing no otherwise to our seeing Bodies, than as they may be occasions of our having those Ideas which represent them to our Minds. I say *Minds*; for as 'tis the Idea

only that is properly seen, and not the Body; so 'tis the Mind only that sees, and not the Eye, Seeing being indeed a sort of Thinking, and terminating immediately upon Idea, as all other Thought does, and differing no otherwise from it than as to the manner of our having that Idea, which I need not further explain. I know how hard it is to persuade People out of the prejudices of Sense, improved by Custom and Education, and confirmed by a certain *Philosophy*, which very much favours and indulges them, and we are forced sometimes to comply with them in the received forms of speaking; but however we may talk, let any one that can abstract from these Prejudices employ his Thoughts distinctly about this Matter, and *conceive* any otherwise of it if he can. We do not then truly see by the Light of the Sun, any more than we are warm'd by his Heat, but we see by an *intelligible* Light. For we see by Idea, and since, according to the Principles of this Theory, that Idea is in God, it hence follows, that God is truly all that to us which the Heathens of Old, and almost all People now vainly imagine of the Sun, that he is indeed our Light, the Light of our Minds, the *true* Light, as the Evangelist says, or our intelligible Light, as

Soliloq. Lib. 1. Cap. 1. St. Austin calls him. 'Deus
' Intelligibilis lux, in quo, &
' a quo, & per quem intelligi-
' biliter

‘bilater lucent, quæ intelligibiliter lucent omnia, and therefore ought to have the highest Love, and the lowest and most prostrate veneration of all Spirits, as the true Sun of the intellectual World, the bright and inlighning Object of their Understandings. And therefore well might the Seraphick Father go on, after he had laid down this with some other Principles, to this Act of Adoration, ‘Exaudi, Deus meus, Salus mea, Lux mea, Vita mea.

36. Furthermore, if the Divine Ideas are the Ideas whereby we Think and Understand, as by the whole Tenor of this Theory, there appears great Reason to believe, then it will hence follow again, that the Divine Word or Wisdom in which those Ideas are, is our only true Teacher and Master that inlighens our Understandings, and whom consequently we are to consult by all inward Application and Attention for the knowledge of those Truths which depend upon those Ideas. And that *Words*, whether *Spoken* or *Written*, instruct us no otherwise than occasionally, that is, no further than as they serve as signs to admonish us to convert our Minds to him who is the true intelligible Light of them. According to what St. *Austin* has more largely deduced to this purpose in his excellent Book *De Magistro*, which is a designed Prosecution and Improvement of this very Notion. Men may speak to the Ear, but he has his Chair in

Heaven that teaches the Heart. *Cathedram in caelo habet qui corda docet.* It is he that teaches Man Knowledge, that gives Understanding to the Simple, and that opens the Eyes of the Blind: On him therefore we should fix our Eyes for Spiritual and Intellectual Light, and to him we should humbly and devoutly apply our selves for Instruction in the words of *Job*, *That which I see not teach thou me*, Job 34. 32.

And as a further improvement of this (to remark something upon this occasion that relates to *Learning and Study*) we may hence fairly collect, that since we understand by the Divine Ideas, it is to *them* that the Bent and Application of our Minds ought to be directed and addressed (for which way should we turn our Eyes but whence our Light comes) and that *Books* ought to be read and studied no further than as they serve as Means or Occasions to suggest to our Thoughts, or excite in our Minds such Ideas. But 'tis the Ideas themselves, and those Truths which result from them, which are the proper Subjects of Study and Contemplation, since they are the things which we immediately perceive, and which by the Perception of them, render us truly Wise and Knowing: For so much we know (after all our poring in Books) and no more, as we perceive of Ideas and their Relations, and 'tis to be supposed that we Study that we may know; and therefore methinks those Ideas which

which are the immediate Objects of our Knowledge, should be also the proper Subjects of our Study. And if this reflects upon the common Practice of that Exercise, how shall we help it? Men have a wrong Notion of Learning, and that leads to a wrong Application of Study. There is a certain Person that has written a profound Treatise (too profound indeed for me, for I understand not much of it) concerning true and false Learning, *De eruditione solida, Superficiaria, & Falsa.* But I think there is no great need of being so very Elaborate upon a thing of an obvious Consideration. Learning, according to the clearest Notion I have of it, is, in short, neither more nor less in general, than *Acquired Knowledge*: And true Knowledge is the knowledge of *Things*. And so it was accounted in the first and best Ages of the World. This was the Wisdom of *Adam* in Paradise; and this was the Wisdom of *Solomon*, that which he was possessed of, and that which he prayed for. And the Wisdom of the Heathen Philosophers (such as it was) not to say also the Fathers of the Church, was chiefly of this kind. Those venerable Ancients, upon whose *Writings* some now so value themselves, were themselves chiefly considerable for the knowledge of *Things*. But now the Tables are turned. Learning is now changed from the knowledge of *Things* to the knowledge of *Books*. And

accordingly instead of studying *Things*, Men study *Books*, and those not always the best neither, nor in the best Order; and that Study which was formerly, and is truly the proper Exercise of the Mind, is now become the labour of the Eye and of the Hand, a mere *manual Servility*. Instead of the Sciences, those necessary and immutable Truths which are the Fettival Provision wherewith Wisdom spreads her Table, and which are the contemplation of Angels: Men now study one another, and read not so much for intellectual Light as for reading's sake, using Books as some do the Languages wherein they are written, more as an *End* than as a *Means* (whereby the Progress that might be made in the knowledge of *Things* is very much retarded) and so measure their Learning, not by the justness and exactness of their Understandings, and the clearnes of their Thoughts and Conceptions of *Things*, but by the number and variety of Books which they have gone over, and he is esteemed the most Learned Man, not that has the clearest and most rational Head, but that has the biggest *Common-place*. But after all, it is not what I Read, but what I Know of the Nature of things that makes me Wise, and if I can be as Wise by reading a few Books, as you are by reading a great many, or by reading no Books at all, only by my own private Thoughts and Reflections,

by

by the mere Contemplation of Ideal Truth. ---Ay, but if Men should thus betake themselves to the thinking and contemplative Way, what will become of *Old Learning*? I am sorry, and a great unhappiness indeed it is, that any thing should be called *Old Learning*, that will not bear the test of Thinking. But if by *Old Learning* they mean the Knowledge of *Truth* (as indeed I know no other Learning, whether New or Old) they need not fear, there is no such great Danger to be apprehended. Truth is a thing of a fixed, settled and immoveable Nature, that will always remain, the same Yesterday, to Day, and for Ever. Nor will Thinking be found to be any Enemy to it. I wish I could say the same of that unceasant, insatiable, promiscuous, disorderly and injudicious Course of Reading that some Men lay out their time in, to the Corruption rather than the Improvement of their natural Senses. 'Tis plain then, that they who shall talk after this manner, do confine what they call *Old Learning* to *Books*. But I would fain know what those Books were written for? Certainly those Books were written for the knowledge of *Truth*, or at least should be so. And why then should our Learning be placed in the knowledge of those Books? Or if they will needs place Learning in the knowledge of *Books*, instead of *Things*, why must it needs be in *old Books*? But after all, Books whether

ther New or Old, do not enlighten us; no, not so much as for the seeing of *themselves*. they are our Ideas only that do that, as being the immediate Objects of the Mind, and therefore 'tis to the consideration of *them*, and those Truths which result from them, that we are directly and finally to apply our Studies, and to Books or Men (which are as *living Books*) no farther than as they may serve as occasions to present such Ideas, or Ideal Truths to our intellectual view. But in what Order and Method this is to be done, I leave to those who have professedly undertaken to consider of the proper method of Study, thinking it sufficient for my present Purpose, as well as mean Abilities, to assign and point out the true and proper *Object* of it.

Only by my Reader's good leave I shall adventure upon this occasion to commend to him this further Remark, that there are three things in *Study*, which by him that would undertake to treat justly and fully of it (which neither my Leisure nor my Ability sufficiently qualifies me for) are, as I think, distinctly to be considered. First there is the *Object* of Study. *Secondly*, There is the method of Study; and there is lastly the manner of Study. By the *Object* of Study, I mean those things to which the Application of the Mind is to be determin'd, which, as we have shewn, are Ideas and Ideal Truths. By the *Method* of Study, I mean that Order of Priority

Priority or Posteriority, according to which this Application is to be made, and these things are to be considered and made the Subjects of our Contemplation, which in general ought to be according to the natural Order of Dependency which the things have among themselves ; but what that is I pretend not to define. By the *Manner* of Study here as a distinct Head of Division from the rest, I understand those Means and Ways which are to be used in this Application : Which in general are these two, *Reading* (under which I comprehend also Conversation with the Learned, there being a reading of Men as well as of Books) and *Thinking*, or private Meditation; But chiefly the latter of these: For since, according to the Principles of this Theory, Ideas and Ideal Truths (the true Objects of our Study) are within our selves, by reason of that Union which we naturally have with the Divine Word or Wisdom, the universal Reason of all Spirits ; it follows that the most direct and natural Way for the discovery of Truth, is, instead of going abroad for Intelligence, to retire into our selves, and there with humble and silent Attention, both to consult and receive the Answers of interior Truth, even of that Divine Master which teaches in the School of the Breast. According to that Admonition of St. Austin, who advises that we should not go abroad, but rather enter into our selves

selves, and that for this very reason, because Truth has her Habitation in the inner Man.
Nolle foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homini habitat veritas.

37. Many are the useful Inferences that might be offer'd to Consideration from this fruitful Principle; but I begin to grow weary, and so perhaps does my Reader too. But let us advance one step further, and then we will sit down. Be it then in the last place observ'd, that this Hypothesis lays the Foundation of *Humility*, which itself is the Foundation of all practical Religion, as low as is possible, and makes Pride appear to be the most unreasonable, I was about to say, the most *unphilosophical* Sin in the World; especially that Pride which we are naturally most subject to, and which upon some Hypothesis (that particularly which supposes our Ideas to be of our own creating, or to be the *Modalities* or *Perfections* of our own Souls) there is no inconsiderable Colour and Pretence for, and which perhaps was the Pride of Angels, and which so soon chang'd them into Devils; I mean the Pride of our Knowledge and Understanding. For since, according to the Principles of this System, we are supposed to be capable of Thinking by the Union which we have of the eternal *Ward*, to become rational and intelligent Creatures, by participation of the universal Reason, and actually to understand by the Divine Ideas, that is, in one

re word, to be all Darkness in our selves, and *Light* only in the *Lord*: To be proud of our Knowledge upon these Principles, is to be proud that we depend upon God, which is indeed a proper Argument for Humility, and the best that I know of, but it must be a strange Chymistry of corrupt Nature that shall extract Pride out of it. Indeed the Doctrine of Divine Grace, as 'tis managed by St. *Austin* against the *Pelagian* Heresie is not a greater mortifier and subduer of Pride than this is. That indeed subdues the Pride of Man one way, and this another, but both effectually in their several kinds. For as no Man has reason to be proud of his *Goodness*, because the good that he does is owing both first and last to the influence of the Divine *Grace* preventing us, that we may have a good Will, and working with us when we have that good Will: so no Man has reason upon this Supposition to be in the least degree proud of his *Knowledge*, because, besides the Divine Concurrence with him in the *Act* of his Understanding (that which before we called *formal Thought*) which this Hypothesis allows in common with the rest, there is this peculiar in this way, that the Divine Ideas are here supposed to be the *Object* of it, and we to see and know so much, and no more, than God is pleased to discover to us of himself. So that every way Boasting is excluded, that no

Flesh

Flesh may glory in his Presence, but that he
Eccles. Chap. 1. v. 1. & 5. that Glories should Glory in
the Lord, since the Word of
God most high is the Fountain
of Wisdom, and all Wisdom cometh from the
Lord, and is with him for ever: To whom, for
all the Communications of his Grace and Truth,
be universal and everlasting Glory and Thanks-
giving. *Amen.*

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